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AMERICAN SOCIETY

by

DON MARTINDALE

*Professor of Sociology
University of Minnesota*



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For
Elio D. and Marjorie Monachesi

PREFACE

The dramatic event in twentieth century America, overshadowing all else, even two world wars and a major depression, is the emergence of the United States as a mass society. There are few students of American society who do not agree with this; they are also almost unanimous in viewing this with alarm. The mass society has been identified by its critics with such things as depersonalization, the mechanization of social relations, and bureaucratization; it is felt to be the enemy of personality, individuality, and privacy; in fact, nearly all the values that Americans have held most dear. Moreover, as if to terrify themselves the more, many of the persons who view America as a mass society have been equally convinced that it is similar in this with Soviet Russia. They presumably anticipate a political regimentation to complement the standardization of behavior through mass production and mass organization of taste through advertising which they believe already obtains.

There is no reason to doubt the description of America as a mass society, nor the judgment of its central importance. Nor is there reason to doubt the hypothesis that the mass society is carrying out a vast liquidation of traditional values. All evidence confirms the hypothesis that the rise of the mass society has been one of the fundamental facts of American experience matched only by the role of the frontier from the colonial period to the American Civil War and the massive immigrations from the 1830's until World War I.

However, there is something wrong with the purely negative estimations of the mass society, for no people voluntarily

gives up its fundamental values unless it receives what it considers even more fundamental in return. The decision to accept the mass society did not come all at once, but step by step. The mass society has grown because at each step in its development it has offered more than its rivals. The core of the mass society lies where its students have placed it: in the techniques of modern mass production and the mass advertising that continually organizes and adapts the taste of contemporary people to mass produced products. However, it is not true that it lies outside the community formations of modern man.

The roots of the mass society lie in the changing forms of the modern community. Traditional forms of the local community seem at present scheduled for destruction along with the values peculiar to them. The constructive community formation to which the mass society is appropriate is the nation. Accompanying the rise of the American nation is a basic reorganization of social and cultural institutions. On the outcome of these developments rests the fate of contemporary man.

In the completion of the present study I am indebted to Edith Martindale, who has read and corrected the manuscript in all its stages, and to Miss Louise P. Olsen, whose careful work and many helpful suggestions have greatly improved the text. For his insight and constructive criticisms of which I have freely availed myself I am deeply obligated to Wilbert Moore.

DON MARTINDALE

February, 1960

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PART I

AMERICA AS A MASS SOCIETY

Introduction to Part I

Mass society does not result from a plot by a little group of conspirators; it is not a consequence of the moral decay of contemporary man; it is not an institution—it is a way of life that has become increasingly peculiar to modern man. As a way in which modern men orient themselves toward nature and toward other men, the mass society represents a transformation in the structure of all major institutions.

One of the central properties of mass society is its transformation of the material foundation of social life by the employment of primarily inorganic forms of power and machines. The mass produced product is a symbol of the mass society, although it does not follow that the material foundation of the mass society is its sole cause. A transformed material base is a necessary but not sufficient condition of mass society.

Whenever one attends to the phenomena of mass production, he quickly discovers that waves of behavior consistent with it are arranged in concentric circles around it like the waves around the impact point of a stone tossed into a quiet pond. Activities consistent with mass production are diffused throughout modern life. Contemporary men encounter one another not only as producers and consumers but as sellers and buyers in a situation where the seller often must create appetites for mass produced items. Accompanying the standardization of material things is a standardization of taste.

Since judgments of taste are made by individuals when tastes are stereotyped, the structure of the personalities which sustain these judgments must also be standardized to some extent. Moreover, contemporary man tends to perceive the problem of personality in ways consistent with the mass society. Thus we are drawn step by step ever farther afield, until we see that the problems of the mass society are co-extensive with modern life.

THE MATERIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE MASS SOCIETY: PRODUCTION AND MARKETING

It has become conventional to describe the United States as a mass society. The United States is a mass society in the sense that it is one of the largest single blocks of the world's adult population engaged in the kinds of pursuits that tend to bring it together into large-scale collective activities. All of these properties are important for the contemporary concept of a mass society. Mere aggregations of population and population density are insufficient in themselves to constitute a mass society. There are areas of the world with aggregations of people and population densities greater than those in the United States, but they do not merit the term, for when distributed in tribal or peasant formations they may be divided into a multiplicity of small units which resist collective action. An urban industrial population, on the other hand, may be formed into a homogeneous unit.

MASS PRODUCTION

The single most quickly identifiable property of a mass society is, no doubt, the existence of mass production of the material things and services necessary for life. In his article on mass production for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Henry Ford defined mass production as the modern method of quantity production of standardized products. It is a special type of factory production in which the principles of power, accuracy, economy, system,

continuity, speed, and repetition are realized. Roger Burlingame provides a somewhat more abstract list of the principles of mass production: precision, standardization, interchangeability, synchronization, and continuity.¹

Mass production resting on the division of labor and massing of productive activity in the factory system, as Burlingame has noted, has ancient roots. Gravitation energy was converted into rotary motion in the water clock, the clepsydra. The use of gear ratio and the conversion of mechanical functions became familiar principles with the clock. Moreover, the transformation of random movement into closely synchronized behavior involved the practical possibility of transforming time into a commodity which could be bought and sold by the minute.

In Burlingame's opinion, the clock was a necessary but insufficient condition of large-scale production. A combination of inventions was necessary for the whole evolution of modern industrialism. The mechanical reproduction of thought, the printing of words on paper, is one of the major prototypes of the modern industrial process. To Usher, "the development of printing, more than any other single achievement, marks the dividing line between medieval and modern technology.

The entire achievement embodied in the printed book with illustrations presents a striking example of the multiplicity of individual acts of inventions that are requisite to bring about a new result. In its entirety, this accomplishment involves: the invention of paper and of inks made with an oil base; the development of engraving on wood and on metals; the development of type founding and metal reproductions of wood blocks; the development of the press and the special technique of press work involved in printing.²

Mass production, in considerable measure, achieved its efficiency by the transfer of skill from the artisan to the machines.³ In Adam Smith's time, great gains in productive efficiency had already been made by an extensive division of labor. He noted that by splitting up and simplifying manufacturing operations

¹ Henry Ford, "Mass Production," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 13th ed.; Roger Burlingame, *Backgrounds of Power* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), p. 15.

² A. P. Usher, *A History of Mechanical Inventions* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 239.

³ Burlingame, *op. cit.*, pp. 56 ff.

gains in production could be made even by the use of relatively unskilled workers. Smith illustrated this by the manufacture of pins in which the drawing out of the wire, straightening it, cutting it, pointing it, grinding the top, and making the head had been assigned as separate tasks to individual persons.⁴ Smith did not foresee the possibility that, when the division of labor had been carried far enough, a point would be reached at which the machine could be substituted for human labor. The division of labor had to precede any extensive development of machinery. Once manual labor had been organized into a series of simple operations, it was possible for machines to execute them with a kind of untiring uniformity unattainable by hand. The transfer of skill to machines takes the form of the introduction of wheels, gears, gigs, in rolling, slitting, clipping, cutting, pointing, and heading devices.

A further step toward mass production beyond the standardization of machine parts was the standardization of the entire machine. Various developments in England were inclining in this direction. In the United States the major step was taken by Eli Whitney, who had achieved fame for the invention of the cotton gin. However, he found his patent infringed upon. In despair of protecting his rights legally, he turned his attention to the problem of creating an elementary assembly line for building cotton gins, beating his competitors by out-producing them. He installed machines (tool guiding devices) in the course of his efforts. He came to the conclusion that accurate and durable mechanisms could be constructed in this manner. While unable to realize his dream of a mass produced cotton gin, Whitney learned a lesson of value.

It is hardly conceivable that Whitney could have envisioned the prospect of a mass production of army rifles without the experience with the cotton gin. Moreover, his fame as an inventor won him serious consideration from the government. In 1798 Whitney proposed to supply the United States Army with rifles at a price too low to be ignored. He contracted to deliver 10,000 smooth bore, muzzle loading, flintlock muskets in two lots, the first three months from the contract date. An advance of \$5,000

⁴ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (New York: Modern Library, 1937), pp. 4 ff.

was made to Whitney on signing the contract. Though he failed to meet the terms of the contract, it was an impressive day in December, 1800, when he took ten disassembled muskets to a meeting attended by the President and several cabinet members and small-arms experts. He invited members of the meeting to pick up at random barrels, triggers, sears, lock plates, etc., and assemble completed muskets.

The basis for accuracy of Whitney's system was the "jig," a master pattern which had been precisely measured, which determined where the machine would operate on a blank. Automatic stops interrupted the motion at the exact moment a certain dimension was attained. Fixtures held the piece of work in a rigid, identical position. Repetitive machines automatically duplicated an operation. Not only did this permit the production of parts with a minimum of skilled labor, but permitted a new kind of continuity. Rifle barrels could be bored, stocks carved, lock plates drilled, sears machined at the same time, and the products assembled continuously. No single machine needed to remain idle while other phases of the operation were being accomplished.

While interchangeability was providing a foundation for the factory system among the rifle manufacturers (to be fulfilled in the Colt, Pratt, and Whitney dynasties), continuous sequence was emerging in flour milling.⁵ Oliver Evans, in Maryland, introduced the automatic sequence which took wheat through all its processes from the grain to the flour sack, cutting labor in half and producing savings in one year of \$4,875.00, while increasing the value of the product by \$32,500.00.

In the early days of the nineteenth century, quantity production by the machine sequence of basic tools and supplies was well under way. Nail making by machine was brought about by 1811. By 1831 one Massachusetts concern was making axes at the rate of 60,000 a year. Wire was produced in quantity by 1832. Water was the chief source of power leading to the concentration by the 1830's of little industrial enterprises along the streams; spindle, loom, and nail factories, glass works, potteries, slitting and rolling mills came into being. By this time the penny press was estab-

⁵ C. A. Pillsbury, "American Flour," in C. M. Depew, *One Hundred Years of American Commerce*, 1895, I, 267; Burlingame, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

lished (the *Baltimore Sun* in 1830) for the mass production of printed material.

In the 1840's Cyrus McCormick began to mass-produce his reaper and introduced the policy of installment buying to market it. He sold it to the farmer on a token payment before harvest, waiting for the balance until the farmer had sold his grain. Later Isaac Singer applied the same principle to selling the sewing machine. McCormick also established the system of the traveling agent, so important to American standardization. The reaper clarified other implications of mass production: the reaper's productivity over sickle or scythe was more than ten times. Other agricultural machinery, such as the gang plow, seed drill, thresher, and mower, introduced at this time, represented equivalent savings.

The Civil War speeded the shift to mass production in many ways. It created a vast labor shortage requiring the change to mechanization wherever possible; simultaneously, it offered a vast market for standardized products. Labor-saving farm machinery released thousands of men from agricultural work. By 1863 the Springfield Armory alone was turning out 25,000 stands of small arms a month, and fifteen private armories produced 60,000. At the start of the war the shoe industry was still semi-domestic: leather was cut in a workshop, and the pieces were farmed out to scattered workers. There was reason to change all this; one contract in the Civil War called for 800,000 pairs of shoes. By the third year of the war the stitching machine patented by Lyman Blake had been put in operation, and one man was able to sew several hundred pairs of shoes a day at a rate 100 times faster than previously. By the end of the war machines were used to roll sole leather, split upper leather, stitch uppers and bind edges, sew uppers to the sole, and form and attach heels. The ready-made clothing industry was established in 1847 by German Jewish immigrants. By the time of the Civil War, mechanization had been introduced with typical savings and acceleration.

A new stage in the development of modern mass production was marked by the work of the primary initiator of scientific management in the United States, Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856-1915). As foreman at the Midvale Steel Company, Taylor defined

his task as getting output. He was determined to put the facilities of the shop to maximum use, and was shocked by the spectacle of a man doing less than his best. After quarreling with his men for two or three years, he resolved to acquire exact knowledge of the ingredients of a full day's work.⁶ Taylor went to work with a stop watch and measured the motion of both man and machine; he measured the time it took to get material and to bring it to the machine; the distance it had to be carried, the time required to turn and stoop, the rate at which the machine was run, the angle at which cutting tools were most efficient, and so on.

Every problem of the adaptation of men to machines was studied thoroughly. Taylor simplified and standardized tasks, cut the physical motion to a minimum, set production standards in terms of average productivity, established scientific standards for the determination of piece rates, and expanded the ratio of management and planning personnel in the industrial enterprise. He spent twenty-six years perfecting his system of scientific management, establishing scientific management as a distinct profession.

The synchronization of men and machines into one continuous operation appears in the assembly line. To be sure, it was not new; it was present in principle in the grain processing of Oliver Evans in 1783.⁷ In the 1870's, in the Cincinnati stockyards, hogs were mechanically caught, suspended, slaughtered, scraped, and cleaned in one series of operations from an endless conveyor moving overhead on a monorail. Henry Ford reported that the ideal of his assembly line was derived from the practice of the Chicago meat packers.⁸ These and other anticipations were raised in the Ford production line to a new intensity.

At the time the Ford Company began operations, the first moving assembly line was used in the production of the flywheel magneto. Originally this assembly had been a one man job; a workman turned out 35 to 40 completed assemblies in a 9-hour day. After the moving assembly line was placed in operation with 29 men, they began turning out 132 magneto assemblies per

⁶ Frank B. Copley, *Frederick Winslow Taylor* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1923), Vol. I, p. 228.

⁷ Siegfried Giedion, *Mechanization Takes Command* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 78.

⁸ Henry Ford and Samuel Crowther, *My Life and Work* (New York: Doubleday Pub. Co., 1923), p. 81.

hour, or 1,199 per 9-hour day, representing a one-third saving of time.

In 1913 moving assembly lines were installed for motor assembly, cutting the number of workers necessary to produce 1,000 motors in a 9-hour day from 1,100 to 472. Motor assembly was split into 84 operations. The idea of movement was soon extended to inventories as well as production. By the time the Ford Company became established at Dearborn on the River Rouge, a network of production, assembly, and transportation lines had developed that covered the country. By 1914, when the millionth car was produced, Ford had achieved a monopoly in the low cost field. Nevertheless, in the interests of mass sales, the costs continued to be cut from \$780 in 1910 to a low of \$290 in 1924.

Beyond the assembly line lies the continuous-flow chemical plant, such as the big semi-automatic systems of Union Carbide, Du Pont, and Allied Chemical. Automation on its present scale dates from 1942, when Standard Oil of New Jersey erected the oil industry's first giant fluid catalytic crackers. The continuous-flow principle has been growing in the chemical industry, where raw material (fluid or gas) continuously flows in one end, passing through intricate processes and spewing forth a 24-hour stream of products at the end. Plants of this sort may be run from a central control room staffed with a few men gazing at automatic-control instruments. High-speed electronic calculating machines, television, magnetic tape recorders achieve completely automatic production on the assembly line and even increasingly take over the routine tasks of business and office.

MASS MARKETING

Mass production or the quantity production of standardized items is not something that can occur by itself, leaving other activities of the society unchanged. Production had to leave the home for the factory. The worker followed it, and found his skills ingeniously transferred to the machine. The products of the machine then had to find their way to the consumer. Mass production presupposes mass consumption; in a sense the mass consumer was necessary before mass production could occur.

It is not without significance that the first clear cases of mass production of a contemporary type occurred in the United States

with respect to government orders of war materials. The war crisis of 1798 supplied the conditions for large orders of standardized items backed by capital. Similarly, the Civil War was an important factor in the extension of mass production into a number of areas. It provided the market for firearms and many other types of war materials. It brought about a revolution in several industries.

Once mass production was established as a going concern, it became a component in its own growth. For mass production to occur at all, an industry had to leave the home and the artisan's workshop and enter the factory. Considerable capital investment was necessary for the factory to realize its potential efficiencies. However, once the transfer to the factory had been made, two conditions obtained: (1) there was at least a market for the products of the factory by the factory workers themselves, and (2) once the factory had achieved its momentum it could produce items cheaper than the former artisan and even, at times, produce them at a higher standard quality. The very existence of the factory, therefore, tended to drive still other artisans and home producers out of business, creating still more new markets. This was possible only when the factory on the average produced a higher quality item cheaper than the hand producer could achieve.

Henry Ford's endeavors were based on the perception of these facts. To his mind, the success of factory production depended on its capacity to serve the consumer: to supply him with a higher quality item cheaper than he could obtain it outside the factory.⁹ He believed that machinery could execute any piece of work faster, cheaper, and with greater precision than human hands. The public would be served better by the machine product. On one occasion he urged that costs could be cut 50 per cent if production were increased 500 per cent. By decreasing costs, the number of people able to buy the product would increase. Ford's procedure was to decide in advance on his price, and then compel the engineers to design an automobile in terms of it.

Ford knew that the workers in the factory were a potential market for the items they mass produced. He announced a policy

⁹ For a perceptive review of Henry Ford's philosophy of industrial democracy, see Andre Siegfried, *American Mid-Century* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955), p. 160 ff.

favoring high wages, increasing the output of the worker as well as his purchasing power. When in 1914 the average daily wage at Detroit was two dollars, Ford raised it to five dollars; by 1920 wages had been raised to six dollars for an eight rather than a nine-hour day.

In the nature of the case, there were potential limits to the conquests that mass production could make in this direction. It was quite possible, on the one hand, for other manufacturers to adopt the same procedures that made Ford successful and which gave him, for a time, a monopoly in the low-priced car field. Moreover, it was possible to reach the normal limits of the market in which a competitive situation requiring an ever increasing volume of production could not operate. A transformation of the problems of mass marketing has been under way since 1920. The change-over from small-scale retailing has been traced in detail by Weiss.¹⁰

Weiss has argued that between 1920 and 1950 retailing has undergone a revolution, becoming big business. He feels that A & P and Sears, which do individual totals of business of \$2,500,000,000 annually, typify the change-over from a nation of small shopkeepers. Meanwhile, retailing has tended to become self-service as typified by the supermarket. Selling is increasingly by "sight and touch." The time-per-transaction of sales has been cut; the customer increasingly makes his buying decisions in split seconds. There has been a decline of specialty retailing; every major type of retailer tends toward a department store type of operation to such a degree that there is little to differentiate a large Woolworth or Grant store from a Sears or Ward unit, or a Penney or Gamble-Skogmo from a department store. It is increasingly difficult to differentiate a super drugstore from a supermarket, and large jewelry stores even carry items found in Woolworth's and Penney's. According to Weiss, retailing has become concentrated into a few strong hands. Around 400 giant retail associations control one-half of the total national volume in major merchandise categories; 100 huge retailers control one-third of the total volume in many basic merchandise categories.

¹⁰ E. B. Weiss, *Mass Marketing to the "400" Mass Retailers* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1950). The remainder of this section will primarily follow Weiss' discussion.

Advertising today, according to Weiss, must manufacture customers as efficiently as the factory produces merchandise if it is to keep step with mass production. There are around 1,500,000 retailers operating 1,700,000 retail units. Of these, 100,000 account for one half of the retail volume. Some 400 retail organizations, in turn, control 90 per cent of those 100,000 retail units. In 1939, for example, 54 per cent of all retail stores did less than \$10,000 business per store. Their total volume was \$3,900,000,000 or 9.1 per cent of the total retail sales for the year. In 1949 the ten largest retailers turned in an equivalent dollar volume. In 1948 fifteen large retail organizations did a reported business of \$12,500,000,000. They included A & P, Sears Roebuck, Montgomery Ward, Safeway Stores, J. C. Penney, Kroger, Woolworth, Allied Stores, American Stores, May Department Stores, First National Stores, Macy, Federated Department Stores, Gimbels, and Kresge. In the same year nine food chains reported \$6,100,000,000 in business: The major retail outlets for 80 per cent of our national advertisers are in the fields dominated by the 400 giant retailers.

The 400 largest retail organizations are taking over retailing in the merchandise lines in which national advertisers are most numerous. In 1948 they did around \$30,000,000,000 worth of business. One hundred of them did around \$20,000,000,000 worth of business in 40,000 store units averaging around \$75,000,000 for each store.

Mass retailing is transforming the process of mass advertising. The two main trends are a growing competition for public attention and a growth of self-service, self-selection, and robot retailing which requires more pre-selling. To build consumer demand today in a competitive advertising field requires a minimum annual expenditure of \$250,000. Around 400 manufacturers of consumer goods spend that much or more; some 1,000 advertisers in all fields invest around \$100,000 in national advertising. Weiss maintains that no more than 200 of those who produce retail merchandise can claim consumer demand, and at least 150 of these spend more than \$250,000 annually. Brands need pre-selling more than ever before, even as brand loyalty declines. Total expenditures on advertising, however, have declined proportionately.

A number of conditions structure the situation within which

the advertiser must operate. The number of literate persons ten years of age and over increased from around 40,000,000 in 1888 to over 113,000,000 in 1947. The number of publications received per literate person increased from 0.73 in 1888 to 3.51 in 1947. The average number of pages of advertising per monthly magazine also increased from 60 in 1888 to 208 in 1947. The average number of pages of advertising per weekly publication increased from 2.5 in 1888 to 135 in 1947. The number of homes with radios increased from a negligible figure in 1922 to 37,000,000 in 1948. The number of broadcasting stations increased from 30 in 1922 to 1,962 in 1948. There is a mounting din of advertising voices.

A most significant developments in retailing, to Weiss' way of thinking, are the growing similarity of the giant retailers and the disappearance of the specialty store. The mass retailers are engaged in a program of inventory diversification which makes them more similar by the day. Along with this, A & P typifies a trend toward the reduction of store units; it has reduced the number of stores from 15,000 to 5,000, with an enormous enlargement of each unit.

All major types of retailers employ the same principles of store fixtures and design. The supermarket is most imitated, inasmuch as it has made the greatest progress in reducing the time per sale, stimulating impulse sales through open display and the development of self service and self selection. Weiss maintains that the supermarket is hoping to operate with an average mark-up of twelve per cent—an objective only achievable by the supermarket techniques of visual selling.

Largely through the efforts of engineers, retail selling is being standardized, simplified, rationalized, and technocratized. The department stores inevitably began to cast envious eyes on the supermarket formula of retailing when their pay roll cost per transaction jumped from 33 cents in 1939 to 63 cents in 1948. Supermarkets had proved that they could sell a variety of merchandise far removed from food in one-half to one-tenth the time per transaction in the traditional outlets. The techniques devised for speeding up shopping did not shrivel the size of the average sales; they tended to increase it. Visual display spurs impulse sales and the more impulse sales the higher the average sales

check. By accelerating the shopping tempo the sales check was also increased.

There are only a limited number of floor plans and fixture designs suitable for open or visual display when the aim is self-service and self-selection adjusted to volume, turn-over, impulse selling, reduction of labor costs, faster stock handling, less warehouse expense, speeding up floor traffic, and providing space for assortment. Thus the movement toward uniformity was speeded by the engineers. For example, in studying the design for a paper department fixture, the Scott Paper Company examined the height and reach of over 10,000 women.

The super drugstore is revolutionizing items passing through it as the supermarkets revolutionized all lines of merchandising passing through their food outlets. Rexall, which has some 8,500 units, is promoting the addition of extra departments of different merchandise. Skillern & Sons, Incorporated, operates a chain of departmentalized super drugstores in Texas. In 1948, two years after they started stocking radios, Skillern reported that only one outlet in the southwest was selling more radios of that particular brand. In the same two years it built an annual volume of over \$200,000 in appliances on time payments alone. Other mass retailers, meanwhile, have gone into competition with the drug stores. Krogers has a drug section stocking 75 high turnover items of nationally advertised brands. Wrigley's, a supermarket chain in Detroit, carries an assortment of 200 drug items.

In a defensive reaction, the drugstores have intensified their drive to add non-drug items. The Sun Ray Drug Company is closing smaller stores and enlarging others while increasing the quantities of non-drug merchandise. Rexall closed 61 of its stores in 1947, and as many in 1948, committing itself to a policy of super drugstores. *Drug Topics*, which studied the merchandising strategy of the drug chains, discovered that 90 per cent of all drug chains operate departments stocking fountain pens, pencils, small electrical items, men's leather goods, etc.; 80 per cent sell toys, games, school supplies, magazines, books, and luggage; 70 per cent sell radios; 60 per cent sell sporting goods; 48 per cent sell women's hosiery; and 43 per cent sell cutlery.

As the super drugstores introduce supermarket techniques, they reduce the multiplicity of brands as rapidly as market con-

ditions permit, preferring pre-sold merchandise. Only 37 per cent of the large independent drugstores use advertising to stimulate floor traffic. On the other hand, every major chain engages in national advertising; Rexall, for example, invests several millions of dollars annually in advertising on a national scale. The drug chains claim that when a manufacturer stops such advertising, the results show up within a month. When a radio show is dropped during the summer, they report that sales fall as much as 35 per cent.

Weiss anticipates that robot retailing will be the major trend in the second half of the twentieth century. The vending machine has become the symbol of mechanized retailing. At an air field, in one month a vending machine rang up a volume of over a thousand pairs of nylon hosiery, perhaps more than all but a very few retail stores. The International Cellucotton Produx Company has developed a vending machine for Kleenex Pocket Pack Tissues. Another company is making one to vend linen handkerchiefs. At the present time there are, perhaps, a million vending machines which sell confections, beverages, and cigarettes.

PRODUCTIVITY AS THE KEY TO WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES

The high productivity of the American economy is the foundation of a high standard of living. With six per cent of the world's population and seven per cent of its land area, the people of the United States produce and consume one-third of the world's goods and services, including half of the manufactured goods of the world. The aggregate national income of the world is around \$550,000,000,000. The share of the United States in this world income increased from 26 per cent in 1938 to 41 per cent in 1948.¹¹ The aggregate real income of the 160,000,000 Americans in 1955 exceeded the combined incomes of the 600,000,000 persons in Europe and Asia. The *per capita* income in the United States was more than \$1,500, compared to the world average of \$200.

Man-hour productivity is higher in the United States than

¹¹ W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), pp. 393 ff., and J. Frederic Dewhurst and Associates, *America's Needs and Resources* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955), p. 892. The present section primarily follows Dewhurst, Chapter 25.

anywhere else in the world. According to Clark, the American worker's wages between 1925 and 1934 had twice the purchasing power of those of British workers, three times those of French and German workers, and four times those of Italian, Japanese, and Russian workers.¹² The comparison of thirty-one industries in terms of employment and output for 1935-1939 showed the average output per man-hour in the United States to be 2.8 times that in Great Britain.¹³

Comparative purchasing power may be measured by the amount of working time required in different countries to earn enough to purchase standard quantities of some item. This has been extensively studied by Swope, former President of the General Electric Company.¹⁴ American laborers had to work 2.2 months to earn enough to pay a year's rent, compared to an average of 2.8 months or 30 per cent more in eight European countries. Moreover, the typical family in the United States has twice as much living space, and better lighting and heating. The work time required to purchase a food basket consisting of a quart of milk, a dozen eggs, a pound each of bread, butter, and beef was as follows: The American worker required 1.7 hours of work to purchase this order of food; the English worker, 4.2 hours; the Italian, 7.3 hours. To buy an automobile the American had to work 4.5 months, while the average European had to work 16.3 months or four times as long. The contrasts are even greater between workers of the United States and South America. To buy one kilowatt-hour of electricity the South American had to work seven to eight times longer than the American. To buy a newspaper, the American required three minutes' work, the Argentinian 12 minutes, the Brazilian 24 minutes.

While purchasing power declined in most European countries during World War II, it rose in the United States. Excluding Soviet Russia, *per capita* purchasing power in Europe declined 12 per cent between 1938 and 1948, while in the United States it rose 31 per cent. Although productivity increased in both Europe

¹² Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1940), p. 41; Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 893.

¹³ László Rostas, *Comparative Productivity in British and American Industry* (London: National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 1948), p. 27.

¹⁴ Gerard Swope, "Standards of Living," *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1938; Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 894.

and North America, its rise was higher in the United States. The average output per man-hour in fifteen European countries rose six per cent from the 1935-1938 average to 1940. Output per man-hour in 1950 in the United States was 47 per cent above the 1940 average.

COMPARATIVE *Per Capital* INCOME, 1938-1948 *

<i>Country</i>	1938	1948	<i>Per cent Change</i>
United States	\$521	\$683	31.1
France	236	228	—3.4
Germany	337	160	—52.5
Italy	127	105	—17.3
United Kingdom	378	401	6.1

* *An Economic Survey of Europe*, 1948 (United Nations: Economic Commission for Europe, 1949), p. 235.

COMPARATIVE WORK TIME REQUIRED TO PURCHASE VARIOUS
STAPLE FOODS *

<i>Country</i>	<i>Bread (lb.)</i>	<i>Minutes of Work Time</i>			<i>Sugar (lb.)</i>
		<i>Butter (lb.)</i>	<i>Eggs (doz.)</i>		
United States	6	31	22		4
France	9	168	96		25
Germany	10	129	105		26
Great Britain	7	37	66		9
Italy	15	183	102		43
U.S.S.R.	19	373	291		122

* "Work Time Required to Buy Food, 1937-1950," *Monthly Labor Review*, February, 1951; Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 897.

The contrast in the purchasing power of workers' wages was even greater for manufactured items in 1950. A radio set requiring 20 hours' work in the United States required as much as 500 hours in Portugal and Indonesia. In France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands the cost in working time required to purchase a radio set was from four and a half to six and a half times what it was in the United States. On the other hand, indicating the crucial role of technology, there was a much narrower range in the cost of personal services (hair cuts and maid service, for instance). In general, purchasing power in the United States is 50 per cent to 60 per cent higher than in such industrially ad-

vanced countries as Canada and Sweden, and up to several hundred times greater than that of undeveloped countries.

Purchasing power and productivity have been increasing rapidly within the United States.¹⁵ From 1914 to 1948 the average working time in 25 manufacturing industries declined from 51.5 to 39.7 hours a week (23 per cent), while purchasing power increased 134 per cent. Although prices have increased on nearly all articles, the "working hour price" has declined. To earn enough to buy an automobile tire required 96 hours of work in 1914, but only 11 hours in 1948. On the other hand, many familiar necessities and especially services required as much as two to five times as many hours of work.

The national income of the United States in 1950 was \$241,000,000,000, averaging \$1,580 *per capita*, or \$5,530 per household. This was a four-fold increase over 1850. The increase in material well being was accompanied by a decline in the number of working hours. In 1850 the worker put in 70 hours a week and turned out 34 cents worth of goods in 1950 purchasing power. The volume of goods produced in 1950 was 25 times greater.

The fundamental causes of these increases in productivity are found in technological progress and the use of inanimate energy. In 1948 Americans consumed a *per capita* mineral and water power energy in the equivalent of eight tons of coal *per capita*. At the opposite extreme was Burma, with a *per capita* consumption of mineral and water power energy equivalent to 570 pounds of coal. In 1850 wood for fuel supplied 90 per cent of our total energy, while mineral fuels, wind, and water power supplied only nine per cent. Fuel wood dropped to 21 per cent of the total by 1900, and less than three per cent in 1950. Ninety-seven per cent of the energy used in the United States in 1950 was from mineral fuels and water power. Moreover, the energy used for work performance was 38 times larger in 1950 than it was in 1850: from the equivalent of 12,200,000 tons of coal to 468,000,000 tons of coal.

Together with the use of more efficient fuels, the efficiency of energy conversion has grown. Today electric central stations

¹⁵ "What an Hour's Work Would Buy, 1914-1948," Studies in Labor Statistics No. 3, National Industrial Conference Board, New York, March, 1950; Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, pp. 898 ff.

get as many kilowatt-hours of delivered energy out of one pound of coal as they obtained from seven pounds in 1900. The combustion efficiency of bituminous coal has increased from three per cent in 1900 to 18.5 per cent in 1950.

The energy sources accounting for total work output have changed. In 1850 one-eighth of all work done was by human beings and more than one-half by mules, horses, and oxen. By 1900 the work animals were doing only 22 per cent of the total work, and human workers were doing only five per cent. In 1950 99 per cent of work output was from inanimate energy.

THE SOURCE OF WORK OUTPUT

<i>Source</i>	<i>1850</i>	<i>1900</i>	<i>1950</i>
Human	13.0	5.3	0.9
Animal	52.4	21.5	0.6
Inanimate	34.6	73.2	98.5

* Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 908.

This change has been accompanied by an enormous concentration of power in convenient, compact, and mobile forms. In a single day the Consolidated Edison System in New York delivers enough electricity to do the work of 4,000,000 draft horses or twenty times as many men—18,000,000 horse power hours. Moreover, electric energy is delivered at a cost of a penny or two per horse-power-hour. A draft horse can be hired for ten dollars a day. Animal power costs from fifty to a hundred times as much as mechanical power.

The United States is not only the heaviest consumer of mechanical energy and the most productive country in the world, but the most heavily capitalized. In 1952 there was an average investment per employee in the 100 largest non-financial corporations in the United States of over \$15,000. The United States has

AVERAGE CAPITAL INVESTMENT PER WORKER

<i>Type of Industry</i>	<i>Investment</i>
Trade	\$ 8,000
Railroads	24,000
Utilities	52,000

tended to work out its destiny in terms of mass production resting on a mass market and supported by high wages. The primary result is the highest standard of living in the world.

SUMMARY

The present chapter explores some of the implications of the idea that the United States is a mass society. A mass society implies much more than the notion that an aggregation of people is united under a single social system; it carries with it the added ideas of uniformity and homogeneity. With more than 170,000,000 people united under a single system in which only twelve per cent work in non-urban pursuits and of which more than two-thirds are concentrated in urban areas, the United States merits the ascription.

The most quickly identifiable property of a mass society is the mass production of its material goods. In the words of one of its leaders, Henry Ford, mass production is the quantity production of standardized items; it is a special kind of factory production in which the principles of power, accuracy, economy, system, continuity, speed, and repetition have been employed.

The technical foundations of mass production are ancient. The movement toward the modern forms of mass production got under way in England with the revolution in textile manufacturing and metal trades associated with the steam engine. In the United States the most distinctive of all steps toward modern forms of mass production was taken by Eli Whitney, who worked out most of its rudimentary principles in connection with his United States government contract for 10,000 flintlock muskets. Whitney introduced the "jig" or master pattern precisely measured which determined where the machine would operate on a blank, with automatic stops to interrupt the motion at the exact moment a certain dimension was attained. Both the elimination of skilled labor and a new kind of continuity then became possible. Interchangeability was provided with a new foundation in the manufacture of rifles.

Oliver Evans of Maryland introduced the automatic sequence in grain processing. Other industries began to adopt these principles for quantity production of items by machine sequence. In the early days of the nineteenth century nails, wire, axes, clocks,

etc., were being mass produced. By the 1840's the McCormick reaper had been put into mass production. By the end of the Civil War mass production of shoes had been brought about; after the war the mass production of sewing machines got under way.

A new stage in the development of mass production was marked by scientific management, most vigorously promoted by Frederick Winslow Taylor. Wages were raised and a new level of *efficiency was achieved by the application of scientific principles to the integration of men and machines into more efficient sequences.*

Meanwhile, the moving assembly line had been introduced into meat packing, and was adapted to industrial manufacture by Henry Ford. The ideal of continuous movement was applied not only to the main assembly line and the minor assembly lines feeding it but even extended to inventories and raw material supply. The principles are still undergoing extension leading to the continuous flow chemical plant like the great semi-automatic systems of Du Pont, Union Carbide, and Allied Chemical in which raw materials pour in one end of the plant and debouche at the other in a series of finished products on a 24-hour basis.

But mass production presupposes mass marketing. Mass production itself could hardly have got under way without some initial mass markets and the supply of capital permitting the institution of the new efficiencies of the machine process. The war crisis of 1798 supplied the conditions for federal purchase of manufactured rifles in quantity. Many of the great steps toward mass production came, in considerable measure, with war—the Civil War and World Wars I and II.

Once established as a going concern, however, mass production could acquire a kind of life of its own. By selling items cheaper than they can be produced in the home or artisan's workshop, a two-fold process is set in motion. The artisan is forced into the factory, and a new market is created. Meanwhile, marketing acquires a structure that accommodates it to mass production. To an ever-increasing degree, marketing has tended to be concentrated in a few hands. It has grown self-service, self-selection, and increasingly robot.

One of the most immediate products of these trends is the unusually high standard of living of the American people. With

six per cent of the world's population, the United States produces and consumes one-third of the world's goods, including one-half of the manufactured goods of the world. Moreover, the share of the United States has tended to increase. The aggregate national income of the world was around \$550,000,000,000 in 1948. Of this amount the United States' share was 41 per cent. Productivity is the key to the United States' welfare.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. What is meant by a "mass society"?
2. Why does Burlingame believe that the clock was one of the first inventions leading toward mass production?
3. In what ways did the eighteenth century developments in the textile and metal working industries lay the foundations for mass production?
4. Why is Eli Whitney considered one of the major figures in the development of mass production in America?
5. How did the Civil War affect mass production in the United States?
6. What is meant by scientific management? Of what importance is it for mass production?
7. In what ways has mass production changed in the twentieth century?

8. Outline Henry Ford's conception of industrial democracy.
9. What changes are taking place in marketing in the twentieth century?
10. How does America compare with the rest of the world with regard to productivity and purchasing power? How do you account for the difference?

2

THE TRANSFORMATION OF BEHAVIOR AND TASTE IN MASS SOCIETY

Mass production and mass distribution in the United States have lifted income and consumption to the highest in the world.¹ The *per capita* income of the people of the United States is twice as high as that for the people of Great Britain, three times higher than that for the people of France, six times that for the people of Italy, and seven times that for the people of the world as a whole.

During the period between 1900 and 1950 the scale of living of Americans more than doubled. While the population doubled, real national production increased five times; thus the *per capita* quantity of commodities and services increased two and one half times.² In the United States in 1950, one passenger automobile was registered for every four persons, compared to one for every twenty-one in the United Kingdom, one in twenty-six in France, and one in 190 in Italy. The United States owned three-fourths of the world's automobiles.

It is no matter of great surprise that foreigners occasionally see Americans as preoccupied with material things.

At every point in his day's work and pleasure, an American is wonderfully served by gadgets. In English trains, to take a petty example, the ash-trays are so constructed that it is almost impossible to extinguish

¹ "Monthly Bulletin of Statistics," (New York: United Nations, March, 1953); "National Income Statistics of Various Countries," (New York, United Nations, 1950).

² For a summary of the data on the American standard of living, see Clyde W. Phelps, *Financing the Instalment Purchases of the American Family* (Baltimore: Commercial Credit Company, 1954), pp. 11 ff.

a cigarette without amputating a finger in the attempt; in American club cars the ash-trays gently swallow up your butts at a touch. The point is that no Englishman bothers to improve the one, while all Americans learn to expect the other. Paper towels, ice water, fountains in hotel lobbies and in the corridors of office buildings, heaters in cars and radios in bedrooms—all these aids and a thousand more supply an American's creature comforts even before he has become aware of the need of them.³

This is seen as a source of weakness as well as strength.

These gadgets and adjustments all add up to the American High Standard of Living. . . . But it is also unhappily true that a population thus pampered is ill-conditioned to face the first impact of emergency. British accusations of American 'softness' are not entirely the result of envy. If soldiers miss their Coca-Cola and if silence (freedom from radio) lowers morale, then in all external conflict the first advantage goes to the enemy.

Some American observers attending to the same facts have described American society as "consumption oriented."

American society in the phase of incipient decline of population becomes consumption oriented. . . . It is, in fact, now widely accepted that the American economy depends on opening up internal frontiers of consumption as the frontiers of production and land use begin to close down.⁴

In its peculiar "consumption orientation" related to its mass production and mass marketing, American society differs from many previous societies.

CONSUMPTION IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

The patterns of consumption are determined, in the first instance, by the type of economy; that is, by the method of producing and distributing the material things of life. One of the most significant measures of the success of an economy is its capacity to produce more of the material necessities of life than are needed for immediate consumption. All economies have some capacity to exceed the day-to-day requirements of the people they serve.

³ S. Gorley Putt, *View from Atlantis* (London: Constable, 1955), pp. 80 and 81.

⁴ David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 148, 149.

However, economies vary enormously in the amounts and types of things they can produce.

Among Non-Literates. For most of man's stay in the world his economies have been relatively simple and the amount of goods available for consumption have been limited. Because of ideas of what is fit for human consumption or because of special taboos, however, not even peoples close to a subsistence economy use all available food stuffs.⁵ Moreover, the peaks of work and consumption do not always coincide. The Tallensi of the Gold Coast work hardest in May and June, when the food supply is lowest; they feast at ease in the dry season.⁶ The Bemba alternate between the season of food plentitude (April to October) and the "hunger months."⁷ Cycles of want and plenty are found among the Mexican Cheran, the Minnesota wild rice growers, and the Eskimo.⁸

Among non-literates food and clothing are the primary consumption goods. Despite their simplicity, they show some differentiation between material and prestige goods. A prestige economy can only operate where the mechanisms of production provide more than is needed for sheer subsistence, and the specialization necessary for the production of such surpluses is found in large groups in favorable environments. The Hottentot and Bushmen of South Africa live under the same environmental conditions, differing only in size. (Around 1900 the Hottentots were numbered at 50,000.) While the Bushmen produce little more than subsistence, the economically secure Hottentots keep cattle. The Bushmen have no chiefs, priests, or other specialists; their rituals and ceremonies are simple. The Hottentots have chiefs, headmen, and counsellors. Although they have no priests, their religious occasions are celebrated by large feasts.⁹

The allocation of economic surpluses becomes complex in complex economies. Herskovits believes that Thorstein Veblen's conception of "conspicuous consumption" is a valuable key to the

⁵ Melville J. Herskovits, *Man and His Works* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948), p. 280.

⁶ M. and S. L. Fortes, "Food in the Domestic Economy of the Tallensi," *Africa*, vol. ix, 1936, pp. 237-276.

⁷ A. I. Richards, *Land, Labor, and Diet in Northern Rhodesia* (London: 1939), pp. 35 ff.

⁸ Herskovits, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 284-285.

prestige economics of non-literates.¹⁰ Economic surplus can be distributed over a whole population in the form of socialized leisure and consumption, or it can be concentrated in the hands of persons engaged in non-subsistence callings—a "leisure class."¹¹

Conspicuous consumption can be as significant in the rituals of non-literate cultures as it is in the debut of a millionaire's daughter. In Guadalcanal, for example, an elaborate expenditure in the form of food for feasts and gifts is necessary for the rise of a man to a position of community leadership.¹² The consumption and destruction of property that accompanied the Kwakiutl potlach and the African upper class funerals are also examples of non-literate conspicuous consumption for prestige reasons.

Social rank is often revealed by conspicuous consumption, as in the case of the houses of Samoan chiefs which grow more elegant the more exalted the rank. While the commoner wears cotton cloth, the Asharti chieftain wears silk cloth of exclusive pattern. "The prestige economy is a topsy-turvy system, where gain comes through expenditures rather than through saving, and the highest position is reserved for those who most conspicuously spend the contributions of less privileged people, for the vicarious enjoyment of the contributors."¹³

In Complex Pre-Industrial Societies. The most important pre-industrial literate community, the city, rests for its existence on an extensive permanent excess of material production beyond subsistence needs. Most of the peculiar urban types (craftsmen, merchants, entrepreneurs, artists, diplomats, condottiere, officials) presuppose the permanent economic excess necessary to the existence of the city. Their social being rests on being free from the requirement of the food economy.

Even in non-literate societies, the moment the production of the material things of life exceeds subsistence requirements, the use of material things quickly come to express social themes arising outside the economic sphere proper. The possibilities for such secondary economic expression of non-economic motives is greatly

¹⁰ Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1912), pp. 68 ff.

¹¹ Veblen, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

¹² H. I. Hogbin, "Social Advancement in Guadalcanal," *Oceania*, Vol. IX (1937-1938), pp. 289-305.

¹³ Herskovits, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

increased in the city. Moreover, the customs in non-literate society that tend to regulate the relations of the material and prestige economy also tend to break down. The regulation of the material and prestige economy tends, under these circumstances, to pass over into law. Where it has become possible for a person of humble origins to "live like a king," police regulations may prevent him from doing so, lest the distinction between commoner and king be erased.

Police regulations of private conduct and sumptuary laws formed a part of Roman law. Similar codes were universal in the Middle Ages. Where sumptuary laws were not a part of royal decree or national statute, as in France and England, they were parts of the police regulation of the cities.¹⁴

Vincent has traced the police regulations of personal conduct and sumptuary legislation of the three main cities (Zurich, Bern, and Basel) of the Swiss Confederation which endured as a group of small independent states fused into a confederation for five hundred years from its origin until 1848. Bern was governed by an aristocratic family; Zurich and Basel were ruled by so-called "business aristocracies," by a small combination of rich plutocrats.

In the ordinances passed by these authorities a strong religious motive is abundantly evident when they attempt the regulation of personal conduct. In many words they endeavor to enforce the ten commandments, proclaim against profanity, the neglect of the Sabbath, the extravagances of luxury as displeasing in the sight of God. To them the wrath of God was clearly to be seen in earthquakes, the desolations of war or the failure of crops, and to obtain relief the people must give heed to their ordinances.¹⁵

Prior to the Reformation, the administration of the sumptuary and moral laws of these cities had been in the hands of an ecclesiastical court called the *Chor-Gericht*, which also had jurisdiction over adultery and marriage relations. Under the influence of the Reformation, these functions were separated; marriage relations were left to the ecclesiastical tribunal, while a new court was cre-

¹⁴ John Martin Vincent, *Costume and Conduct in the Laws of Basel, Bern, and Zurich, 1370-1800* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935); Kent Roberts Greenfield, *Sumptuary Law in Nürnberg: A Study in Paternal Government* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1918); F. Elizabeth Baldwin, *Sumptuary Legislation and Personal Regulation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1926).

¹⁵ Vincent, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

ated to administer the sumptuary laws. While commissions were regularly appointed to carry out sumptuary and moral regulations, the bases of their powers were enactments of the highest legislative authorities of the cities.

In all Sabbath laws costume was carefully regulated. In the early days men had to appear in ruffs and black mantles; their clothing also had to be dark. Women wore only dark clothing in church with white headdresses. Expensive jewelry and gold-mounted prayer books were forbidden. Christenings were also regulated, both before and after the Reformation. Sumptuary aspects of the occasions were seen in limitations on gifts and festivities. The gift allowable each sponsor varied from three shillings in 1336 to two ducats in the eighteenth century. The sumptuary aspects of funerals were also strictly regulated. In Zurich, codes from 1336 to 1374 limited the amount of wax to be used for candles to ten pounds. In Bern in 1526 the number of candles used in mourning was limited by the rank of the deceased: high officials might have four, the lower nobility two, lesser people according to family means, but the wax must not exceed five pounds. Other legislation limited the cost of funerals by fixing the number of guests, the length of time spent in mourning, the numbers of persons permitted to wear mourning garb, and the size and expensiveness of funeral meals.

The chief problem for the law-makers in regard to weddings was the number of people to be invited, the expense of the gifts that might be received. In 1304 in Zurich the bride and groom could each invite ten married ladies (not counting bride's maids and little children). No one could give more than one present to the bride. No wedding procession could have more than two singers, two fiddlers, and two trumpeters. The ordinance of 1637 in Basel covering weddings runs to sixteen duodecimo pages. Guests were restricted to forty-eight. The regulations attempted to prevent long sitting at table, superfluous drinking, and some expense. By the eighteenth century the prosecutions for disobedience of wedding ordinances were infrequent.

Most elaborate of all were the ordinances against non-traditional clothing and personal education. This "warfare of centuries against fashion in dress," as Vincent calls it, came to an end with the arrival of the French Revolution, which "liberalized the laws

in favor of individual freedom.”¹⁶ The cities alternated between despair and renewed zeal in striking down the new fashions that appeared from time to time.

*The Swiss citizens should maintain their own costume as a patriotic duty, that ranks and classes should be distinguished by their dress, were rock-bound principles throughout, so far as laws were concerned. Economic reasons were reiterated without end, for the prevention of extravagance in display was deemed a governmental duty, both in times of general distress and in periods of prosperity. Protection of home industry occasionally appeared in so many words, when articles of Swiss handiwork were definitely prescribed, but the motives are so deeply interwoven that cost and social welfare must also be taken into consideration.*¹⁷

Quite apart from all the particular reasons for the sumptuary laws of pre-industrial society, the sociological observation that inspires the authorities is that unless it is kept under control, the behavior associated with the consumption of material goods may at times destroy the traditional way of life.

TRADITIONAL AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF WORK AND CONSUMPTION

The United States was originally settled by north European (primarily English) Protestants, acquiring its large southern and eastern European and Roman Catholic populations only in the course of the nineteenth century. Its traditional conceptions of work and consumption, thus were primarily those of the north European Protestants. The relation between work and consumption by these groups was first fully described by Weber and Tawney.¹⁸

In the opinion of Weber and Tawney, the Protestant Reformation emphasized those elements of traditional Christianity that tended to encourage religious and economic individualism. The sacramental theory of the church of traditional Christianity attributed religious salvation to the proper performance of the sac-

¹⁶ Vincent, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

¹⁷ Vincent, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-132.

¹⁸ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. by Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930, 2d ed., 1948); R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1926).

raments (baptism, confirmation, the eucharist, matrimony, penance, holy orders, and supreme unction) under the ministrations of the priesthood. For the lay person, religious behavior was traditional and authoritarian. The church drew a sharp distinction *between the spheres of the secular (every day life) and the sacred (the city of God)*. A religious elite of monks and nuns withdrew from the secular world for practice of a purified form of religious behavior in monastic seclusion.

The Protestant Reformation occurred at a period of intensified lay religious feeling. It de-emphasized the importance of the sacraments and the mediation of the priests as a means of salvation, laying primary importance on the individual's personal relation to God. It broke down the distinction between the secular and sacred spheres and, while no one could achieve salvation by good works alone, it advanced the idea that a person who really belonged to the elect that God had chosen to save would display "the outward forms of inward grace" in their conduct. Modes of behavior that formerly had been appropriate to a monastery now became appropriate to every day life. The Protestants were bearers of what Max Weber has called "inner worldly asceticism."

Christian asceticism, at first fleeing from the world into solitude, had already ruled the world which it had renounced from the monastery and through the church. But it had, on the whole, left the naturally spontaneous character of daily life in the world untouched. Now it strode into the market-place of life, slammed the door of the monastery behind it, and undertook to penetrate just that daily routine of life with its methodicalness, to fashion it into a life in the world, but neither of nor for this world.¹⁹

Since they accepted the doctrine of predestination, the Protestants conceived of man's particular position in life as God ordained.²⁰ However, while one was not saved by his this-worldly conduct, that conduct gave some indication to the individual as to whether he was possibly among the elect, for if one really were saved his conduct would be in accord with it. One's particular position in life, thus, his "calling," took on a renewed significance. One tended to judge his salvation chances in terms of his success

¹⁹ Max Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

²⁰ These arguments were cast in their most emphatic form by the Calvinists. Other Protestant groups held them with somewhat less intensity.

in his calling. Everyday conduct acquired a sudden new intensity when each failure was examined as a potentially negative religious sign. But since one could never be really certain, each new step toward perfection tended to redouble the force toward a further step. Meanwhile, the earnings produced by zealous performance in one's calling could not be used in frivolous expenditures on clothing, entertainment, travel, and the like.

This worldly Protestant asceticism, . . . acted powerfully against the spontaneous enjoyment of possessions; it restricted consumption, especially of luxuries. On the other hand, it had the psychological effect of freeing the acquisition of goods from the inhibitions of traditionalistic ethics. It broke the bonds of the impulse of acquisition in that it not only legalized it, but . . . looked upon it as directly willed by God. The campaign against the temptations of the flesh, and the dependency on external things, was . . . not a struggle against the rational acquisition, but against the irrational use of wealth.²¹

An intensified work ethic, a disapproval of all forms of consumption defined as irrational, led to the rapid accumulation of capital. Thus the "restraints which were imposed upon the consumption of wealth naturally served to increase it by making possible the productive investment of capital."²²

These attitudes toward the production and consumption of wealth were transported to colonial America. They were particularly strong in the northern colonies where the Puritans were dominant and in conflict with more feudalistic conceptions of the cavaliers of the southern colonies. Both in Europe and North America, however, the strength of the Puritan's attitudes toward work and consumption varied even in a given city. The sumptuary legislation of the city authorities of Basel, Bern, and Zurich indicates that the city authorities were often in the position of imposing their particular version of the Protestant ethic on the rest of the community by law and police regulation. Similarly, in the northern colonies of North America, sumptuary legislation by civic authorities was normal, though by the end of the seventeenth century it had begun to decline.²³

²¹ Max Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-171.

²² Max Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

²³ Merle Curti, *The Growth of American Thought* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943), p. 46.

The types of persons whom Weber and Tawney described as bearers of "inner world asceticism" have recently been re-named by Riesman as "inner-directed."

The inner-directeds . . . survive from the period of transitional population growth in America and abroad. They are still dominant in many regions and many occupations, even in the cities. They are also probably the most numerous type, if we include among them not only those whose inner-direction is clear and unequivocal but also many working-class people who aspire to be inner-directed but are actually unable to adjust either to inner-directed or to other directed modes of conformity.²⁴

These inner-directed men, Riesman maintains, think in terms of work, non-human objects, and objectified social organization.

The sphere of pleasure and consumption is only a side show for inner-directeds. This is truer for men than for women. Some men diminish attention to pleasure to the vanishing point, delegating consumption problems to their wives; these are the good providers. Others turn consumption into work: the work of acquisition.²⁵

Thus, Riesman believes that the traditional Puritan conception of the relation between work and consumption, while still present, is breaking down.

THE BREAKDOWN OF PURITAN ATTITUDES TOWARD WORK AND CONSUMPTION IN A MASS SOCIETY

In the last chapter the phenomenal growth of mass production and marketing were examined. In the present chapter we have been examining man as a consumer. The remarkable efficiencies of the economy of contemporary man have created greater surpluses than have any previous economy. In the nature of the case, this either leads to a new kind of sumptuary legislation peculiar to contemporary man (as has in fact in part been the case for totalitarian Germany and Russia) or to the play-back of production surpluses upon traditional conduct. Except for war-time rationing and legislation against trafficking in drugs, narcotics, and the like, the United States has not experimented with sumptuary legislation.

²⁴ Riesman, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

Foreign observers take it as a commonplace, that the older type of consumption had to break down in the United States.

There are . . . to the American eye . . . many self-evident necessities of life that are by no means taken for granted even in London. It would astonish an American University President's wife to learn that the familiar whirr of an electric refrigerator suddenly recharging itself in a silent kitchen only the other day sent a startled Vice-Chancellor (and an academic knight, at that!) panting into my room with a white face and the terrified announcement: "Gorley, your kitchen is clicking!"

Economists no doubt explain that the American system of over-production and eager salesmanship would break down in hopeless confusion if all these daily needs were *not* supplied. Our old fashioned thrift, transplanted to the United States, might wreck the whole wasteful beauty of it all.²⁶

Sooner or later the efficiencies of mass production had to bring the American productive and marketing economy to a point at which the markets were saturated. Either new markets had to be found outside the country, or the domestic ones had to be reconstructed. Both expedients were followed.

One possible way to create new internal markets is by transforming the habits of the traditional buyer. Traditionally, he had been trained to work hard, to save, to invest his money, and to restrict his consumption. One of the major assaults of the mass society has been made on the traditional values of thrift, leading to contemporary forms of installment buying.

INSTALMENT BUYING

The time came in the expansion of mass production when it was no longer possible to create new markets simply by lowering prices. One basic form of adaptation of buying behavior to this condition appears in the development of instalment buying. It brought about as radical a transformation in consumer behavior as the one represented by the shift of productive enterprise from the home to the factory, and the transfer of skill from the artisan to the machine.

Instalment buying was not unknown in antiquity.²⁷ In Rome

²⁶ S. Gorley Putt, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

²⁷ See Roger W. Babson, *The Folly of Instalment Buying* (New York: Fredrick A. Stokes 1938), pp. 18-32.

when land values were low Marcus Licinius Crassus (105-55 B.C.), an associate of Caesar, made real estate investments to the extent of 8,000 talents (\$10,000,000) and by placards informed the Roman citizens that they could buy new and modern homes on suitable property without paying for them in full at the beginning. In the eighteenth century instalment selling was practiced in France. Furniture was sold on the instalment plan in England; and, as early as 1817, the furniture shop of Cowperthwait & Sons began instalment selling in the United States. Large-scale instalment selling made its appearance with the marketing of the McCormick reaper and with the Singer Sewing Machine Company soon after Howe patented the lock-stitch in 1846. Instalment selling quickly spread to sets of books, pianos, and organs. Large-scale instalment selling of pianos began in 1875 in the mass diffusion of middle class culture.

According to Babson, the next major impetus to instalment selling came with the United States government's instalment selling of Liberty Bonds in World War I. The general transformation of buying behavior into instalment patterns was carried through after World War I in connection with the growth of the automobile industry. Instalment selling of automobiles was vigorously promoted by other car manufacturers to help them compete with Ford who resisted the plan. Although the policy violated his New England conception of saving and thrift, Ford was forced to accept. The adoption of instalment selling of automobiles made the practice respectable, and from 1920 to 1930 instalment plans appeared in the sale of washing machines, vacuum cleaners, electrical and gas appliances, radios, refrigerators, jewelry, musical instruments, and even securities. The mail order and farm implement houses took up the practice, and were followed by department and clothing stores.

The peak of the early wave of instalment purchasing sales reached \$6,500,000 in 1929. In 1938 it was estimated that Americans bought over 60 per cent of their new cars and 75 per cent of their furniture and electrical appliances on the instalment plan. By this time, instalment purchasing accounted for 40 per cent of the farm implements and 25 per cent of the jewelry sold.

By 1938 instalment buying had become so much a part of the American scene that the Department of Commerce took official

cognizance of it. An instalment credit unit was set up in Washington under the direction of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce to supply information on instalment credit with respect to the nature and type of goods sold, instalment terms, geographical diffusion of instalment plans, and the varieties of plans in use.

As the practice spread, large financing companies arose to implement it. In 1908 the first major finance companies for this purpose appeared. In 1912 the Commercial Credit Company was incorporated. John N. Willys formed a finance company for stimulating automobile sales in 1915; it was taken over by the Commercial Credit Company in 1922. In 1915 the Commercial Investment Trust was organized. In 1919 the General Motors Acceptance Corporation was started. The Universal Credit Corporation, founded in 1928, was taken over by the Commercial Investment Trust in 1933. In addition to the "Big Three" finance companies, there are more than five hundred local finance companies with offices throughout the United States.

According to Phelps, instalment buying is intimately related with the American standard of living.²⁸ Most American families use instalment credit at one time or another. Normally about one-third of the urban customers and more than one-fourth of all customers purchase goods and services on an instalment plan. The majority of users of instalment plans belong to the middle income groups.

Instalment buying is higher for families than for individuals, for house-owning families than for renters, for large families than for small. The proportion of consumers using instalment credit is greater for wage workers than for salaried or self-employed persons apart from income level. It is higher for urbanites and for younger age groups. The percentage of families in a given income group using instalment buying is greater for those units whose head is less than 35 years of age.

American families use instalment credit for more than ten per cent of their total expenditures. During the first six years after World War II, instalment purchases totaled \$76,300,000,000, or 9.8 per cent of all retail sales. Automobiles were the most impor-

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 20 ff.

tant item in instalment purchases. During this period about \$33,000,000,000 worth of instalment credit was used to purchase 13,000,000 new cars and 22,000,000 used cars. Consumers have been using instalment credit for more than half of the new cars and three-fifths of the used cars they buy. Other items of high unit value for which instalment plans are used comprise about one-fifth of the purchases at department stores, one-half of the purchases of furniture, musical instruments, household appliances (including radios and television sets), and jewelry. Of the \$135,000,000,000 worth of durable goods, excluding residences, owned by American families, the major part have been acquired by means of consumer instalment credit.

Old fashioned conservatives have been shocked by the growth of instalment buying. Babson summarizes his stand on such buying this way:

The over-extension of time-payment plans is an unhealthy development. While a person may mortgage his property within reason, a man should not mortgage his future income unless absolutely compelled to do so and then only temporarily. Urging the buyer into debt by instalment-plan buying is bound to create trouble, discontent, and unhappiness. Instalment buying or debt contracting by poor people is a calamity. It places a mortgage upon their health, their jobs, and their earning power. It creates as much unhappiness, misery, and discontent as any other bad habit.²⁹

BUDGETISM

Babson, writing in 1938, saw in the extension of instalment buying the possible liquidation of some aspects of the traditional way of life of Americans. The study of the new middle classes in the 1950's (the salaried middle-management personnel of the modern corporate structures of business and government) by Whyte seems to confirm these anticipations. In the packaged suburbs in which the young persons in the new middle classes tend to congregate, he maintains that one may discern a strong consumption-mindedness.³⁰

The young members of the new middle classes, according to

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

³⁰ William H. Whyte, *The Organization Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1957), pp. 352 ff.

Whyte, have faith that a continually expanding economy will retroactively pay for today, eliminating all reason for self denial. They save little. The average bank savings deposit throughout the country (\$1,342 in 1953) is illusory, for in the packaged suburbs such as Park Forest, Illinois, and Levittown, Pennsylvania, the average deposit is \$300. Most young couples carry life insurance, but the cash value of their policies is low. A check of the budgets of younger married couples in the \$5,000 to \$7,500 bracket indicates that median equity in savings is around \$700. On the other hand, the median amount of loan money outstanding was \$1,000.

For the majority of the new middle classes, saving is no longer a virtue in itself. They expect to use personal loans for short-term emergencies. Moreover, loans are used for planned purchases as well. Personal loans are primarily made for debt consolidation and emergency medical expenditures.

Members of the new middle classes are so extremely budget-conscious that Whyte described their outlook as a kind of "budgetism," not because they keep formal budgets (few of them do) but because their monthly salaries tend to be completely committed to a system of instalment payments. The aim, he believes, is to have one's self pre-committed to regular, unvarying monthly payments on all major items. The month has become the standard unit in budgetary thinking. The young couples now pay winter oil bills in equal monthly fractions throughout the year. Even heavy seasonal obligations tend to be smoothed out: Christmas presents, real estate taxes, birthdays, spring cleaning, and outfitting the children for school represent major seasonal expenses which they try to transform into monthly payments. If the vendors of such services do not set up systems of monthly instalments, the purchasers float loans and do it themselves. It is, in Whyte's phrase, a kind of self-entrapment in which the new middle classes find security.

The young suburbanites even go beyond the point at which monthly payments can be said to be functionally useful. They are strangely indifferent to the interest rates on the money they borrow and borrow much more than they save. Most are amazed to discover that they pay a minimum of ten or twelve per cent interest a year on outstanding loans or purchases.

Whyte visualizes a case of budgetism carried to its logical conclusion. A store could assign a couple a credit limit of some amount (say, \$150 or \$200). After buying up to this limit, the purchaser would pay the account in equally scaled, monthly payments with interest charges on the unpaid balance of from one to one and a half per cent a month. There would always be an unpaid balance, for once started on revolving credit, a couple would never stop; they would buy more as soon as they had paid off a purchase. Moreover, they would pay from 12 to 18 per cent interest on the unpaid balance annually.

Such revolving credit plans are not an imaginary possibility; they are a reality first invented to fit the needs of a lower economic group. The schemes were so well designed to fit the budget psychology of the new middle classes, however, that they have been widely adopted by them. Many stores have found that customers who are well enough off to rate charge accounts frequently prefer revolving credit. It evens out seasonal expenses. The old coupon-book plans which preceded revolving credit had many of its features but the psychological effect was different. With revolving credit even impulse buying can be pre-planned.

Whatever expression it may take, the rhythm of budgetism is going to become more compelling. Organization man's suburbia provides only a foretaste. Our whole population is moving toward the more regularized life, and as the guaranteed annual wage becomes a reality, the conditions for middleclass budgetism will become yet more universal. And then, finally, there are the children of suburbia—a generation of organization people for whom the Depression is not a father's tale but a grandfather's. Nobody, as suburbanites sometimes remark, is going back.³¹

Whyte does not believe the shift to budgetism is peculiar to the new middle classes; it merely represents the vanguard of a general trend.

ADVERTISING AND THE MANIPULATION OF TASTE

It is not only buying behavior that is being transformed with a consequent change in the traditional way of life. The attitudes

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 364.

and decisions of Americans are also being systematically transformed.

Galbraith has maintained that while classical economic theory presupposed the independence of desire for goods from the processes by which they were produced, this is no longer true.³² A line between production and wants is provided by modern advertising and salesmanship in a manner which cannot be reconciled with the concept of independently determined desires. The whole purpose of advertising and salesmanship is to create wants that did not previously exist. A new consumer product must be introduced with a suitable advertising campaign to arouse interest in it. Galbraith maintains that outlays for the stimulation of demand have become more important than outlays for the manufacture of the product. In 1956 the total advertising expenditure amounted to \$10,000,000,000. The outlay for advertising had been increasing at the rate of more than \$1,000,000,000 a year.

As advertising has grown in volume and extent,³³ it has tended to assume increasingly bizarre forms. Most recently large-scale efforts have been made to channel unthinking habits, purchasing decisions, and thought processes. Some of the major forms of these new developments in modern advertising have been traced by Vance Packard.³⁴

The use of mass psychoanalysis to direct advertising campaigns has become a multimillion dollar industry. The lengths to which the researchers are prepared to go may be seen in the fact that a Chicago advertising agency has been studying the psychological concomitants of the housewife's menstrual cycle for clues to effective selling appeals. The same agency has used psychiatric techniques to study little girls for the same purpose. In 1956 a political party took the position that its candidates were products that must be sold. Motivation research, as the new advertising strategy is called by Louis Cheskin, head of a Chicago firm that conducts psychoanalytic studies for merchandisers, assumes that the person in the buying situation acts compulsively, uncon-

³² John K. Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958), pp. 155 ff.

³³ Otis Pease, *The Responsibilities of American Advertising* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958).

³⁴ Vance Packard, *The Hidden Persuaders* (New York: Pocket Books, 1958). The remaining portions of this section primarily follow Packard.

*sciously guided by hidden images.*³⁵ For this reason, it is said that women pay more for skin cream than for soap, for while soap only promises to make them clean, the skin cream promises to make them beautiful. People, according to this view, do not buy oranges; they buy vitality. They do not buy automobiles; they buy prestige.

Motivation research is the latest development in the evolution of market research which attempted to lay a scientific foundation for advertising and salesmanship by statistical study.³⁶ Market research undertook to gather statistics on the attitudes of persons who might conceivably buy products of a given kind at a given price. However, market research did not always seem to give accurate information about how persons would act, even when it accurately reflected their conscious attitudes. The marketeers decided that people answer questions in a manner that makes them appear to be sensible and rational beings. The Advertising Research Foundation, for example, maintains that people are inclined to admit reading only magazines of high prestige value. From responses to questionnaires, one would judge that the *Atlantic Monthly* is the most widely read magazine in the United States, but in fact the "pulp" have twenty times the readership.

Among the major recent cases of mistakes in merchandising resting on the assumption that people buy automobiles on a rational basis was the Chrysler Corporation's decision, based on consumer surveys, that people wanted a sturdy car without frills, one easy to park. Chrysler's share of the auto market dropped from 26 per cent in 1952 to 13 per cent in 1954. In desperation the Company completely overhauled its styling, bringing out a car in 1955 which was sixteen inches longer and three inches lower, making Plymouth the longest car in the low-price field, and Dodge the first car with three-color exteriors. Chrysler's share of the market bounced back in 1955.

All such phenomena in modern advertising, Packard thinks, are related to the fact that as a nation we are so rich that consumers are under no immediate necessity to buy more than about

³⁵ Louis Cheskin, *Color Guide for Marketing Media* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1954).

³⁶ George Horsley Smith, *Motivation Research in Advertising and Marketing* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954).

40 per cent of what is produced. Moreover, the pressure to buy tends to grow less. Advertising attempts to create pressure. In 1955 \$9,000,000,000 were spent in advertising, a billion more than in 1954 and three billion more than in 1950. For each man, woman, and child in America in 1955, \$53 was spent to persuade him or her to buy industrial products. The problem of merchandising has been intensified by the increased standardization of products. The greater the similarity between products the less reason there is for brand selection. There are no really significant differences between the various brands of most whiskeys, beers, automobiles, detergents, and cake mixes.

Under these circumstances, ad men enthusiastically accepted the psychological theory that the human consciousness is made up of levels: a conscious rational level, preconscious and subconscious level, and an unconscious level.³⁷ Motivational analysis (MR) began to explore devices for influencing consciousness at the second and third levels; it got underway as a serious movement in the late 1940's and early 1950's. The major figures in the movement were Ernest Dichter, president of the Institute for Motivational Research, Inc., and Louis Cheskin, director of the Color Research Institute of America.³⁸ Forerunners of the motivational analysis were John B. Watson, a founder of the behavioristic school of psychology in the United States and Dale Houghton of New York University. In the 1940's the major advertising journals (*Advertising Age*, *Printer's Ink*, *Tide*, and *Business Week*) began devoting more space to motivational analysis. In 1956 *Fortune* carried a cover article on MR. The manual, *A Directory of Organizations Which Conduct Motivation Research*, (costing \$25), lists eighty-two organizations in the United States qualified and ready to undertake depth analysis.

According to Packard, the manual, *A Directory of Social Scientists Interested in Motivation Research* (also costing \$25), lists 150 social scientists, mainly on college campuses, ready to undertake motivational research. By 1955 the McCann-Erickson Agency in New York had five psychologists manning a special motivation department. Among social scientists taking advantage of the trend was Burleigh Gardner, social anthropologist at Har-

³⁷ Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 18 ff.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 221-232 for a summary of motivation research findings.

vard, who set up his own consulting company, *Social Research, Incorporated*, in 1953. The standard fee charged by Ernest Dichter is \$500 a day. He has developed a "psycho-panel" of several hundred families whose members had been charted for emotional make up: security, ambition, realism, neuroticism, etc. Presumably the response of this unit to various advertising appeals permit full, accurate predictions of response to a product.

The monthly magazine of Dichter's organization, *Motivations*, is sold at \$100 for a year's subscription. His fees for studies by his organization range as high as \$25,000. Among Dichter's clients are General Foods, General Mills, Lever Brothers, American Airlines, Carnation Milk Company. Some of Burleigh Gardner's clients for consumer motivation studies are General Electric, General Mills, Jewel Tea Company, United Airlines, and *The Chicago Tribune*. Among the clients of Louis Cheskin's Color Research Institute are Philip Morris, Procter and Gamble, General Foods, and General Mills.

A number of psychological instruments are employed in motivation research. One of the most widely used techniques is the "depth interview" conducted much in the manner of a psychiatrist but without the couch.³⁹ Interviewers encourage the patron to talk freely about the images arising around the product—a laxative, cold tablet, deodorant, weight reducer, or athlete's foot remedy. This often produces long brooding seances about highly personal problems. The Rorschach ink-blot test—ambiguous forms into which the subject is to project his anxieties, inadequacies, and conflicts. Many depth probers use the TAT (Thematic Apperception Test), a series of printed pictures into which the subject is encouraged to project himself so that his impulses, wishes, and feelings may be assessed.⁴⁰ The Szondi test is also widely used. It is a test in which the subject is shown a series of cards bearing portraits of people and is asked which one he would most like to sit beside.⁴¹ All the pictures are of a thoroughly disordered

³⁹ Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 30 ff.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 140 ff.

⁴¹ In addition to the Szondi Test are the Bender Visual-Motor Gestalt Test, Machover's Draw-a-Person Test, the Gehl-Kutash Graphomotor Projection Test. Lawrence E. Abbot and Leopold Bellak, *Projective Psychology* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1950); Harold H. Anderson and Gladys L. Anderson *An Introduction to Projective Techniques* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1951); John E. Bell,

group of people—homosexuals, sadists, epileptics, hysterical persons, catatonics, paranoids, depressed persons, or maniacs. It is assumed that the individual will sense a *rapport* with some more than others. For example, an ad agency for the major whiskey distillers sought to diagnose the personality of the heavy drinker, since heavy drinkers consume 85 per cent of the volume of whiskey sold. It was concluded that a man drinks heavily because he gets a change in personality from drinking. The heavy drinkers were given the Szondi test before and after drinking, showing a radically different set of identifications. Finally lie detectors and the eye-blink rates (preferred by James Vicary) are used as clues to emotional tension during tests. Hypnosis is also used by Ruthrauff and Ryan, the New York ad agency; and the use of trained hypnotists as radio and television announcers has been seriously considered. Experiments have also been made with subliminal stimulation, the flashing of ads on the motion picture screen during regular shows. The flashed messages were too short for people in the audience to recognize them consciously, but presumably long enough to permit their being absorbed unconsciously.

One direction taken by advertising as a result of motivation research is the conscious attempt to create "personalities" for products. It was found that less than two per cent of the people loyal to a given brand of cigarettes, whiskey, or beer, could actually distinguish them from others. Then why not manufacture brand loyalty? David Ogilvy's advertising firm devised a moustached man with a black eye patch to advertise an obscure brand of shirt, and Hathaway shirt sales soared. Procter and Gamble's image builders personified their soaps: Ivory soap was personified as mother and daughter on a pedestal of purity; Camay as a glamorous, sophisticated woman. The Company's two shortenings, Crisco and Golden Fluffo, were differentiated in the image of a professional dietitian and a warm, robust, motherly character. Self images have been provided for the buyers of the various gasolines so effectively that a dealer who changes his brand of gasoline may find his business reduced as much as 30 per cent.

Projective Techniques (New York: Longmans Green, 1948); Gerald S. Blum, *The Blacky Pictures: A Technique for the Exploration of Personality Dynamics* (New York: The Psychological Corporation, 1950); Pearl Breen Berg "The Use of the Graphomotor Projection Test in Describing the Personality of a Group of Normal Girls," *Revue de psychologie* Vol. 1, July 1952, pp. 469-494.

Cigarettes have been personalized: Camels as masculine, strong, and for ordinary working people; Lucky Strikes as strong and for men, but less for working men.⁴² The cancer scare set in motion a flurry of new cigarette image building. Automobiles too have been built into symbols of personality and position.

Another basic direction taken by modern advertising under the influence of motivation research is the more ingenious exploitation of guilt feelings, fears, anxieties, hostilities, loneliness, and tension. Dichter objected to cigarette ads that expressed images of dreamy happiness. Smokers, he maintained, smoke when they know they are under strain. They smoke to release tensions, to express sociability, as a reward for effort, an aid to poise, in anticipation of stress, and as proof of daring. Young people smoke to appear older; older people smoke to appear younger. People under pressure smoke as a reward for a tough job well done. Advertising began to emphasize youth, sophistication, and reward.

When people began to cut down on sweet foods (consumption of confectionery items fell ten per cent from 1950 to 1955), the loss was counteracted by the ad men by emphasizing bite-sized pieces of candy which could appeal to self-indulgence in moderation. When a midwest tractor firm found that its potential customers were reluctant to buy because they feared the tractor would tip over, they re-designed it to *look* as if the weight was more evenly distributed over the front and rear wheels. Researchers for American Airlines helped break down the prejudice against flying by a campaign intended to provide symbols of the family approval of flying. A sense of security on airlines was secured by having hostesses practice talking into a tape recorder in a soft, calm manner. Dichter discovered that the loan company's advantage over the bank for some kinds of loans (which people could obtain cheaper at a bank) was due to its lower moral tone.

James Vicary found that one reason for preference for the supermarket over the small grocery is that it is easier for young housewives to conceal their ignorance about foods. Tooth paste makers doubled their sales in a few years by keeping people feeling uneasy about their teeth. Social Research found that the two

⁴² Pierre Martineau, "Martineau Stresses Product Personality at Homemakers' Meet" *Advertising Age*, June 22, 1953. Summary of Speech.

best customers for pain relievers are suggestible anxiety-prone people and aggressive, self-reliant types who insist on prescribing their own medication. A *Chicago Tribune's* study showed that a significant function of the automobile is to express aggression. A Chicago ad agency claims that people who have body odors secretly do not want to give them up—B.O. is a defense mechanism. A greeting card company found that a key factor in the use of greeting cards is the loneliness of the sender. A barren, gnarled tree alone on a windswept hill was its best seller. Weiss and Geller came to the conclusion that people buy home freezers (which are usually more costly to own and operate than normal food plans) because of their anxieties and uncertainty and the reassuring sense of safety, security, and self-sufficiency that freezers give. The same agency claims to have discovered that air conditioners have a hidden security value in the psychic need to keep the windows closed. At the same time, one of the major problems in selling air conditioners is to overcome a latent claustrophobia in many people. The do-it-yourself boom, it is claimed, is linked to the demand for security and self-sufficiency.

Packard maintains that when Lloyd Warner (an anthropologist at the University of Chicago) published his book, *Social Class in America*, in 1948, it created a major stir in advertising circles and has become a manual for developing merchandising appeals. To Warner there are nine social classes: upper-upper, upper-middle, upper-lower, middle-upper, middle-middle, middle-lower, lower-upper, lower-middle, and lower-lower. Warner believes that the American social classes can best be defined not only in terms of wealth and power, but in terms of people's consumption and sociability habits. From a merchandising point of view, the three top classes are the "quality" market constituting 15 per cent of the population. Another 20 per cent of the population appears at the bottom. Merchandisers are particularly interested in the 65 per cent in the middle. Moreover, according to Gardner, the middle class woman (who controls 80 per cent of the family's purchasing decisions) is the major merchandising target.

In Warner's view the middle majority woman is hard working, serious, unimaginative, and tense. Her life is bound by narrow routines; she likes only family things; her imaginative resources

are limited; she has a strong moral code; she feels a deep sense of guilt when she deviates from her moral code.

When ad men wished to produce a fragrance called Naomi, they thought of illustrating it with one of Gauguin's drawings of South Sea island girls. When the depth probers showed this to the middle majority women for whom it was intended, they found Gauguin's island girls to be dirty, heavy, sweaty, perhaps Africans. When shown a young American blond girl holding flowers, however, this produced emotionally warm and admiring responses.

The tastes and buying habits of the lower-lower class, by contrast, have been found to be related, carefree, and uninhibited. Louis Cheskin found that people with many emotional outlets tend to favor muted or neutral colors, while persons with few emotional outlets favor strong colors.⁴³ When asked to design two boxes for a candy manufacturer, one to sell for \$1.95 and one for \$3.50, Cheskin came up with the conclusion that the box for the \$3.50 candy could be made for nine cents, while the box for the cheaper brand would have to cost 50 cents.

When a Chicago brewery tried to raise the status appeal of its beer by showing it was drunk by the best people—by persons in dinner jackets and fox-hunting outfits—the men in taverns suddenly found that it did not taste right any more. The beer fell from first to nineteenth place on the market. Social Research looked into the situation, and came up with the conclusion that beer drinking is an informal, predominantly middle class beverage. It recommended that the brewers in their ads show hearty “all American men” and if girls were shown, they should be more sweet than sexy. It has become accepted in modeling circles that only persons with the sweet, girl-next-door look have a chance of winning Miss Rheingold titles.

People whose tastes have been manipulated in this manner eventually turn up in the supermarkets, where many of their buying decisions are made. In the study made by the Du Pont Company (1954) based on 5,338 shoppers at 250 supermarkets, it appears that increasing numbers of persons buy on impulse. The shopper does not make a list; less than one in five has a list. Impulse buying of pungent odor food (cheese, candy, cake, snack

⁴³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 36 ff.

spreads, and other self-gratifying items) runs as high as 90 per cent of all purchases. Other investigators have confirmed this. The Folding Paper Box Association found that two-thirds of all purchases were made on impulse.

James Vicary set up cameras and started following the ladies in the supermarket to record the eye-blink rate of women as they shopped. How fast the eye blinks (normally about 32 times a minute) is an index to tension. The eye blink rate did not go up as the ladies entered the supermarket to indicate mounting tension, but went down to around 14 blinks a minute. As Vicary put it, the women went into a hypnoidal trance. Some of them, he reports, had a glassy stare and were so entranced that they wandered through the store plucking things at random, bumping into boxes without seeing them, and passing a foot or so from hidden cameras without noticing them. At the check-out counter, the eye blink rate would start increasing to a high abnormal of 45 blinks per minute when the cash register sounded. Often the women did not have enough money to pay for all the things in their carts.

The average woman, it was found, takes twenty seconds to cover an aisle in a supermarket. Under such circumstances visual appeal must operate instantaneously or it will have no effect at all. The Color Research Institute specializes in designing packages that have deep impact. They perform elaborate tests to see how the eye travels over the package. A woman's attention, according to some psychologists, is most quickly attracted to red, a man's to blue. Many merchandizers make sure that their "splurge" items, on which profit margins are highest, are at eye level. Moreover, a test by the *Progressive Grocer* showed that customers buy 22 per cent more if the shelves are kept full, suggesting a powerful urge for conformity. The Coca-Cola Company discovered that customers in a supermarket who pause to refresh themselves at a soft drink counter tend to spend more. While in the past years the average American family spent about 25 per cent of its income for food, it now spends nearly 30 per cent.

SUMMARY

A mass society means more than a mere aggregation of people. Only when a collection of persons is subject to the same

processes and formed into a homogeneous unit does it merit the characterization. An urban industrial population formed into a homogeneous unit is the prototype of the modern mass society. The United States with 175,000,000 people united under a single system, only 20 per cent of whom are engaged in agriculture, is one of the important mass societies of the modern world.

One of the most quickly identifiable aspects of a mass society is mass production of the material items necessary to life. The United States has led the modern world in the production in quantity of standardized items resting on the principles of precision, standardization, interchangeability, and synchronization.

From the days when Eli Whitney introduced the principles of mass production into the manufacture of army rifles, one area of production after another yielded to the transformation. In the assembly lines of the Ford plant the twentieth century world reached the threshold of a new level of mass production for a network of production, and transportation lines covering the country began to meet in the moving assembly line. Beyond this are the continuous-flow chemical plants and other forms of automatic production of our times.

The principle of mass production concealed within itself the possibility of economic democracy. Mass production required for its realization mass consumption. A process was set in motion involving mass retailing and mass advertising in an interacting spiral resulting in the increasing growth of self-service, self-selection, and robot retailing, all of which in turn require more pre-selling.

As the efficiencies of mass production began to saturate the available markets, expedients were devised to stimulate the productive process. One significant expedient was the development of consumer credit and the extension of instalment buying. This touched basic items with the McCormick reaper and Singer sewing machine in the nineteenth century. Instalment buying, however, genuinely came into its own with the automobile in the twentieth century. From here it extended to radios, refrigerators, furniture, television sets, and on to an almost endless array of items. The development of instalment buying commits future consumption in the process, and is accompanied by an extensive liquidation of traditional attitudes toward saving. The new so-

cial ethic of *budgetism* replaces the traditional demand for saving.

The second fundamental transformation carried out in connection with mass production and consumption is the transformation of taste. The primary function of advertising is to carry out a standardization of taste without which the entire productive process would break down. However, as the competition of the various producers becomes more intense, the problem becomes the stimulation of buying in the face of an increasingly saturated market. One line of advertising strategy becomes the creation of psychological obsolescence. Another objective is to establish preferences between different brands of essentially identical products. This has led more and more to the adventure of the modern advertisers into the field of motivation research, depth analysis, psychological testing, etc. The manipulation of unconscious impulses and symbols has increasingly become the rule.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. In what sense is America "consumption oriented"? Do you agree?
2. In what ways is the American high standard of living sometimes said to be a weakness as well as a strength?
3. Applied to a non-literate society, what do the terms "material economy" and "prestige economy" refer to? Of what importance is the distinction?
4. How do you account for the frequency of sumptuary laws in early societies?
5. What is meant by the phrase, "the traditional relation between work and consumption in the United States"? How is it changing?
6. In what ways does instalment buying represent a change in traditional American behavior?
7. What is "motivation research"? Of what significance is it?
8. Compare Riesman's "inner-directedness" and Max Weber's "inner worldly asceticism."
9. What is the meaning of budgetism? In what respects does it represent something new in the American way of life?
10. In what ways has the theory of levels of human consciousness affected modern advertising?

3

PERSONALITY IN MASS SOCIETY

In a society undergoing rapid change, the individual assumes special importance. This is inevitable, for social change means that existing institutions are, in some respects, inadequate. In the intervals between the break-down of old and the formation of new institutions, the continuity of social life rests on the ingenuity and energy of individuals. When it is necessary to rely on the individual, an attempt will be made to understand him and legitimize his activity. Through a series of revolutions, our own society has produced more theoretical explanations of personality than any other period in human history.

THE HUMANISTIC AND RELIGIOUS VIEWS OF MAN

The two poles in the modern explanation of personality are formed by the humanistic and religious views of man. These views arose out of the two major areas of social experience, where modern individuality was freed for expression and encouraged to carry out the reconstruction of the social order.

The Humanistic View of Man. The humanistic view of man arises in literati circles associated with the socio-political environments of the city and of the nation in their formative periods. It was a view of learned men who acted as secretaries, ambassadors, envoys, and tutors to the princes, political bosses, and dictators of the Renaissance city and later to the enlightened despots of the seventeenth and eighteenth century monarchies. The humanistic advisors, tutors, and confidants of the Renaissance city despots included such persons as Dante (1265-1321), Francesco Petrarca (1304-1374), Lorenzo Valla (1406-1456), Marsilio Ficino (b.

1433), Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola (1462-1494), Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1524), Erasmus (1466-1536), and Juan Luis Vives (1492-1524). The eighteenth century humanists included such men as John Locke (1632-1704), Voltaire (1694-1778), Montesquieu (1689-1755), Goethe (1749-1832), and David Hume (1711-1776).¹

As tutors, advisors, secretaries, ambassadors, and confidants, first to the rulers of cities and later to the authorities of the emerging states, these literati ransacked the classical literatures of ancient Greece and Rome for ideas and ideologies usable in the establishment and justification of new social forms. Their lives and their activities fell outside the institutions of the past. They found the meaning of their existence in services to their times made possible by their scholarship and creativity. They rested their self-confidence in their studies and their private talents.

They developed an optimistic theory of human nature and located their identities in the world of learned men, not in any particular area or institution. They were of the conviction that human problems could best be solved by human enterprise. The highest objective in life was visualized as the full development of the abilities of the learned man. For their political sponsors, they criticized traditional institutions and provided many of the ideas and the rationalizations for institutional reform. The objective of institutions in their view was to promote the full emergence of human capacity. These ideas guided the French and American Revolutions, and supplied the basis for contemporary liberalism.

The Religious View of Man. The contemporary religious view of man can be seen taking shape in the minds of pre-Reformation reformers such as Jerome Savaronala (1452-1498), William of Occam (c. 1349), John Wycliff (1324-1384), and John Huss (1369-1415). It came to full flower in the thought of Martin Luther (1483-1546), John Calvin (1509-1564), Ulrich Zwingli (1484-1531), and John Knox (c. 1505).²

In one respect the religious view of man took shape under conditions similar to those of the humanists, a time of institutional

¹ Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, trans. by Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettigrove (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951).

² Preserved Smith, *The Age of the Reformation* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1920).

change. It expressed a new religious individualism comparable to the literary and political individualism of the humanists, however, the religious context had very different consequences for their view of man.

While the self-reliance of the cultivated man was the core of humanistic theory, the religious conception of man was built around the conceptions of suffering, sin, and redemption. The humanists thought man by nature good; the religious theorists saw him as a creature of sin. The humanists wished to implement individual self-realization; the religious theorists wished to bring man's original nature under the disciplined control of the religious conscience. To the tact and sophistication of the humanists, corresponded the moral rectitude of the religious man.

When one conceives of the individual as naturally evil, he is correspondingly led to the necessity of social control. This is a poor basis for individualization. Traditional Christianity drew precisely this conclusion; the expressions of individuality were suspect. Man's social and religious fate was best kept under the tight control of the sacramental theory of the church and the watchful eyes of the priesthood. Religious intensity could not manifest itself as secular individuality; it took the form of a flight from the world into the monastery.

The non-sacramental theory of the church was another matter. Since human nature was viewed as basically evil, the problem of control remained, however, the arena of control was shifted to the inner structure of man's character. The old simple contrast between an evil human nature and a good social order which kept it under control was replaced by a complexly structured personality; the foundations of tragedy and triumph were placed at its core. For its full development, the religious personality, so conceived, simultaneously rejected external restraints while it tightened the internal controls.

Personalities constructed on the basis of the supposition that they simultaneously comprise a principle of evil and of control are capable of generating rather remarkable energies. There is hardly a major problem of the world that they are incapable of transferring to the arena of their inner natures. Many of the remarkable revolutions of the modern world were carried out by personalities of this sort.

THE TRANSITION TO A SCIENTIFIC THEORY
OF PERSONALITY

The humanistic theory of personality was most strong in Italy and France; the religious theory of personality was dominant in northern Europe after the Reformation and in the United States during the nineteenth century. The humanistic theory of personality was prominent in the Renaissance, and later, during the eighteenth century; the religious theory of personality was strongest during the Reformation and during waves of revivalism thereafter. In the United States both before and after the Revolution the religious theory of personality was dominant; the revolutionary period, like a bright island in a somber sea, was lighted by the humanistic theory of personality.

Eventually, during the nineteenth century, the observations on personality that had been assembled from the humanistic and religious points of view were taken over and incorporated into the scientific theories of personality. It quickly became conventional, as it remains today, for scientific theories of personality to dissociate themselves both from the religious and the humanistic views of man. It is argued that both the theory of the goodness and of the badness of human nature are mistaken—in itself human nature is neither good nor bad. The idea that human nature is “good” is often described as a mere ideology; the idea that it is “evil” is said to represent a moral rather than a scientific judgment.

While one can accept the essential correctness of these judgments, it is also clear that much of the original polarity of the humanistic and religious views of man remains in contemporary theories of personality. Modern theories of personality differ in terms of their emphasis on such things as biological or instinctive foundations of personality or on the significance of situation, experience, and learning. Personality theories emphasizing the role of biological and emotional elements are clearly the modern heirs of the religious view of man. In his theory of personality, Freud, for example, treats the emotional life of man in terms equivalent to those of the old religious reformers.

Now look away from individuals to the great war still devastating Europe: think of the colossal brutality, cruelty, and mendacity which

is now allowed to spread itself over the civilized world. Do you really believe that a handful of unprincipled place-hunters and corrupters of men would have succeeded in letting loose all this latent evil, if the millions of their followers were not also guilty? Will you venture, even in these circumstances, to break a lance for the exclusion of evil from the mental constitution of humanity?³

Nor did the similarities between the Freudian and religious theory of personality stop with the common judgment of the evil of human nature. Freud went on in his theory of a censoring mechanism (which refused to permit expression of immoral emotional impulses arising from man's original nature) and his later theory of the super-ego (internalized norms which keep negative social impulses under control) to identify a personality mechanism that parallels the religious conscience. Freudian and other drive and instinct theories of personality are modern heirs to the religious theory of man. In them biology takes the place of evil.

There have been other theories of personality which emphasize the importance of environment. In its extreme form behaviorism described personality as a mere cross section of the activity stream. Moreover, the Gestalt and Field theories of personality play down the importance of all biological and historical factors, and place the problem of personality in terms of the "situation" or "field" in which behavior occurs. Such theories emphasizing environmental and situational factors as well as learning are the modern heirs of the humanistic theory of personality.⁴

It is, however, a mistake to conceive of the humanistic and religious theories of man or their scientific successors as simple alternatives. They arose in different social contexts to explain different manifestations of individuality. It may well be true that some of the scientific heirs of the humanistic and religious positions may be more supplementary than alternative to one another.

At the present time all major theories of personality agree that the personality is a product both of inheritance and experience, particularly social experience. It would also follow from this that major changes in society have an influence on the types of per-

³ Sigmund Freud, *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, trans. by Joan Riviere (New York: Garden City Pub. Co., 1943), p. 131.

⁴ For a review of the current theories of personality, see Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, *Theories of Personality* (New York: John Wiley & Co., 1957).

sonalities a society creates. Since the clear emergence of personality theory in sociology around 1900, it has been undergoing rather rapid change. In part this is because modern personality is changing.

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF
PERSONALITY IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

The three great students of personality in early American sociology were William James, Charles Horton Cooley, and George Herbert Mead. James opened up the subject. In his principles of psychology he drew a distinction between the empirical self and the pure ego. By the empirical self or "me" he meant all of a man's self that he calls his own.⁵ The constituents of the self, according to James, are the material self (the material body of the person), the social self (the recognition a man gets from others—a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their minds), the spiritual self (a man's inner subjective being, psychic faculties, or dispositions). The self-emotions, according to James, are self seeking, and self preservation which may be directed toward the bodily, social, or spiritual self. Self-feeling depends on a ratio of one's hopes to his success.

$$\text{Self Esteem} = \frac{\text{Success}}{\text{Pretensions}}^6$$

James believes that self regard tends to form a hierarchical scale with the bodily self at the bottom and the spiritual self at the top. All these distinctions belong to the phenomenal self, the self as a part of ordinary experience. Behind all these manifestations is the pure ego, a pure principle of personal identity.⁷ According to James, there are a number of theories of this pure self or "inner principle of personal unity." These are the spiritualistic theory, the associationistic theory, and the transcendentalistic theory. According to the first of these, the pure self is the soul.⁸

Writing some ten years after James, Charles Horton Cooley

⁵ William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: Henry & Co., 1890), Vol. 1, p. 291.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

⁸ James, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

simplified James' distinctions somewhat and further clarified the social content and social structure of the self. The social self, according to Cooley, "is simply any idea, or system of ideas, drawn from the communicative life, that the mind cherishes as its own."⁹ The preconditions for the emergence of the social self are instinctive self feeling, social experience, and the consolidating functions of habit. "The object of self-feeling is affected by the general course of history, by particular development of nations, classes, and professions, and other conditions of this sort."¹⁰ As social conditions vary, so will the content of the self. "Habit has the same fixing and consolidating action in the growth of the self that it has elsewhere, but it is not its distinctive characteristic."¹¹

The rise of the self proper is contained in Cooley's theory of the looking-glass self. "A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person, the imagination of his judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification."¹²

The specific tie between personality and social structure was traced in detail by Cooley in *Social Organization*. He theorized that the basic formation of the social self occurred in primary groups characterized by face-to-face association and cooperation. The chief properties of primary groups in addition to face-to-face association were unspecified associations, relative permanence, and the small number of persons involved. Such was the case in the old fashioned neighborhood, the play group of children, and the group of elders. In such groups an intimate fusion of individuality and group occurs. The primary group is "fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual."¹³

These ideas were brought into full synthesis and development by George Herbert Mead. Mead maintained that the ongoing process of social life (interaction between creatures of the same kind) precedes the appearance of the self. As the only creatures with a language, Mead assumed, man has the unique opportunity to develop the self. The social life of non-human creatures in part

⁹ Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902), p. 147.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 152.

¹³ Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization*, *op. cit.*, pp. 24 ff.

depends on the response to the symbolic implications of the behavior of others; one creature senses danger and flees, and others of the herd follow. Only human beings carry on social life in terms of significant symbols or language—parts of behavior which have identical meaning to all parties to the social act or mutually understood gestures.

The peculiar property of the self, according to Mead, is its reflexivity:

It is the characteristic of the self as an object to itself that I want to bring out. This characteristic is represented in the word "self," which is a reflexive, and indicates that which can be both subject and object. This type of object is essentially different from other objects, and in the past it has been distinguished as conscious, a term which indicates an experience with, an experience of, one's self.¹⁴

Only language makes this possible. Language consists of shared symbols. The behavioral meaning of language is the response it evokes. When a child learns a word from its mother, it automatically takes over the attitudes of the mother. People who share a language have a great body of meanings and attitudes in common. "The self, is that which can be an object to itself, is essentially a social structure, and it arises in social experience."¹⁵ Only in a community interaction by means of language can this occur.

The self arising in social experience by the internalization of the attitudes of others mediated by language, goes through two major stages represented by play and the game. The essential process in the rise of the self consists in an individual taking the role of the other. This occurs every time a new word is learned, for attitudes of the other are automatically internalized in the process. In play a new stage of self-consolidation occurs. The child playing at the adult roles it perceives around it takes over and reenacts in its own behavior not single items but whole blocks of the behavior of others. The child playing at "mother," "father," "keeping house," "fireman," acquires a considerable self-realization in the process. In the game, according to Mead, a new level of self development is achieved. The organized game is a structured

¹⁴ George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 136-137.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

social activity in which the proper performance of any one position requires the specialization of behavior to accord with the specialized behavior of every other member of the game. The pitcher and catcher of a baseball team, for example, only play their parts correctly when they rely upon the specialized behaviors of other participants in the game. While the child at play, in Mead's language, takes the role of some "specialized other," in the game he takes the role of all the other members of the team—the "generalized other."¹⁶ With the ability of the individual to take part in the organized game, he is ready for general adult participation in society.

In the course of its formation, the self gradually acquires a structure the key elements of which Mead describes, following James, as the "me" and the "I." By the "me" Mead refers to the attitudes of the community so far as they are taken over and made a part of the self. As a set of internalized social attitudes the "me" functions within the person as once others functioned from without—as a basis for self judgment and as a foundation of approval or disapproval. However, no person is a mere reflection of the attitudes of his society. The individual is also an active agent. "I" refers to the individual as actor; it is the principle of response.¹⁷ William James' distinctions between the empirical and pure ego have become, in Mead's account, the two sub-structures, the "me" and the "I," which together make up the self.

Among the general properties of these interesting accounts of the sociology of personality developed in the early decades of the twentieth century, is their clear continuity with the religious view of man. In William James' account of the self, the soul is still visible as the pure ego—as the real self behind the phenomenal self. In all cases the most critical characteristics of the self is the operation of a structure within the personality bearing close similarity to the religious conscience. The spiritual self in the account of James operates in this manner; the norms and standards of the primary group internalized in the personality operate as the equivalent conscience for Cooley; Mead directly described the operation of the "me" as identical with the conscience.

There is another property that binds these theories of the

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 152-163.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 173 ff.

social person together. All of them presuppose the small town environment characteristic of nineteenth century America. All the illustrations of personality formation rest on small town conditions and situations: the play group, the sand lot baseball game, the family reunion group, even the dog fight. Moreover, the individual is assumed to be the kind of autonomous moral agent familiar in the small Protestant community of nineteenth century America.

When one turns to the theory of personality growing out of the James, Cooley, Mead tradition at mid-century, the environment presupposed as the basis for the formation of the self is quite different. The recent theories assume a mass society. Ideas of the structure of the self are so radically transformed that neither the religious nor the humanistic view of man can any longer be said to apply.

THE FORMALIZATION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

Mass production, mass marketing, the substitution of budgetism for saving, and the mass manipulation of taste cannot be without consequences for the relation of the individual to society. Contemporary theory of personality, when it is not concerned with the organization of individual drives or internal structure of the self but with the relations of the individual to social groups, tends to be dominated by the concept of social roles. The language of social roles seems to be unusually appropriate to the problem of the social presentation of the self in modern society. The description of self in its everyday social affairs in these terms has been carried out with unusual economy and insight by Erving Goffman.¹⁸

Goffman maintains that when an individual appears before others he has motives for trying to control the impression they receive of the situation. Interaction is the reciprocal influence of individuals on one another's actions during social contacts. A performance is all the activity of a given participant serving to influence other participants. The pre-established pattern of action unfolded during the performance is a "part" or a "routine." When an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to

¹⁸ Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Social Sciences Research Center, 1956).

take seriously the impression that is fostered. The actor's attitude toward the impression he fosters varies from his belief in it, sincerity, to his disbelief in it, or cynicism. Front is the expressive equipment of a standard kind, intentionally or unwittingly employed during the performance. The "setting" is the same scenic parts of expressive equipment. Manner consists of those stimuli which warn the audience of the attitude the performer expects to bring to the situation. The tendency for a large number of different roles to be presented behind a small number of fronts is a natural development of social organization. Since fronts tend to be selected to fit the task to be performed, trouble arises when those who perform a given task are forced to select a suitable front from several dissimilar ones. Tasks may arise that do not fit the standard array. In military and medical hierarchies, for example, tasks arise which fall between the spaces of existing ranks.

Goffman maintains that while in the presence of others the individual infuses his activity with signs which dramatically highlight acts that might otherwise remain obscure. Sometimes dramatization constitutes a problem for practical reasons, as when merchants must charge high prices for things that look expensive to pay for the insurance, slack periods, and things of the sort that do not appear before the public eye. Sometimes the management of appearance is so complex that it becomes a special function of some members of an organization while the real work is done by others.

According to Goffman, since the performance of a routine through its front makes claims upon the audience, the individual's performance tends to incorporate and exemplify the officially accredited and accepted values of the society. There is thus a constant difference between appearance and reality. One of the richest sources of data on the presentation of idealized performances is the literature on social mobility. Upward mobility involves presentation of performances proper to the strata above one's own in the efforts to move upward and keep from moving downward. In American society Goffman thinks such upward mobility is most frequently expressed in status symbols of material wealth. Idealized performances are not confined to status movements, but also appear defensively, as when southern Negroes

present the stereotype of ignorant shiftlessness or when the junk peddler maintains an image of abject poverty.

In appearances before the public, economies and pleasures and profits and errors tend to be repressed. The urbane style affected in some scholarly books contrasts with the feverish drudgery the author may have endured in earlier drafts; and many performers foster the impression that they have only ideal motives for acquiring the role or that they have ideal qualifications for it (suppressing the indignities, insults, and humiliations and deals entering into its acquisition). Medical schools, according to Goffman, often recruit students partly on the basis of ethnic origin, while they publicly sustain the myth that the students occupy their position by merit alone.

Nor must one assume that the audience wants the truth. The audience may experience a great saving of time and emotional energy if it accepts the performance at face value. For example, it saves wear and tear on the emotions if one accepts the myth in relation to the medical doctor that the general practitioner sends the patients to a specialist on the basis of merit rather than because of college ties or fee splitting arrangements.

The performer can therefore rely on his audience to accept minor clues as a sign that something is important about the performance. The audience may however misunderstand such clues. Moreover, unintended gestures occur incompatible with the impression being presented: by accident, because of self-consciousness or embarrassment, or lack of dramaturgical direction. Performances, in fact, differ in the degree that expressive consistency is required. It is usually greater in sacred performances, but may be present in secular performances as well. The expressive coherence required in a performance often reveals the discrepancies between the social and real self.

While it is necessary for the audience to accept signs to orient itself to the performance, this puts the performer in the position of misrepresenting and may lead the audience to examine with special care those properties of the performance that cannot easily be feigned. The reaction to impersonation is ironically strongest when it most nearly approximates the real thing. The social definition of impersonation is, however, not very consistent. It tends to be rigid with regard to such sacred status as that of doctor or

priest, but weak with regard to others. Organizations such as real estate bodies develop codes specifying the degree to which doubtful impressions (by over-statement, under-statement, and omission) may be conveyed. In American law intent, negligence, and strict liability are distinguished, but there are no universal rules to guide socially approved amounts of misrepresentation. The possibilities range from the barefaced lie to the white lie that may accomplish a humanistic purpose.

As Goffman sees it, the performance of an individual always accentuates some matters and hides others. The restrictions placed on confidence and maintenance of social distance may generate awe, holding the audience in a state of mystification. The audience often cooperates in a respectful fashion with awed regard of the sacred integrity imputed to the performer. Frequently the only real secret is that there is no secret.

Goffman urges that some performances serve mainly to express the characteristics of the task rather than of the performer. A number of individuals cooperating in staging a single routine is a team. A routine which requires a team often centers in a member of the team who becomes a star, forming the lead or hub of attention. A team always has something of the character of a secret society.

A region is a place to some degree bounded by barriers to perception. In Anglo-American society, when a performance is given it is usually in a highly bounded region. The front region is the place where the performance is given. The back region of a performance is often located at one end of the place where the performance is presented, being cut off from it by a partition or guarded passageway. In this case the performance in the front region can receive back region assistance. The vital secrets of a show are visible backstage, but this area is closed to the audience as a fundamental part of the management of impression. The back region may include such things as the kitchen, bedroom, and bath of the private home; the service areas of a hotel, restaurant, or store; the places in the television or radio studio where the technical work goes on; the back stage of the theatre; and the locker rooms of a club. Backstage language and behavior often contrast sharply from front region behavior with reciprocal first-naming, cooperative decision making, profanity, open sexual

remarks, griping, smoking, informal dress, sloppy posture, sub-standard speech, shouting, play, aggressiveness, kidding, inconsiderateness, and the like. However, activity in the concrete situation is always a compromise between the formal and informal styles of front and back stage. Sometimes amiability is reserved for the public, and sullenness and backbiting occur behind the scenes. The higher the rank of an individual, the smaller the teams and the more extensive the areas of one's life in which front region behavior is required.

A basic objective of a team is to support the definition of the situation fostered by its performance, involving the over-communication of some facts, the under-communication of others, or information control. A variety of secrets, from the standpoint of their relation to the conception of others about the possessor, surround any performance. Dark secrets are information incompatible with the image of the self which the team maintains before the audience. Strategic secrets pertain to intentions and capacities important for designing future actions by the team. Inside secrets define an individual as a member in the know in the group. One team may have entrusted secrets about another. Free secrets are somebody else's secrets known to one.

From the standpoint of a particular performance, the crucial roles are distinguished by Goffman as those who perform, those performed to, and outsiders. These roles can be distinguished on the basis of the regions to which the role player has access: performers appear in the front and back regions; the outsiders are excluded from both the audience and the back region. There is never complete concurrence of function and information and accessible region between these roles.

The most spectacularly discrepant roles are those that bring a person into a social establishment in a false guise. Varieties of this are the informer (the person who pretends to be a member of the team, is allowed to come back stage and acquire destructive information, and who openly or secretly sells out the show to the audience); the shill (someone who acts as though he were an ordinary member of the audience but who is in league with the performers, providing a visible model for the audience of the kind of response the performers seek); the spotter (a presumably innocent member of the audience, but acting as a protective agent

for the otherwise unprotected public); the self-appointed spotter, the "knocker," or the "wise guy" who does not possess the knowledge of backstage operations he claims to possess; the professional shopper (the Gimbel man in Macy's or the Macy's man in Gimbel's, the fashion spy, the foreigner at national air meets); the go-between or mediator (one who learns the secrets of each side and gives each side the true impression that he will keep its secrets).

The discrepant roles of informer, shill, spotter, shopper, and go-between contain an unexpected, unapparent relation of roles, information possessed, and regions of access. In each case the person may participate in the interaction of both the performers and audience. Other discrepant roles are represented by the non-person—a person present when roles are played but who does not take the role of either performer or of audience, nor tend to be what he is not. The servant is the classic case of a non-person, expected to be present in the front region while the host is performing. Among other persons treated as if they are not there are the very old, the very young, and the sick. Today an increasing body of technical personnel (recording stenographers, broadcasting technicians, photographers, and secret police) are treated as if in a sense they are not present. Among other discrepant roles of persons not present during the performance, but with unexpected information about it, are service specialists (the architect, furniture salesman, specialist in settings, the dentist, hairdresser, staff economist, accountant, lawyer, researcher who formulates factual elements of a client's verbal display, and ghost writer). Service specialists are often in a position to possess entrusted secrets, and may exploit their knowledge to gain concessions from the performer. For legal, professional, ethical, and enlightened reasons they often stop with minor forms of blackmail.

A special category of un-persons, in Goffman's *Alice in Wonderland* terminology, is the training specialist who has the complicated task of teaching the performer how to build his impression. Another type is the confidant, the person to whom the performer freely confesses his secrets about the way in which the performance was pure impression. The role of colleague also affords those who play it some information about performances they do not attend. Every role, moreover, has its defrocked priests ready

to tell what goes on in the monastery. Such is the doctor who will describe in print how his colleagues split fees, steal each other's patients, specialize in unnecessary operations; or the professor who exposes his colleagues. Renegades often take a moral stand, maintaining that they are true to the ideals of the role rather than the particular performers of it.

When two teams interact, they tend to stay in character; backstage familiarity is suppressed. Despite the working consensus and gentlemen's agreement not to disrupt it, there are often less apparent currents of communication of a surreptitious sort. Among the types of communication incompatible with the official impression are treatment of the absent, staging talk, team collusion, and temporary re-alignments. At times the audience is praised in ways not permitted in its presence; but when the members of a team go backstage, they regularly derogate the audience by mock role-playing and uncomplimentary terms of reference. Doctors refer to an absent patient as "the cardiac" or "the strep." Moreover, in the absence of the audience, the members of the team may refer to their routine in a purely technical or cynical way, dramatizing their difference from the audience. Often backstage activity is in the form of a council of war, but when the teams meet a temporary truce or working consensus is observed.

That team-mates, when out of the presence of the audience, often discuss the problem of staging or shop talk points up the fact that individuals with widely different social roles live in the same climate of dramaturgical experience. When a participant conveys something during interaction, he is expected to communicate only through the lips of the character he has chosen to project. The performer may, however, convey much that is out of character in a way that prevents the audience as a whole from realizing the fact. Through such by-play performers can affirm backstage solidarity even while engaged in a performance.

An important kind of team collusion is found in systems of secret signals. Staging clues are often offered to the performers from backstage and are employed between performers and shills or a pitchman and his plant among the suckers. Informal cues or high signs may initiate a phrase in a performance, as when a husband by shading his voice conveys to his wife that the two should start farewells. Another type of cue functions to confirm for the

performer the fact that he does not really hold with the working consensus and that the show is merely a show. This is derisive collusion.

Performers often speak out of character in a way that can be heard by the audience but does not openly threaten the integrity of the two teams. These are temporary, unofficial, or controlled re-alignments, often aggressive in character. Unofficial communication may be carried on by innuendo, mimicry of accents, well placed jokes, significant pauses, veiled hints, kidding, and overtones. It may extend a noncompromising invitation to the other team to increase or decrease social distance and formality. Temporary re-alignments may be seized upon in an unofficial way by a subordinate or unofficially extended by a subordinate. By employing double talk the subordinate can initiate lines of action without giving open recognition to the impressive implication of such initiation. Barracks and jails abound in double talk. Among places most fruitful for studying re-aligning actions, especially temporary betrayals, according to Goffman, are the informal convivial communications among relative equals, such as marriage pairs. Flirting, for example, may occur in which males will try to destroy the females' pose of virginal unapproachability, while females may attempt to force males to a commitment of concern without weakening their defensive position.

By the arts of impression management, Goffman refers to the attributes required of a performer for successfully staging a character. The performer must exercise tact with expressive responsibilities, since acts may occur inappropriate to the impression to be created. When an outsider accidentally enters a region in which a performance is being given, or when a member of the audience enters backstage, he may catch those present off guard. The past life and current round of activity of a performer contain at least some facts which could discredit the performer. Unintentional or involuntary gestures, inopportune intrusions, and *faux pas* are sources of dissonance. Some scenes occur when team mates cannot countenance the effect, and blurt out immediate public criticism of the individuals with whom they are supposed to cooperate dramaturgically. At times an individual may make unusual claims on the audience, pleading with them to treat themselves as part of his team or allowing him to treat himself as part

of their team. Performances may be disrupted by unintended gestures, inopportune intrusions, *faux pas*, and scenes. The show may be "saved" by defense measures of the performers, protective measures by the audience to assist the performers in saving the show, and measures which the performers must take to make it possible for the audience and outsiders to employ protective measures on the performers' behalf.

If a team is to sustain its line, the teammates must accept certain moral obligations. The key in maintaining team loyalty is preventing the performers from becoming so sympathetically attached to the audience that the performers disclose the consequences for them of the impression. A team can defend itself against disloyalty by developing high in-group solidarity. Another technique for countering the danger of affective ties between performers and audience is to change the audience periodically. To maintain the team's performance each member of the team must possess dramaturgical discipline, remembering his part, and not committing *faux pas*. The focus of dramaturgical discipline is found in the management of one's face and voice.

In addition to loyalty and discipline in the dramaturgical sense, team mates must exercise prudence. Among the techniques for securing cooperation are the choice of only such members as are loyal and the acquisition by the team of a clear idea of how much loyalty and discipline it can rely on from the membership as a whole. The circumspect performer will attempt to select the kind of audience that will give a minimum of trouble in the course of the show. An automatic way of insuring that no member of the team or audience acts improperly is to limit the size of both teams as much as possible. Moreover, the dramaturgically prudent performer adopts his performance to the peculiar conditions under which it must be staged. The audience's access to information sources external to the interaction must be considered.

Most of the defensive techniques of impression management have a counterpart in the tact of audiences and outsiders who act in a protective way to help the performers save their show. Access to the back and front regions of a performance is controlled not only by the performers but by others. Individuals voluntarily stay away from regions into which they have not been invited. When interaction must proceed in the presence of outsiders, they

often tactfully act uninterested. The etiquette for tactful inattention and the effective privacy provided by it, vary from society to society, but they are always present. The necessity for being tactful does not cease once the audience has been admitted to a performance. It may choose not to see an actor's slip and to forgive the beginner.

While the audience sustains the show by protective tact in behalf of the performers, the performers must act in such a way as to permit this. Despite the fact that performers and audiences employ techniques of impression management, there audiences often gain inadvertent glimpses behind the scenes. The real individual beneath all the deceit and illusion is, as Goffman sees him, rather pitiful.

Whether the character that is being present is sober or carefree, of high station or low, the individual who performs the character will be seen for what he largely is, a solitary player involved in a harried concern for his production. Behind many masks and many characters, each performer tends to wear a single look, a naked unsocialized look, a look of concentration, a look of one actor who is privately engaged in a difficult, treacherous task.¹⁹

To Goffman a social establishment is any place surrounded by fixed barriers to perception, where a particular kind of activity takes place. Such social establishments may be studied from the standpoint of impression management. When social establishments are analyzed as closed systems, they may be examined from four perspectives: technically, in terms of efficiency, of internally organized activity, and achievement of pre-defined objectivity; politically, in terms of the actions that participants may demand of others; structurally, in terms of horizontal and vertical status divisions; and culturally, in terms of moral values which influence activity pertinent to fashions, customs, matters of taste, politeness, decorum, ultimate ends, and normative restrictions on means. The dramaturgical approach may constitute a fifth perspective—describing the techniques of impression management employed in a given establishment. The structural and dramaturgical perspectives intersect most clearly in respect to social distance. The cultural values of an establishment determine how participants

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 150-151.

are to feel, and establish a framework of appearances that must be maintained whether or not there is feeling behind the appearance.

Expression, according to Goffman, plays a communicative role during social interaction. The individual tends to treat others present in interaction on the basis of impressions they give about the past and the future. Communicative acts thus are translated into moral ones, for the impressions others give are treated as claims and promises of a moral character. The individual need not allow the impressions that arise as a by-product of his activity to affect his frame of reference, but it is to his advantage to create the desired impressions.

Goffman formulates his conception of a basic dialect of self-presentation in ordinary life in terms of these ideas:

In their capacity as performers, individuals will be concerned with maintaining the impression that they are living up to the many standards by which they and their products are judged. Because these standards are so numerous and so pervasive, the individuals who are performers dwell more than we might think in a moral world. But *qua* performers, individuals are concerned not with the moral issue of realizing these standards, but with the amoral issue of engineering a convincing impression that these standards are being realized. Our activity, then, is largely concerned with moral matters, but as performers we do not have a moral concern in these moral matters. As performers we are merchants of morality. Our day is given over to intimate contact with the goods we display and our minds are filled with intimate understandings of them; but it may well be that the more attention we give to these goods, the more distant we feel from them and from those who are believing enough to buy them. To use a different imagery, the very obligation and profitability of appearing always in a steady moral light, of being a socialized character, forces us to be the sort of person who is practiced in the ways of the stage.²⁰

Goffman's conceptions of the self have been reviewed at length because they typify one of the major approaches by social scientists to the personality of modern man. To modern students the language of the theatre has become almost universal in analyzing the self, which, particularly in its social appearances, is analyzed in terms of roles, performances, acts, scenes, and incidents.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

The contrasts with the theories of James, Cooley, and Mead are striking. In place of the small town, Goffman presupposes the mass society as the back drop to the self. In place of the conception of the self as an autonomous moral agent or as the humanistic man of taste, there appears only the opportunist observing, at best, purely discretionary rules.

THE SELF-DEVELOPMENT LITERATURE

The self-improvement literature of another day rested on the assumption, at times thinly disguised, that man was a moral agent ultimately concerned with the salvation of his immortal soul. Such literature was intended to serve either the improvement of man's spirit or his mind. However, the most popular of the items of the new self-improvement literature correspond directly to the kind of world assumed by Goffman.

The approach to personality by the practical students of personal relations, seems to flow naturally into the language and categories of merchandising. The contemporary self improvement literature is by and for people with something to sell. Perhaps the most famous "how to" book on socially effective personal relations is Dale Carnegie's *How to Win Friends and Influence People*.²¹ Carnegie rose from the obscurity of a Missouri farm to international fame by skillfully exploiting a widespread demand for effective self-presentation. The book was first published in 1936, selling a million copies the first year. It has been printed abroad in fourteen languages. It was on the *New York Times*' best seller list for ten years. It has sold over 5,000,000 copies, and continues to sell over 250,000 a year.

It was Carnegie's opinion that there are some fundamental techniques for "handling" people. The first principle is never to criticize, for it only puts a man on the defensive, makes him strive to justify himself, wounds his pride, and hurts his sense of importance. Rather than criticize—this is the second principle—praise him. On the other hand, we should not use flattery, for, Carnegie tells us, everyone would catch on to it and we would all be experts in human relations, but give honest, sincere appre-

²¹ Dale Carnegie, *How to Win Friends and Influence People* (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1958).

ciation.²² Moreover, it is only possible to influence others by getting them to talk about what they want and showing them how to get it.

To put them into the terms of Goffman, Carnegie's formulations could, perhaps, be stated somewhat as follows: A most crucial set of roles in everyday life are those intended to get the other person to do one's bidding. For all such roles there are three basic techniques of self-presentation that will go far toward achieving one's objective. (1) Never attack other persons, at least not directly; it only puts them on guard—in fact sometimes they counter-attack when they are wounded. (2) Soften them up with a little praise; that is, "honest, sincere appreciation." (3) Always disguise the form of influence you wish to exercise as something the other man wants.

With respect to the second principle, Carnegie warns that one should not use flattery, for if that were all there were to influencing others, all persons would be experts in social relations. If one really does not like the other person or persons, however, this is not a condition that can be changed by fiat. It may be assumed, then, that the difference between "flattery" and "honest, sincere appreciation" in this context is the subtlety and effectiveness of the latter.

While there are three principles for influencing people, the task of making them like you appears to be a bit more complicated, for this is said to require six rules:

Rule 1. Become genuinely interested in other people.

Rule 2. Smile.

Rule 3. Remember that a man's name is to him the sweetest and most important sound in any language.

Rule 4. Be a good listener. Encourage others to talk about themselves.

Rule 5. Talk in terms of the other man's interest.

Rule 6. Make the other person feel important—and do it sincerely.²³

Above all, Carnegie urges, if you wish to make people like you, or if you wish to manipulate them, avoid doing what comes naturally. "Hesitate about doing the natural thing, the impulsive

²² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

thing. This is usually wrong.”²⁴ Moreover, it is wise to practice constantly one’s newly won arts. “Apply these rules at every opportunity. If you don’t, you will forget them quickly.”²⁵

It appears somewhat more difficult to win people to one’s own way of thinking than it is to make them feel friendly, for it requires no less than twelve rules for this:

- Rule 1. The only way to get the best of an argument is to avoid it.
- Rule 2. Show respect for the other man’s opinions. Never tell a man he is wrong.
- Rule 3. If you are wrong, admit it quickly and emphatically.
- Rule 4. Begin in a friendly way.
- Rule 5. Get the other person saying “yes, yes” immediately.
- Rule 6. Let the other man do a great deal of the talking.
- Rule 7. Let the other man feel that the idea is his.
- Rule 8. Try honestly to see things from the other person’s point of view.
- Rule 9. Be sympathetic with the other person’s ideas and desires.
- Rule 10. Appeal to the nobler motives.
- Rule 11. Dramatize your ideas.
- Rule 12. Throw down a challenge.²⁶

The kinds of things one can expect to gain out of life is not inconsiderable if one will only observe these rules.

If you can be sure of being right only 55 per cent of the time, you can go down to Wall Street, make a million dollars a day, buy a yacht, and marry a chorus girl.²⁷

Carnegie expresses enthusiastic agreement with J. Pierpont Morgan’s opinion that a man usually has two reasons for doing a thing—the one that sounds good, and a real one.²⁸ Under these circumstances, if one intends to persuade another to one’s way of thinking, it behooves him to exploit the reasons that sound good.

As one’s skill develops in manipulating people, making them like you, and persuading them to accept your way of thinking, one approaches the time when he is able actually to change peo-

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

ple's opinions without giving offense or arousing resentment. There are, it seems, nine rules for this:

- Rule 1. Begin with praise and honest appreciation.
- Rule 2. Call attention to people's mistakes indirectly.
- Rule 3. Talk about your own mistakes before criticizing the other person.
- Rule 4. Ask questions instead of giving direct orders.
- Rule 5. Let the other man save his face.
- Rule 6. Praise the slightest and every improvement. Be "heartly in your approbation and lavish in your praise."
- Rule 7. Give the other person a fine reputation to live up to.
- Rule 8. Use encouragement. Make the fault seem easy to correct.
- Rule 9. Make the other person happy about doing the thing you suggest.²⁹

That these are discretionary rules intended to secure successful behavior in the market place is shown in the kind of results Carnegie indicates one can expect, as in his chapter, "Letters That Produced Miraculous Results."

I'll bet I know what you are thinking now. You are probably saying to yourself something like this: "Letters that produced miraculous results! Absurd! Smacks of patent medicine advertising!"

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Let's be honest. Is the title, "Letters That Produced Miraculous Results," accurate?

Now to be frank with you, it isn't.

The truth is, it is a deliberate *understatement* of fact. Some of the letters reproduced in this chapter harvested results that were rated twice as good as miracles.

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Mr. Dyke says that letters he used to send out, asking for information from dealers, seldom brought more than a return of five to eight per cent. He said he would have regarded a 15 per cent response as most extraordinary, and he told me that, if his replies had ever soared to 20 per cent, he would have regarded it as nothing short of a miracle.

But one of Mr. Dyke's letters, printed in this chapter, brought 42½

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

per cent; in other words, that letter was twice as good as a miracle.³⁰

Among the remarkable stories that Carnegie relates is the tale of how, when standing in line to register a letter in the post office, he noted a rather bored clerk. He resolved to break the man's boredom, and complimented him on his head of hair. The clerk, he relates, was immensely flattered. When he told this story in public, Carnegie continues, a man asked him afterward what he wanted to get out of the clerk. Carnegie apparently felt that he had gotten much more out of the incident than the opportunity to practice his technique:

Oh yes, I did want something out of that chap. I wanted something priceless. And I got it. I got the feeling that I had done something for him without his being able to do anything whatever in return for me.³¹ If nothing else, it seems, Carnegie's technique provides one with a sense of superiority.

Many persons have criticized Carnegie for the development of rules for a kind of pseudo-*Gemeinschaft*—developing a kind of imitation of family attitudes into a strategy of business success. Actually, he turns the flank on all such critics and proposes the transformation of family behavior into a personal relations strategy. There are seven lucky rules for success in marriage:

Rule 1. Don't nag.

Rule 2. Don't try to make your partner over.

Rule 3. Don't criticize.

Rule 4. Give honest appreciation.

Rule 5. Pay little attentions.

Rule 6. Be courteous.

Rule 7. Read a good book on the sexual side of marriage.³²

It is not unfair to describe this most famous of all self-improvement books as extending the rules for successful personal behavior in the market place to the sphere of the family. Here and there Carnegie gives some idea of what he really thinks about people. He feels that about 85 per cent of personal success is due to skill in manipulating people.³³ People are primarily motivated by an inflated sense of self-importance.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 204-205.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 238.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

If some people are so hungry for a feeling of importance that they actually go insane to get it, imagine what miracles you and I can achieve by giving people honest appreciation this side of insanity.³⁴

People are not particularly complicated; in fact, in Carnegie's universe their sexual maladjustments can be cleared up by reading a good book on the sexual side of marriage. Moreover, in the end, people are bores.

If you want to know how to make people shun you and laugh at you behind your back . . . never listen to anyone for long. . . .

Do you know people like that? I do, unfortunately; and the astonishing part of it is that some of them have their names in the social register. Bores, that is what they are—bores intoxicated with their own egos, drunk with a sense of their own importance. . . .

Remember that the man you are talking to is a hundred times more interested in himself and his wants and his problems than he is in your problems. His toothache means more to him than a famine in China that kills a million people. A boil on his neck interests him more than forty earthquakes in Africa.³⁵

The unvarnished truth, according to Carnegie, "is that almost every man you meet feels himself superior to you in some way."³⁶ This is true even in life's most intimate spheres, and he quotes with approval Dorothy Dix's view that "matrimony is no place for candor. It is a field for diplomacy."³⁷

A MODERN THEORY OF THE INNER STRUCTURE OF THE SELF

The theory of motivation touches what Gerth and Mills consider the core of character structure. Motives, they say, "are generally thought of as subjective 'springs' of action lying in the psychic structure or organism of the individual. But there is another way to think of them. Since persons do ascribe motives to themselves and to other persons, we may consider motives as the terms which persons typically use in their inter-personal relations."³⁸

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

³⁸ Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Character and Social Structure* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953), p. 114.

Developing this idea, Gerth and Mills maintain that "a satisfactory or adequate motive is one that satisfies those who question some act or program." Or from another point of view, "motives are acceptable justifications for present, future, or past programs of conduct. But to call them 'justifications' is not to deny their efficacy; it is merely to indicate their function in conduct."³⁹

This language strongly parallels that of Carnegie. Gerth and Mills insist that "when a person confesses or imputes motives, he is . . . usually . . . trying to influence others."⁴⁰ In an industrialized metropolis, they maintain, the person is confronted with a variety of situations. There is not only a distinction between public and private roles, but between two or more private or intimate roles. All these different public and private roles have different motives. As they phrase it:

The individual must keep one set of motives secret from the others, for they may appear 'silly' to some, even though 'beautiful' to others. He compartmentalizes not only his conduct but also his reasons for it, and insofar as he cannot do so, his motives may be in conflict. He may have difficulties deciding whether he does this or that for love or for duty, for 'selfish' economic gain or for civic betterment; perhaps he will not be sure whether he is marrying this woman because he loves her and she has such a pleasant voice, or because she is so wealthy.

That this is an effort to provide a theoretical justification for the type of thing Carnegie urged may be gleaned from the conclusions of Gerth and Mills which do justice to those of Carnegie:

No one vocabulary of motives is accepted by everyone, so the alert individual must use one or the other tentatively, until he finds the way to integrate his conduct with others, to win them as allies to his act.⁴¹

This corresponds to Rule #10 of Carnegie's twelve rules for winning people to one's own way of thinking. As Carnegie put it, simply "appeal to the nobler motives." Moreover, it corresponds to Goffman's conception of the self as an a-moral merchant of morality.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

SUMMARY

Mass production, mass marketing, the transformation of taste, the liquidation of traditional attitudes toward thrift, the growth of budgetism cannot be without influence upon personality. Until the rise of mass society, the traditional range of personality theory in the West was circumscribed by the humanistic and religious views of man. The former conceived of human nature as essentially good; the latter saw it as bad. The former visualized the highest achievements of personality in the self development of the cultivated man; the latter visualized the self-discipline of the religious man as critical to his salvation. With the rise of the scientific theories of personality, the ideological aspects of the humanistic and religious views of man were eliminated, but their technical features were largely preserved.

When American sociologists turned their attention to the problem of personality around the turn of the century, they developed theories springing from a position close to the religious view of man. The presuppositions of their theories appear to have included the small town and the individual as an autonomous moral agent. James' social self, Cooley's looking-glass self, and Mead's "me" presuppose the social origins of conscience—but the individual is a man of conscience nevertheless.

Since the days of James, Cooley, and Mead, the full implications of the mass society have gradually become clear. With subtle brilliance Goffman writes out of the heart of the theory developed by the sociological theorists of personality, but with a difference. The old intimacy of small town image and incident disappears as the elaborate complexities of the mass society are presupposed. The analysis shifts to social appearances and takes place in terms of roles, acts, scenes, and incidents. Man as an opportunist rather than moral agent is visualized operating at the center of his web. Both the religious and the humanistic view of man are excluded from the new theory.

Where the language and imagery of the stage is not applied to the contemporary problem of personality, the practical manual of personal relations seems to slip naturally into the language of merchandising. The rules of personal deportment often come to bear a remarkable similarity to the discretionary rules of the mar-

ket place. In accord with this some contemporary social psychologists have reduced the problem of motivation to the strategy of success in the manipulation of inter-personal relations.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. What is meant by the humanistic view of man?
2. How does the humanistic view of man differ from the religious view of man?
3. In what senses do modern theories of personality reflect the humanistic and religious views of man?
4. What are the main types of self according to James? In which of these is the influence of the religious view of man most evident?
5. What does Cooley mean by the looking-glass self?
6. Compare Mead's "me" with the Christian conscience.
7. How do Goffman's theories compare and contrast with those of Mead?
8. How are Dale Carnegie's theories of personality similar to those of Goffman?
9. In what sense does the Gerth-Mills theory of motivation reflect the influence of the mass society?
10. What is your own theory of personality?

THE ELITES OF MASS SOCIETY AND THE SOCIETY OF THE FUTURE

Quite in accord with a world in which the social presentation of the self is conceived of as a systematically maintained theatrical or merchandising illusion, significant public personalities increasingly achieve prominence in much the way celebrities of the entertainment world achieve it. At least this is the view of C. Wright Mills.¹

THE CELEBRITIES

Mills maintains that the world of the celebrity has become the American forum of public honor. With the development of national means of communication, the professional celebrities of entertainment have become the center of attention. All older kinds of notables, in Mills' view, are forced to compete with and to borrow prestige from them. Cafe society comprises the major inhabitants of the world of the celebrity, the institutional elite, the metropolitan socialite, and the professional entertainer. This society is founded on publicity, and its members seem to live for exhibitionistic mention of their doings by social chroniclers and gossip columnists who originally were professional party-givers, or journalists.

During the 1920's, when the speak-easy became a crossroad of society, the socialites began to look to Broadway and Hollywood. A few decades earlier a prize fighter like Gene Tunney could not

¹ C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 71-93.

have been welcomed into cafe society. In this world of the celebrity, publicity is decisive for rank and the night club is its decisive institution. By 1937, according to a *Fortune* listing, about one-third of cafe society's list was not in the *Social Register*.

Mills thinks the professional celebrity is the crowning result of the star system at the pinnacle both of the prestige system and big business. The mass communication networks are the means by which celebrities are formed and where they are employed for profit. The professional celebrity earns money precisely by being a celebrity. Movie stars, Broadway actresses, TV personalities, all are celebrated because they are displayed as celebrities. They form the core of the new prestige system. The screen star has replaced the debutante as a modern object of honor. The debutante seizes all opportunities to mingle in cafe society with the movie stars. Mills believes there is no higher prestige than to have one's picture on the cover of a national magazine; it is a greater honor than having one's picture in the society column. The top spot is the cover of *Life*; during the forties, no debutante made it, while the pictures of 178 movie queens and professional models were displayed.

The gossip columnist, in Mills' opinion, has replaced the well bred man-about-town and social hostess as the arbiter of "The New 400"—the top ranking celebrities. In 1953 Igor Loiewski Cassini published a list of 399 names of celebrities. This list contained three types of people: (1) Professional celebrities (composing 30 per cent of the listed names drawn from the entertainment industries, champions of sport, art, and journalism), (2) the metropolitan 400 (people of family and property making up about twelve per cent), and (3) key persons of institutional hierarchies (forming 58 per cent).

The key status figure of the prestige system has undergone a number of changes in modern times. In the nineteenth century the hostess was the key figure in society, but she was only known in a fragmentary way in America; the leading figure of the metropolitan 400 was the debutante. The debutante declined in the 1930's as a result of the competition of the more entertaining glamour girls of the fashion industry and cafe society. In the 1930's some debutantes tried to compete with Hollywood; they hired press agents who got their pictures in the newspapers and

saw to it that articles about them were printed in the national magazines. Glamorous members of the younger set appeared endorsing soap, skin cream, and other things in women's magazines, even as the debutantes began to emulate the commercial activities of their rivals. Mills believes that so far as the more socially prominent modern debutante makes her debut into anything that will give her celebrity, she makes it into cafe society. Otherwise she finds herself all dressed up with no place to go. As Mills describes her, the social type of the modern celebrity is the "All-American Girl."

In any New York night club on a big night at the time of the two-o'clock show her current model can be found: with the doll face and the swank body starved down for the camera, a rather thin, gaunt girl with a wan smile, the bored gaze, and often the slightly opened mouth, over which the tongue occasionally slides to insure the highlights. She seems, in fact, always to be practicing for those high, nervous moments when the lens is actually there. The terms of her competition are quite clear: her professional stance is the stance of the woman for whom a haughty kind of unconquerable eroticism has become a way of life. It is the expensive look of an expensive woman who feels herself to be expensive. She has the look of a girl who **knows** her fate rests quite fully—even exclusively—upon the effect of her look upon a certain type of man.²

The most decisive public personalities, Mills says, are a product of deliberate artifice and the tie-back to commercialism is direct.

One easily forgets that the underside of the glamor of cafe society is simply a service trade in vice. Those engaged in it—the procurers, the prostitutes, the customers, who buy and sell assorted varieties of erotic service—are often known to their associates as quite respectable. And the All American Girl, as a photographed image and as a person, is often a valued and indispensable helpmate to the great American salesman.

Among those whom Americans honor, none is so ubiquitous as the young girl. It is as if America had undertaken to paint a continual national portrait of the girl as Queen. Everywhere one looks there is this glossy little animal, sometimes quite young and sometimes a little older, but always imagined, always pictured as **The Girl**. She sells beer, and she

² *Ibid.*, p. 81.

sells books, cigarettes, and clothes; every night she is on the TV screen, and every week on every other page of the magazines, and at the movies, too, there she is.³

The commercial use of celebrities for advertising purposes has become a big business. The unique organization in the field of bringing advertisers and endorsers together is Endorsements, Inc., under the presidency of Jules Alberti. It is said that nearly 8,000 celebrities have been used in the media for nearly 4,500 products. Nearly 1,400 agencies were involved in this at a combined cost of media space in a twelve year period of over \$700,000,000. The fees paid to the celebrities are estimated at about one per cent of that amount.⁴

The sellers of modern products find it profitable to secure endorsements from persons of fame, beauty, and wealth. Such persons, while not particularly able to increase their beauty in the commercialization of their names, do not ordinarily impair their fame or wealth thereby. Amy Vanderbilt, author of *Amy Vanderbilt's Complete Book of Etiquette* (1952), which has been syndicated to many newspapers and has sold hundreds of thousands of copies, has received large sums to endorse such products as: Lucky Strike cigarettes, Royal Crest sterling, Lifebuoy soap, Nash, Kelvinator, Sing King chairs, Westinghouse-Micarta, Blue Bonnet margarine, and American greeting cards. She is reported to be of the opinion that it is quite socially correct for anyone to endorse foods, spirits, cosmetics, automobiles, books, plays, and even ideas. On the other hand, she feels that it shows a lack of taste to endorse depilatories, patent medicines, tooth paste, certain toilet articles, underclothing, or highly personal things.⁵

Whatever their origin, there is some tendency for prominent persons in American mass society to meet in the tinsel world of the celebrity.

PRESS AGENCY AND THE MANUFACTURE OF PROMINENCE

For socially prominent individuals and concerns, the manufacture of reputation, the external and visible aspects of personality,

³ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁴ William M. Freeman, *The Big Name* (New York: Printers' Ink Books, 1957), p. 37.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185.

has increasingly fallen into the hands of specialists. In 1937 Charles Washburn reported that there were more than 25,000 press agents in New York City alone.

In the early days the stunts to publicize prima donnas, song and dance men, mind readers, female impersonators, and the like attracted most attention. One press agent staged a tug-of-war by the chorines on a traffic isle on Broadway and 46th Street, tying up traffic for an hour. The milk baths for Anna Held and the tan-bark pavement on the streets to spare the nerves of Mrs. Patrick Campbell were notorious stunts. To advertise the movie, *Tarzan of the Apes*, Harry L. Reichenback terrified a hotel for a few hours by planting a full-grown lion in a bedroom. To advertise Rudolph Valentino, who was growing a beard for an Arabian role, Reichenback persuaded a midwest convention of barbers to adopt a resolution begging Valentino to cut off his whiskers, on the assumption that they would be driven out of business when the men of America refused to shave.⁶ However, press agency rapidly became one of the serious activities of the American mass society.

The best known case history of the creation of personality by public relations was Ivey Lee's transformation of the public image of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. Lee transformed Rockefeller's reputation by having him give dimes to children, endow a great university, establish a research foundation dedicated to the advancement of mankind, and contribute to various philanthropies. The oil magnate's image was transformed from that of a greedy, ruthless, penurious old pirate into that of a kindly old man.⁷

The extent of the operation performed on John D. Rockefeller's public image has only been revealed recently with the election of his grandson, Nelson Rockefeller, to the governorship of New York. Drew Pearson observed that in 1914, when John D. Rockefeller, Jr. first met Ivey Lee and when Nelson was six years old, a Rockefeller could not have been elected dog catcher.⁸ The Rockefeller family, the symbol of ruthless capitalism, was perhaps the most hated family in North America as a result of the killing

⁶ Charles Washburn, *Press Agency* (New York: National Library Press, 1937).

⁷ Theodore R. Sills and Philip Lesly, *Public Relations* (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1946), p. 135.

⁸ Drew Pearson, *Washington Merry-go Round*, November 9, 1958.

of several striking Colorado miners by state militiamen and armed guards of the Rockefeller company. Ivey Lee piloted the course of action that transformed John D. Rockefeller's image into one of a public benefactor. In Pearson's opinion, without the skill of Ivey Lee and the readiness of Rockefeller to establish the Rockefeller Foundation and make gifts of hundreds of millions of dollars to charities, Nelson Rockefeller would not be governor of New York today.

Among more recent famous cases of the manufacture of public personality was King Carol of Rumania's success in erasing the negative images aroused by a career of scandals, illicit love affairs, abdication, intrigue, and treachery. Carol turned his throne over to his son, and fled with his mistress, Magda Lupescu, to Mexico. Most countries, including the United States, would not permit him to enter. King Carol engaged a public relations council who reversed the monarch's public stand. Carol began to oppose the Axis and affirm confidence in the Allied cause. He became accessible to the press, and Mme. Lupescu was provided with an image of dignity. Carol's comments were soon given lengthy and favorable reception in the American press.⁹

Since most important topics in the news are subject to choice and opinion, it is natural that everyone should wish to make his own choice of what is to be reported in the newspapers. The most natural thing in the world, then, is to hire a publicity agent who performs such a selection of facts to be reported in accordance with the employer's conception of himself and his interests. Even before World War I the New York newspapers took a census of regularly employed press agents, and found about twelve hundred of them. They were in the employ of great corporations, banks, railroads, business organizations, social and political affairs, statesmen, and others.

The good press agent understands that the virtues of his cause are not news unless they are such strange virtues that they jut right out of the routine of life. This is not because the newspapers do not like virtue, but because it is not worth while to say that nothing has happened, when nobody expected anything to happen. So if the publicity man wishes free publicity, he has, speaking quite accurately, to start some-

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1130.

thing. He arranges a stunt: obstructs the traffic, teases the police; somehow manages to entangle his client or his cause with an event that is already news.¹⁰

In the words of Sills and Lesly

The press agent is a weaver of flimsy threads who does not care much whether he gets publicity or notoriety for his client so long as the name gets into print. His services are in demand by the actor, musician, circus, and orchestra. . . . Trademarks of this highly skilled practitioner are such standbys as the "theft" of the glamorous actress' jewels, a fall from a horse that bruises a shapely leg, the "collapse" on the set or backstage, and the "girl chosen as the pin-up favorite of the men at Camp Cootie."¹¹

While most public relations men do not want to be identified exclusively with the zany antics of the Hollywood practitioners of their craft, they all recognize that the creation of personal reputation as a most serious objective of their profession. Building the name of a certain business leader is an assignment that anyone in public relations might receive.¹² The problem might be that the company in which the executive is located is well known, while only a few thousand persons have heard of the president. His public relations council works on the assumption that the public thinks more in terms of persons than impersonal corporations and that favorable recognition of the president will produce good will for the company. According to Burnett, the public relations department will arrange for the president to meet such opinion-makers as columnists, commentators, editors, authors, and heads of other corporations. The objective is for him to make a good impression on such opinion-makers so that they will remember him as a fine, intelligent, friendly, and sincere person. When they are critical about business leaders, they will think of someone else, and when they have something favorable to say about business, they will sometimes think of him.

¹⁰ Walter Lippman, *Public Opinion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922), pp. 345-346.

¹¹ Sills and Lesly, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

¹² Verne Burnett, *You and Your Public* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943), pp. 146 ff.

CONTRASTING INFLUENCES ON PERSONALITY OF THE
SMALL COMMUNITY AND THE MASS SOCIETY

It is quite possible to conceive of a social situation in which the language of the theatre and of merchandising are quite inappropriate, both to the individual and to his relations with his fellows. These are social situations where artful devices to win friends and influence people would only convince others that the individual had lost his mind. The arbitrary attempt to manufacture public reputations by some persons is sometimes impossible.

For the greater part of his stay in the world, man has lived in relatively small communities. A man in this situation is likely to know only a few hundred people in his lifetime; he may see none, or at best a few strangers. Long-time associates depend for their estimates of one another on shared experience; strangers judge each other on the only basis possible—first and surface impressions. When one of a group of long-term associates suddenly chooses to manipulate impressions, he will only invite the judgment that he has lost his mind. The stranger who declines to manipulate impressions will not escape being judged in terms of such impression; he will merely insure negative judgments of himself. He will be thought strange, or careless, or calloused.

In a society of long-time associates the "proofs" that modern men frequently require of one another are unnecessary. The long-time associates already have something infinitely more important than social security numbers, driver's licences, AGO cards, draft registration cards, credit ratings, etc. One does not have to ask a member who he is; he has always been known. One does not have to ask about his reliability; this is a quality known even down to the possible pressures on the individual from others. One man may be known as the black sheep of an otherwise reliable family, another as the reliable member of a shiftless family, and so on. The long-time associates, therefore, have the most valuable of all knowledge for a prediction of performance reliability—relatively complete historical knowledge.

In all social situations, the things about a person most important to his associates tend also to become most important to himself. The contemporary world has presented us with examples of circumstances, as in the case of refugees in World War II, in which

one of the deepest tragedies in the individual's life is the loss of his papers. The point of synthesis of the personality of modern man tends to be found at a different point than for personality in a small community of life-long associates. Modern man finds, to an ever increasing degree, his point of personal integration in the formal organization of human conduct. It is this fact which leads modern personality theory to the stage for its analogies, as one of the arts of impression management, or it leads to business and merchandising for insight as to effective personal deportment. Like modern products which are standardized to a point where they lose intrinsic differentiation only to be differentiated in the course of competitive marketing on the basis of a secondary psychological manipulation, so modern individualization is first standardized in terms of formal criteria, often receiving a secondary reconstruction in the hands of the modern publicity agent. Meanwhile, for the great mass of modern men, there is an extensive formalization of personal identity.

FROM HERE TO UTOPIA

In his book *Utopia* (1516), Sir Thomas More described an imaginary island enjoying utmost perfection in law and politics. The device of describing utopia has been used by sensitive critics of contemporary society for clarifying the implications of the trends in our civilization. It is perhaps significant that the United States and Soviet Russia, the two nations more frequently typified as mass societies than any others, have been the foundations for the great utopias of our time. Moreover, these utopian constructions have tended to find the same tendencies in each. The first of the great modern Utopias was *We* by Eugene Zamiatin.¹³

We. Zamiatin was a Russian poet, novelist, and revolutionary attached to the chair of ship architecture, where he taught in the ship building faculty under the Communists. *We* was published outside Russia. Of the theme of *We*, the translator observed:

It is a novel that puts most poignantly and earnestly before every thoughtful reader the most difficult problem that exists today in the civilized world—the problem of preservation of the independent original creative personality. Our civilization today depends upon the

¹³ Eugene Zamiatin, *We* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1924), trans. by Gregory Zilborg.

energetic movement of great masses of people. Wars, revolutions, general strikes—all these phenomena involve great masses, large groups, enormous mobs. . . . Our great successes in mechanical civilization, our exceptional efforts in efficiency, tend to bring into play large numbers rather than great individualities. What, under these conditions, is the lot of creative individuality? . . . The problem of creative individuality *versus* mob is today not a mere Russian problem. It is as poignant under Bolshevik dictatorship as it is in Ford's factory.¹⁴

The scene of *We* is laid at a time when the whole earth under its head, the Well-Doer, has been subjected to the power of the United State. In this future time, people are known by their assigned numbers. The chief protagonist is D-503, whose task is to build the *Integral*, a space ship intended to bring the blessings of the United State to other worlds. The hundreds of thousands of numbers dressed in identical unifs (from uniform) wear golden badges on their chests with the state number of each one, male or female. The city in which they live is paved with sheets of glass and composed of geometric transparent buildings which have been sealed off from the primitive free world by a magnetic wall, the Green Wall. At the same hour, the millions of numbers begin work as one, and as one they finish work, at the same time. At the same second, designated by Time Tables according to which the United State is run, they carry the spoons to their mouths, go out to walk, go to the auditorium, go to the halls for the Tayloristic exercises, and then to bed. People no longer live "in a condition of freedom like the beasts, like apes, like herds." And those who deviate are eliminated "without stopping the eternal great march of the whole machine." In the words of D-503, "In order to eliminate a broken peg we have the skillful heavy hand of the Well-Doer, we have the experienced eyes of the Guardians."

To conquer the world it was necessary to master the problems of hunger and love. Shortly before the Two Hundred Years' War between the city and the land, petroleum food was invented. The 0.2% of the population of the earth that survived in the bosom of the United State enjoyed greatest happiness. Having conquered hunger, the United State directed its attack against love, which was transformed, organized, and expressed in a mathematical

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. vii-viii.

formula. A number was able to obtain a license to use any other number as a sexual product. Individuals were carefully examined in a laboratory of the Sexual Department, their hormone balance was determined, and a table of sexual days was formulated. Then upon application, a permit was issued permitting a number to enjoy the services of another number or numbers and a pink check-book was received. In this manner there was no more reason for envy or jealousy in the United State. The denominator of the fraction of happiness was reduced to zero, and the whole fraction converted into a magnificent infiniteness.

Criminality was eliminated from the United State by the elimination of freedom. "If human liberty is equal to zero, man does not commit any crime. That is clear. The way to rid man of criminality is to rid him of freedom." To discover the slightest sign of atavism a Bureau of the Guardians was constantly on the watch. Similarly, religion and the conceptions of evil were eliminated. In the words of D-503:

We returned to the simple mindedness and innocence of Adam and Eve. No more meddling with good and evil and all that; everything is simple again, heavenly, childishly simple! The Well-Doer, the Machine, the Cube, and the giant Gass Bell, the Guardians,—all these are good. All this is magnificent, beautiful, noble, lofty, crystalline, pure. For all these preserve our non-freedom; that is, our happiness.

Even poetry in the United State has been transformed into a commodity; and for anyone who does not conform there remains the machine which disintegrates him.

The contrasts to the city of *Zamiatin's* story are provided by the Museum, a house left over from the twentieth century world. In the Museum there are flowers, trees, grass, and even some wild human beings that escaped the destruction of the Two Hundred Years War and are living in a wild state on the other side of the Green Wall. The drama centers on the individual emotions which the United State was not completely able to organize: O-90, who has frequently made use of D-503's sexual services, falls in love with him and insists on having a child by him, though this will mean that she will be submitted to the machine and disintegrated. D-503 visits the museum with I-330, and falls in love with her; D-503 stumbles behind the Green Wall and gets a vision of an-

other world; D-503 develops a strange malady which is interpreted as the birth of a soul within him, a phenomenon beginning to assume epidemic proportions; D-503 begins to plot revolution with others, and lays plans to destroy the Green Wall and steal the *Integral*. While these events are developing, the scientists of the United State have surmounted the last barrier to happiness. As reported in the State Journal:

It is the last barricade on our road to happiness. Rejoice! This Barricade has been blasted at last! The road is open!

The latest discovery of our State science is that there is a center for fancy,—a miserable little nervous knot in the lower region of the frontal lobe of the brain. A triple treatment of this knot with X-rays will cure you of fancy—Forever!

You are perfect; you are mechanized; the road to hundred per cent happiness is open!

When D-503 underwent the operation he denounced his fellow conspirators and his love, and they were rounded up, tortured, and disintegrated by the machine.

Brave New World. Similar projections to those of Zamiatin, but for Anglo-American society, were made by Aldous Huxley in *Brave New World* in 1932.¹⁵ The scene is laid six centuries hence (in 532 A.F., or After Ford), when science has been employed to achieve perfect conformity, or in the planetary motto, "Community, Identity, Stability" has been achieved. The babies are mass produced from chemical solutions in laboratory bottles, and children are completely conditioned for their adult roles. In the words of the Resident Controller for the Western World:

Our Ford—or Our Freud, as, for some inscrutable reason, he chose to call himself whenever he spoke of psychological matters—Our Freud has been the first to reveal the appalling dangers of family life. The world was full of fathers—was therefore full of misery; full of mothers—therefore full of every kind of perversion from sadism to chastity; full of brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts—full of madness and suicide.

Family, monogamy, romance. Everywhere exclusiveness, everywhere a focusing of interest, a narrow channeling of impulse and energy.

¹⁵ Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World* (New York: Modern Library, 1946).

"But everyone belongs to everyone else," he concluded, citing the hypnopædic proverb.

The foundation of stability in the *Brave New World* is laid in the laboratories where babies are mass produced. By chemical control of the incubating solutions, individuals of varying degrees of ability are produced:

"The lower the caste," said Mr. Foster, "the shorter the oxygen." The first Organ affected was the brain. After that the skeleton. At seventy percent of normal oxygen you got dwarfs. At less than seventy eyeless monsters.

In the words of the Resident Controller of the Western World:

"We believe in happiness and stability. A society of Alphas would be unstable and miserable. Imagine a factory staffed by Alphas—that is to say, by separate and unrelated individuals of good heredity and conditioned so as to be capable (within limits) of making a free choice and assuming responsibilities.

"It's an absurdity. An Alpha-decanted, Alpha-conditioned man would go mad if he had to do Epsilon Semi-Moral work—go mad, or start stirring things up. Alphas can be completely socialized—but only on condition that you make them do Alpha work."

From the decanting laboratories the babies went to the Social Predestination room, where the process of adaptation was completed. "And that," put in the Director sententiously, "is the secret of happiness and virtue—liking what you've got to do. All conditioning aims at that: making people like their inescapable social destiny."

While one conditions lower caste people not to waste the Community's time by reading books, they are also conditioned for high level communal consumption:

'We condition the masses to hate the country,' concluded the Director. 'But simultaneously we condition them to love all country sports. At the same time, we see to it that all country sports shall entail the use of elaborate apparatus. So that they consume manufactured articles as well as transport.'

'Strange,' mused the Director, . . . 'strange to think that even in Our Ford's day most games were played without more apparatus than a ball or two and a few sticks and perhaps a bit of netting. Imagine the

folly of allowing people to play elaborate games which do nothing to increase consumption. It's madness.'

In the *Brave New World* all obstacles to happiness have been eliminated, including art. In the words of the Resident Controller, "That's the price we have to pay for stability. You've got to choose between happiness and what people used to call high art." It was not art alone that had to be sacrificed in the *Brave New World*. Among the sacrifices, according to the Controller, were science ("All our science is just cookery book, with an orthodox theory of cooking that nobody's allowed to question, and a list of receipts that mustn't be added to except by permission from the head cook"), truth ("Truth's a menace, science is a public danger. . . . Our Ford himself did a great deal to shift the emphasis from truth and beauty to comfort and happiness. Mass production demanded the shift"), and God ("Call it the fault of civilization. God isn't compatible with machinery and scientific medical and universal happiness").

The foundations of stability have been laid by chemical control of biological development and conditioning. For the little upsets of everyday life, a happiness drug, *soma*, is used. For the emotional upset due to the cyclical changes in female chemistry, a set of treatments known as the Pregnancy Substitute and the Violent Passion Surrogate are utilized. These create all the effects of pregnancy and violent passion without the actual occurrence of these contingencies. When all else fails because of uncorrectible individuality, the individual is exiled to an island. As the Controller phrases it with reference to a man he is about to exile:

That's to say, he's being sent to a place where he'll meet the most interesting set of men and women to be found anywhere in the world. All the people who, for one reason or another, have got too self-consciously individual to fit into community life. All the people who aren't satisfied with orthodoxy, who've got independent ideas of their own.

The contrasts in Huxley's Utopian picture are provided by the comparison of the *Brave New World* and a Zuni Indian reservation which was too primitive to civilize, hence it was sealed off from civilization by a high tension electric wire. The drama centers on Bernard Marx, who had too much alcohol in his decanting

bottle and who experienced some of the tension of maladjustment more typical of the twentieth century.

1984. The third great Utopian projection of the contemporary world is George Orwell's *1984*.¹⁶ His projection visualizes a world in which Europe has been absorbed by Russia, the British Empire by the United States, and a third super-state, Eastasia, organizes the rest. The most fundamental principle expressing the international relations of these great super-states is that "War is Peace." In one or another combination, the great super-states are permanently at war with each other. The primary aim of warfare in accord with the principles of double-think—the mode of thought of the world of 1984 by which everything is and is not what it implies—the aim both recognized and simultaneously not recognized by the Inner Party, is to use up the products of the machine without raising the general standard of living. From the moment the machine first appeared, we are told, it was clear that human drudgery, and to a great extent inequality, would disappear if the machine were deliberately used to end hunger, overwork, dirt, illiteracy, and disease. If permitted to occur, this would lead to the idea that the privileged minority had no function, since in the long run a hierarchical society is only possible on a basis of poverty and ignorance. Since problems arise when the masses are kept in poverty by restriction of goods (this could also slow down industry), the problem was to keep the wheels of industry turning without increasing real wealth. The essential service of war is the destruction of the products of human labor by shattering to pieces, or pouring into the sea or stratosphere, the materials that would otherwise make the masses too comfortable and intelligent.

Even the privileged groups are kept near the brink of hardship. This process increases the importance of small privileges. Thus by the standards of the early twentieth century, even a member of the Inner Party lives an austere life. His luxuries (a large, well appointed flat, better clothes, food, tobacco, his two or three servants, his private motor car or helicopter) set him in a different category from a member of the Outer Party, and the members of the Outer Party enjoy a similar advantage in comparison to

¹⁶ George Orwell, *1984* (New York: Signet Books, 1950).

the submerged masses of proles (for proletarian). War accomplishes the necessary restriction of goods in a psychologically acceptable way.

In his capacity as an administrator of the Inner Party, a member is often in a position to know that an item of war news is not true. This, however, is neutralized by the technique of *double think*, permitting the member to retain his mystical belief that war is real and will end victoriously, while he knows the opposite. Science has almost ceased to exist; in fact, in the language of 1984, *Newspeak*, there is no word for science. The empirical methods of the past on which scientific achievement was founded are opposed to the basic principles of Ingsoc (English Socialism). In matters of vital importance, war and police espionage, however, the empirical approach is still tolerated.

Efficiency, even in military matters, is unnecessary in all matters except those of the Thought Police. Each of the superstates is unconquerable, forming a separate universe in which any perversion of thought can be practiced. War eats up the surplus of consumable goods, and preserves the psychological atmosphere needed by a hierarchical society. The real war, in fact, is waged by the ruling group against its own subjects. Permanent war and peace are therefore identical, and *war is peace*.

Almost as fundamental for the society of 1984 as the principle *war is peace*, is the principle *ignorance is strength*. The primary bearing of the principle is in the maintenance of social hierarchy. Since the neolithic age, runs the argument, mankind has been subdivided into the High, the Middle, and the Low. The aim of the Highs is to remain where they are, the aim of those in the Middle is to change places with the High, and the aim of the Low is to abolish all distinctions, creating a society in which all men are equal. While conspiring for power, the Middle may use such terms as "freedom," "justice," and "fraternity." Socialism was the last link in a chain of thought stretching back to the slave rebellions of Antiquity.

The new movements appearing in the middle of the twentieth century—Ingsoc in Oceania, Neo-Bolshevism in Eurasia, and Death Worship in Eastasia—had the conscious aim of perpetuating unfreedom or inequality. The development of science was such that by conscious strategy the High were at last able to

maintain their position permanently. This had become especially urgent, since by the beginning of the twentieth century human equality had become technically possible. Foreshadowed by totalitarianism, Ingsoc emerged as a fully worked-out political theory intended to perpetuate the new aristocracy of bureaucrats, scientists, trade union organizers, publicity experts, sociologists, teachers, journalists, and professional politicians. The invention of printing, the radio, and television had made it possible to keep every citizen—at least every important one—under twenty-four hour surveillance by the police. Moreover, the new High group realizes that the only secure basis for oligarchy is collectivism, the abolition of private property.

At the apex of the society so constructed and maintained is Big Brother, infallible and all-powerful, the theoretical source of every success, achievement, victory, scientific study, knowledge, wisdom, and happiness. He is a face on the billboards, a voice on the telescreen, though he has never been seen. Below Big Brother is the Inner Party with a membership limited to 6,000,000 (two per cent of the population). Below the Inner Party is the Outer Party, and at the base are the Proles. In principle, membership in these groups is not hereditary. Admission is by examination at the age of sixteen. In practice, proletarians are not allowed to graduate into the party. The most gifted, who might become nuclei of discontent, are marked down by the Thought Police and eliminated.

All beliefs, habits, tastes, emotions, and mental attitudes are designed to sustain the mystique of the Party. A Party member lives from birth to death under the eye of the Thought Police. Even when he is alone, he is never sure he is alone, for asleep or awake, even in his bath or bed, he can be inspected without warning and without his knowledge. Inconsistent thoughts and actions when detected mean certain death. Endless purges, arrests, tortures, imprisonments, and vaporizations are not inflicted as punishment for crimes which have actually been committed. A person who might commit a crime in the future is disposed of. If the person is naturally orthodox (in *Newspeak* a good thinker), he will know the correct belief and desirable opinion without taking thought. The elaborate training in crimestop, blackwhite, and double-think make him unwilling to think too deeply about any-

thing whatsoever. Crimestop is the faculty of stopping short, as by instinct, at the threshold of any dangerous thought. Black-white, like many *Newspeak* words, has two contradictory meanings. Applied to an opponent, it is the habit of impudently claiming that black is white; it also means the ability, required by party discipline, to believe, to know that black is white. Party discipline demands the continuous alteration of the past, the mutability of the past is a central tenet of Ingsoc. Past events have no objective existence, but survive only in written records and in human memories. The past is whatever the records and memories agree upon. What was called "reality control" in Oldspeak is called *double-think* in *Newspeak*. It is the capacity to hold two contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, believing both. This is all important for the complete subordination of the individual to the community, summarized in the slogan, *Freedom is Slavery*.

The hero of Orwell's story is Winston Smith, a member of the Outer Party who works in the Ministry of Truth. Like all other members of the party, wherever he goes he sees the portraits of Big Brother. He wears blue overalls, the uniform of the Party. The police patrol and thought police maintain constant vigilance. Wherever he goes, a telescreen not only blares instructions and propaganda, but permits the scrutiny of a member without his being aware of it. In addition to the Ministry of Truth concerned with news, entertainment, and education there is the Ministry of Peace concerned with war, the Ministry of Love concerned with law and order, and the Ministry of Plenty responsible for economic affairs.

A relatively severe form of sexual chastity is imposed on family members. Their lives are organized by the telescreen which wakes them up, regulates their exercises, sends them to work, and provides emotional outlets in the two minutes of hate and in hate week.

Winston Smith's particular job for the Ministry of Truth is the re-writing of History and the news to conform to the changing requirements of the party: the re-writing of the economic predictions of Big Brother to conform to what actually happened, the complete elimination of all references to any persons who have been vaporized and to unpersons. The story hinges on Winston

Smith's deficient memory (an incapacity to forget what party requirements demand), his engaging in a treasonable love affair, and his toying with revolutionary thoughts.

With Julia, everything came back to her own sexuality. As soon as this was touched upon in any way, she was capable of great acuteness. Unlike Winston, she had grasped the inner meaning of the Party's sexual puritanism. It was not merely that the sex instinct created a world of its own which was outside the Party's control and which therefore had to be destroyed if possible. What was more important was that sexual privation induced hysteria, which was desirable because it could be transformed into war fever and leader worship.

There was a direct inner connection between chastity and political orthodoxy.

The sex impulse was dangerous to the Party, and the Party had turned it to account. They had played a similar trick with the instinct of parenthood. The family could not actually be abolished, and indeed, people were encouraged to be fond of their children in an almost old fashioned way. The children, on the other hand, were systematically turned against their parents and taught to spy on them and report their deviations. The family had become, in effect, an extension of the Thought Police.

Winston Smith's illicit love affair is discovered, and his traitorous thoughts are disclosed. He is systematically subjected to the tortures of the Ministry of Love. The story closes with the victory of the Community over him.

He gazed up at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken him to learn what kind of smile was hidden beneath the dark mustache. O cruel, needless misunderstanding! O stubborn, self-willed exile from the loving breast! Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother.

Zamiatin's *We*, Huxley's *Brave New World*, and Orwell's *1984* are, to be sure, imaginary societies. However, they derive their gripping force from the fact that they take the properties of a mass society as most decisive for our times and explore the consequences these properties imply.

Every society imposes some restrictions on the freedom of the individual. If it did not, there would be no society, only an an-

archy of individuals working at cross purposes with one another. It is the conviction of these authors, however, that in the modern mass societies the sphere of what is being left to the individual is being radically narrowed.

It is the conviction of all the writers of the utopias that modern mass society is carrying out a fundamental transformation of the basic institutions. The family, in particular, is seen as scheduled for radical modification (Orwell) if not destruction (Zamiatin and Huxley). Meanwhile, all are convinced that the sentiment of love is negative to a mass society. The future society will not know economic want, but strange things will happen to the economy to prevent it from producing democratic effects. In the mind of all the great Utopian writers the hierarchical organization of society will be intensified. They see modern science as putting new weapons of social control in the hands of the masters of society. The Utopians are all agreed that among the things that will have to be eliminated to permit the mass society to come to its own are art, science, and religion.

SUMMARY

Corresponding to the forms of a world in which the social presentation of the self is visualized as a theoretical illusion or an advertising gimmick, prominent persons in the mass society increasingly have recourse to the services of the publicity agent, employing the same techniques as the professional celebrities of the entertainment world.

Meanwhile, for the ordinary persons whose histories have been reduced to shadows, a redoubled importance attaches to formal criteria of personal reliability. A process is at work changing the relation of the individual to society that may be described as the formalization of personal identity.

In all these areas—mass production, mass consumption, the standardization and manipulation of taste, the formalization of personal identity—one may seek the defining property of contemporary society. One may also seek it in the Utopian constructions of future society.

The supposition that underlies the modern Utopias is that the United States and Soviet Russia, despite other differences, are in considerable measure moving in the same direction. They have

taken mass production, mass consumption, the standardization and manipulation of taste to represent the major trend of the times. To the minds of these social critics, an overwhelming standardization of people accompanies the central process of the mass society. As they see it, the mass society is destroying human emotions; it is eliminating creativity, it is transforming basic institutions.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. What is meant by the celebrity? What forces have inclined socialites in contemporary society to emulate the professional celebrities of stage and screen?
2. What is meant by the commercial use of celebrities?
3. Charles Washburn maintains that the good newspaper man makes the best press agent. Do you agree? Explain your answer.
4. How do you account for the development of the modern press agent?
5. Explain the statement, "Sometimes the president is the most carefully merchandized product of a company."
6. In what ways does the community of life-time associates influence personality differently from the community of strangers?
7. What is meant by the formalization of personal identity?
8. In what ways are Zamiatin's *We*, Huxley's *Brave New World*, and Orwell's *1984* similar?
9. What in the present world corresponds to the re-writing of history in George Orwell's *1984*?
10. In what ways is Huxley's *Brave New World* a criticism of the present world's attitudes toward art and science?

PART II

THE CHANGING FORMS OF THE
AMERICAN COMMUNITY

Introduction to Part II

Part I of the present study was intended to pose the problem of the mass society, by tracing some of its major manifestations. However, in the process of tracing some of the primary characteristics of the mass society, one isolates numerous social phenomena that fall outside its compass. The Utopias which project properties of the mass society to their logical conclusion were intended in considerable measure to oppose the emergence of the mass society.

In his foreword to the Modern Library edition of the *Brave New World* in 1946 Huxley observed that the kind of trends he had projected in his novel were developing at a speed that even he had not anticipated. The equivalents of soma and hypnopaedia and a scientific caste system, he observed, "are probably no more than three or four generations away."¹ Nor, he thought, was the sexual promiscuity of the brave new world far distant. "In a few years," he speculated, "no doubt, marriage licenses will be sold like dog licenses, good for twelve months, with no law against changing dogs or keeping more than one animal at a time. As political and economic freedom diminishes, sexual freedom tends to increase."² The utopia he had projected, he suggests, may be upon mankind in less than a century.

Huxley returned to these problems in 1958 in *Brave New World Revisited*.³ In a series of discussions of "The Arts of Selling," "Brainwashing," "Chemical Persuasion," "Subconscious Persuasion," and "Hypnopaedia" Huxley detailed evidences of the fulfillment of the prophecies of the novel. He also clarified his conviction that it is still perhaps not too late to turn back. A call to action ended his essay: "We can," he observes, "be educated for freedom. . . . Nothing short of everything is really enough.

¹ Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World* (New York: The Modern Library, 1946), Foreword, p. xii.

² *Ibid.*, pp. lii-liii.

³ Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World Revisited* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1958).

Freedom is menaced and education for freedom is urgently needed. But so are many other things—for example, social organization for freedom, birth control for freedom, legislation for freedom.”⁴ At the present time, he observes, as a product of over-organization and over-population, a “human life of inmultiple personal relationships has become almost impossible. Therefore, if you wish to avoid the spiritual impoverishment of individuals and whole societies, leave the metropolis and revive the small country community, or alternatively humanize the metropolis by creating within its network of mechanical organization the urban equivalents of small country communities, in which individuals can meet and cooperate as complete persons, not as the mere embodiments of specialized functions.”⁵

The students and critics of mass society thus have perceived that the phenomena of the mass society consist in a powerful configuration of forces operating within the framework of contemporary social life, in serious conflict with others. Since social forms are anchored in communities, the mass society has become the great liquidator of traditional community forms.

There is a strong inclination on the part of those persons aware of the destructive properties of the mass society to assume that this destructiveness exhausts its function. The principles of community formation, however, operate on all social forms and not simply on those disintegrated by the mass society. Perspectives are incomplete so long as they attend only to the process of community destruction without examining the positive forms of new community formation.

Communities are total ways of life, complexes of behavior composed of all the institutions necessary to carry on a complete life, formed into a working whole. Communities are slow to form and persistent once formed. They represent both the ultimate encouragements and discouragements on human social development. Unlike particular institutions which may present a varied kaleidoscope of changing forms, communities are remarkably stable. Governments, for example, may come and go while the basic community remains. Essentially similar communities have

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

endured for millennia despite major changes in particular institutions.

The fundamental principles of community formation are the same for the most primitive tribe as for the most advanced mass society. While varying without end in detail, the numbers of human communities that have been formed are relatively few in basic type.

In the following sections the theory of community formation is sketched (Chapter 5) and various continuities between the communities of the United States and those of the world have been traced (Chapters 7 and 9). The studies of the American community proper are contained in Chapter 6 (the rural community), Chapter 8 (the American urban community), and Chapter 10 (the American nation).

While it is possible to use only those chapters in Part II which bear on the changing fate of the American community, important theoretical and comparative historical material is contained in Chapters 5, 7, and 9. They permit the location of the forms of the American community within the rich context of human experience.

One of the fundamental suppositions of the present study is that American society is a ground swell in the shifting tides of human experience. Only by historical and comparative material is it possible to relate American society to the changing fate of mankind and demonstrate that it is not something static, but a changing configuration of forces.

5

THE THEORY OF COMMUNITY

From the time he is born until he dies, a man, like every other living creature, requires access to things in the world about him if he is to stay alive. When he is very young, he must also have the protection of other people if he is to survive. A sort of minimum of social life is required for the survival of the individual, even under the best of conditions. However, it is conceivable that once the individual is old enough to fend for himself, he can live quite alone all the rest of his life.

Under such circumstances, the life of an individual would probably assume a rhythmic pattern. The nature of basic human needs would impose the rhythm of a periodic search for food and water, punctuated by periods of satiety. Moreover, the individual might discover that the cycle of nature (when there are periodic rains, droughts, or winters) requires the prudent institution of periods of hard work and storage in times when food is plentiful in anticipation of the difficult months when food is scarce.

Those areas of the individual's life where he is dependent on others have the capacity to expand and grow permanent. The period of dependency in man is longer than it is for most creatures; he must spend an extended period under the influence of others. All practical considerations add up to the conclusion that the normal situation for men is a condition of society; the person who is detached from the social matrix and who lives in individual self-sufficiency is an abnormal case.

THE NATURE OF THE COMMUNITY

Many times in human history individuals have been lost and have managed to survive for longer or shorter periods. Also, at

times, though this has undoubtedly been more rare, individuals have voluntarily turned their backs on society, and resolved to establish their own way of life. Our interest is not in such involuntary or voluntary *Robinson Crusoes*, but in using the hypothetically self-sufficient person as an analytical point from which to approach the problems of a community.

The life of an isolated self-sufficient individual would be expected to display the properties of rhythm, pattern, and completeness. There is every reason to suppose that life in a community will also display such properties. The system and completeness of the isolated self-sufficient man's life may clarify what happens in society. In society collective solutions to the problems of life are substituted for individual solutions. In society man is able to undertake solutions to problems he could not attempt in an isolated state; he achieves new efficiencies and his potential individual self-sufficiency is curtailed. At the same time all those requirements of human life that resulted in the rhythm and pattern of the self-sufficient individual remain.

The community establishes collective bases for solutions to life problems. The first step toward community formation is the stabilization of the solutions to collective problems. People in a collectivity have no less need for food, shelter, and protection than they do individually. Any single individual of the collectivity may perform only a very specialized task; he may make butter, cut timber, keep records, even act as a grave-digger or a hangman. The collective task must be stabilized, or this is not possible.

In some respects there is greater necessity to stabilize the solution to a collective problem than to an individual problem. The attempt to set up a stable solution to life problems under extraordinarily difficult conditions may be seen among the Eskimos, of whom there are about 40,000 scattered from the Aleutians and the Bering Sea to Greenland.

VILLAGE COMMUNITIES OF THE EAST AND WEST

The principles of stability, consistency, and completeness operate at all times to form communities. As long as the economy on which a community depends rests on hunting and food gathering, the physical environment will impose rather severe limits on the economy, and through it, on other institutions. Except under

unusual conditions, a people living by hunting and gathering will of necessity be highly mobile; this in turn will seriously limit the amount and kinds of property they acquire. The size of the group will be relatively small, its internal structure relatively undifferentiated, its authority structure clear and of a special type.

Hunters and gatherers have always stored food in times of abundance as insurance against times of scarcity. The active entry into cooperation with nature for food production, however, involves much more extended planning. Among the social changes that have accompanied the rise of agriculture are a new level of prosperity, more permanent settlement of communities, the development of new kinds of property, the origin of a new social differentiation, and a strengthening and development of communal institutions. In a study that has become classical, Henry Sumner Maine advanced the thesis that from England through Europe and the Near East to India, the village community was at one time universal. Such a community has some of the properties of a general stage in the development of civilization. It was Maine's view that while this village community has largely disappeared from Europe, not, however, without leaving a profound imprint on the law and other institutions, it is still evident in India.¹

The village-community of India, according to Maine, exhibited too many resemblances to the teutonic township to be accidental. It has the same dual aspect of a group of families united by common kinship and of a company of persons exercising joint ownership over land. The patriarchal family forms the racial unit at the core of the village-community. In India the village community is still the basic source of land law, defining the reactions of the various sections within the group and between one group and another, and between the group and the government. In the Indian village community, the relation of men to the land is one of common enjoyment by the village and by the families inside it. Though he may be the chief of his household, the individual has almost no power of independently disposing of property. The family head is only a sort of administrator of the household.

Indian village communities, therefore, present a legal situation offering sharp contrasts to the legal conceptions of the great pio-

¹ Henry Sumner Maine, *Village-Communities in the East and West* (London: John Murray, 1895).

neering students of jurisprudence, Bentham and Austin. According to their theories, a law is a command of a particular sovereign addressed by political superiors to political inferiors. It imposes on the subjects a *duty*, and threatens a penalty (or *sanction*) for disobedience. The power vested in particular members of the community of imposing a sanction in the event of neglect or breach of a duty is a right. The key ideas in this theory of law are *command*, *sovereign*, *obligation*, *sanction*, and *right*. The customary law under which Indian village communities have lived for centuries has practically no conception of these distinctions. It would be inappropriate to speak of a political superior commanding a course of action. The council of village elders does not command; it declares what has always been, even if it be the distribution of water from a new irrigation project never in operation before. Nor is there a system of rights or duties, for an aggrieved person complains not of an individual wrong but of a disturbance of the order of the entire little community. Nor is the law enforced by sanctions, for the sole punishment is often only universal disapproval. On the other hand, Maine believes, the terms *sovereign*, *subject*, *command*, *obligation*, *right*, and *sanction* in the law correspond to a stage toward which the law steadily inclines.

The ancient cultivating community, as it existed in Germany, consisted of a number of families with proprietary control over a district divided into three parts: the *mark* of the village, the common *mark* or wasteland, and the arable *mark* or cultivated area. The village was inhabited, the common *mark* was held in mixed ownership, and the arable *mark* was divided into lots appropriated to the several families. Each family was governed by its own free head or *paterfamilias*. The family dwelling could be entered only by sufferance of its members; even officers of the law might not enter without permission. The rights of the family over the common were controlled and modified by the rights of every other family. When cattle grazed in the common pasture or when the householder felled trees in the common forest, an elected or hereditary officer watched to see that the common domain was equitably enjoyed. The proprietary relation of the householder over the arable *mark* was individual. The cultivated land was divided into three great fields, and a rude rotation of crops was practiced.

Each field lay fallow once in three years. Each household and family tilled its lot in the three great fields by its own labor. Despite individual ownership, the family could not cultivate what it pleased; it had to sow the same crop as the rest of the community and permit its lot in the uncultivated field to lie fallow at the same time. Nothing it did could interfere with the right of other households to have pasture for sheep and oxen in the fallow.

For all intents and purposes, Maine believed, the village community from England and Scandinavia to India was essentially the same. In both areas there was an arable *mark* divided into separate lots, but cultivated according to minute customary rules binding on all; there were reserved meadows; there was the waste or common land enjoyed as pasture; there was a village consisting of habitations ruled by despotic male heads. From India to England a council of government once existed to determine disputes regarding custom. The rules governing cultivation had the same purpose—to reconcile the common plan of cultivation with the holding of distinct lots by separate families. The common life of the group admitted private property in cultivated land, but did not permit departure from joint cultivation of the land.

The Indian village had nothing comparable to the ancient teutonic assembly of adult males, but it generally had a council of village elders. At times the Indian village was under a headman whose position was in effect hereditary; however, Maine argues that where the village community was most perfect in India, there were signs of an original proprietary equality between all the families composing the group. At times even when the authority was lodged in a headman, he was only a nominal chief; at other times the village council was viewed as a representative body.

Also reminiscent of the ancient Western communities was the Indian villages, a nearly complete series of occupations and trades which permitted the villagers to conduct collective life without outside assistance. Besides the headman or council with qualified judicial and quasi-legislative power, the villages contained a police and several families of hereditary traders (blacksmith, harness-maker, shoe-maker). The village Brahmin conducted religious ceremonies, and the village may even have had a dancing girl to attend festivities. There was almost always a village

accountant who was highly important in an unlettered population. Maine attaches especial importance to the fact that the grain dealers found throughout India were never hereditary traders incorporated in the village group of India, nor were they members of the municipality in the towns that developed from one or more villages. The trades which remained outside the organic group were those which brought goods from distant markets.

Sometimes the village communities of the Eastern world are unconnected with any exterior body except by the shadowy bond of caste. The community is so organized as to be complete in itself. The end for which it exists is tillage of the soil. It contains in itself the means of following this course without help from the outside. Besides the cultivating families who form the major part of the group, there are families hereditarily engaged in the humble arts. Such a community contains a village watchman, a village police, and organized authorities for the settlement of disputes and the maintenance of civil order.

The Eastern village is internally differentiated. Below the families descended from the founders of the colony are the others. The brotherhood often forms a sort of hierarchy, the degrees of which appear to have been determined by the order in which various sets of families were assimilated into the community. Maine was of the belief that only the urgency of the struggle for existence could have forced men to submit to the amalgamation of the primitive group with strangers. "It is the extreme value of new labour which condones the foreign origin of new hands which bring it."² However, the time came when this process of receiving new elements ceased, and the village community became a closed corporation.

Originally the village community with these characteristics was, in Maine's opinion, universally spread from England to India, forming a sort of common starting point for the later developments in both areas. The village community even represents, he believed, one of the starting points for developments in North America. The earliest English immigrants to North America belonged primarily to the yeomanry. They organized themselves into village communities for purposes of security and

² *Ibid.*, p. 178.

cultivation. A town was organized when the general court granted a tract of land to a company of persons, the land being initially held as property in common. The proprietors then proceeded to divide the land, first assigning house lots, then tracts of meadow land, and at times, tracts of mineral land. Pasture and woodland were held as the common property of the community. A law of the general court in 1660³ prohibited further extension of the privilege of use of the common wood, timber, or herbage by households other than those present at the origin of the town or permitted in the town with its consent. After this the New England commons rapidly became private property. Thus in the early New England communities a kind of aristocracy of first settlers appeared. In Maine's opinion, this is a tolerably exact parallel to the events of the contemporary Indian village community and an example of the natural tendencies in such communities.

To Maine's way of thinking, the village community with these properties was the foundation of the modern laws of real property, rent, and price. There is little doubt, moreover, that it was a form of community universally distributed throughout the territories extending from Ireland and England to India, preceding the developments of contemporary community forms. Maine seems to have had the opinion that the village community, resting on the patriarchal family was, a universal stage in civilization. If one were to modify the conception of the village community somewhat to admit that the dominant unit was sometimes the matriarchal, not just the patriarchal, family; a fairly plausible case can be made for the near universality of the village community. To be sure, there have been various kinds of tribal communities (hunters and food gatherers, more or less pure hunters and pure gatherers) which have never acquired a degree of agriculture, but the peasant village in matriarchal, patriarchal, and at times, mixed forms, has been for long periods widely distributed over the world.

As far as one is able to determine, the village was the most complicated community form that mankind had invented for many thousands of years. It provided the kind of community

³ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

form within which the development of pottery making, basketry, textile weaving, domestication of animals, and more complicated tool making could take place. When human civilization took shape, it was on a foundation of the village community.

To North Americans, it is significant that the village community was so deeply ingrained in the traditions of the English yeomen who migrated to the new world that it became the first form of rural community on North American soil.

THE FEUDAL MANORIAL COMMUNITY

If the forms of the village community had not been deeply ingrained in the experience of Western man, he would not have recreated it so quickly and automatically on the North American continent. However, the forms of the modern rural and urban community did not grow directly out of the village communities of primitive Europe. They grew out of the feudal manorial communities that took their place. Before attending to the process of feudalization, however, one should note that the forms of the medieval village community were somewhat more complex than has been suggested.

There were two patterns of settlement in early medieval agricultural society—by hamlets, and by villages. The hamlets were typical of regions with poor soils (Scotland, Wales, Cornwall, Brittany, Western Normandy, and the central French highlands); the villages were found in the more fertile regions. When settled in hamlets, each household had a small plot of land cultivated continuously until it was exhausted, when a new plot was substituted. The villages fell into two divisions. Most of England, France, and Germany was cultivated by the two or three-field system under which one field was left fallow while the others were cultivated with heavy plows drawn by four to eight ox teams. South of the Loire in France and in the Mediterranean area, the lands of the village were divided into rectangular plots. Each house had several plots on which it practiced biennial rotation between fallow and crops. These plots were plowed by small teams and the scratch point plow.

Agricultural yields were low; production was rarely more than ten bushels of grain per acre sown with two bushels of seed. The chief foodstuffs were bread and ale, the brewing of which took

about half of the English grain crop. There was a perpetual shortage of hay, since the oxen and horses had to be fed in winter. In the villages operating on the two- and three-field systems, each house had its garden, fruit trees, a strip in the arable fields, and a share in the hay crop. The livestock grazed on the common village pasture. Hogs were pastured in the village woods, where wood was also gathered. In this agricultural partnership, plowing, reaping, and threshing were by joint effort. Village herds-men looked after the stock. Religion was a complex fusion of pagan and Christian rites, and the religious life centered in the village priest. Clothes were made by the village women. A few village artisans and industries took care of most other village needs.

The question as to how feudalism arose out of a system of village communities, how the manor arose out of the *mark*, has not been completely settled. An old theory held that it was due to the benefices, or grants of Roman provincial lands to their subordinates contingent upon military service and other duties, or by the tribal chieftains who overran the Roman Empire. According to this theory, the enjoyment of land was coupled with the discharge of definite responsibilities. In time such rights to enjoyment of land became hereditary. However, Maine was of the opinion that this did not account for the origin of feudalism north of the Alps, where the cultivated soil was in the hands of free, fully organized communities (in contrast to Italy or Gaul). Such communities had a very different structure from that of the manorial group held together by a variety of subordinate relations to a feudal chief or lord.

In contrast to the democratic village community, the manorial community rested on the distinction between a number of persons holding land of the lord by free tenure and a number holding land of the lord by tenures of servile origin. Both classes were held together through a peculiar tribunal, the court baron. Land of the first kind was tenemental land; the second was the lord's domain. Both were essential to the manorial group. If there were too few tenemental lands to supply the minimum number of free tenants to attend the court baron, it became a mere customary manorial court sitting for assessment and receipt of dues from tenants of the domain. If there was no domain, the authority of

the lord over the free tenants was no longer manorial; it became a seignory or mere lordship.⁴

A school of writers centering on Von Maurer have maintained that the manor arose out of the *mark* indigenously rather than by imposition from without.⁵ The basic cause was the frequency of inter-tribal war. Either the conquerors in tribal conflicts appropriated and colonized part of the waste and held it in dependence of the victorious society, or land was restored to the conquered society, but superiority over it remained to the victor.

Undoubtedly there were a number of factors which cooperated with this process to bring about the emergence of the feudal system. In southern France there survived from Roman times great estates worked by *coloni*. On these estates the land was divided into two parts—one cultivated for the lord's benefit, the other divided among the *coloni*. In the area to the north, many villages founded by chieftains and their followers probably had similar origin. It also appears clear that formerly free villages were brought into subjection by powerful men, a process particularly important in the troubled ninth and tenth centuries, when no man was safe without a mounted warrior to protect him.⁶

In some places in India, Maine observed that in contrast to the usual village structure, the office of headman belonged absolutely to the head of a particular family.⁷ Moreover, he enjoyed the judicial power of mediating in disputes, interpreting customs, and maintaining order. Though never permitted to come to fruition, the tendencies toward feudalization appear to have been present in India, including nascent phenomena of absolute ownership.

The fact that India was inclined on a road toward feudalism suggests that there were important economic and juridical advantages to feudalism which have tended to be under-rated.⁸ A free owner who commended himself to his lord, exchanging free socage tenure for allodial ownership accompanied by certainty, regularity, and permanence of service, received in return a kind

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

⁶ L. Sidney Painter, *A History of the Middle Ages, 284-1500* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953), p. 99.

⁷ Maine, *op. cit.*, pp. 155 ff.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 161 f.

of protection. Without this process, Maine believes, Europe, which was full of great wastes (with forests to be felled, swamps to be drained, and tracts of land to be tilled), would hardly have been exploited. The village community was little adapted to such entrepreneurial activity.

In Europe, as the manorial system took shape, the villagers supported the lord by working for him and paying him rents in kind. A part of the arable land (usually between one-third and one-half) was reserved for the lord; it was his *demesne*. The peasants worked the *demesne* of the lord and owed him a share of the hay, care of his crops, and various other kinds of labor. The serf could marry, but he could marry no one outside the village without the lord's leave. The lord could require his peasants to use his mills. He had full power of jurisdiction over the person of the peasant. At the same time, the lord usually protected his peasants with somewhat less care than his horses, for they were the source of his own wealth, and custom tended to control the exactions from the peasant by the lord.

The internal and external disorders of medieval Europe tended to hasten the transfer of the rural society into manorial form. The Viking, Moslem, and Magyar raids made no village, cathedral, or monastery safe without adequate protection by armed men. The mounted warrior dominated military life; against him the unmounted soldier was helpless. In these troubled times a free man could either become a soldier or sink to the status of a serf. Every landlord with property beyond his needs was inclined to give benefice (a grant of land sufficient to support a soldier for life) in return for military service. The same landlords, in turn, were inclined to seek protection from still more powerful men. The benefice, meanwhile, readily evolved into a hereditary grant or fief (*feudum*).

The feudal relations functioned to protect the vassal, on the one hand, and secure his service in the lord's army on the other. By the eleventh century every lord of any importance had at least one castle, and his vassals were pressed into garrison duty. The vassals also attended the lord's court, and decided various disputes. A variety of officials developed around the lord's household; these often held fiefs for their support.

In the feudal hierarchy the decisive point at which a man

most completely enjoyed independence of those above him and was most completely able to do what he liked, was the lowest man able to build and garrison a castle.⁹ This required considerable resources, moreover, it did not mean much unless the lord had a sufficient number of knights to garrison his fortress. If adequately guarded, such a stronghold could easily be defended during the forty days when, by convention with his own vassals in turn, a lord could keep a feudal force in the field. Meanwhile, vassals who did not possess castles of their own were at the lord's mercy. In France the term "baron" usually designated the owner of a castle. He usually possessed the power of high justice as well.

The peasant village and the manor were among the most significant communities of Europe at the time of the discovery and settlement of North America. The attempt to transplant these community forms to the new world is one of the most fundamental components of early American history.

SUMMARY

One of the major developments in the communities of the world was the new level of mastery of the food quest made possible by the domestication of plants. Among the things made possible by this development was the formation of larger, more permanent communities than had been possible to hunters and food gatherers. The village community provided the basis for the domestication of animals, established new types of property, and made possible large aggregations of wealth. So superior were such communities, which came into being some ten thousand years ago that in one form or another they became almost universal. They provided the foundation for more complex communities.

Henry Sumner Maine has argued that the village community was, if not a universal stage in the development of mankind, universally distributed in the prehistoric period from England to India. In this area the units of the village community were patriarchal families. The political authority of the community was the body of elders and family heads. While tillable land was owned by families, its cultivation was carefully regulated by communal custom. Within the community, those trades were prac-

⁹ Painter, *op. cit.*, pp. 114 f.

ticed which made it self-sufficient. Maine suggested that while the traces of the village community have long since been submerged in Europe, they are still manifest in contemporary India.

In Europe the village community was displaced by the manorial community. It is very possible that a number of factors contributed to the transition there from a world of village communities to a world of manors, or feudalism. When the plantation system of Rome deteriorated, its remnants may have reorganized into proto-feudal form. The great estates of France came to be worked by *coloni*, in part for the lord, and in part for their own benefit. In the area to the north, it is possible that many villages founded by chieftains and their followers assumed a similar form.

There is little doubt that the external and internal troubles of Europe in the Middle Ages—the attacks by the Magyars, Vikings, and Moslems on the one hand, the state of anarchy within—tremendously accelerated the process of feudalization.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. Analyze some form of the movement toward stability in contemporary social life.
2. What is meant by "consistency" as a principle of community formation?

In what sense does it presuppose stability? What does it add that is not already contained in the first principle?

3. In what sense is the principle of "completeness" necessary if one is to account for community formation?
4. According to some social scientists, the most complicated community known to many was the peasant village. Analyze it in terms of the principles of community formation.
5. In what sense did the village community supply the foundations for more complex communities?
6. In what ways did the feudal manorial community differ from the village community?
7. Analyze the feudal manorial community in terms of the principles of community formation.
8. The attempt was made to transplant both the peasant village and the manorial community to the new world. Of these attempts the village community was more successful. How do you account for this?
9. In what ways was the class system of the manorial community different from that of the peasant village?
10. Which type of community do you believe was superior—the manor or the village? Explain.

6

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN RURAL COMMUNITY

Although the formation of the European city had long been underway at the time of the settlement of North America, Europe was still predominantly rural. Its rural communities were peasant villages and manors of a medieval type. The new world presented itself as an area for rural development. The forms of the European peasant village and the manor were transferred as far as possible to the New World. From the beginning, however, there were differences.

THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY VS. THE MANORIAL SYSTEM IN COLONIAL AMERICA

For the first two centuries of English occupancy, the North American colonies were primarily agricultural, so that at the close of the period even in New England, where commerce and industry were most developed, nine out of ten men were engaged in farming. The proportions were greater in the South. The colonies were settled at a time when England itself was agriculturally undeveloped with only around one-quarter of its potential agricultural land under cultivation. The work of reclamation and enclosure which eventually transformed the face of England took place two and a half centuries after the first settlement in North America.¹

¹ For a concise review of the history of American agriculture, see Everett E. Edwards, "American Agriculture—The First 300 Years," *Farmers in a Changing World* (Washington: U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, 1940), pp. 171 ff.

American agriculture initially underwent a considerable amount of forced experimentation, for seeds hardy in the Old World were not always hardy in the New and knowledge of growing conditions in the new hemisphere had to be gained. In this period a complex inter-penetration of New and Old World agriculture occurred, such that four-sevenths of the present total volume of agricultural production in the United States is made up of plants domesticated by the American Indians. New World plants that were added to the immigrants' stock included corn, cotton, peanuts, pumpkins, squashes, beans, potatoes, sweet potatoes, tobacco, and tomatoes. Some forms of New World cultivation were taken over, particularly corn technology; Old World use of machinery and draft animals was inaugurated and stock breeding was introduced from England. Once sufficient adaptation had occurred to permit agriculture to thrive, the colonies became a kind of battle ground, where the Old World village community and manorial systems could compete for acceptance.

THE MANORIAL SYSTEM EVOLVES INTO THE NEW WORLD SLAVE PLANTATION

The abundance of land in the New World and the persistence of feudal patterns among the highest English social strata at the time North America was colonized, made the hereditary grant of landed estates to friends of the king a normal procedure. However, the available land surrounding such estates was so abundant that it was difficult to persuade the ordinary immigrants to settle on such feudal holdings, or to stay on them once they had arrived. The owners of large tracts, for their part, sought to collect quit rents (money payments in exchange for feudal dues and services), much to the distress of tenants who had no ready means of obtaining cash. This was a source of agitation until the Revolutionary War. In addition to large feudal grants, which aided the formation of large estates, there was a system of head rights (first consisting in granting 50 acres of land to immigrants landing in Virginia), which quickly evolved into a plan for building large holdings in the southern colonies.

The attempt to establish manorial holdings and the formation of large estates by means of head rights soon created labor trouble. The manorial system of England rested on a foundation of

village communities. Since America offered no such base, would-be New World manors faced severe difficulties for lack of these pools of labor. There were numerous attempts to hold the Indians in bondage; as late as 1706 in Massachusetts Indian children were sold into bondage and women taken in war were enslaved. The men, however, could not be satisfactorily enslaved. Labor contract methods were then widely adopted for labor recruitment. These were adapted to conditions in England, where wages were fixed by statute, minors were apprenticed, and vagabonds were bound. Indentured servants, both voluntary and involuntary, were used in great numbers. They were debtors, criminals, kidnapped persons often supplied in great numbers by professional kidnappers in London and other seaport towns, and even many political exiles from the English Civil Wars at the time of Cromwell. The difficulty with indentured servant labor was the heavy cost of transportation, the need to acclimatize them, the high death rate, and the fact that, in the end, they formed only a temporary labor supply. However, such labor was extensively used; after the initial settlers, perhaps half of the immigrants came as indentured servants.

The first Negro slaves in the English colonies were brought by a Dutch privateer in 1619 and sold to planters. The second cargo came in 1630; after 1635 they were brought in regularly from England, the New Netherlands, and the West Indies. In 1690 there were around 5,000 Negro slaves in the southern colonies. When, toward the end of the Seventeenth Century, the English government banned kidnapping and sending convicts to America, the slave trade gained momentum until there were around 400,000 slaves in the colonies in 1760.

The difference between manorial and plantation agriculture is of basic importance. Manorial agriculture is a form of subsistence husbandry (crops for use); plantation agriculture is a form of agrarian capitalism (crops for sale). After 1615 the southern colonies of North America began to develop cash crops for export. Tobacco became the main cash crop of Virginia, with exports rising from 20,000 lbs. in 1618 to 500,000 lbs. in 1627. Virginia also experimented with viniculture and silk culture, and offered bounties for hemp, flax, indigo, exotic fruits, nuts, and spices all in the interest of developing additional cash crops.

The farm economy of South Carolina and Georgia soon came to be concentrated on rice and indigo, both of which were profitably produced with slave labor. Rice exports from Charleston rose from 1,800 barrels in 1700 to 110,000 barrels in 1773. However, tobacco exports continued to be most important, rising from 29,000,000 pounds in 1709 to 47,000,000 pounds in 1746 and 100,000,000 pounds in 1775.

Tobacco quickly exhausted the richest soil, requiring the constant acquisition of new land. White labor was costly, and Negro labor was quickly substituted.² Sometimes large plantations had as much as 1,000 acres under tobacco cultivation besides land for other crops, and a cattle range and woodland. Many plantations were over 5,000 acres in size. Since enclosure was impracticable, unoccupied regions became ranges where cattle, horses, and swine grazed freely in herds.

The plantation system soon added cotton to its profitable activities. Sea Island cotton was cultivated in South Carolina after 1767, and exports rose to more than 9,000 pounds by 1789. In 1790 cotton exports reached 8,000,000 pounds. Short staple cotton was also grown, reaching 56,000,000 pounds by 1800. The crucial event in cotton planting was the invention in 1793 of the cotton gin, which facilitated processing. In 1801, 100,000 bales of cotton were marketed. National production rose from 171,000 bales in 1810 to 5,387,000 bales in 1859.

The plantation system quickly found its point of gravity in cotton growing along the Mississippi and in Alabama. Around two per cent of the planters held estates with fifty or more slaves. In 1850 about 18 per cent of the farms of the south were plantations, reaching their highest concentration in the so-called Black Belt of Alabama. Tobacco production also continued to expand, reaching 110,000 hogsheads in 1790 and rising slowly to around 160,000 hogsheads on the eve of the Civil War. Corn was the only grain grown extensively in the South, and that was for use rather than for sale.³

² H. U. Faulkner, *American Economic History* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 67.

³ For estimates of the role of the plantation system in the contemporary south, see Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. 230 ff.

A plantation system has very different effects than a manorial system; its computations of both land and labor are in terms of profitability, not husbandry. In a very basic sense the American South started with a structure like European feudalism, but moved toward the colonial capitalism of Rome, including even the introduction of slavery. The plantations preempted the richest lands, compressing the yeoman farmers of the south to poorer areas and thus converting them into "poor white trash." Many of the yeoman farmers were forced either to migrate to the north and west or were trapped in a downward spiral of cultural backwardness. This was like Rome's decline of culture and population.

The plantation itself raised many of the items it needed, but it was organized around its cash export crop. Plantations were distant from one another which discouraged community life. They were characterized by the social extremes of the leisured family of the planter and the ignorant slaves—the two groups meeting in the great house. The occupations of the planter strata were directed toward planting, law, politics, and the army. The young men were often educated in English schools, and even more often they became wastrels, spending their time in gambling, horse racing, cock fighting, dueling, sexually experimenting with female slaves, and the like. The great bulk of the yeoman farmers was caught in a vice between the planters and the blacks, where they in turn became fertile soil for many of the dark tides of anti-Negro sentiment.

THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY SYSTEM

By contrast with the southern agricultural system, grants of land in the colonial charters of northern colonies established free and common socage (the tenure of English peasants). Most grants were made to trading companies. In New England and eastern Long Island, tracts were 36 square miles, a figure later adopted for the rectangular survey of United States public lands in the Old Northwest. When a settled community became crowded,⁴ representatives looked up a tract and petitioned the colonial government for permission to migrate. The government sent a committee to investigate and survey the tract, and if it approved, the grant was authorized. Near the center of the tract

⁴ Edwards, *op. cit.*, pp. 176 ff.

a village was laid out around a green with a meeting house, the minister's house, a burial ground, a market place, and a school. Plots of sufficient size for dwellings, outbuildings, gardens, and stock enclosures were awarded to individuals. From the large block of land around the village site, strips were distributed among the settlers by lot, each family receiving some of the best as well as some of the poorest land. The uncultivated land was used as common pasture under one or more herdsmen employed by the community. All the essentials of the old village community, as Maine had observed, were re-constituted in the New World.

The agricultural technology of these village communities was little different from that of the Middle Ages. There were few plows, and those that existed were the awkward, poorly designed moldboard type requiring three or four horses or four to six oxen to draw them. The tools used for harvesting, threshing, and cleaning grain were medieval. Wheat and smaller grains were cut with sickles; grass and other grain were cut with scythe. Livestock was initially scarce; Plymouth had no cattle for three years and no horses or sheep until 1627. During the Seventeenth Century the livestock was given little care and, for the most part, allowed to run wild.

In the northern village communities agriculture tended to be fused into systems of self-sufficiency; but lumbering, the production of naval stores and supplies and fishing were carried on for profit. There was some trade in furs, whiskey, iron, and salt; but New England came to depend on the West Indian traffic for rum, molasses, and sugar. Some New England fortunes were made in the transport of slaves.

While liquidating many of the Tory elements in the colonies and fastening the more democratic forms of land tenure on the country as a whole, the American Revolution failed to eliminate the plantation system. Blockade runners exported southern cotton and tobacco during the war. The effect of the war was most directly felt by industry and commerce, for it tended to reserve domestic markets for American businessmen. The northern colonies quickly developed the manufacture of textiles, in competition with England, and provided a northern market for southern cotton. The development of industries began to aggregate workers

who represented growing markets for farm products. Village husbandmen were thus increasingly inclined to buy the cheaper and often superior fabrics of the local factory instead of depending on homespun, and to sell agricultural products in the growing urban markets to secure the money for this purpose. Particularly around the cities, the village peasant proprietor often turned into a true farmer, working for the market rather than for personal subsistence. Even in the early Nineteenth Century New England husbandmen showed a tendency to specialize in the production of dairy products for sale.

Thus one of the last battles of the village community and the manorial system was fought out in the colonial period. The manorial system of the South rapidly turned into a form of colonial capitalism. In the North, at a somewhat slower pace, the village community of peasant proprietors was turned into a community of small farmers. In the course of the Eighteenth Century the cultivation of wheat shifted from the eastern region of the North and the Connecticut valley to western Massachusetts; in the Middle Colonies wheat was grown along the Hudson and Mohawk valleys. Flax became a commercial crop in New England and New York between 1740 and 1760. The plow was introduced for grain growing; improved breeds of livestock were introduced; horses were raised for work animals and for export to the West Indies; sheep raising became generalized, with seven to ten per farm. During the early Nineteenth Century in the northern states wheat production continued a westerly shift, reaching Ohio by 1830, and Wisconsin by 1860. Corn formed a belt below wheat, and the production of pork followed corn. The New England area, on the other hand, began to specialize in dairy production, producing at this time 70 per cent of the nation's cheese and 50 per cent of its butter.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE

At the time of the American Revolutionary War, the self-sufficient peasant proprietor was turning into a farmer. It was possible for the agricultural husbandman to buy the products of industry cheaper than he could make them himself; but this meant that he had to find a market for his products.

It was not possible for the agricultural husbandman to remain a peasant in a world shifting over to mass production. In the nature of the case, agriculture itself had to change. As industry left the farm home because it could achieve high quality at less cost the efficiency of those activities retained on the farm had to increase if farm production was to maintain an equivalent place. The problem of parity of farm products with industrial products was born. As science and technology were being applied to industry, they had also to be applied to agriculture.

In England it was not accidental that the enclosures and the movements toward scientific agriculture were concomitant developments; they were, in fact, two aspects of one and the same process, the capitalization of the farm. Arthur Young, Jethro Tull, Viscount Townsend, Robert Bakewell, all demonstrated the significance of scientific farming.⁵ In North America Washington and Jefferson conducted agricultural experiments. Robert Livingston helped distribute Spanish merino sheep, Henry Clay imported Hereford cattle, and societies for the promotion of scientific agriculture popularized the new movement. The fairs also sponsored the diffusion of scientific knowledge, as did the farm journals—*The American Farmer*, established by John P. Skinner in 1819 and *The Cultivator*, started by Jesse Buell in 1834. Interest in scientific agriculture continued to grow until the federal patent office received an appropriation of \$1,000 for the collection of agricultural statistics.

Despite the development of scientific agriculture, the gains in farm productivity were not a result of the introduction of science in the early Nineteenth Century. Since there was far too much land to encourage attitudes of care, the pioneer farmer skimmed off the cream and then moved on. Meanwhile, in the South, tobacco and cotton cultivation left a train of dessicated soils in their wake. The initial gains in American agriculture came by way of the introduction of machinery, speeding up the rate of extraction rather than increasing the foundation of yield. The cradle, used for harvesting, was introduced about 1820. Between 1825 and 1840 the cast iron plow was manufactured, and next the steel plow share was evolved. The Hussey and McCormick reap-

⁵ Faulkner, *op. cit.*, pp. 213 ff.

ers came into use in the 1840's as did mowing, threshing, haying machines, and seed drills.⁶

The Civil War provided the occasion for carrying through the mechanization of American agriculture. In mobilizing the largest army known to that date, the Union drew a million farmers from agriculture. At the same time the markets for agricultural products were never better. By the close of the war the shift to mechanization had largely been accomplished. The process appeared to be irreversible; it continued at an accelerating rate. From 1860 to 1910 there was a general displacement of men by horses. Among the major farm implements and machines introduced after the war were the twine binder, spring-tooth harrow, disc harrow, gang plow, cotton seed planters, corn shucking machine, corn binder, combine, and the centrifugal cream separator. After 1900 American agriculture switched from animal power to power driven machinery.

The application of science to the improvement of machinery is only one aspect of the scientific revolution of agricultural development. Some of the amazing directions that agricultural science took were revealed in the 1943-1947 *United States Yearbook of Agriculture*.⁷ Ernest G. Moore reviewed a few of the applications of science to agriculture by men associated with the Department of Agriculture. At the time Marion Dorset went to work for the Department of Agriculture in 1894, hog cholera was causing losses of up to \$65,000,000 a year. By 1903 he had solved the problem. Theobald Smith found a way to control tick fever in cattle which, around 1890, had begun to cause widespread losses. Smith found that it was caused by a protozoan parasite in the blood of infected animals. The research cost \$65,000 for salaries and expenses, but resulted in savings up to \$40,000,000 a year.

Dr. L. O. Howard furnished the basic information for campaigns to eradicate mosquitoes, the control of which made it possible for the United States to build the Panama Canal after French engineers had failed to do so. Maurice C. Hall experimented with carbon tetrachloride as a treatment for hookworm,

⁶ Edwards, *op. cit.*, pp. 228 ff.

⁷ Ernest G. Moore, "Men Who Went Before," *United States Yearbook of Agriculture* (Washington: U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, 1947), pp. 1 ff.

and courageously tried it on himself, proving it could be used on human beings. It is estimated that at least 15,000,000 persons have benefited.

L. A. Rogers improved the quality of butter. S. M. Babcock of the University of Wisconsin developed an accurate test for butter fat, giving creamery men, cheese makers, and other dairy processors a more equitable basis for buying milk and providing farmers with a means of testing their cows. T. J. Burrill proved that bacteria cause plant diseases. Erwin F. Smith discovered how many kinds of bacteria that cause plant disease. E. C. Stakman of the University of Minnesota established the existence of strains or races of disease-causing organisms. C. M. Woodworth did the first work in breeding plants resistant to insects. Other breeders developed varieties of wheat resistant to the hessian fly, the Sequoia potato resistant to leaf hoppers, and hybrid corn resistant to chinch bugs. C. V. Riley introduced a parasitic insect enemy of the cabbage worm, and the Australian ladybird to control cottony cushion scale of citrus trees in California. A variety of students developed hybrid corn which averages a yield of about 25 per cent above pollinated corn. In 1942-1945 American farmers harvested 2,000,000,000 bushels of corn by the use of hybrid seed corn, and in 1945 alone the increase was 600,000,000 bushels worth three quarters of a billion dollars.

The effects of the steel plow, new tillage machines, the mower, the binder, the thresher, and the combine have been estimated by Sherman E. Johnson.⁸ The time used to produce 100 bushels of wheat dropped from 320 hours in 1830, to 108 hours in 1900, and to 47 hours in 1940. The number of tractors has increased steadily since 1910. In 1945 there were 2,425,000 tractors on farms, an increase of 57 per cent over 1940. In the same period the number of grain combines increased 74 per cent, corn pickers 53 per cent, and milking machines 117 per cent. As a product of hybridization in 1944, American farmers harvested 40 per cent more corn than they had harvested between 1935 and 1939, even though the acreage harvested was only 5 per cent greater. The conversion of farming as a product of the application of science, carrying with it ever increasing dependence on the market, continues at an ever accelerating rate.

⁸ "Farm Science and Citizens," 1940 *U. S. Yearbook of Agriculture*, pp. 921 ff.

FARMERS IN POLITICS

All the developments that turned the rural villager into a farmer tended sooner or later also to force him into politics. Since there was plenty of land in the New World, a universal aspiration of the new immigrants and the sons of old immigrants was to own farms of their own. However, this required capital for the purchase of land and the equipment to work it. At an early date the farmers assumed the aspect of a debtor class, pressing for freer credit and better credit terms. As early as 1780 the farmers of central and western Massachusetts agitated for paper money in opposition to the Boston capitalists. When they revolted under Daniel Shays, Governor Bowdoin sent an army against them.

In the early state period the Federalist Party, expressing the interests of traders, bankers, and speculators, quickly became opposed by the agrarians, who formed the Democratic-Republican Party headed by Jefferson and Madison. This party represented the interests of the agricultural population, which was 95 per cent of the whole. The Democratic Party supported the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and sponsored the cause of the small farmers and planters. It supported the abandonment of property qualifications for voting and office holding, the abolition of imprisonment for debt, the establishment of free public education, the destruction of the National Bank, the policy of moving the Indians beyond the Mississippi, and a liberalized land policy.

The western agitation for easy credit continued with migration over the Alleghanies. Pressure also developed for liberalizing land policies eventually embodied in graduation bills reducing the price of slow selling land and in the Preemption Act of 1841, which gave the actual settlers preference in land sales. These pressures continued and were eventually expressed in the Homestead Act of 1862, granting settlers 160 acres free of charge, the establishment of the Department of Agriculture, and the Morrill Act which created the land grant colleges.

When the farmer borrowed money for the purchase of land and equipment, he was automatically bound rather tightly to the market. His only hope of liquidating his debts was a good market for his crops. Moreover, as the farmer moved farther into the frontier, his attention was automatically forced onto the problem

of transportation of produce to market. The agrarians soon pressed the government for a solution to this problem as well.

Up to the time of the Civil War, agriculture was the predominant occupation. The war, however, created unprecedented opportunities for the industrial entrepreneur, and from 1869 to 1899 the value of manufactured products climbed from \$3,000,000 to \$13,000,000,000. During this period, as Edwards has noted, the robber barons sought to control political policy in their interests by manipulating tariffs, controlling banking and currency, avoiding taxation, winning subsidies for railroad and timber companies, obtaining government contracts. When the farmers found the railroads they had so ardently supported to be their major opponent, the first major farm organization to operate as a political pressure group was formed.

The Grange (the National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry) was formed in 1867. It was an important factor in the battle against the railroads between 1869 and 1875.¹⁰ Granger meetings also provided a forum in which farmers could identify their grievances and common interests. Though the National Grange asserted its non-political character in 1874, this did not prevent members from holding political meetings outside the Grange. In eleven western states various Independence, Reform, and Anti-Monopoly Farmers' Parties elected members to local legislatures. The first act to control the railroads was passed in Illinois in 1869, limiting the roads to charging uniform and reasonable rates. Other states soon followed. The Granger laws sought to establish schedules of maximum rates, to prevent larger charges for short runs than for long hauls, to preserve competition by forbidding the consolidation of parallel lines, and to eliminate free passes for public officials. The Granger movement declined rapidly from 1874 to 1880, when the number of Granges dropped from 20,000 to 4,000.

In the post-Civil War period, the situation of the farmer as debtor tended to get worse than it had been before the war. During the war the farmer often mortgaged his farm for mechanized equipment. When the war was over he was confronted with mounting costs for industrial goods, fluctuating markets,

¹⁰ S. J. Buck, *The Granger Movement* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1913); *The Agrarian Crusade* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920).

drought, and a falling market for agricultural commodities. The Union had issued \$433,000,000 in paper money or "greenbacks" to help finance the war, some of which were to be repaid in gold, some in silver, and some with unspecified modes of re-payment. Various series of bonds had been floated with interest rates from four to eight per cent. How the bonds were to be paid was of some consequence to indebted farmers, for if redeemed in gold the bond would rise to par value. The Greenback Program, which took shape in 1874, denounced the resumption of specie payments; called for a free coinage of silver on a par with gold; and demanded the suppression of national bank notes. The Greenback Movement had extensive influence on state and national politics.

The farmers' clubs which grew up spontaneously with the Grange in the 1870's were organized into state alliances. In 1887 the Grand State Alliance of Texas joined with the Farmers' Union of Louisiana to form the National Farmers' Alliance. Other mergers followed. The alliances called for free coinage of silver, government issuance of paper money, the reduction and equalization of taxation, and the reclamation of excess lands held by railroads. In a number of states the alliances managed to get their slate of candidates elected.

In 1891 the Alliance held a convention with the Knights of Labor at Cincinnati. The following year the People's or Populist Party was launched; it vigorously promoted a variety of farmer and labor measures. All of these movements helped to lay the foundations of the present day farm organizations.¹¹

The Grange reached its early peak in 1875, when its membership reached 868,050. It declined rapidly thereafter, but gradually was rebuilt into one of the most substantial farm organizations of the country. In 1951 its membership had again reached 860,000 with its major strength in New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Oregon. The state granges hold an annual meeting at which they pass resolutions on governmental policy. The Grange also maintains a Washington office and a research staff to keep its lobbyists and any interested members of Congress informed about pertinent facts of pending legislation.

¹¹ A compact review is contained in Lowry Nelson, *American Farm Life* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 117 ff.

The Farmers' Alliance, which came into existence at the time the Grange was in decline, faded away with the Populist Party in which it had reached its strongest expression. The Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union of America (the Farmers' Union) is the second oldest existing farm organization. It came into existence in Texas in 1902, taking the place of the Farmers' Alliance. It has militantly supported the underprivileged in agriculture on a platform of Jeffersonian fundamentalism and advocacy of the family-type farm. In 1950 there were about 7,000 local unions with a dues-paying membership of 185,000. The Farmers' Union maintains livestock shipping associations in the major markets of the midwest and operates the Farmers' Union Central Exchange at St. Paul, Minnesota. The Farmers' Union members own the Farmers' Union Grain Terminal Association of St. Paul.

The American Farm Bureau Federation originated as an organization of farm families to facilitate the work of the federal Agricultural Extension Service. The local county farm bureaus, organized by county agricultural agents, developed into state organizations. A national federation, the American Farm Bureau Federation, was formed in 1919. At the local level it is an educational program sponsored by a public agency. It grew rapidly and quickly assumed legislative influence. It has always worked with such non-farm groups as the United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the American Legion. It has increased rapidly in membership since World War II, reaching a membership of 1,492,282 families in 1952.

In addition to the farm organizations, there are, according to the statistics collected by the Farm Credit Administration, about 61,000 cooperative associations in the United States. They developed rapidly during the agricultural depression of the 1920's. In 1925 membership in marketing and purchasing associations alone was 2,700,000; by 1950 it had grown to 6,584,000. The National Council of Farmer Cooperatives was organized in 1929. It is an educational and policy-making body for perhaps 5,000 cooperatives comprising 2,600,000 members, for whom it acts as a lobbyist on national issues. The activities of the farmers in politics reflect the radical transformations in their fates.

THE GOVERNMENT IN AGRICULTURE

Proposals for a federal department of agriculture are almost as old as the United States.¹² It was not until 1839, however, that official action was sanctioned. Congress appropriated \$1,000 for collecting agricultural statistics and other activities, and an Agricultural Division was set up in the Patent Office. The Republican Party, indebted for victory in 1860 to the agricultural West, was pledged to agrarian reform, and on May 15, 1862, created the Department of Agriculture. An agricultural library and museum were soon established in it. Monthly reports containing the latest news on the conditions of crops were sent to farmers' clubs and state agricultural colleges. Beginning in 1883, bulletins were issued by the various divisions dealing with the results of specific investigations. The first division of the Department, Chemistry, 1862, studied soils and fertilizers, the composition of plants raised on various soils, food and drug adulteration, and sugar manufacture. The Entomological Division was created to combat destructive insects; after 1882 Congress began an annual appropriation of \$20,000 for this purpose.

The work of compiling statistics by the Department, begun in 1863, was originally concentrated on crop reporting. When the need for securing statistics on foreign markets developed, the statistical branches of the Department were reorganized, and agents were sent into the field.

The Bureau of Animal Industry was created in 1884 to supervise meat imports and exports. Quarantine stations were set up near the major cattle ports, and the Bureau directed its attention toward wiping out pluro-pneumonia and Texas fever.

As the need for research developed, proposals for coordinating agricultural research were made. The land grant colleges, established by the Morrill Act of 1862, potentially provided for a comprehensive system of agricultural research. Officials of the Department of Agriculture proposed the establishment of a unit in the Department to serve as a clearinghouse for findings in the

¹² For a summary of the early history of the government in agriculture, see Edwards, *op. cit.*, pp. 246 ff. For a compact survey of the recent picture, see Nelson, *op. cit.*, pp. 152 ff.

colleges. The experiment stations became the link between the Department and the colleges. After 1880 formal meetings of college representatives were held under the chairmanship of the commissioner of agriculture to coordinate research.

During its first twenty-seven years, the Department's annual expenditures rose from \$64,000 to more than \$1,000,000, and rose to \$2,623,000 by 1894. The Department of Agriculture continued to expand with changing needs of the times. The Secretary of Agriculture was entrusted with the protection of the national forests in 1905, with enforcement of the Food and Drug Act in 1906, with meat inspection in 1907, and with inspection of dairy products for export in 1908.

After the turn of the century the Department inaugurated county demonstration work and put it in the hands of field agents. Thousands of farmers served by the county agents became advocates of a nationwide system of extension work. In 1914, under the Smith-Lever Act, Congress agreed to match state grants for extension work. Special extension divisions were set up in the state agricultural colleges to cooperate with the extension office.

There was a brief period of agricultural prosperity in the United States in the first decade of the twentieth century. This was prolonged by World War I, however, from 1920 until 1940 American farmers experienced a prolonged period of almost continuous depression. During the 1920's there was increased pressure on the government to act. Under President Hoover an effort was made to correct the imbalance between farm and non-farm prices by helping farmers market their produce cooperatively and through purchase by stabilization corporations of wheat and cotton when the prices fell. In the early days of the New Deal a program of reduction in acreage of surplus crops was inaugurated. These proposals were later incorporated in the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. In addition to acreage control, marketing quotas were authorized. Surplus crops were stored, and government loans were extended up to 90 per cent of parity. In perishables the Commodity Credit Corporation was permitted to buy in quantities sufficient to maintain the price at the guaranteed level. From 1940 to 1953 war demands for agricultural products made it unnecessary for the government to in-

voke the controls authorized by Congress, but the surplus in cotton and wheat in 1953 made it inevitable that acreage controls and marketing quotas be invoked once again. The over-production of butter reached such magnitude that the government agreed to purchase butter at 90 per cent of the parity price through 1953.

Through all these developments the Department of Agriculture and the Farm Credit Administration have tended to expand. The number of employees in 1932 was 28,647 exclusive of the Agricultural Extension Service personnel of 8,000. Two years later the number had increased to 40,000, and by 1939 to 90,000. As of 1951, the number had declined to 81,000.

The Agricultural Extension Service provides grants-in-aid to the states for an adult education program to be administered by the land grant colleges. It is the most elaborate education program for farm people in the world. In 1951 it had a staff of 12,642.

The Commodity Stabilization Service is responsible for administering production adjustments and price supports; for stabilization, international commodity agreements, and the agricultural conservation program. The fiscal agency through which it operates, the Commodity Credit Corporation, has a capital stock of \$100,000,000. In addition to a full-time professional staff, farmer committeemen serve in this organization on a *per diem* plus expenses basis.

The Soil Conservation Service is an agency that provides technical assistance to farmers and ranchers in making adjustments in land use, treatment of water, and soil conservation. There are 2,383 districts organized under state laws. In 1951 it was estimated that 80 per cent of all farms and ranches were included.

The Farm Credit Administration is the heir of the Federal Land Bank's devices for providing credit to farmers. The Farm Home Administration has its central purpose in the provision of financial aid to farmers unable to obtain credit from other sources. The Rural Electrification Administration makes loans to organizations of farmers for financing their acquisition of electrical and telephone services. Such organizations are usually cooperatives which enter into contractual arrangements with the Rural Electrification Administration for necessary loans.

THE RURAL COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES

If discussions of the rural community are not to explode in purely verbal opposition, some agreement must be established as to the meaning of the term. Sanderson's definition has been widely accepted among rural sociologists: "A rural community consists of the social interaction of the people and their institutions in the local area in which they live on dispersed farmsteads and in a hamlet or village which forms the center of their common activities."¹³

This can be interpreted as consistent with the position taken in the early pages of the present chapter, where a community was taken to be an integrated total way of life resting on the principles of *stability* of problem solutions, *consistency* between one problem solution and another, and *completeness*, the formation of the whole to a complete way of life. A rural community is fully present when a complete way of life finds its synthesis in agricultural husbandry. A mere center for common activities does not by itself mean that the way of life as a whole forms an integrated unit. A center of social activity may represent an important component in community development without constituting a full community.

The two types of rural formations constituting complete rural communities in colonial America were the manors of the South and the village-economies of the yeomen in New England. Only rarely did the developments in the United States tend to perpetuate these originally self-sufficient rural communities in their original form as, for example, when the village-centered New England systems were transported by stages eventually to the Mormon settlements of the inter-mountain area.¹⁴

All the most fundamental events in American agricultural history have tended to break down the self-sufficient rural community. The manorial community went first, quickly becoming centered in the production of a cash crop (tobacco, rice, indigo, cotton, or sugar) for export. The manorial community was trans-

¹³ Dwight Sanderson, *Rural Sociology and Rural Social Organization* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1942), pp. 278-279.

¹⁴ Lowry Nelson, *A Social Survey of Escalante, Utah* (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Studies, 1925).

formed into the plantation in a system of colonial capitalism resting on slave labor.

The very abundance of new land soon began to operate on the village communities of the northern and central colonies. There was every reason for the sons of village proprietors to hope to establish farms of their own and for the newly arriving immigrants to acquire land. However, the acquisition of land, even though it was cheap, and the minimum of livestock and equipment necessary to set up farming encouraged the borrowing by prospective farmers. The persons who borrowed all or part of the funds necessary to begin farming in turn looked toward the market for sale of enough produce to liquidate their debts. The rural husbandman tended to be progressively ensnared into a market orientation in an irreversible process.

The migration of industries from the farm home to the factory increased the dependence of the farmer on the market; the application of science to agriculture and the increasing dependence of the farmer on machinery made necessary the marketing of produce to pay for scientific improvements and machinery. The Civil War took men off the farms, encouraging wholesale mechanization of farms, and provided favorable markets.

All of the most fundamental events in American agriculture—the application of science to farming, the emergence of farm organizations, and the ever-expanding place of the government in agriculture are part of the destruction of the self-sufficient farm community. They re-locate the point of gravity of those events that determine the farmers' destiny in national, economic, and political spheres. To a nation so near to a self-sufficient agrarian past, these have not always been pleasant events to contemplate. An embattled agrarianism has persistently glamorized the old type family farm and local community.

By the beginning of the Twentieth Century, however, the liquidation of the rural community in the United States had gone so far that considerable interest was aroused by anyone who could prove its existence. Wilson was quite well aware of the fact that whatever meaning the locality had had before, automobile transportation was going to transform it. Before the automobile, he observed, scattered farm families tended to limit their interaction with the surrounding world to a sphere comprised by a

team haul of a given center. The "team haul" defined the radius of a circle of social intercourse.¹⁵

Wilson's concept stimulated Galpin to develop a technique for delineating the so-called "rurban community." Around 1913 he actually mapped the trade areas of a Wisconsin county with respect to where the farmers bought hardware, did their banking, bought dry goods, sent the children to school, and so forth. The lines for the various services did not coincide, and were particularly at variance with political centers. What Galpin discovered was not something stable, but an almost incredible ferment. "The fundamental community is a composite of many expanding and contracting feature communities possessing the characteristic pulsating instability of all real life."¹⁶

If one put Galpin's findings into a framework of the community conceived of as a stable, integrated, total way of life, he was, in effect, concluding that the rural community did not exist. In its place was a ferment of community fragments. The career of the concept of community after Galpin only confirms this. Galpin found that trade zones most completely define the clusters of local interaction which he called "community," but in Michigan it was found that high school attendance was far more important. Sanders and Enslinger added the idea of "neighborhood clusters" in trying to pin down the local forms.¹⁷ Kolb attempted to use name consciousness as a means of neighborhood identification.¹⁸

Kolb and Marshall, in charting changes in Dane County, Wisconsin, neighborhoods over a twenty-year period, found that while there was only one new "active" neighborhood from 1920 to 1931, thirty-two of those which were active in 1920 were inactive by 1931.¹⁹ When the students attempted to characterize the rural service centers, the instability was manifest once again. Kolb thought that there were at least five: they were the single, simple

¹⁵ Warren H. Wilson, *The Evolution of the Country Community* (Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1912), pp. 91-92.

¹⁶ C. J. Galpin, "The Social Anatomy of an Agriculture Community," University of Wisconsin AES Research Bulletin, no. 34, p. 18.

¹⁷ Irwin T. Sanders and Douglas Enslinger, "Alabama Rural Communities: A Study of Chilton County," Alabama College Bulletin 136, 1940, 33:1A, p. 80.

¹⁸ J. H. Kolb, "Rural Primary Groups," University of Wisconsin, AES Research Bulletin, 51, 1921.

¹⁹ J. H. Kolb and Douglas G. Marshall, "Neighborhood-Community Relations in Rural Society," AES Research Bulletin, 154, University of Wisconsin, 1944.

service village, containing only one service; limited service villages, providing at least two but less than six services; the semi-complete, intermediate type with some but not complete services in all fields; the complete, partially specialized centers; and the highly specialized urban types (cities ranging in size from 5,000 upward).²⁰

Zimmerman divided rural centers into those he called independent and dependent, using as criteria whether a center had a post office, a telegraph office, an express office, a publisher, and a bank. Independent centers were further classified on the basis of the number of business units reported in *Bradstreet's Book of Commercial Ratings*. By this method he identified 68 trade centers in Minnesota with over 75 units, 73 with from 50 to 85 units, and 211 with less than 50 units. In addition, there were 1,211 elementary centers lacking one or more communication services.²¹

In the early 1940's, under the direction of Carl C. Taylor, the United States Department of Agriculture sponsored a series of six community studies in El Cerrito, New Mexico;²² Sublette, Kansas;²³ Irwin, Iowa;²⁴ Lancaster, Pennsylvania,²⁵ Landaff, New Hampshire;²⁶ and Harmony, Georgia.²⁷ The specific aim of this series of studies to secure samples on a continuum from high community stability to great instability. In Taylor's mind the extreme points of the continuum were marked by the high community stability of the Amish of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in contrast to the "dust bowl" community of Sublette, Kansas. The

²⁰ J. H. Kolb, "Service Relations of Town and Country," *AES Research Bulletin*, 58, University of Wisconsin, 1923.

²¹ C. C. Zimmerman, "Farm Trade Centers in Minnesota, 1905-1929," *AES Bulletin*, 269, University of Minnesota, 1930, p. 10.

²² Olen Leonard and C. P. Loomis, "El Cerrito, New Mexico," *Rural Life Studies*, 1, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, November, 1941.

²³ Earl H. Bcll, "Sublette, Kansas," *Rural Life Studies*, 2, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, September, 1942.

²⁴ Edward O. Moe and Carl C. Taylor, "Irwin, Iowa," *Rural Life Studies*, 5, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, December, 1942.

²⁵ Walter M. Kollmorgen, "The Old Order Amish of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania," *Rural Life Studies*, 4, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, September, 1942.

²⁶ Kenneth MacLeish and Kimball Young, "Landaff, New Hampshire," *Rural Life Studies*, 3, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, April, 1942.

²⁷ Wayne Waller, "Harmony, Georgia," *Rural Life Studies*, 6, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, January, 1943.

other four communities were conceived as lying in between, with El Cerrito representing a kind of cultural island.

None of the communities was self-sufficient, nor did they find their point of integration, so far as there was any integration, in the same manner. The Old Order Amish, though confined to a rural way of life by their religion, and though possessing an ancient tradition of peasant self-sufficiency, had a considerable and growing dependence on cash crops. Its point of integration was found in the family.

El Cerrito was an irrigation community of peasants descended from one-time prosperous ranchers. It had considerable stability due to the extent to which its family and church life so completely absorbed its members. Because the community failed to prepare its members for the outside world, they were almost completely dependent on it. However, El Cerrito is not self-sufficient; its members find it necessary to piece out the subsistence economy by some work or aid from the outside. When individuals are away long enough to learn the ways of the outside world, they are nearly always lost to the community.

Landaff, New Hampshire, was settled by the descendants of some original New England community villagers. Something of a self-sufficient community form appeared in the area and endured until the Civil War, when the Northern Army's demand for woolen goods led to a reorientation of the economy toward the wool market. With the collapse of the woolen market after the Civil War and the shift of sheep raising to the mountain states, this type of farming declined. The community has never returned to its self-sufficient form, but has explored other sources of cash income, such as lumbering and, more recently, dairy products. Even so it has continually lost ground, with fewer children and fewer persons remaining in the community. So far as there is any center to the community, it tends to be in a local unit of the Grange.

Sublette, Kansas, is primarily a one-cash-crop area where local conditions fluctuate widely with "dust bowl" conditions, on the one hand, and the state of the wheat market, on the other. The community has tended to have a one-third turnover in a five year period. Leadership is lacking, and the school is almost the only institution with anything like an integrating role.

Harmony, Georgia, has a long history of instability under the plantation system and its alternatives. It tended to remain a one-cash-crop region, concentrating on cotton cultivation, until the boll weevil devastations of the 1920's. More recently, for some of its segments, dairy products have introduced some stability. However, Harmony is crossed by the race division and is kept in an unstable state to tenancy. So far as it has a center, this tends to be found in the church and school.

The rural life studies have proved that rarely can a true rural community be found any longer in the United States; what exists in fact is a kaleidoscope of community fragments. Nelson's summary of the status of the American rural community agrees with these formulations:

Changes . . . are taking place. Boundaries shift somewhat, for occasionally two neighborhoods coalesce to form one. Functions also change: where the church was important at a former period, a school or farm bureau unit may have taken its place. The village nuclei also show dynamic tendencies. Their populations grow or decline; the nature of the business units which compose them may undergo changes. The trade area itself may contract or expand. It is impressive, indeed, to contemplate the fluidity of community life, the flexibility manifest in man's adaptation to the earth's surface.²⁸

No matter from what point one approaches it, the American rural formation does not present a complete community form. The little red school house is a thing of the past, being replaced by the consolidated school. The consolidated church is also tending to replace the former community church. The trade zones intersect and overlap. Rural government is a maze of overlapping jurisdictions. Rural destinies are determined by events remote from the rural sphere. As all forms of human life tend to move toward synthesis, so does human life in rural areas, but there is rarely any point within the locale that could permit the type of stable integration that a community requires. The fluidity of rural life in considerable measure arises in the attempt to form a community life where no community life is possible.

²⁸ Lowry Nelson, *Rural Sociology* (New York: American Book Co., 1948), p. 94.

SUMMARY

In North America the first forms of the rural community were the manorial communities in the south and the organization of village communities by English yeomen in the north. The first of the communities in North America to be transformed were the southern manors; these quickly turned into plantations resting on slave labor and operating, not on a subsistence basis, but on a system of colonial capitalism. The cash crops for export tended by slave labor were tobacco, rice, indigo, cotton, and sugar. The plantation system rose to its height with cotton cultivation.

The abundance of land in the New World sent the peasant proprietors of the village communities on the road toward becoming market-oriented farmers. The sons of the early villagers and newly arriving immigrants needed capital if they were to own and establish farms of their own. They borrowed money for this purpose and looked to agricultural husbandry to pay off their debts. They thus tended to become market-oriented. At an early period the farmers, as a debtor class, opposed the city bankers and financiers. This process was greatly accelerated when the Appalachians had been penetrated and settlement of the Old Northwest got under way. As in the case of the manorial community, the village community in turn was transformed.

The major events affecting American agriculture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries proceeded at an accelerating rate. The development of the factory system was made possible by the transfer of industry to the towns. As manufacturers shifted to the factory, the farmer had to buy products formerly made in the home. The application of science to the farm also bound the farmer closer to the market. As the point of gravity in the farmers' life order shifted to commercial and political spheres, a variety of farmer movements and farm organizations took shape. The focal point in the changed order of agricultural affairs increasingly became the federal government. From the time the Department of Agriculture was established in 1862 to the present, the role of government in agriculture has continued to grow.

All these formations continued to react on the rural community to shatter its unique forms. A persistent agrarianism has continued to idealize the rural community, but its most devoted

students continue to report that the more closely they search for the rural community, the more completely they become aware of an unceasing ferment.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. In what ways does the Eskimo illustrate the principles of community formation?
2. What differences did Henry Sumner Maine find between the village communities of India and Europe?
3. In what way does the manorial community of feudalism differ from the rural village community?
4. What is the difference between a *benefice* and a *fief*? Of what importance is the difference?
5. In what sense is it true that the ultimately free man under feudalism is the lowest owner of a castle?
6. How do you account for the fact that in the United States science was initially applied to the construction of agricultural machinery rather than to other phases of agriculture?

7. Of what importance was the Civil War to the mechanization of American agriculture? Explain your answer.
8. Trace the career of the farmer in politics.
9. How do you account for the increased role of the government in agriculture after the Civil War?
10. In what sense may the rural community in America be said to be declining?

THE WESTERN CITY

All evidence suggests that whenever the principles of stability, consistency, and completeness are permitted to work without outside interference, communities of considerable stability appear. In his examination of village communities, Maine observed that in the formation of the village community the time must sooner or later have been reached when the capacity to absorb strangers ceased. Why it absorbed strangers in the first place is not hard to understand; the strangers had things the villagers wanted or needed. Moreover, with respect to the world round about, Maine thought, the village communities were originally quite elastic.

On the whole the conclusion which I have arrived at concerning the village-communities is that, during the primitive struggle for existence they were expansive and elastic bodies, and these properties may be perpetuated in them for a time by bad government.¹

Whenever a system of authority grows up outside the village community which affects it in a stable way, however, the community tends to close. For India, Maine argued, this closure was produced by British dominion.

Whether the Indian village-communities had wholly lost their capacity for the absorption of strangers when the British dominion began, is a point on which I have heard several contradictory opinions; but it is beyond doubt that the influence of the British Government, which in this respect is nothing more than the ordinary influence of settled authority, has tended steadily to turn the communities into close corpora-

¹ Henry Sumner Maine, *Village Communities of the East and West* (London: John Murray, 1895), p. 168.

tions. The definition of rights which it has effected through its various judicial agencies—the process of law by which it punishes violations of right—above all the money value which it has given to all rights by the security which it has established from one end of India to another—have all helped to make the classes in possession of vested rights cling to them with daily increasing tenacity.²

The village communities illustrate some of the characteristics any community may have. They may be elastic with respect to the events lying outside of them; they may be led by external events to close into rigid forms. They may also be transformed into something quite different: the village communities of the Middle Ages were transformed into manors; in the northern colonies of North America the village communities were transformed into variously integrated settlements of farmers.

George Homans has advanced the theory that human communities are subject to two kinds of change: conflict, which results in fighting, and disintegration, which results in the destruction of the community.³ Homans has illustrated his theories by tracing the disintegration of a New England rural community.

A society in which crime, alcoholism, divorce, suicide, and psychoneurosis occur was described by Durkheim as being in a state of *anomie*. Homans equates this with *social disorganization* and illustrates it in a study of a New England town called Hilltown.⁴

Hilltown was incorporated by the colonial legislature in 1767 with a population of 150 persons. It built schools and roads, carried on its business in the town meeting, cared for its needy, and even provided a company of militia for Concord and Bunker Hill. It sent representatives to the colonial and state legislatures. It chose and provided for a minister, for the town was originally of unified religion—Calvinist in doctrine and Congregational in organization.

Hilltown was a settlement of farms, each farm producing most of the food needed by the family. They raised corn, grain,

² *Ibid.*, pp. 106-107.

³ Homans, *The Human Group* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950), p. 336.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 338 ff. Based on the Ph.D. thesis of D. L. Hatch, "Changes in the Structure and Function of a Rural New England Community since 1900," Harvard University, 1948.

and hay; had a kitchen garden and an orchard; and kept pigs, cattle, and chickens for meat. Some commodities were sold for the cash needed for the few necessities purchased outside. Farm work was carried on by the family, and each member had his part. The population grew from 150 in 1767 to 1,825 in 1850, after which it slowly declined to 1,019 in 1945. Homans has pointed out that the decades in which towns like Hilltown were most prosperous was during the period when New England literature and philosophy were in flower—the time of Emerson, Thoreau, and Hawthorne.

In 1835 the first major railroad from Boston to the hinterland was open, and in 1841 an all-rail connection was established between Boston and the Middle West. Yankees began to migrate, and many New England towns, including Hilltown, began to decline. At this time every farm was in some measure a shop where (in winter) furniture, shoes, and small articles were turned out. By the 1840's, however, the industrialization of New England was under way, and Hilltown itself partly underwent the process. A small tinware factory and a blanket factory were established. The saw mills were active, and some French Canadians came to work in the surrounding woods.

During the early nineteenth century evidence of the intensity of local religious feeling appeared in the fact that in Hilltown, when the Unitarian movement was felt, the Unitarians formed a new society (1827). The Methodists formed a third group in 1838. Religious sentiments were intense and closely related to everyday life. Social life was active and intense, with skating, sleigh-ride parties, charades, "kitchen junkets," farm bees, and spelling bees. The average Hilltownner visited one of the industrial cities only two or three times a year. The three churches supported women's organizations, young people's clubs, and Sunday schools. Everyone knew everyone else. There was some division of social classes—between substantial farmers and merchants who held the chief offices of the town (selectman, treasurer, and chairman of the school board), a middle, and a lower class. The towns people had a clear conception of the qualities that made a good citizen; they were being upper class, having possessions, and maintaining a high level of morality. The actual leaders reinforced one another in agreement with these norms.

After 1900 all this tended to change, and in Homans' opinion Yankee farmers were increasingly unwilling to accept the standard of living associated with subsistence farming. Today Hilltown farmers specialize in milk or poultry production for the market. The history of local farming has been complicated by the Finns who arrived in the middle of the last century and worked hard to become the most able and prosperous farmers in the area. The Irish who came in the eighteenth century intermarried with the Yankees. The Yankees are jealous and suspicious of the Finns; the Finns exercise little control of political affairs and have little interest in them.

The Finns have literally kept farming alive, but no one has done this for industry. The blanket mill has burned down; the furniture factory has consolidated with larger factories elsewhere; the shoe shop is gone; and only two saw mills remain. The old hotel is gone, and the railroad company no longer keeps the express office open. The automobile and truck have put an end to Hilltown as a retail center. Meanwhile, lower-middle-class persons from a neighboring industrial city have made Hilltown a low-rent suburb.

Except on rare occasions, the town meeting is sparsely attended and is generally viewed as a dull affair. The roads are no longer cared for out of local funds; more than half the cost of maintenance is paid by the state. The same is true of the schools, which have decayed; Hilltown sends its high school students by bus to a neighboring city. The prestige of holding office has declined to the point that few elections are contested. The townspeople are indifferent, and the officials are often dishonest. Since 1885 six town tax collectors have run off with town money. The Methodist church has disappeared, and the Congregational and Unitarian churches are poorly attended. No leading man is prominent in church circles or even regular in church attendance. The Old Yankee families are dying out. Hilltown girls are employed out of town in even greater numbers than men. The fraternal orders have left town, and social life is impoverished. Standards of morality have deteriorated. Divorce, with no stigma attached, has increased among all classes. Many younger women are quite openly pregnant before marriage. Sex norms have relaxed. "The girl is expected to 'come across' or 'put it out,'" and

the girl who, by these standards, cheats her escort gets few dates. "There is a common pooling of information among boys. No conventions of Victorian gallantry restrain young men from a frank discussion of their dating experiences. The expression is heard: 'I paid for her dinner and I didn't get a damn thing out of her.'" ⁵ Even the social standing of the family is no longer an unquestioned affair established by working social consensus:

Hilltown still looks as a New England town ought to look: white churches, green elms, classic houses, and all. But the activities that created the setting are dead. The churches are deserted; many of the farms are abandoned; the families that once kept up the houses on Main Street are represented now by the spinsters and the childless; the other town institutions carry out only a small part of what was once their duty and their pride.⁶

To Homans, the changes and technical and physical developments in the external environment made the people relatively poorer than other persons in nineteenth century America, while changes in the cultural environment made them more anxious to become more wealthy.

The fact that communities arising out of the operation of the principles of stability, consistency, and completeness tend to achieve a kind of integration which, within limits, resists destruction has often led to the treatment of the community as a kind of organism. Actually, the community does not resist destruction; people defend a communal way of life. It is, however, easy to reify the community. The destruction of a community, from this standpoint, is a kind of organic death. This interpretation is strongly suggested by Homans' theory of social disintegration. A community, or for that matter any group, is conceived by Homans as composed of two "systems"—an *external system* consisting of men's actions toward the environment and composed of interests, actions, and interactions; and an *internal system* consisting of men's actions toward each other and composed of interaction, inter-personal sentiments, norms, and inter-personal rankings. Social disintegration is perceived as a set of effects arising in the

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 355.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 356.

external system and initiating a cycle of effects in the internal system.⁷

The steps in this process in Hilltown, as seen by Homans, were as follows: (1) In the external system, (a) the number of sentiments that led the members to cooperate declined, (b) the number of activities the members of the group carried on together then decreased, (c) hence the frequency of interaction between members of the group also decreased; (2) in the internal system, (a) the frequency of interaction decreased, (b) bringing about a decrease in the strength of inter-personal sentiments, (c) resulting in a blurring of norms once common and clear, (d) involving a vagueness in inter-personal ranking, ensuing in (e) a loss of social control (expressed in such things as a new frequency of pre-marital sex relations).

While such an organismic conceptualization is a tribute to the kind of integration a community may achieve when a community is not interfered with from the outside, this very fact of integration is all the organismic analogy really accounts for. Such organismic ideas must be employed with caution, lest they be taken to imply that a community "dies" in the same sense as an organism. Communities never die; they are destroyed. Hilltown was, originally, a more or less self-sufficient village community of the early New England type. It yielded to the same forces that transformed the rural husbandman in America into a farmer. Its farm industries were relocated in the factory. Its farming ceased to be primarily for home consumption, and became market oriented. Local institutions ceased to represent the point of synthesis of community life. This destruction of Hilltown was carried out by community forms external to it.

A community form that anciently arose in opposition to the village community was the city. Wherever the city appeared, it destroyed or absorbed the village communities that stood in its path, and drew their fragments into essentially new patterns.

THE INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF THE CITY

It is assumed that as a community the city is a product of the same principles that produce a hunting community like that of

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 359.

the Eskimos or a rural village community. Hence it is not enough to say, simply, that the city arises from the working of the processes of stability, consistency, and completeness; for, while this is true, it does not serve to distinguish one community type from another. In addition to these primary principles of community formation, there must be various secondary principles of community differentiation that serve to distinguish one community from another. The approach to these secondary principles is most easily made by way of the theory of institutions.

Life is a kind of activity peculiar to organisms describable as nutrition, growth, and reproduction. In social life or collective activity, the basic forms of living activity (nutrition, growth, and reproduction) are realized in various kinds of common and conjoint behaviors. One can thus visualize social behavior as addressed to a series of problems divisible into two broad types—the mastery of nature and the accommodation to other men.

There are many definitions of “institution,” but in one way or another they are always reduced to the fact that *an institution is a standard solution to a collective problem*. For example, one of the most fundamental problems of every individual or group of individuals is to stay alive. One of the most fundamental institutions of any community is the standardized solution to the problem of securing from nature what is necessary in the way of food, shelter, and the materials for clothing that make this possible—the economic institution or institutions of a community. The fundamental economic institution of the Eskimos is the hunter and his family, constituting the basic team for securing food and materials and working them up into useful forms. Within the economic team represented by the Eskimo family, a definite sexual division of labor holds with clear-cut areas of responsibility between the hunter and his wife or wives. Specialized instruments are used by each, and in general, the person using a given type of weapon or instrument is responsible for its manufacture and, in case of a dispute, he is its owner. While the Eskimo male manufactures harpoons, darts, sledges, knives, etc., the woman manufactures awls, needles, needle cases, and the like. In times of famine the Eskimos have resorted to cannibalism in order that the group might survive, but this is not an institution; it is *not* a standardized solution to the food problem.

In addition to the problem represented by the mastery of nature, such other problems arising out of the accommodation of man to man are the regulation of sex activity, the socialization of the young (components in family institutions), the distribution of authority in making and executing decisions binding on the group (the source of political institutions), the settlement of disputes and maintenance of order (the source of legal institutions), and the achievement of conceptual and emotional closure with regard to those factors lying outside the controls of every day life (the source of religious institutions).

It is advantageous to distinguish the *institution*, as the standardized solution to a collective problem, from the *group*. A group is an actual association of people. The institution, or a set of institutions, is the ways in which the group solves its problems. There is no particular reason to confuse a plurality of people with the way they solve their problems, for these are things of a quite different type. An Eskimo hunter need not be confused with his harpoon regardless of how efficient a hunter he becomes by use of it. A variety of groups may employ the same institutions; a single group may change its institutions.

Institutions as the standardized solutions to collective problems may be inefficient or efficient; they may be generalized or specialized. When a community is described as arising out of the stabilization of some solutions to collective problems, this is equivalent to saying that the ultimate core of a community is made up of institutions. When the further idea is advanced that around the major solutions to collective problems waves of consistency radiate, tending to bring a complete scheme into one system, this is equivalent to saying that a community represents a complete, more or less integrated, system of institutions. It follows from this that when different kinds of communities arise, the basis for the difference will be found either in the nature of the basic institutions or in the kind of integration holding between them. Usually both things will be true. The uniqueness of the city may be found in terms of a way in which institutions may be specialized.

As a standardized solution to a collective problem, an institution secures some values to the persons employing it. If it did not, people would not employ it. One could perhaps use the con-

cept, *primary institutions*, for those collective solutions to problems which provide direct access to the basic values involved in the mastery of nature and the accommodation of man to man. However, once patterns of institutional behavior are in existence, they become conditions of action. Sometimes new efficiencies of behavior are possible when new solutions to problems are instituted, having as their conditions behavior already organized in the primary institutions. These may be called *secondary institutions*.

The distinction between primary and secondary institutions just developed should not be confused with the distinction introduced by Cooley between *primary and secondary groups*. By primary groups Cooley referred to intimate, face to face, enduring associations of people such as the play group, the family, the council of elders, and the neighborhood. Secondary groups were those associations of people of a more impersonal, formal, and specialized nature such as the school, the church, or the state. It was his theory that primary groups have a fundamental formative influence on personality, while secondary groups tend to engage only the more superficial layers of the self.

There were two main differences between Cooley's distinction between primary and secondary groups and the present distinction between primary and secondary institutions. Cooley was speaking of groups which are associations of people, not of institutions which are solutions to collective problems. Moreover, he was trying to account for the relation between groups and personality; the distinction between primary and secondary institutions is intended to account for differences between communities. Perhaps it would have been better to distinguish between *institutions of first level* and *institutions of second level*. However, though this would have avoided possible confusion with Cooley's distinction between primary and secondary groups, it tends to commit one to the view that social life is composed of levels. This notoriously invites judgments of value as to what may be deep and profound or higher and more worthy in social life. All in all, the distinction between primary and secondary institutions is probably less confusing.

Some fascinating insights into the differences between primary and secondary institutions have been brought out by Maine who, as a student of comparative jurisprudence, was interested in the

early history of price and rent. He has argued that the remains of Roman law indicate that in ancient times transfers of the possession of land were extremely rare, and when they occurred they were accompanied by extraordinarily cumbersome formalities.⁸ Moreover, Maine believed that it was useless to search the records of ancient law for traces of the ideas we automatically associate with rents determined competitively. Nevertheless, it was true that in the village community occasions arose when individuals found it necessary to obtain land, the use of land, or other articles, from others. Such acquisitions forced men to make decisions of value equivalents or decisions as to price.

Under the circumstances of primitive society, Maine argues, only custom could have served as a measure of price. The influences of custom as the determinants of price can still be observed in some parts of the world.

Although in the East influences destructive of the primitive notion are actively at work, yet in the more retired villages the artificer who plies an ancient trade still sells his wares for the customary prices, and would always change their quality rather than their price—a preference, I must remark, which has now and then exposed the native of India to imputations of fraud not wholly deserved.⁹

Within the economy of the village community, exchange did take place but, if Maine is correct, the process of competitive exchange itself was not permitted to establish prices.

The situation in which prices are determined, not by custom but by the market, represents something quite new. Maine was of the conviction that the market did not even originate in the village community; it was organized outside it as an economic institution alien to those of the village community.

In order to understand what a market originally was, you must try to picture to yourselves a territory occupied by village-communities, self-acting and as yet autonomous, each cultivating its arable land in the middle of its waste, and, I fear I must add, at perpetual war with its neighbor. But at several points, points probably where the domains of two or three villages converged, there appear to have been spaces of what we should now call neutral ground. These were the Markets.

⁸ Maine, *op. cit.*, pp. 188 ff.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 190-191.

They were probably the only places at which the members of the different primitive groups met for any purpose except warfare, and the persons who came to them were doubtless at first persons specially empowered to exchange the produce and manufactures of one little village-community for those of another.¹⁰

Sir John Lubbock has also maintained that there is a very ancient association between markets and neutrality. Maine urges that there is an historical connection between these phenomena, since the *Jus Gentium* of the Roman *Praetor*, which was originally, in some measure, Market Law, became part of our international law. Also associated with the market was the idea of sharp practice and hard bargaining. As Maine charmingly puts it:

These three ideas seem all blended in the attributes of the god Hermes of Mercury—at once the god of boundaries, the prince of messengers or ambassadors, and the patron of trade, of cheating, and of thieves.¹¹

The market, thus, was a space of neutral ground, where members of different autonomous proprietary groups met in safety and bought and sold, unshackled by customary rules.

Once market law appears, it is Maine's opinion that it tends to exercise a dissolving and transforming influence on customary law. The law of personal and movable property tends to absorb the law of land or immovable property, and the law of movable property is assimilated to the law of the market. This process was still at work in the nineteenth century courts, where a whole group of legal maxims having their origin in market law (of which the rule of *caveat emptor* was most significant) grew at the expense of all those competing with them.

As long as the village-community existed, it resisted the full development of market law. In India the grain dealer, though a person of great prestige and wealth, is often excluded from village privileges to which the village tradesmen, whose business is anciently a part of the village, are freely admitted. Moreover, it is possible, for a time, for two sorts of price determinations (customary and market) to coexist. In India it is reported that villagers who pay the price of the day for corn collected from all parts of India or for cotton cloth from England will complain if

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

asked an unaccustomed price for shoes produced locally. The law of the market fully triumphs only when the village community is in ruins, a phenomena so complete today that a rule of the market (self-interest) "has been supposed to express an original and fundamental tendency of human nature."

Maine's studies of the law of price and rent and the manner in which market law came ultimately to dominate the law of real property have been traced, not only because they illustrate the difference between primary institutions (the village economy) and secondary institutions (the market economy), but because he had perceived that the very fate of the village-community rested on the relation between these institutions. The kind of community in which market law could become universal was possible only when the village community was in ruins. A community resting on a system of secondary institutions had replaced communities resting on a system of primary institutions. The peculiar property of the city is that it is a community form resting on secondary institutions. Economically, the most important of these is the market.

Weber has given a somewhat fuller development of the idea that the city is a peculiar kind of community than have most other sociologists.¹² According to Weber, perhaps the simplest of all approaches to the city is physical. The city is a relatively dense settlement of dwellings forming a colony so extensive that personal reciprocal acquaintance is lacking. While this is true much of the time, it is not alone sufficient to characterize a city, which is a system of institutions and not merely a peculiar physical and psychological structure.

Economically the city is a settlement whose inhabitants live off of trade, commerce, and industry rather than agriculture. Hence, the focal point of the city economically is in the market. The market could have arisen either by serving a hinterland or it could have grown up to serve a lord's or prince's residence. Weber believed that in Europe in the Middle Ages markets very often developed most quickly and fully when both conditions that would justify a market were present. While economically all cities represent structures, where a major part of the inhabitants

¹² Max Weber, *The City*, trans. by Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958).

satisfy their needs in a market, there may be a sub-typing determined by a predominance of consumption or production interests. Some cities have arisen as places where various people spend income earned elsewhere (Las Vegas), others have arisen because of the location of various productive industries in the vicinity (factories, manufactures, home-work industries).

The city is never merely an economic form, for it develops as a regulatory association as well. The city may own property, and have a budget of receipts and expenditures. It may actively develop an urban policy; for example, it may seek to stabilize the conditions of the local urban economy by means of regulations in the interest of permanently and cheaply feeding the masses. The city itself may become a corporation with a personality before the law.

In the ancient world and in the Middle Ages the city not only had a peculiar economy and represented a special politico-administrative entity, but it was a fortress with a garrison. Not every fortress was a city, but almost every city needed a fortress and/or garrison if it were to defend its inhabitants against pillage. Sparta in ancient Greece, Weber observes, sparkled because of its lack of walls. However, this was possible because Sparta was a kind of permanent, open, military camp. So important were the fortress and garrison to the city that some theorists have tried to trace the very origin of the city to the garrisoned fortress.¹³

The city may have special associational and status peculiarities. The members of the city may be formed into an oath-bound association. As members of the city they may possess specific status (as citizens) in the civic corporation.

The city . . . has always contained elements from most varied social situations. Office candidates qualified by examinations and mandarins rub shoulders with illiterates despised as rabble and practitioners of the (few) unclean occupations in East Asia. Many kinds of castes carry on their activities beside one another in India. Blood relatives organized in clans appear together with landless artisans in the Near East. In Antiquity free men, bondsmen, and slaves emerge alongside noble landlords, their court officials and servants. And in the early

¹³ Frederick William Maitland, *The Charters of the Borough of Cambridge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1901).

medieval city ministerial official and mercenaries, priests and monks, encounter one another in the city.¹⁴

Without receiving a new common status as citizens, it would not be possible for types of such diverse origin to act together in cities.

The characteristics of a full urban community were formulated by Max Weber as follows:

To constitute a full urban community a settlement must display a relative predominance of trade-commercial relations with the settlement as a whole displaying the following features: 1. a fortification; 2. a market; 3. a court of its own and at least partially autonomous law; 4. a related form of association; and 5. at least partial autonomy and autocephaly, thus also an administration by authorities in the election of whom the burghers participated.¹⁵

It is assumed that the principles of community formation stability, consistence, and completeness are as much at work here as in the case of the rural community, forming the urban community into an integrated unit.

THE ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL CITY

Out of the peasant villages on the basis of developments of pottery making and metallurgy, domestication of the pack-ass and other creatures, and inventions such as the ox cart, the wheel, and the sailing ship, the first cities of the world arose.¹⁶

In the earliest Mesopotamian cities, economic production was dominated by the temples. In theory the gods owned the farm land, while the town land was owned individually. At Lagash the farm land was divided into the estates of twenty deities. One of the consorts of the chief deity of the city Bai owned seventy square miles, three-quarters of which were allotted to individual families; the rest was retained as a personal estate worked by the Goddess's wage earners and tenants. In her temple were bakers, slaves, brewers, spinners, weavers, a smith, and other artisans. There were also clerks, priests, and officials. The temple

¹⁴ Max Weber, *The City*, p. 92.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

¹⁶ For a review of the urban revolutions of Mesopotamia, Egypt, and India, see V. Gordon Child, *What Happened in History* (New York: Penguin Books, 1946), pp. 82 ff.

owned and provided equipment (metal tools, plows, plow animals, wagons, and boats) for various economic activities. In addition to the persons of the divine household, there was a considerable population of professional merchants or traders, who were not always attached to the households. Imports were made of copper, timber, stone, gold, lapis lazuli, and other precious substances from distant lands. Caravans and flotillas were organized that crossed swamps, deserts, mountains, and seas. Semi-permanent trading posts were established for the collection of freight and cargo at various points throughout the trade area of the ancient world. The new aggregations of wealth made possible the emergence of new classifications: distinctions arose not only between urban and rural but among the various urban groups.

While the village-community had its political authority in a council of elders, this could not possibly serve the needs of the city. The political institutions of the city came to be centered in a city governor or king. In theory he owed his authority to identification with the chief god of the city. An army of priestly and secular officials developed for the various administrative and judicial services he brought under control. His expenses were paid, at times, by the produce of a special section of the farm lands and by various kinds of tribute. He also received a major share of the booty taken in war. Out of the princely magazines payment was made for digging canals and other works. The kings also dispatched trading expeditions to Oman and other foreign countries for metals, stones, and timber. The metal trades, vital for the armament industry, were a royal monopoly.

The cities aggregated considerable wealth in terms of the standards of the ancient world, and were subject to attack by nomads or by other cities. They came to be surrounded by a brick wall and foss, around which extended a system of field and pastures created by collective work in building dikes, digging canals, and draining swamps. Armed professional soldiers made their appearance in the service of the city governors to repel barbarians, or the hosts of other cities. Metal war equipment was a major item in the graves, and the oldest documents describe wars against adjacent cities.

The nature of the ancient city as a new community was symbolized by the city religion. The cities always had a chief city

god and complex pantheon of subordinate deities—the process of religious *synoecism* corresponding to the fusion of villages into the new unity of the city. In Mesopotamia, monumental temples and artificial mountains were built, and the shrines were adorned with the richness of the community. The many activities of the temple were maintained by priestly corporations. Temple accounts were kept, and soon after 3000 B.C. writing was invented. Schools were established, libraries were assembled, literature was taught, and studies of astronomy (undoubtedly with astrological intent) were begun in these schools. Among the major tensions of the Mesopotamian city were those that emerged from the rival claims of the priestly and secular authorities.

The early city-forming period of Mesopotamia and Egypt evolved into patrimonial kinship of an oriental type. The kings developed a commercial and warehouse administration run by semi-bureaucratic staffs. By means of socage imposed on their subjects, they undertook great building programs. When these formations disappeared, and to a large extent the literary culture associated with them declined as well. A new period of city formation dawned around the Mediterranean.

In the Homeric period of ancient Greece, hereditary kings ruled over places,¹⁷ which may have been castles but which later came to be known as cities. In part the Greek city evolved out of the king's castle. Military expeditions around the Mediterranean world were organized by kings and their followers in quest of booty. The use of ships for piratical adventures was important, for the kings often owed their power to a horde of treasure gathered by piracy or in middleman trade, either by trading themselves or by granting protection for such trade to others in return for fees. Warfare rested on the military competence of self-equipped knights, a condition shattering the military monopoly of the kings. Moreover, nobles often maintained their own chariots, ships, and followers. The coastal city that emerged was a settlement of warriors. Within these cities there was a rapid evolution as the kings were displaced by the nobles who underwent a process of *synoecism* that was the real or fictitious basis of the city. The nature of warfare was changing, and the disci-

¹⁷ Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 140 ff.

plined hoplite and sailor were taking the place of the weaponed knights of earlier times. With the change of military technique, the Greek city underwent a progressive democratization.

The key strata of the Greek city were warriors. The city was democratic, but its democracy was restricted to the warrior citizens. They jealously guarded their ranks against penetration, and continually agitated for military adventures that would increase the war booty to be divided among themselves. These facts set the Greek city apart from later forms.

It was Weber's view that the city came to most full development as a distinct community in medieval Europe. This did not happen all at once. A series of cities emerged in Italy after the eighth century, A.D., which were transitional between the ancient city and the late medieval city. Comparable to the city religions and city gods of the ancient world were the city saints of the early medieval cities. The early medieval cities developed armies, and even at times undertook forms of active city imperialism in a manner suggestive of the cities of ancient Greece and Rome. However, the point of gravity of the medieval city lay in other things.

While the ancient city was a religious unity, each city being the cult of its special city god, the medieval city grew up in a framework of universal Christianity; one did not change his religion when he moved from one city to another. While the key strata of the ancient city were warriors, the key strata of the medieval city were merchants and artisans. The ancient city was the bearer of the highest military technology of the time; but this was not true of the medieval city. And while the ancient city pursued a policy of active military conquest in the interest of gain, the medieval city pursued a pacifistic policy in the interest of peaceful trade. In both the Ancient World and the Middle Ages the city underwent a somewhat similar internal evolution: originally patricians dominated in both types; in times these strata found themselves faced with tyrannies; and the tyrannies in turn tended to evolve into democracies. However, while the city tended to glide into the hands of a warrior guild in the Ancient World, it eventually fell under the regime of merchant and artisan guilds in the Middle Ages.

According to Weber, there were numerous variations in the medieval urban community.¹⁸

(1) *Political autonomy.* There was considerable variation in the amount of political autonomy achieved by the medieval city. At the one extreme, it was so complete that the city could pursue imperialistic foreign policies on the basis of its own armies conquering territory and cities, even holding other cities under subjection. However, numerous cities achieved a great degree of political independence.

(2) *Autonomous law of the city and its guilds.* Many politically independent medieval cities practiced law without chartered confirmation. One of the most basic aspirations of the cities was for an autonomous law, subject only to the city's special requirements. The city administrations also sought to prevent the guilds and corporations from securing charters without its permission. When the patrimonial bureaucratic states arose, they made increasing inroads into the city's legal autonomy.

(3) *Autocephaly.* An autonomous legal and administrative magistracy was sought by all cities. Few cities outside the Italian, however, achieved full autocephaly. The city generally secured practical autocephaly for lower jurisdiction; and also developed its own administrative body, the council. But the city tended to remain partially heterocephalous, sharing power between the burghers and the city lord.

(4) *Tax powers.* Tax powers over the burghers and tax freedom toward the outside were universally sought. The power of the burghers to tax their own members, at the same time remaining free from tribute and tax obligations toward the outside, was immensely variable. Generally, the more powerful the city lords, the less this was possible. In some instances, however, cities managed to purchase the right, and were either able to pay off the city lords all at once or to reduce this to regular lump sums that could be computed in the city's own budgeting procedure.

(5) *Urban economic policy.* Every city had a market, the supervision of which was in considerable measure taken by the council from the hands of the city lord. Particularly important was the city's attempt to eliminate competition from the outside. However, the city's economic policy varied through numerous compromise possibilities because of conflicting interests. After the sixteenth century, this began to decline.

The medieval city was still at its height in the seventeenth

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 181 ff.

century, when the settlement of the North American continent got fully under way. Just as the forms of the rural community established in the New World were modeled after the current models in Europe, so the cities of the New World were modeled after those current in England at the time.

THE DECLINE OF THE URBAN COMMUNITY IN THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL ERA

In the fifteenth, sixteenth, and early seventeenth centuries the cities were the most important communities of English society. However, at this time, when England was slowly fashioning the conception of the national state and achieving a new measure of political unity, the economic system of the cities everywhere began to disintegrate.¹⁹ Every city was guarded by protective tariffs and stringent regulations to guarantee a rigid commercial monopoly. Every city sought to be an independent state with powers of aggression and defense, exclusion of strangers, the imposition of tolls, the right of reprisals, and restriction of competition.

The mercantile privileges of a town were usually vested in a body known as the guild merchant. Guild members shut out all strange merchants and non-guildsmen, but allowed them to buy and sell at wholesale provided they paid tolls, sold their commodities only to guildsmen, and did not buy certain enumerated commodities, such as wool, grain, untanned leather, and unfulled cloth reserved for the use of the town. To guild members, on the other hand, there were special rights, such as sharing in any commercial transaction made by fellow guildsmen. There were efforts to promote cooperation and collective bargaining among guild members. The guild extended various forms of fraternal aid to members, such as care of the unfortunate, arbitration, relief, and the like. In return for the privileges of membership, the guildsman was bound by the regulations of the guild merchant who often regulated trade in the minutest detail.

At the head of the guild were the alderman and his associates, appointed in meeting of the assembly. Members had to share in the common charges of the community. The ordinances

¹⁹ E. Lipson, *An Introduction to the Economic History of England* (London: A. and C. Black, Ltd., 1920), p. 239.

were enforced in the guild court. The guild was no mere commercial association, but an important element in the civic constitution, subordinate to the municipal government. It primarily supervised the trade monopoly. A distinction existed between the ordinary guild members and the burgesses. The guild member possessed commercial status, but was deprived of control in the political life of the community unless he was also a burgess. However, the distinction between guild and community was not complete; the same officers governed the borough and the guild. In time the merchant guild merged with the city administration.

A most important department of town administration dealt with the regulation of trade and control of all buying and selling. A most significant part of policy was intended to prevent dealers and middle men from manipulating supplies to force up prices; the most important regulations were those intended to prevent forestalling (buying up goods before they reached the market) and engrossing (securing monopolies). Also as a part of the urban economic policy, municipal granaries were at times established. The cities tended to form complete economic units in which the interests of strangers were excluded, and control of economic life was consolidated in the hands of a select number of burgesses.

The industry of the medieval city was organized by the craft guilds which comprised three classes of members: masters, journeymen, and apprentices.²⁰ Apprenticeship was a system of technical training. It was a contractual relationship between master and apprentice. It was essential to the craft guild, insuring permanence of practice and continuity of tradition. In time, apprenticeship became standardized to seven years. There were usually limits on the number of apprentices a master might employ; sometimes they were proportionate to the status of the craftsman; sometimes their number was absolutely fixed. For example, the London coopers in 1537 assigned three apprentices to a past warden or master, two to a liveryman, and one to a householder "out of clothing."²¹

After completing their apprenticeship, men were free to become journeymen or wage-earners seeking employment as hired workmen. On the continent, journeymen were compelled to

²⁰ Lipson, *op. cit.*, pp. 279 ff.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

"wander." In England, journeymen were usually expected to remain with their masters for a year after their probation was ended, though they were then paid in wages. The journeyman looked forward to the day when he could take his place as a master. Sometimes he was required to furnish a "master piece"—a practice that became most prominent in the seventeenth century. The master piece and examination of a journeyman were intended to protect the skilled craftsmen against the competition of untrained workmen, and incidentally, to protect the consumer against inferior work as well.

The purpose of the craft guild was the establishment of a system of industrial control over all persons engaged in a common pursuit. Technical ordinances were intended to protect the consumer against defective work and the producer against cheap labor. Penalties were imposed for poor workmanship. Night work was generally prohibited. Wages and prices were often regulated by both the city and the guild. The guilds also acquired functions as religious fraternities.

Lipson partially accepts Brentano's view that the later history of the medieval city was in considerable measure contained in the conflict between the guild merchant and the craft guild. This view takes the merchant guild of wealthy traders to be older and stronger, an organization excluding the artisans from membership. It is assumed that the craft guilds were associations formed to protect the craftsmen to some extent against the merchant guild. There is little doubt that relations between the *majores* and *minores* were often strained. At first the craft guilds were private and voluntary associations which struggled into existence in the face of vigorous opposition by municipal authorities, who were suspicious of their attempts to establish industrial monopolies. Later, the civic authorities were forced more and more to change their attitudes and encourage the formation of craft guilds in order to tighten their hold over those engaged in trade and to exact a satisfactory standard of workmanship. The craft guilds became public bodies with semi-legal authority and an organic, if subordinate, department of civic administration supported by the municipal government.

The craft guilds were components in the shift of the center of political gravity and the passing of municipal offices from the

landed to mercantile interests. The connection between the craft guilds and the municipality grew so intimate that membership in a craft became the chief avenue to citizenship. However, at no time did the municipality completely dissolve into the guild.²²

Internal Causes of Civic Decline. There are natural limits to the possible expansion of a community under any given set of circumstances. The limits to the expansion of the medieval and Renaissance city were the complete monopoly of the local market. Once this had been achieved, a structural readjustment was required in the constituent institutions of the city. The prosperity of a master was in ratio to the number of his journeymen and apprentices. However, if he had a sufficient number of these to become genuinely prosperous, once the limits of the market had been reached, he tended to create so many masters that the entire system was depressed. This situation caused more and more arbitrary measures to be employed to prevent journeymen from becoming masters. As a class of permanent journeymen began to appear, the old harmony between masters and men broke down and new yeoman guilds began to appear. Severe struggles over wages and hours broke out. The use of the master-piece as a prohibitive device to prevent journeymen from ever becoming masters appeared. Heavy fees were extorted from journeymen for admission to the freedom of the city. Journeymen were forbidden to keep servants, to work for anyone save their masters, to work in secret, or at night. The number of apprentices was increased to diminish competition with journeymen. Masters even tried to control the funds of their subordinates and use them for their own religious purposes.

Within the craft guild disintegrating influences were evident. The growth of oligarchy within the guild was facilitated by a reluctance of members to take office. The guild pageant, which had served as an outward symbol of the religious and social life of the guild, was discontinued for lack of support. The exclusiveness of the craft reached such proportions that it often became injurious to the welfare of the city. The guild had originally been broadly democratic, but the distinction between those of the "livery" and those who were not became sharp. The former had

²² *Ibid.*, p. 340.

purchased and wore on ceremonial occasions the livery of the organization; they monopolized offices and dictated policies. Liveried members thus became a distinct class.

External Causes of Civic Decline. While the relations within the guild were growing more tense and leading to separate organizations of journeymen and the increasing predominance of an oligarchical principle in the guild, a competitor to the guild in the form of the domestic system was growing at its expense from without.²³ In contrast to the guild system, where the master bought the raw material, worked it up in his shops, and sold the finished product, under the domestic system an entrepreneur gave out work to employees who did not live under his roof. At times the employee furnished materials and tools, but more usually the employer supplied both. After paying a rental for the tools, the employee received a piece-wage. The new type of entrepreneur was primarily a merchant devoting his attention to large-scale (in terms of the period) purchasing and sales. Manufactures were performed by persons living in their own homes in country villages or suburbs of large towns who often combined their indoor labors with cultivation of the soil. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the technique of manufacture underwent considerable improvement. The system was immensely helpful to agricultural tenants hardly able to support their families from their farm products. The system developed most extensively in the woolen industry, extending to nail-making, soap-boiling, and pottery manufacture.

In the sixteenth century, at the time the guild was beginning to undergo extensive decay, European commerce was taking on a new character. The geographical discoveries opened whole new areas of the world for trade. To exploit these new discoveries, trading companies were established and engaged in a new level of wholesale business. These new trading companies found their normal anchorage in the growing national states rather than the cities. The conduct of trade on this level required a new kind of comprehensive facilities for banking, credit, and shipping.²⁴

For protection against both weather and pirates, the merchant

²³ F. A. Ogg and W. R. Sharp, *Economic Development of Modern Europe* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927), p. 56.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 66 ff.

vessels often preferred to travel in flotillas, forcing a new kind of cooperation. The governments that controlled distant colonies promoted consolidation of trade in the hands of chartered, controlled, and taxed corporations. The companies enjoying a monopoly of the trade in a section of the world were of two types: regulative, a company whose members supplied their own capital and retained their own profits, and joint-stock, a company whose members put their capital in a common fund, entrusting the management of the business to a board of directors.

There was an increasing development of national as opposed to local commerce even ante-dating the rise of the trading companies. As industry began to move from the cities to the country, it became decreasingly possible for urban economic policy to be effective. The cities began to press the state for support. In England under the Tudors and the first two Stuarts, there was an increasing regulation of civic industry by the state. The principal aims of their policy were to check the movement of the textile industries from the town to country districts, to prevent the concentration of industry in the hands of capitalists, to prevent the creation of an impoverished proletariat, to exercise police supervision over the movement of labor, to maintain the quality of English goods, and to prevent class conflicts. The Poor Law Statutes were based on the experiments of municipal authorities. The Statute of Artificers was based on guild practices and on the medieval Statutes of Laborers.²⁵

Whether or not the cities realized it, there were extraordinarily serious risks in entrusting their urban economic policies to the state. For if extra-city economic behavior ever became more important to the state than civic economic activity, the state was in an ideal position to override the interests of the cities. As early as the fourteenth century in both England and France, the crown had sufficient power to institute tariff policies and compel the towns to yield to them. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, England, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal pursued national commercial policies.

Mercantilistic theory, which developed in the second half of

²⁵ For selected documents embodying various forms of state regulation of industry. A. E. Bland, P. A. Brown, and R. H. Tawney, *English Economic History* (London: G. Bell, 1915), pp. 313 ff.

the sixteenth century and dominated commercial policy for two hundred years, represented a form of national commercial policy. The crown attempted to promote trade and the circulation of money, to discourage the importation of commodities other than precious metals and raw materials, to encourage exports by bounties, and to encourage home industries—manufactures, shipping, fisheries, and the accessory naval strength.

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND THE CITY

It is important to distinguish between the quantitative size of a settled area and its properties as an integrated community. While at times in the immediate pre-industrial era under the influence of the domestic system and mercantilism, some cities lost members; others grew more populous. There was, however, a general loss of urban autonomy by all, whether they were increasing or decreasing in population.

The influence of the industrial revolution, which in the United States was traced so far as it was manifest in the rise of mass production and the revolution of agriculture, was to increase enormously the populations settled in urban areas. This quantitative increase in the number and size of city settlements was most pronounced in those countries in which the industrial revolution came most quickly. In the nineteenth century in Wales and England, the number of cities of 5,000 population or over increased from 106 in 1801 to 622 in 1891. The population of London in the same period rose from 800,000 to more than 4,000,000, and the population of all cities of England and Wales in this period rose from 1,500,000 to 15,500,000. By 1891 the urban population constituted 72 per cent of the whole.²⁶

Particularly important for demonstrating the transformation of population from a rural to an urban situation was the case of France, the one major European nation to achieve a stable population in the nineteenth century. From 1846 to 1891 the percentage of urban population in France changed from 24 per cent to 37 per cent. The large cities increased most rapidly. Between 1801 and 1881 in France, cities of 20,000 to 100,000 increased 145

²⁶ These and other statistics of nineteenth century urban growth are taken from the summary of Adna Ferrin Weber, *The Growth of Cities* (New York: Columbia University Studies, Vol. II, 1899).

per cent; cities of 100,000 or over increased 158 per cent, and the population of Paris increased 314 per cent.

Until 1852 there was scarcely an observable civic population growth in Prussia. Between 1867 and 1895 the number of cities increased from 1,400 to 1,841, and the percentage of urbanites in the population increased from 36 per cent to 51 per cent. In this case, again, the larger the city, the greater the increase. Of the residents of the five largest German cities in 1819, one in six persons was a Berliner, but in 1890 one out of every four was a Berliner.

It was precisely in those cities, in which the effects of the industrial revolution were most pronounced in the nineteenth century that growth of cities was most rapid. Between 1800 and 1890 the urban population increased from 21 to 62 per cent; in Prussia the growth was from 7 to 30 per cent. The urban population of the United States increased from 4 to 27 per cent; in France it grew from 4 to 26 per cent; and in Russia from 4 to 9½ per cent.

In the United States in 1800, there was no city of 100,000; in 1850 there were six; and in 1890 there were eight with populations of over 1,000,000. In 1800 in the United States there were five cities of 20,000 or over; in 1850 there were 24; and in 1890 there were 137. In the same period, the number of cities with between 10,000 and 20,000 citizens grew from none to 180.

The first stage in the development of the factory system did not tend to increase the aggregation of the cities.²⁷ Because water was at first the all-important source of power, the textile industry in England spread through the valleys of Yorkshire and in the open country in Manchester. The same principles of location held true for New England. The development of the steam engine made all the difference, for steam worked most efficiently in large units, achieving a maximum efficiency when the parts of the plant were no more than a quarter of a mile from the power center.²⁸ Every special machine in the plant tapped power by belts and shafts from the steam engine. The more units added within a given area, the more efficient the utilization of power. Huge fac-

²⁷ See the review of the industrial city by Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1938), pp. 143 ff.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

tories, such as developed in Manchester, England, after 1820 were repeated in New Bedford. The advantage of locating the factory in or near existing cities was the presence of a large labor supply and the various accessory services required by a working population.

The steam-operated factory was the primary agent of urban congestion, but the railroad transportation system after 1830 was a close second. Power was concentrated in the coal fields. Where coal was mined or stored or obtainable by cheap transportation, industry could operate regularly throughout the year. The coal and iron industries therefore attracted accessory industries. The new heavy industries massed in the coal areas: iron and coal mining, smelting, hardware production, glass manufacture, and machine construction all tended to collect in the same centers.

With considerable conviction Mumford argues that the two key reference points in the contemporary city are the factory and the slum. Every other detail of urban life tends to be subordinated to the factory, including even the water supply and government buildings. The factory usually obtains the best sites (for the cotton, chemical, iron, and other industries) near a water front, for large quantities of water are needed for productive processes—for making steam, for cooling, for making chemical solutions, and for getting rid of semi-fluvial waste without cost.

The general result is the pollution of water and air and the accumulation of piles of slag and waste in what originally were the most attractive cities. Old one-family houses nearby are transformed into rented barracks. People become so hardened to the dirt, filth, and noise that the finest houses of the city are often built in close proximity to dark, dingy slums.

Mumford observes that the age of invention and mass production came around to the requirements of workers' quarters and utilities last of all. In time cast iron piping appeared together with improved plumbing, gas for lighting and cooking, and the collective water and sewage systems. The need for such improvements was dramatized by the tragic increase of human problems. The infant mortality rate in New York City was 120 per 1,000 live births in 1810; by 1820 the figure had increased to 240 per 1,000. This was typical of the effects of nineteenth century industry on city residents. The major achievement of this civic awareness, in

Mumford's terms, was "the standardization of the factory slum."²⁹

According to Mumford, the physical lay-out of the industrial city—the rectangular blocks, each of identical size, separated by streets and avenues of standard widths—satisfies the real estate speculator, surveyor, and mass builder.³⁰ Once so established, the city can grow by indefinite addition. Each lot is beautifully adapted to the ideas of the new real estate speculators, "being of uniform shape, . . . capable of ready appraisal and exchange." Every street could be a traffic artery, every section a business section, permitting intensification of land use and the rise in rents and realty values.

The inorganic gridiron plan of city lay-out was adapted to speculation and sale, for the first step in the development of a new quarter of the town was the plotting of streets, followed by the division of blocks into lots; coordinated development for a single block was almost impossible. Even when civic centers were present in the early stage of planning, the municipal sites were usually sold to pay for street extensions and paving. As the pattern extended, it was accompanied by the destruction of the natural properties of the open space. Low places and streams were filled in. The first step in preparing a site for real estate speculation was the clearing away of all or most of the natural features of the area.

The rectangular street and block system, projected indefinitely toward the horizon, was the universal expression of capitalistic fantasies. The abstract street-net, with its lots selling and renting by the front-foot, became the dominant expression of the city. The hope for a steady rise in the unearned increment was at its lowest in the meaner factory towns: it achieved its maximum of feverish excitement in the great commercial and political centers.³¹

In Europe the cities that contained residues of medieval traditions often managed to retard the tempo of their growth, but in the New World the towns were often established with no more primary consideration than the location of the industrial plant. From it the civic mass spread out, sometimes over hundreds of

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

³⁰ Lewis Mumford, *City Development* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1945), pp. 5 ff., and *The Culture of Cities*, *op. cit.*, pp. 183 ff.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

square miles. The dirt and noise were fantastic. Smoke pollution had become serious in Pittsburgh as early as 1839, and in 1938 it was estimated to cost more than \$2,300,000 annually.³² In experiments on sound in Chicago, a scale of noise was set up with 100 per cent representing the noise of an artillery barrage. The study revealed that while the country had 8 to 10 per cent noise, the suburbs 15 per cent, and the residential districts of the city 25 per cent, the commercial and industrial districts had from 30 to 35 per cent.³³

It was Mumford's view that the metropolis was dominated by finance, insurance, and advertising.³⁴ The cities with their banks, brokerage houses, and stock exchange centers are the natural collecting points of savings and centers for surplus capital. Investors and manufacturers are drawn to the cities by the concentrations of financial power and markets. Meanwhile the mortgages on urban real estate whose values are secured in the continuing growth of the metropolis are the most important component in the standing of savings banks, building and loan associations, and insurance companies. The fatalities and insecurities of life are offset by insurance companies by the device of combining the maximum number of risks. Moreover, through control of capital resources, insurance companies become the significant landlords of distant farming land and metropolitan real estate. Precisely because control extends to other cities, there is further impulse for extension of monopolistic control to prevent the rivalry of sub-metropolises. This, in Mumford's opinion, leads to the final step in the process—the attempt to develop an effective monopoly of advertising, news, publicity, and periodical literature which establish the national brand and control over the national market.

The characteristic technical achievements of the city, Mumford believes, are those that further congestion. Water is stored in great reservoirs and transmitted through a network of water mains, solving one of the fundamental problems of the city and delivering a supply of pure, municipally supervised drinking water. This in turn results in a lowering of the disease and urban

³² *Ibid.*, p. 193.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 228 ff.

death rates. The bathroom is supplied with running water, and the bath tub becomes a permanent fixture in every home. However, with the bathroom and its increasing complications, the cost of building also increases, tending to intensify congestion. The bathroom becomes an agent of congestion.

Along with running water and all its associated technical developments, the second major achievement of the city is the transportation system. The ramifications are extensive, including street paving, street cleaning, and varied construction projects. The extension of Seventh Avenue and the widening of Varick Street in New York City cost \$6,000,000 a mile. Wacker Drive in Chicago cost \$22,000,000 a mile.³⁵ An amazingly varied series of transportation devices are seen over head and under ground. However, every development of transportation only increases costs and intensifies the need for more concentrated use. In the 1920's as many as 2,000,000 people entered Manhattan from outlying boroughs every day within the space of an hour and a half in the morning, and returned home at night within an hour and a half.³⁶

The physical limits of metropolitan congestion are set by the available amount of water, the point where one city fuses with another, and cost. The agents of the Regional Plan for New York discovered that the cost of water during the decade of 1920 rose from \$35 to \$65 for each person. There is an enormous human cost in time just getting to and from the city. Every new utility requires a new corps of workers to build and operate it. Robberies occur seven times as often in cities of over 250,000 as in centers of 10,000. The police force increases, and other problems require additional groups of specialists.³⁷

Despite all that can be done, the converse of the spiral of congestion, invention, and rising costs sooner or later sets in, and the blighted areas of the city appear. When this occurs, the inhabitants of an area can no longer pay their share of the municipal taxes.³⁸ The street cleaning department overlooks the area, the fire and sanitary inspectors become careless, and the typical slum

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 244.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

appears. The only alternative to this process is the standardization of blight which tends only to put an outward show of respectability on such areas. The blighted area is unable to pay its share of municipal services and is unable, even, to pay for its internal renovation and repair.

SUMMARY

The fact that communities arise because of the forces represented by stability, consistency, and completeness has led many theorists to the view that they are a kind of "organic" complex. This has encouraged the elaboration of organic analogies of community death or disintegration. However, communities do not die; they are destroyed. They are destroyed whenever new problem-solutions arise and lead to the formation of new communities in competition with the old.

One of the major events in the formation of human communities was the rise of the city on a foundation of, and at the expense of, the village-community. In isolating the uniqueness of the city, it is useful to draw a distinction between primary and secondary institutions. Institutions are standardized solutions to collective problems. So far as such institutions directly produce the value to which they are instrumental, one may describe them as *primary*. However, sometimes a division of labor is possible which, while not directly securing the ultimate values for which the institutional complex is intended, secures a richer and more extensive array than can be secured by the primary institutions. *Secondary* institutions are types which serve primary institutions. The city is a unique community in the sense that it found its point of synthesis in secondary rather than primary institutions.

The first cities of the world arose in the river valleys of the ancient world—the Nile, Tigris, Euphrates, Ganges, and Huang Ho. The ancient city was a new kind of religious, economic, and political structure. A city religion expressed the symbolic unity of a new kind of community. Temple organizations carried on cultivation and manufacture. A new kind of political structure was manifest in the city governor and his growing armies and bureaucracy of administrators. The cities built walls to protect themselves, and developed armies to defend them and to wage war on other cities.

The great cities of the ancient world were the matrix of human civilization. Within them writing was invented, mathematics and science were advanced, astronomy was studied, literature was developed, and art was promoted. The first wave of city formation in the Near East tended, however, to be checked under the domination of imperial administrations of patrimonial despots of oriental type.

The new cities that arose around the Mediterranean world were coastal settlements of warriors primarily intended to practice piracy and to prey upon the carrying trade. Though often founded by kings, they quickly slipped into the hands of warrior nobles. The patterns of warfare, however, changed and the semi-feudal knights who originally controlled the cities of the classical Mediterranean world lost their monopoly of warfare to the disciplined hoplite and the sailor. Though the city was still a religious unity, the civic religions were relatively secularized. Moreover, trade played a more important role in the prosperity of the Mediterranean cities than it had in the formations of the first city period. The patricians lost control first to the tyrants who made themselves spokesmen for the politically underprivileged members of the city, then to the ordinary citizens. There was an evolution of the structure of the ancient Mediterranean city from an originally kingly or patrician form, through tyranny, to democratic forms. The key strata of the ancient city always remained the warrior-citizen, and the major elements in civic policies were the city wars for plunder and booty.

To the mind of Max Weber, it was in medieval Europe that the city as a distinctive community of mankind came into its own. The new city differed from the ancient city; it was not distinguished by a unique city religion; its key was found not in warfare but in peaceful industry and trade; its decisive strata were merchants and craftsmen—not warriors. Though this varied after an internal evolution from a patrician to a democratic form, the medieval city displayed a high degree of political autonomy, autocephaly, independence and power, an independent administrative body, and a market. It also had its city fortifications and a militia or garrison for its protection. The medieval city was still at its height when the New World was discovered.

Precisely during the period of the colonization of the New

World the decline of the urban community in Europe began. Within the cities the guilds increasingly hardened and developed restrictive measures leading to inner-city conflict between journeymen and masters and a tendency for guild masters to turn their crafts into hereditary dynasties. Meanwhile, the domestic system represented a shift of industrial production outside the city. Finally, accompanying these developments was the appearance of national economic policies and mercantilistic policies abroad. The states originally began to intervene in the administration of urban economic policies for the benefit of the cities, and acquired powers which could later be used to bring the cities under national control.

To estimate the significance of the industrial revolution for the city, it is necessary to keep judgments of the city community separate from the facts of city size. The industrial revolution vastly increased the size of the cities; it simultaneously accomplished a far more complete liquidation of the city as an autonomous community than had previously occurred. Factory production penetrated the city to destroy the remnants of industrial production by artisans.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. How did Homans account for the distintegration of Hilltown?
2. What is meant by primary institutions, by secondary institutions? How are they different from primary and secondary groups?
3. What is meant by the statement that the city finds its point of synthesis in secondary institutions?
4. In what ways did the cities of ancient Greece differ from the cities that preceded them in the valleys of the ancient world?
5. In what ways were the cities of ancient Greece different from those of medieval Europe?
6. Describe the main causes of the decline of the medieval city.
7. In what ways was the industrial city different from preceding types?
8. In what sense are the very technical achievements of the city agents of congestion?
9. What happened to the urban guilds of the medieval period with the rise of the industrial city?
10. In judging the industrial city, why is it necessary to keep judgments of communal integration separate from judgments of size?

THE CRISIS OF THE AMERICAN CITY

The cities formed in colonial America closely followed the contemporary English city with limited powers granted by the colonial legislature lodged in a council and a mayor, elected on limited suffrage. The mayor, aldermen, and recorder formed the local judiciary.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CITY

The first North American cities were established at a time when the European city was beginning to go into decline as an integral community. The powers active in the colonial areas of the New World were those that at home were represented by the mercantilistic system. After all, the New World was opened by groups of capitalistic adventurers seeking opportunities, not in local English civic arenas, but in colonial areas. When the colonial cities took form, a rapid differentiation of interests took place, and the Old World tensions between the civic and national blocks were partly reproduced. The various higher officials, overseas traders, rich planters, upper clergy, and the like were Tories and Loyalists, while the normal middle class citizens of the cities were Whigs. The cry of the Americans for "no taxation without representation" was the counterpart of the struggle for autonomy in the cities of the homeland. The leadership of the American Revolution tended quickly to glide into the hands of lower middle class elements, small merchants, less prosperous professional classes, and indebted planters: Otis, Jay, the two Adamses, Henry, Franklin, Hancock, and Washington. They represented a fusion of the interests of the colonial city and the frontier against im-

perial policies of English mercantilists.¹ In no little measure, the American Revolution was therefore a conflict in the New World between civic interests and the British crown. The American Revolution was, in part, a victory of the colonial city. Although in 1790, at the time of the first census, only five cities (New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Charleston, and Newport) were so classified, and though they held only five per cent of the population, the city as such was in a position of comparative strength. In the early days of the federal period, the United States formed its cities on English models.

When Tocqueville wrote about the American city in 1835, he was impressed by their character as integral communities. "Local assemblies or citizens," he said, "constitute the strength of free nations. Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people's reach, and teach men how to enjoy it." Moreover, he continued, "the institutions of New England form a complete and regular whole."² It was his opinion that municipal independence was the natural consequence of the principle of the sovereignty of the United States and its peculiar history. The relation they had held to the British state was preserved into their federal period.

It is important to remember that they [the cities] have not been invested with privileges, but they have, on the contrary, forfeited a portion of their independence to the State. The townships are only subordinate to the State in those interests which I shall term social, as they are common to all citizens. They are independent in all that concerns themselves; and among the inhabitants of New England I believe that not a man is to be found who would acknowledge that the State has any right to interfere in their local interests. The towns of New England buy and sell, sue or are sued, augment or diminish their rates, without the slightest opposition on the part of the administrative authority of the State.³

A radical growth of cities had occurred by the time Lord Bryce came to study American institutions. In 1790 there were thirteen

¹ Wilbur C. Abbot, *New York in the American Revolution* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929); John C. Miller, *Sam Adams: Pioneer in Propaganda* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1936).

² Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 53.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

cities with more than 5,000 population and none with more than 40,000. In 1880 there were 494 cities with more than 5,000 population, 40 exceeding 40,000, and 20 exceeding 100,000 inhabitants. Of the ten largest cities in the United States in 1880, only Baltimore, New Orleans, New York, and Philadelphia were municipal corporations in 1820. American city government was radically modified after the early state period, and made into a partial replica of the state government:

a mayor was elected directly by the voters;
certain executive officers or boards were elected by the city,
and others were appointed by the mayor or city legislature;
a city legislature, consisting usually of two chambers, was
directly elected by the voters; and
judges were elected by the voters or appointed by the state.

Bryce grouped the functions of city government under three headings: those delegated by the state (coercive and administrative powers including police power, granting licenses, execution of laws relating to adulteration and explosives); those that are "proper" matters of local regulation (education and the care of the poor); and those of a business order (paving, cleaning streets, the maintenance of sewers, provision of water and light).⁴ Education was often detached from city government and entrusted to a special administration. Sometimes police power was entrusted to a special board. Most remarkable, to Bryce, was the fact that in Boston the police had been entrusted with power to license, regulate, and restrain the sale of intoxicating liquor, which it in turn passed on to a board of three persons. When he examined how such a system of government worked, Bryce concluded:

There is no denying that the government of cities is the one conspicuous failure of the United States. The deficiencies of the national government tell but little of evil on the welfare of the people. The faults of the state governments are insignificant compared with the extravagance, corruption, and mismanagement which mark the administration of most of the great cities.⁵

Bryce thought the main causes for municipal corruption were

⁴ James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1891), Vol. I, pp. 598-599.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 608.

the incompetence and disloyalty of governing boards and officers, the introduction of state and national politics into municipal affairs, and the assumption by the legislature of direct control of local affairs. By the spoils system offices in the city became a reward for party service.

Now the spoils system, with the party machinery which it keeps oiled and greased and always working at high pressure, is far more potent and pernicious in great cities than in country districts. For in great cities we find an ignorant multitude, largely composed of recent immigrants, untrained in self-government; we find a great proportion of the voters paying no direct taxes, and therefore feeling no interest in moderate taxation and economical administration; we find able citizens absorbed in their private business, cultivated citizens unusually sensitive to the vulgarities of practical politics, and both sets therefore specially unwilling to sacrifice their time and tastes and comfort in the struggle with the sordid wirepullers and noisy demagogues. In great cities the forces that attack and pervert democratic government are exceptionally numerous.⁶

The basis for the municipal corruption described by Bryce was provided in part by the growth of urbanism.

GROWTH PROPORTION OF URBAN POPULATIONS IN THE U. S. A., 1790-1950

<i>Year</i>	<i>Per Cent of Whole</i>
1790	5.1
1830	8.8
1860	19.8
1890	39.7
1920	51.2
1950	65.0

By 1825, with the opening of the Erie Canal, a wave of development occurred in such centers as New York City, Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, Rome, and Utica. By the 1840's railroad construction was fully under way with equivalent effects; when the rail networks touched commercial centers, mining camps and industrial centers sprang up. In 1850 the discovery of gold in California and the opening of the trans-Mississippi frontier were

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 613.

major factors in accelerating the growth of urban centers. After the Civil War the growth of the cities was accelerated. In 1880 one out of every five midwesterners lived in urban communities of 4,000 or more inhabitants; within ten years, it was one in three.⁷ From 500,000 population in 1880, Chicago grew to more than 1,000,000 in ten years, becoming the second largest city of the nation. The Twin Cities trebled in size in the same decade.

In the years immediately following the Civil War, the processes of mass factory production were coming into flood. The new factories located in the cities for the advantages of concentrating into large units, and the availability of a labor supply. They actively recruited immigrants as workers, and the cities rapidly became characterized by a multiple of nationalities. In 1890 there were 7,000 Scandinavians in Chicago and 50,000 in the Twin Cities. The foreign-born inhabitants in Chicago in 1890 numbered as many as the entire population a decade earlier. Chicago in the 1890's had huge concentrations of Germans, Swedes, Norwegians, and Bohemians. It was the third largest German city, the third largest Swedish city, the second largest Norwegian city, and the third largest Bohemian city in the world. A fourth of the people of Philadelphia were foreign born, a third of those of Boston. New York was the greatest center of immigrants in the world, with half as many Italians as Naples, as many Germans as Hamburg, twice as many Irish as Dublin, and two and a half times as many Jews as Warsaw.⁸

The massing of people into the cities carried with it an aggravation of problems. The streets became major problems in the 1870's, for they were so poorly paved that after every rain they turned into seas of mud. Cobble stones and granite blocks were soon used in the east, and wooden blocks in the middle west. These last, however, were hardly adequate, and asphalt and brick soon became universal in paving.⁹

Since most large cities were intersected by waterways, the latter soon became a minor problem. An era in city bridge building was opened when the Brooklyn Bridge, the longest suspension

⁷ A. M. Schlesinger, *The Rise of the City, 1778-1898* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1893), p. 57.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 78 ff.

bridge in the world, was designed and built by the Roeblings. It was completed in 1883. By the time the bridge was completed, however, traffic had become heavier, and the Washington bridge was built over the Harlem river between 1886 and 1889. Other cities had the same problems, and Pittsburgh built a suspension over the Allegheny; Philadelphia built a cantilever bridge over the Schuylkill; and Richmond, Indiana built a suspension bridge over the Ohio river.

When horse cars, omnibuses, and cabs of an older day proved inadequate to move the city traffic, a rapid evolution of transportation facilities was set in motion. New York experimented with an elevated railroad which was so successful that it was quickly copied by other cities. San Francisco experimented with cable cars, which in turn were adopted by other cities. The invention of the dynamo in the 1870's and the possibility of the production of cheap electric current lead to the launching of trial electric street car lines in the 1880's. They rapidly replaced the cable cars in most cities. Meanwhile, to escape the rapidly increasing congestion, subway building was begun. Between 1895 and 1897 Boston built a subway a mile and a half long under Tremont Street at a cost of \$4,250,000.

Communications had also grown to be a major problem, and with the settlement of the conflict between the Western Union Telegraph Company and the Bell Company in 1879 and the invention of the carbon transmitter, metallic circuit system, and switchboard, the telephone became fully practical. By 1880, 85 towns had telephone exchanges. The telegraph also developed, though more slowly, and there was increased pressure for an improved postal service, resulting in a lowering of postal rates, special delivery service, and free delivery of mail.

Improved lighting was almost as necessary as improved communication, developing from experiments successively with kerosene lamps, gas jets, arc lamps, and finally, with the invention by Thomas A. Edison of the electric bulb, of electric lighting. The number of central electric plants increased from 38 in 1882 to 600 in 1888, and 3,000 in 1898. Improvements in the production of gas also occurred with the discovery of the process of making water gas (decomposing steam and mixing it with carbonic acid and other gases).

The problem of waste elimination had grown to such proportions that systems of underground conduits and the use of vaults and cess pools were rapidly adopted. When these wastes were poured into nearby bodies of water, however, they poisoned the lakes and streams and became a menace to the people's health. Similarly, the garbage had to be disposed of in ways not dangerous to human health. The need led to the development of public water systems. In 1873 some 600 cities had such systems. The number multiplied six times in the next two decades.

Other problems generated by congestion appeared dramatically with various urban fires. Chicago and Boston had major fires in the early 1870's. Hardly a year passed thereafter without one or more costly conflagrations and great loss of life. It was necessary to institute new building codes, on the one hand, and to develop professional fire departments with better fire fighting equipment on the other.

Housing remained a fundamental problem. The hotels increased in size and sumptuousness. This produced such famous hotels as the Stratford and Lafayette in Philadelphia, the Youngs and Berdome in Boston, the Palmer House and Auditorium in Chicago, the Plaza, Savoy, and Waldorf-Astoria in New York. An array of second- and third-class hotels appeared as did the flop houses in the Bowery, where a bed could be secured for a few cents a night. Intermediate between the hotel and the private dwelling were the expanding boarding houses and increasing numbers of apartment hotels.

The less prosperous groups of the city were crowded into slum areas. Schlesinger maintains that "in all Europe, only one city district, in Prague, was half as congested as certain parts of Manhattan."¹⁰ Meanwhile, in the major cities slum conditions were made worse by the invention of the "dumb-bell" (from its floor plan) apartment. The apartment buildings were five or six stories high, running ninety feet back from the street. Each floor was honey-combed with rooms, many without direct light or air, and housing one or more families. They were foul, grim, infested with vermin, and lacked privacy and proper sanitary conveniences. In New York one slum district became known as "lung

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

block," because of the number of tubercular deaths there. In 1879 the total number of tenements in New York was estimated at 21,000, and their inhabitants at more than 500,000.¹¹

The major cities—New York, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco—became great centers of crime. Schlesinger maintains that in the 1880's criminality still possessed a frontier flavor with free use of large knives and six-shooters. In the older American centers, however, crime for profit had become professionally organized. A census study indicated a 50 per cent rise in the number of prison inmates between 1880 and 1890. A *Chicago Tribune* study revealed a growth in the number of murders and homicides from 1,266 during 1880 to 4,940 in 1899 (from 24.7 to 107.2 per 1,000,000 population).¹²

The structure of American city government and the cities' pyramiding problems created conditions for infinite forms of graft and corruption. To begin with, the governmental structure was awkward and difficult to administer. Around 1850 there grew up a practice of appointing boards, commissions, and agencies to carry out various functions. The theory was that these organizations removed the activity from politics; but in reality they eliminated the last remnants of clear-cut responsibility and made the entire system infinitely adaptable to the spoils system.

The sporadic movements toward reform usually ended with the appointment of still more boards and commissions; but the inescapable need to establish clear-cut responsibility could not be permanently suppressed. Movements developed to concentrate more responsibility in the hands of the mayor and to introduce the merit system for routine personnel. These developments became items in the program of the National Municipal League founded in 1894. Two-chamber city legislatures began to decline, and the number of independently elected and appointed commissions was reduced. A new development was represented by the commission form of government introduced in Galveston, Texas, in 1901 at the time the city was stricken by wind and flood. The idea of a separation of powers was abandoned and authority was concentrated in a single small governing body; the members

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

¹² S. S. McClure, "The Increase of Lawlessness in the United States," *McClure's Magazine*, XXIV, 1904, p. 168; Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

of which were the only officials elected by the people.¹³ One of the members of the commission was designated as mayor; the others became the heads of the departments of city government and, collectively, its legislative body. The city manager system adapted the principles involved to larger urban centers.

The problem of civic corruption was brought radically into focus in 1902, when S. S. McClure sent Lincoln Steffens into the field to look into suspected corruption of the cities as a basis for a series of articles intended to increase the circulation of *McClure's Magazine*. The six magazine articles that resulted were collected in 1904 and published under the title, *The Shame of the Cities*.

In St. Louis Steffens found that "corruption was not merely political; it was financial, commercial, social."¹⁴ About 1890, in St. Louis, Steffens discovered that public franchises and privileges were sought not only for legitimate profit and convenience but for loot. "The riffraff, catching the smell of corruption, rushed into the municipal assembly, drove out the remaining respectable men, and sold the city—its streets, its wharves, its markets, and all that it had—to the new greedy businessmen and bribers. In other words, when the leading men began to devour their own city, the herd rushed into the trough and fed also."¹⁵ Men contracted thousands of dollars in debts for the sake of being elected to office. A man who spent his last nickel on the street car one night was able to deposit \$5,000 the next day. A member of the House of Delegates netted \$25,000 in one year. A councilman was paid \$50,000 for his vote on a single measure. In St. Louis eighteen members of the municipal legislature were indicted.

In Minneapolis, under "Doc" Ames, 107 out of 225 policemen were fired. Steffens said of Ames that "he set out upon a career of corruption which for deliberateness, invention, and avarice has never been equaled."¹⁶ For chief of detectives the mayor picked a former gambler who knew the criminals needed for the business

¹³ Harold A. Stone, Don K. Price, and Kathryn H. Stone, *City Manager Government in the United States* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940), pp. 5 ff.

¹⁴ Steffens, Lincoln, *The Shame of the Cities* (New York: Sagamore Press, 1957), p. 9.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

in hand. His task was to invite to Minneapolis thieves, confidence men, pick-pockets, and gamblers. The head of the gambling syndicate was to have charge of gambling, making terms, and collecting the loot. A collector for women was a medical student in the "Doc's" office.

Burglaries were common. How many the police planned may never be known. Charles F. Brackett and Fred Malone, police captains and detectives, were active and one well established crime of theirs is the robbery of the Pabst Brewing Company office. They persuaded two men, one an employee, to learn the combination of the safe, open and clean it out one night, while the two officers stood guard outside.¹⁷

In Pittsburgh, paving contracts worth more than \$3,000,000 went to the firm of the city's boss; contracts totaling \$33,000 went to other companies. The favored contractor received from \$1.00 to \$1.80 more per square yard than the average in other cities.

Steffens strongly objected to two views that were often advanced to explain civic corruption in his day. They were that it was due to foreigners, and that it was due to the lack of the spirit of business in politics. Steffens found the greatest concentrations of corruption in St. Louis (a German city), Minneapolis (Scandinavian and New England), and Pittsburgh (Scotch Irish). But nativity was not the important thing. He came to the conclusion that it was precisely the businessmen who were often most active in civic corruption.

I found him buying boodlers in St. Louis, defending grafters in Minneapolis, originating corruption in Pittsburgh, sharing with bosses in Philadelphia, deploring reform in Chicago, and bearing good government with corruption funds in New York. He is the chief source of corruption, and it were a boon if he would neglect politics.¹⁸

Among the forms that civic corruption took, in Steffens' opinion, St. Louis was an example of boodle, Minneapolis of police graft, Pittsburgh of political and industrial control, and Philadelphia of general civic corruption.¹⁹

In 1947 Allen made a follow-up study of the American city to discover the degree to which the kind of conditions described by

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

Lincoln Steffens still obtained. He noted that the various chambers of commerce had developed *façades* of impressive achievement: parkways, boulevards, museums, art and historical treasures, schools, railroad terminals, traffic control systems, and suburbs. He insisted that beneath the surface, however, there was the same story of boodling, slums, disease, vice, waste, mismanagement, and disregard of public health.

Boston has a world famed symphony orchestra, and one of the most venal and noisesome city governments in the world. Philadelphia has a multi-million dollar art museum and tap water so nauseous it cannot be drunk. Miami has more than three hundred hotels and superb Biscayne Boulevard, and also, gambler rule and barbarous Negro slums. Birmingham has inexhaustible iron resources, and doesn't own its own soul. It is ruled by absentee overlords residing in other states more than one thousand miles distant. Chicago has twenty-eight miles of magnificent lakeshore parkways and the rest of the city is a grimy and dreary dump. St. Louis finally abated its notorious coal smoke pall, but continues strait-jacketed in a seventy-year-old boundary system that is literally strangling the city to death. Detroit is the automobile capital of the world, and a recent mayor and numerous other officials were sent to jail for tawdry thefts and vice shake-downs. And San Francisco's mighty Golden Gate and Oakland Bay bridges are peerless in beauty and engineering genius, but the city's transportation system would shame a community half its size; the police force is graft-ridden and incompetent, and the municipal government is a dung heap of bungling phonies and clowning politicians.²⁰

In 1947 Allen subscribed to Steffens' propositions that the businessman is the root of evil in civic affairs, and the people alone are responsible for the mismanagement and plundering of their cities.

THE URBAN COMMUNITY

A community arises as a product of the processes leading toward stabilization, consistent adjustment of various stabilized areas of behavior to one another, and completeness. So far as a city becomes a true community, it is not only a product of these processes but finds its point of integration in secondary rather than primary institutions.

²⁰ Robert S. Allen, *Our Fair City* (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1947), p. 4.

In the modern city there is no doubt that the point of gravity in the determination of the fates of men is found in the more indirect economic and more formal and specialized political institutions rather than in those institutions that have most direct relevance to basic human values. In the city the family, for example, grows smaller, ceases to be a productive unit in the economy, and experiences an extensive loss of its former functions. Neighborliness declines; the family's living quarters shrink in size; and many of the responsibilities for education, care of the aged, and care of the dependents shift to the community. Married women work in increasing proportions with the size of the city. Productive tasks, such as the making of clothing and even the preparation of most foods, largely disappear with the advent of ready-made items. Child care is shared with day nurseries, nursery schools, kindergartens, and camps. Education is in the hands of the public, private, and parochial schools. Even the rudiments of family religious institutions (family prayers or Bible reading) decline. There are diminishing numbers of family picnics, reunions, christenings, funerals, and marriages; and birthdays decline in importance. Old age and dependency are increasingly cared for by social security.

The urban church reflects the uncertainty of adjustment to the changing metropolitan ferment. Despite a better trained and paid clergy, there tends to be a loss of members which is somewhat higher for Protestant than for Roman Catholic churches. Churches lose their sect differentiations and specialize, stratify, and even cooperate in the attempt to hold their heterogeneous and changing congregations. One major attempt to retain its position sends the urban church toward development as a social center, although the fundamentalists react strongly against all such tendencies to get into the entertainment business. If it is to retain its position the regular church often has to follow its congregation into the suburbs, sometimes leaving in its wake a variety of store-front churches, cults, and sects which flourish and die in brief flickering life cycles. The ethnic church tends to lose ground as soon as its congregation is assimilated and often faces the congregation's changing its church with improvements in class and status. All such phenomena seem to indicate that in a

metropolitan *milieu* there is no such thing as a stable orientation to the supernatural.²¹

However, while the family and the church show a progressive loss and weakening of functions in urban areas, these functions have not been successfully taken over by other institutions. Urban areas show increasing rates of juvenile delinquency and adult crimes both of which are often organized into semi-feudal structures with chiefs, systems of personal loyalties, and criminal codes.²²

Shaw and others have demonstrated that certain parts of the city produce high rates of delinquency regardless of the particular nationality group in the area and regardless of whether the particular home is broken.²³ The greatest concentrations of crime and other problems are to be found in the cheap rent and rooming house area of the city. Gang life is most frequent there; the red light district and vice center are located in or near it; the area is the locale of the liquor traffic and narcotic rings. Faris and Dunham found insanity highest in the area.²⁴ In Chicago the rate of persons committed to hospitals for mental diseases from the population fourteen years of age or over ranged from 48 per 100,000 for the general population to 499 for these areas. Mowrer has argued that family disorganization also conforms to this pattern.²⁵ Other students have found the same to be true for alcoholism,²⁶ illegitimacy, drug addictions, and prostitution.²⁷

Family and religious institutions lose functions in the city; it is only with difficulty that they maintain some sort of adjust-

²¹ H. Paul Douglas, *One Thousand City Churches* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1926). Kenneth Miller, *Man and God in the City* (New York: Friendship Press, 1954).

²² E. W. Burgess, *The Illinois Crime Survey* (Chicago: The Illinois Association for Criminal Justice, 1926).

²³ Clifford R. Shaw, and Henry D. McKay, *Juvenile Delinquency in Urban Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).

²⁴ Robert E. Faris, and H. Warren Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).

²⁵ Ernest R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927).

²⁶ Robert Straus, and Raymond G. McCarthy, "Non-addictive Pathological Drinking Patterns of Homeless Men," *Quarterly Journal of Studies of Alcohol*, 12, December, 1951, pp. 601 ff.

²⁷ W. C. Reckless, *Vice in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933); A. R. Lindesmith, *Opiate Addiction* (Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, 1947).

ment to the environment. Meanwhile, the lost functions have not been reassembled in any systematic way, and the city presents a grim pageant of gang formation, prostitution, juvenile delinquency, crime, mental disorder, drug addiction, and the like.

There is no doubt that the city's economic structure is a primary determinant of its life. Cities concentrate on the extractive and manufacturing industries of the country in proportion to the size of the city. This is followed by aggregations of retail and wholesale establishments, and still further expanded by the automobile at the expense of smaller shopping centers. The proportion of female workers has grown, and the proprietary and managerial functions have been consolidated. Duncan and Reiss have discovered that, though the historical connection between urban growth and industrialization is undisputed, the most rapid growth of urban centers has recently been more closely correlated with government employment.²⁸ Moreover, they have indicated that despite the size of the modern cities they are not economically independent communities. Every urban community, they argue, tends to become dependent upon some other urban communities for a part of the goods and services consumed locally.²⁹

Manufacturing and trade are typical industries which bring income into a city for the sustenance of its population. Several other types of economic activity, nevertheless, figure significantly in the export function of some cities. College and university communities export education services by attracting students from other communities, and they gain an appreciable part of their support from the expenditures of this "transient population" if the community is fairly small. Centers with highly developed entertainment and recreation facilities sustain themselves in part from the expenditures of vacationers, health seekers, retired persons, military personnel, and the like, sometimes to such a degree that they become known by the type of activity, such as "resort centers," "gambling towns," and the like. Sites of large state and federal government institutions are apt to profit considerably from the higher than average employment in public administration. In an era of extensive military mobilization, the primary functions of some places will include that of providing services to large military installations in their locality or hinterland. Some cities develop as transporta-

²⁸ Duncan, Otis Dudley, and Albert J. Reiss, *Social Characteristics of Urban and Rural Communities*, 1950 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956), p. 9.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

tion centers, particularly when they are located at strategic points on a transportation network, or when they are convenient collection points for raw materials, of semi-processed goods. Still other less important and relatively infrequent types of specialization could be mentioned. Religious shrines, mining towns, medical centers, financial centers, fishing communities, and "cultural centers" are some examples.³⁰

This has led Duncan and Reiss to propose classification of cities in terms of their so-called major "functional specialization": wholesale trade centers, retail trade centers, maintenance trade centers, and non-trade centers. The minor types of specialization are higher education centers, public administration centers, entertainment and recreation centers, transportation centers, and military centers.

An extremely important fact emerges whenever one examines the economic life of the contemporary city. Although the economy of the city has had a far more important effect upon the destiny of man in the city than does either the family or religious institutions, *life in the city is not formed into an integrated and working complex around the urban economy*. Over and over again serious students have found that business interests have often initiated some of the major disharmonies in contemporary urban life. Steffens found businessman buying boodle, defending graft, originating corruption, sharing with bosses, and fighting reform. In their re-study of the ground covered by Steffens, Allen and his associates confirmed the existence of these conditions as the United States approached the mid-century mark. They also saw absentee ownership as a major force in the city's loss of autonomous self-direction "with every phase of their community life dominated by absentee owners."³¹

A banker in New York, an estate in Boston, a mill owner in Pittsburgh, wield greater power over the political, economic, and cultural life of distant communities than the people who live and work in them.

These absentee overlords, interested only in their profit and loss ledgers, determine not only the kind of schools the vassal cities shall have, but the extent and quality of public health and recreational facilities, and numerous other essential municipal services. Potentially

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

³¹ Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

supported by subservient newspapers, jackal politicians, and hireling businessmen, they also ruthlessly resist and throttle every attempt at economic emancipation.³²

Thus while economic events determine life in the city, they do not operate to bring city life into a stable, consistent, and complete form. They often destroy these very processes. This has led many persons to seek the point of synthesis of the city in its political institutions.

Berle, who was one of former New York Mayor La Guardia's closest advisers and who held the posts of Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Brazil, made a study for *The Reporter* of the need for a new governmental structure in New York, illustrating his conviction that the great metropolitan areas of the twentieth century have failed to develop governmental institutions adequate to meet the problem of their growth.³³

The City Hall in New York, in Berle's view, is a badly organized management center for a growing complex of services. There are five borough halls with limited management over local streets and public services, but half the people in the metropolitan area are outside the city's administration. In 1955, a time of peak prosperity, the city's welfare department and charitable institutions had to support an indigent and unfortunate population at the rate of \$222,000,000 a year. At the same time, there were huge areas of municipal real estate of various federal, state, and independent authorities, which the city could not even tax. A whole series of semi-autonomous new institutions have originated to take care of problems bridging historical boundaries. The New York port authority, independently of the city, collects tolls on the Holland and Lincoln tunnels and the George Washington bridge, and finances its operations by issuing bonds. Another separate authority, the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, operates other entrances to Manhattan under the East river and from the Long Island side. By state law, the New York City school administration has developed into a kind of empire connected with the city government only because of its two boards. There is a

³² *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³³ A. A. Berle, Jr., "How Long Will New York Wait?" *The Reporter*, September 8, 1955, pp. 14 ff.

whole list of other institutions—the New York Department of Water Supply and the Transit Authority are typical.

So emerges the central problem: What is a 'city government' today? Is there a 'city'? What is 'government' in these terms? What kind of institutions correspond to reality? ³⁴

Nor is there any redress, Berle maintains, when the city turns to the state. While New York City provides an estimated \$710,000,000 of the state's \$1,850,000,000 revenue (60 per cent), up-state New York which includes suburbia "with less than half the state's population got back \$355,000,000 from the general kitty; New York City got back \$260,000,000." The major requirement, in Berle's mind, is a system of government which can liberate and protect the villages within the city, freeing them for the things only they can do; it must hold the historical city responsible for things possible only to it; and it must set up some kind of new authority to coordinate the whole.

New York City presents no unusual case. Long ago Merriam reported a situation in Chicago similar to that found by Berle in New York. The formal government of Chicago, Merriam reported, was chaotic. There were eight principal governments, and at the time, twenty-five minor ones.³⁵ The chief governments had independent taxing and other financial powers, each with its officers and the right to make regulations: the city (mayor and council), the board of education (appointed by the mayor, but independent thereafter), the public library board (appointed by the mayor, but also independent thereafter), the sanitary district (an independently elected board of nine, spending at the time \$60,000,000 a year), Cook County, the Lincoln Park Board (appointed by the governor of Illinois), the West Park Board (appointed also by the governor), and the South Park Board (appointed by judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, twenty in number). There were some twenty minor governments, most of them independent park systems. Metropolitan Chicago included the territory within fifty miles of State and Madison Streets, an area of 5,000 square miles. Within this region there

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³⁵ Charles Edward Merriam, *Chicago* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 90.

were some 1,600 independent governments: Moreover, this enumeration omitted the branches of the federal and state government operating in the region.³⁶

States	4
Counties	16
Cities	203
Townships	166
Park districts	59
Sanitary "	10
Drainage "	188
Miscellaneous	1,027
	1,673

A general review of the structure of government in metropolitan areas is continued in the study of housing by Banfield and Grodzins.³⁷ They indicate that in 1950 more than half the population of the United States lived in 168 metropolitan areas and were governed by 16,000 independent local bodies. None had a single, all-purpose government for the whole.

NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS IN SELECTED METROPOLITAN AREAS *

<i>Area</i>	<i>Governments</i>
New York	1,071
Chicago	960
Philadelphia	702
Pittsburgh	616
St. Louis	420
San Francisco	372
Detroit	355
Minneapolis	316
Portland	314
Los Angeles	298
Madison	292

* Edward C. Banfield and Morton Grodzins, *Government and Housing in Metropolitan Areas* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1958), p. 10.

Under such circumstances it is little wonder that when the processes of the city begin to produce the typical blighted areas, many struggle to get out. The result is a rush to the suburbs.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³⁷ Edward C. Banfield, and Morton Grodzins, *Government and Housing in Metropolitan Areas* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1958).

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION WITHIN STANDARD
METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1950 *

Central city		57.8
Metropolitan ring		42.2
Urban	28.6	
Suburbs and fringe	24.0	
Satellite urban	4.6	
Rural metropolitan	13.6	
		100.0

* Edward C. Banfield and Morton Grodzins, *Government and Housing in Metropolitan Areas* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1958), p. 13.

A variety of suburban forms represent a segregation of elements formerly contained within the city; there are fashionable communities of wealthy business and professional men, able to pay for a high level of services; there are middle class suburbs anxious to have a high level of services and equally anxious to keep costs down; and there are low-middle-class suburbs of factory workers with mortgages absorbing as much as possible of the take-home pay. Outside the central cities the few Negroes are segregated in the least desirable settings.

Duncan and Reiss found that the suburban population tends to differ systematically from the population of the central city.³⁸ It is relatively homogeneous with a high proportion of native whites. It enjoys relatively high socio-economic status. It has a stronger family bent; it has a higher level of fertility and a lower rate of females in the labor force. The suburbs tend to polarize into two major types—the “dormitory” communities whose residents work in the metropolitan area and the industrial suburbs. The dormitory suburb is the modal type. In the nature of the case, it cannot be a self-enclosed unit; it is actually a specialized kind of withdrawn living quarters.

Allen believes the growth of the suburbs is one of the major problems of the contemporary city. Louis M. Lyons comments on this for Boston:

The cleavage between city and suburb that makes the tragedy of Boston is a key fact and index of the social condition of the community.

³⁸ Duncan and Reiss, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

. . . These suburban dwellers are Boston people who moved away from the city. They have fine community housekeeping. They are scandalized by Curleyism and the steadily deteriorating educational system. They talk of letting Boston "stew in its own juice," unaware that their own livelihood is at stake. For these fine suburbs are only bedrooms of Boston. The kitchen and pantry and counting rooms are in the city, where the suburbanites derive their livelihood, many of them from the dismal tenements of the city's poor.³⁹

In 1950 more than 40 per cent of the metropolitan population lived in suburban or rural areas, and it is predicted that 60 per cent of the growth of the city will take place there.⁴⁰

No matter where one applies the test of a true community as an integrated, total way of life, the city is in crisis.

PROBLEMS AND PROMISE OF THE CONTEMPORARY BIG CITY

Some ten years after Allen's study, *Fortune* Magazine also reviewed Steffens' thesis. The *Fortune* study shows that the political structure of the big city has considerably improved since Steffens' day and that, at least with regard to the city hall, the story of the city is no longer completely told in terms of bosses, hoodlers, job seekers, and inefficiency. Improvement in the top levels of big city administration has been under way since 1930, but it has been particularly accelerated since World War II—not a little of the improvement in top civic administration has occurred since Allen made his review immediately after World War II. *Fortune* reports that in city after city recently the electorate has put into office competent, hard working executives.⁴¹

The change in city hall in part reflects changes in the structure of the city. From 1880 to 1920 one of the most significant aspects of big city life was its reception of waves of immigrants. Often no one other than the big city political machines paid any attention to the colonies they formed. The machines helped the immigrants to secure jobs and welfare services; they dispensed personal favors, and Christmas food baskets and in return received

³⁹ Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁴⁰ Amos Hawley, *The Changing Shape of Metropolitan America* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956).

⁴¹ *Fortune* (November, 1957), pp. 156 ff.

the votes of the newcomers. However, the 1924 Immigration Act put an end to this, allowing time for the city to absorb the earlier immigrants, to reduce language barriers, and to educate the children, while federal social security and unemployment insurance freed the immigrants from dependence on the political machines. Meanwhile the National Municipal League and Institute of Public Administration fought for the short ballot and for better city charters, budgeting, and management. Because of the depression in the 1930's, better talent became available for civic employment and the public began to demand better services.

The big-city mayor of today, *Fortune* reports, is like the chief executive of a corporation. He is a college graduate, usually with legal or business training; he is in his late fifties; he works very hard for his \$20,000 to \$25,000 a year salary and expenses (varying from \$2,000 in Milwaukee to \$55,000 in Chicago). He works assiduously on public relations, civic receptions, and often serves as a labor negotiator and a member of the Civil Defense Board. The big-city mayor sees many more of the city's business leaders than formerly, for interest in urban renewal is growing steadily.

Various indexes are available for rating cities. Evaluations may be made in terms of their bond ratings, traffic accident rates, efficiency of fire and police forces, and effectiveness of urban renewal. When *Fortune* studied the 23 largest cities of the United States with estimated populations of over 500,000, it found that eight cities were outstanding in the following order: Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, San Francisco, New York, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and Detroit. In fire protection, Cincinnati, Detroit, and Milwaukee have the best ratings from the National Board of Fire Underwriters; in police protection, Cincinnati, Dallas, and San Antonio have the highest per cent of known crimes for which the police were able to make arrests; in public health, Chicago, Milwaukee, and Baltimore spend most *per capita*, particularly on disease prevention; in traffic engineering, Baltimore, Cincinnati, and Cleveland are rated best by the National Safety Council; in air pollution control, Pittsburgh and St. Louis have done the most effective job; in housing, New York, Chicago, and New Orleans have built the most public housing units since 1950; in slum prevention, Baltimore, Detroit, and Los Angeles have done the best

jobs; in planning, Cincinnati, Detroit, and Philadelphia have the most professional departments.

However, the improvement in the efficiency of city hall only clarifies more fully the seriousness of the situation within which the city finds itself:

The suburbanization of the countryside has plunged America's big cities—specifically the twenty-three cities with populations of 500,000 and over—into a time of crisis. Hemmed in by their hostile, booming suburbs, pressed to maintain essential services for their own populations, they need, if they are to hold their own, let alone grow, top-notch leadership.⁴²

It is *Fortune's* opinion that the big city in considerable measure has, at least temporarily, got such top-notch leadership through the mayor, although he is in an almost impossible situation.

The mayor is hemmed in. As he strives to exercise policy leadership, his power is challenged on all sides. In his own house the staff experts and the civil service bureaucrats threaten to nibble him to death in their efforts to increase their own authority. Then there are the public 'authorities.' Some are single-purpose authorities—like the city housing authorities, and the sewer districts; some, like the Port of New York Authority, handle a whole range of functions. They are eminently useful institutions, but however efficient they may be, they are virtually laws unto themselves. . . . The power struggle also goes on between the mayor and the state legislature, which has a controlling voice in the city's fiscal affairs, but whose membership is apportioned in favor of rural areas. It is the rare mayor who need not make frequent trips to the state capital for additional funds, and the legislature is usually unsympathetic.⁴³

The city manager plan has been widely adopted in the middle sized city. It does not appear to be the best plan for the big city, however, for it fails to produce political leadership on which the responsibility for government can be pinned. The development of the merit system, too, has not proved to be an unmixed good. While it has cleared out some aspects of the spoils system, it has tended to create certain inflexibilities tending to convert itself into a self-perpetuating system. Meanwhile, though city hall has

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 156-157.

been improved, many of the other areas of civic government remain in the condition described by Steffens and Allen.

One big soft spot seems to remain—the police department. There are some exceptions. One is Cincinnati. Another is Milwaukee: its police department is one of the few in the country where organized crime has never acquired a foothold, and the city's policemen, long free from political taint, are professional from the top down. But in most big cities the gambling fix is still a problem and corruption appears to be endemic—in spite of many top-notch police commissioners.⁴⁴

The perpetual problem of the city is in finding funds for essential services, not to mention the funds for new ones. The shortage of funds is the basis for the temptation to create special municipal authorities to build and manage airports, parking lots, and the like. Moreover, the municipal authority allows the city to exceed its debt limit. The authority usually has some sort of "tax" powers to pay for its operations, but every municipal authority fragments municipal administration the more.

The city itself is not master of its transportation. Many cities have sought to solve their problems by annexing suburbs, only to discover that the cost of providing services for newly annexed suburbs outweighs the anticipated taxes. Moreover, the suburbs often incorporate and fight annexation.

While the type of personnel recruited for top civic administration is one of the promising features of the current metropolitan scene, the provision of pure water and the disposal of sewage—the most rudimentary of all problems of the city—are the worst public works problems. They have been steadily mounting since 1940. Forty million Americans live in places lacking adequate sewers; fifty million of those who have sewers lack facilities for the treatment of sewage; even more can not be sure of having enough water to put out a major fire. The situation is worst in the suburbs, where the water and sewer systems are often inadequate even before they have been completed. If the problem of supplying adequate facilities were faced, it would require an estimated expenditure of public money on an average of \$2,600,000,000 a year at least until 1975. Such money would have to be spent by a new metropolitan authority able to deal with the prob-

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

lem on an area basis. The problem is, however, being attacked only feebly and reluctantly with neither adequate funds nor authority.⁴⁵

While *Fortune* was impressed with the big-city mayor, it was not inclined toward optimism about his chances for success.

If the city is to reassert itself as a vital center in American life and, not so incidentally, if it is to help the federal and state governments prevent the rest of the country from turning into a suburban mess, the mayors must take the lead. The omens are promising.⁴⁶

At bottom the city is an economic structure in which the fate of some business and professional men and some types of business is implicated. If the city is destroyed, many forms of business will be destroyed as well; increasing numbers of *local* business men in our cities therefore look to urban renewal for economic salvation. This does not mean that Allen is wrong when he cites the influence of absentee businessmen as among the fundamental problems that a city faces. In some measure the city is a battleground on which the interests of local and inter-local businessmen contend. The only factor that may be questioned is whether the local businessmen have a fighting chance.

The *Fortune* finding that big-city government has been improving and, at present, is in comparatively good shape, is most important. It eliminates the idea that the only thing that ails our cities is corruption. It is a myth that there is nothing wrong with our cities that good government cannot cure. Ironically, some of the devices for securing good government represent major obstacles to the big-city mayor in his attempt to meet the problems of the city. The city cannot solve its problems by annexing the suburbs, which have only postponed the day when they too will face the same problems. The "authorities" created by mayors to get things done further fragment an already curtailed government.

The city is not an autonomous, self-sufficient, self-governing community; forces are at work which continue to fragment it.

⁴⁵ *Fortune*, December, 1958, p. 102 ff.

⁴⁶ *Fortune*, November, 1957, p. 264.

SUMMARY

In the American colonies, the first form of the city was the transplanted city of medieval English type, and the conflict between city and national interests current in Europe was partly reenacted. The American Revolution was spearheaded by urban types that opposed the British loyalists. In the United States the first cities had an autonomy and self-constituency that won the praise of de Tocqueville, however, the industrial revolution transformed the United States and produced the industrial city in somewhat purer form.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. Discuss the statement: in the United States the industrial city appears in more or less pure form. Of what consequence is this?

2. Why did Lincoln Steffens and more recently Robert Allen believe that business was the main cause of civic corruption?
3. What modifications does the *Fortune* study force upon the Steffens-Allen thesis?
4. In what sense is it true that the contemporary city is in crisis?
5. Lord Bryce studied the government of the American city in the late nineteenth century, and judged it to be the darkest spot on the political horizon of the United States. What is the situation today?
6. What, in your opinion, are the main characteristics of the institutions of the city?
7. Discuss the statement: the contemporary American city is not an economically autonomous community.
8. Of what importance is the fragmentation of government in the American city?
9. Discuss the statement: the suburbs are the solution to the problems of the American city.
10. What in your opinion are the prospects of the American city?

THE NATION AS THE DISTINCTIVE COMMUNITY OF MODERN MAN

There is a widespread assumption that a community is a territorial entity. This is the source of the idea that only one community can occupy a territory at one time. That the rural community is so obviously losing members and functions leads to the notion that the city is gaining these people and functions. However, a community is fundamentally a system of social interaction with only incidental spacial properties. On occasion, when rural villages have been flooded out or cities have been burned out, whole communities have picked up, "lock, stock, and barrel," and moved to other locations. A community does not necessarily become a new community because its particular territorial ties have been reconstituted. Further, the idea that there can be no more than one community in a place can be seriously questioned. The evidence suggests that the city is growing only in a quantitative sense, and that it also is in process of being destroyed as an integral community on its home ground.

Mass society is at times interpreted to be the social life of a community-less man. However, the principles of community formation continue to operate at the core of contemporary social life. In the long run the only thing that destroys a community is another community.

NATIONALISM AS EVIDENCE OF NEW COMMUNITY FORMING PROCESSES

Each distinctive community formation represents a complex of institutions (solutions to collective problems). The people that

form a community come to identify the complex of institutions that defines their way of life as a unique community; the members of a community, in other words, symbolize their way of life as a unity, and develop a complex of common sentiments and justifications around it.

AGRARIANISM

The complex of ideas and sentiments developing around and justifying the rural community has sometimes been called *agrarianism*. This is a set of arguments as well as a scheme of values: the glorification of a rural way of life over all others. Spengler typifies this attitude.

He who digs and ploughs is seeking not to plunder, but to *alter* Nature. To plant implies, not to take something, but to produce something. *But with this, man himself becomes plant*—namely, as peasant. He roots in the earth that he tends, the soul of man discovers a soul in the countryside, and a new earth-boundedness of being, a new feeling, pronounces itself. Hostile Nature becomes the friend; earth becomes *Mother Earth*. Between sowing and begetting, harvest and death, the child and the grain, a profound affinity is set up. A new devoutness addresses itself in cathonian cults to the fruitful earth that grow up along with man. And as completed expression of this life-feeling, we find everywhere the *symbolic shape of the farmhouse*, which in the disposition of rooms and in every line of external form tells us about the blood of its inhabitants. The peasant's dwelling is the great symbol of settledness.¹

True agrarianism involves an antipathy to non-rural forms as well as glorification of a rural way of life. For Spengler the city represents the birth of a mass soul spiritually different from that of the countryside. Life becomes more languid; sensation and reason more powerful. Man becomes intellectualized in the city; his art, religion, and science also become intellectualized and alien to the land. In place of the organic life of the rural villager, parties form; they carry out revolutions; they create democracies with parliaments; the forum and the press become the ruling instruments. The idea of money replaces the concept of goods in the city. The stone colossus, the absolute city, evolves out of this

¹ Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1928), Vol. II, pp. 89-90.

formation and contains what Spengler describes as the "sterility of civilized man."

COSMOPOLITANISM

The ideas and sentiments developing around and justifying the city are known as *cosmopolitanism*. To its exponents sophistication, rationality, good taste, and urbanity have long been synonyms for cosmopolitanism. As in the case of agrarianism, cosmopolitanism tends to complete itself in an antipathy to other forms.

As Whyte sees it, the norm of American aspiration has become suburbia—a land of blue jeans, shopping centers, new schools, backyard barbecues, garden clubs, the P.T.A., do-it-yourself enthusiasts, and green lawns. The city that the suburbanite leaves is becoming more than ever a place of extremes.

Here and there, in pleasant tree-shaded neighborhoods, there are still islands of middle class stability, but for young couples on the way up—most young couples, at any rate—those are neighborhoods of the past. They are often the last stand of an ethnic group, and the people in them are getting old. The once dominant white Protestant majority has long since dispersed, and among the Catholics and Jews who have been the heart of the city's middle class, the younger people are leaving as fast as they are able.²

Whyte sees the force that is driving the middle classes to the suburbs as destroying the city itself. For half a century, since Ebenezer Howard projected the plan, the ideal of a self-contained garden town in the country has been discussed by the architects and city planners as an alternative to the contemporary city. This plan, in Whyte's opinion, has undergone a fusion with Corbusier's *La Ville Radieuse* (which would concentrate people into skyscrapers, leaving green spaces between) and has led to the architectural conception of massing the buildings on a mall in which the architect's monoliths are better set off by open spaces. Whyte thinks this is "the wrong design in the wrong place at the wrong time."

The proposals for city re-development, Whyte believes, rep-

² William A. Whyte, *The Exploding Metropolis* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958), p. ix.

resent a reaction to such values of the city as heterogeneity, concentration, specialization, tension, and drive. Even the super highway program is expected to enlarge the suburbs rather than to unify the city. The *Fortune* editors complain of the bleakness with which some of the new proposed civic centers are being conceived, a bleakness that promises to leave them without patrons. Even so, rebuilding is not enough.

But the rebuilding of downtown is not enough; a city deserted at night by its leading citizens is only half a city. If it is to continue as the dominant cultural force in American life, the city must have a core of people to support its theatres and museums, its shops and its restaurants—even a Bohemia of sorts can be of help. For it is the people who like living in the city who make it an attraction to the visitors who don't. It is the city dwellers who support its style; without them there is nothing to come downtown to.³

NATIONALISM

The city, like the country, is ceasing to support integral community forms. The agrarianism of the country and the cosmopolitanism of the city are in conflict with a third ideological complex—*nationalism*, in the end it is always distinct from both.

Increasing numbers of students have treated nationalism as a peculiar complex of loyalties accompanying the development of the modern state.⁴ Hayes views nationalism as a purposeful effort to revive primitive tribalism on an expanded and artificial scale. He traced the evolution of nationalism through various key persons from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. The first form of nationalism, he thought, was the "humanitarian nationalism" of the eighteenth century, finding expression in the writings of such persons as Bolingbroke in England, Rousseau in France, and Herder in Germany. The next stage in the development of nation-

⁴ For major studies, see Sir Ernest Barker, *National Character and the Factors in Its Formation* (London: Harper and Bros., 1927); Edward H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945); Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York: John Wiley, 1953); W. Friedmann, *The Crisis of the National State* (London: The Macmillan Co., 1943); C. J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926); C. J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948); and Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1943).

alism was represented by the fiery nationalism that accompanied the French Revolution and is termed "Jacobin nationalism." "Traditional nationalism" developed in partial reaction to Jacobin nationalism, and appears in the writings of Burke in England, Bonald in France, and Schlegel in Germany. In the course of the nineteenth century, the early forms of traditional nationalism were replaced by "liberal nationalism" expressed in the writings of Bentham in England, Guizot in France, Welcker in Germany, and Mazzini in Italy. In the closing days of the nineteenth and the early days of the twentieth century, a form of nationalism described as "integral nationalism" appeared. It was anticipated in the works of such French writers as Comte, Taine, Barres, and Maurras, finally becoming embedded in Fascism.

While believing firmly that the essence of man is reason (thus human nature is everywhere the same) and that the essential law of society is progress, eighteenth century philosophers were quite aware that the world was divided into a variety of groupings distinguished from one another by language, customs, and political systems. They knew, too, that these units seemed to have different points of strength and weakness. The idea developed that God had implanted in man the impulse to form nationalities resting on differences in geography, climate, language, character, and government. Thus the proper business of the national government was to promote this special form. To Bolingbroke (1678-1751), aristocrat and Tory politician, a distinctively British "genius" was expressed in the British Constitution with its guarantees of liberties, its limited monarchy, and its landed nobility. Rousseau (1712-1778) believed national institutions formed the genius, character, tastes, and customs of a people into one special image in contrast to another, inspiring a passionate love of the particular form. He outlined a program of nationalist propaganda and contemplated a national army, national education, national customs, and national ceremonies. Herder (1744-1803), a court preacher and minister of education, was also convinced that nationalities were natural divisions of the human race set off from one another by the God of Nature and Reason. A fully expressed nationality possesses a "folk character" and a national culture. While Bolingbroke's and Rousseau's nationalism was political,

Herder's was cultural; it rested on a presumed folk spirit in a particular language, literature, and historical tradition.

The Jacobin Club which got its name from the monastery where the members met, was formed during the French Revolution. The club held formal meetings that were open to the public. It became famous and influential, and established 1,200 branches throughout France, gradually became more powerful than the National Assembly itself. The starting point for the nationalism of the Jacobins was provided by the doctrines of Rousseau. Perhaps because they developed their ideas in the midst of foreign war and domestic rebellion, the Jacobins emerged with a nationalism that was suspicious and intolerant of all internal dissent and, hence, quite ready to rely on force and militarism to attain its ends. Its nationalism was fanatically religious and was inspired by a missionary zeal.

The Jacobins created a new type of army which was used for national ends. A military education was thought to be the basis for a society of free men. The Jacobins evolved the idea of the "nation in arms" and "the nation in public schools" and proposed a system of organized public instruction common to all citizens.

Because the Jacobins recognized the significance of language as a basis of nationality, they tried to compel all inhabitants to use the French language and attempted to stamp out dialects and foreign languages. They promoted a new type of journalism in their sensational and popular sheets of news and editorials, and they evolved a new type of semi-private propaganda society. All these things—the new militarism, new schooling, new journalism, and new patriotic societies—in turn helped to sharpen the consciousness of common nationality among Frenchmen. Jacobin nationalism was far more exclusive than the nationalism of the earlier humanitarians. It was so exclusive that Christianity was conceived as dangerous to liberty, and republicanism was viewed as incompatible with national sovereignty. The secularization of Christianity was one of the outstanding achievements of the French Revolution. This was correlated with the idea that charitable institutions were to be secularized and maintained by the state rather than by the church. The national state acquired a paternalistic attitude toward its less fortunate members.

In many respects Jacobin nationalism reached its high point

with Napoleon who made the Jacobin concept of the nation in arms the cornerstone of his career. He tried to realize the ideal of the nation in the public schools and forced the cheap popular press to dance to a nationalist tune.

The form of nationalism that developed in France during the revolution was a deep shock to many of the traditional leaders of other national states. They saw the Jacobins, in their pursuit of natural law and natural rights, trampling on the fundamental historic rights which were the solid cement of society. Edmund Burke in England (1729-1797), Vicomte de Bonald in France (1754-1840), and Friedrich von Schlegel in Germany (1772-1829) epitomize the traditional reaction.

In Burke's formulations, nationality and the state grew naturally. The people were not distinct from the government and had no right to break the ties linking them to their forefathers. Nationality was an expression of the continuity of people in time as well as numbers in space. Burke thought of it as an outgrowth of common legal, political, and religious institutions and customs.

Vicomte de Bonald differentiated sharply between domestic society (the family), religious society, and political society. He thought each ought to be independent, but that the individual ought to be loyal to all three simultaneously. A fully constituted state had a public religion that was tolerant of minority dissent, permanent social distinctions that were expressed most adequately in a landed nobility with special privileges, and an executive authority vested in a monarch. Like Burke, Bonald thought language was not only the distinguishing bond of nationality but a divinely established foundation of social solidarity.

Friedrich von Schlegel so intensified cultural nationalism as to turn it into romanticism. It became a profound enthusiasm for German antiquities. Tradition required, Schlegel thought, that the church as well as the state should be recognized as divine. National culture must embrace history, customs, art, language, and literature. Schlegel also contributed much to popular ideas of racial superiority, purity of blood, purity of language, and the existence of a national soul.

The difference between Jacobin and traditional nationalism was that the former based national patriotism on natural rights while the other based it on historic rights. Jacobin nationalism

was democratic and revolutionary; traditional nationalism was aristocratic and evolutionary. They placed quite different groups in control.

Liberal nationalism, which began to emerge in the course of the nineteenth century, tried to avoid the excesses of both Jacobin and reactionary traditional nationalism. It originated in England and was expressed by such persons as Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), a political Tory from a well-to-do London legal family; François Guizot (1787-1874), a middle class French scholar and politician; Karl Theodor Welcker (1790-1869), a learned German professor; and Guiseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), the son of a middle class Italian physician and professor.

Liberal nationalism began to take shape around 1815, and became a general intellectual and political movement throughout Europe thereafter. It tended to avoid both the natural rights of the Jacobins and the historic rights of the traditionalists. It was evolutionary in its theories, avoiding both reaction and revolution. While it was not aristocratic, it was limited in its democratic proclivities. It stressed individual liberties in political, economic, and religious spheres and reflected the shift of national control into middle class hands.⁵

Integral nationalism is a late nineteenth and twentieth century development. Among the theorists who formulated its principles are Auguste Comte (1798-1857), the founder of positivism and sociology; Hippolyte Adolphe Taine (1828-1893), who came from a middle class French family with strongly Roman Catholic, vigorously anti-Jacobin leanings; Maurice Barres (1862-1923), the descendant of an old Lorraine family; and Charles Maurras (1868-), a French writer and politician of a royalist family.⁶

Perhaps the simplest way to describe integral nationalism is that it retains many of the theories and explanations of traditional nationalism, but breaks with its humanitarianism. To these theories and interpretations, it adds a nationalistic intensity only previously found among the Jacobins. As one of its exponents, Maurras, formulated it, it represents the exclusive pursuit of national policies, the absolute maintenance of national integrity,

⁵ Ross Hoffman, *The Organic State* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1939), pp. 16-21.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-58.

and the steady increase of national power. Under integral nationalism, a nation is thought to decline when it loses its military might. Thus it is hostile to the internationalism preached by the humanitarians of the eighteenth century and the liberals of the nineteenth. In the United States the sentiment of integral nationalism led to the refusal to join the League of Nations and reluctance to cooperate with it, the refusal to adhere to the World Court except on national American terms, naval rivalry, immigration restrictions, mounting tariff barriers, and intolerance of minorities.

Auguste Comte was not primarily interested in nationalism, but his radical attack on abstract humanitarianism contributed to the rise of integral nationalism. Taine's formulas of race, environment, and epoch as determinants of national character and culture, proved to be elements of the theory of integral nationalism. Barres contributed the theory of psychological determinism. There is no liberty of thought, according to his view, as one's psychological processes are determined by the fact that one belongs to a particular race. For Maurras, nationalism was the transrational product of the total influence of the nation on the individual. For example, he felt that the basic traditions of French nationalism were regionalism, syndicalism, the French language, the Roman Catholic religion, hero worship, hereditary hostility toward Germany, and a fondness for overseas expansion. The fruition of integral nationalism is found in the nationalism of the totalitarian governments of the twentieth century.⁷

Hayes and other students have established beyond any doubt that modern nationalism has evolved in conjunction with modern political life. What remains to be seen is the extent to which nationalism is anchored in a special kind of community formation, a formation destructive of both the rural and urban communities of the modern world.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY

In a rural community there is a synthesis of institutions around agricultural activity. In a city the synthesis of institutions is around a secondary institutional formation with the core com-

⁷ Morton Grodzins, *The Loyal and the Disloyal* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press), 1956.

posed of secondary economic formations, particularly the market. It is quite possible, either in the rural community or in the city, for such an internal evolution of institutions to occur that a community of an essentially new type appears. However, precisely because of its greater elasticity, the city presents far greater possibilities for a re-structuring than does the rural community.

The first wave of city formation illustrates the process of re-structuring a community may undergo. At least in some cases the point of gravity in the ancient city tended to shift from its economic to its political institutions. When this occurred the new political structure could turn on the city itself, transforming it and reducing its autonomy in other respects. The history of Mesopotamia illustrates the process by which the cities were brought under subjection by the patrimonially bureaucratic empires. The Mediterranean coastal city, too, tended to undergo an internal re-structuring as the military features of the city became increasingly predominant. It was, of course, not necessary that the new institutional complex originate within the city. In some cases ancient cities were transformed by conquest from without. The community formation to which we now turn is represented by the modern nation, being a somewhat similar development.

Though many responsible students identify the state and the nation, there are some advantages in keeping the two concepts distinct. Max Weber's definition of the state corresponds to a widely held formulation. He insisted that sociologically the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends, since there is hardly a task that at one time or another has not been undertaken by the modern state.⁸ Ultimately, Weber argued, only the use of physical force, is peculiar to it.

Today the relation between the state and violence is an especially intimate one. In the past, the most varied institutions—beginning with the sib—have known the use of physical force as quite normal. Today, however, we say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims *the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory. Note that 'territory' is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force

⁸ Max Weber, *Gesammelte Politische Schriften* (Munich: Duncker and Humboldt, 1921), pp. 386-450. Translated by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 77 ff.

is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence.⁹

While Weber was inclined to locate the state in terms of means, he located the nation in terms of ends.

If the concept of 'nation' can in any way be defined unambiguously, it certainly cannot be stated in terms of empirical qualities common to those who count as members of the nation. In the sense of those using the term at a given time, the concept undoubtedly means, above all, that one may exact from certain groups of men a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups. Thus, the concept belongs in the sphere of values. . . . Insofar as there is at all a common object lying behind the obviously ambiguous term 'nation,' it is apparently located in the field of politics. One might well define the concept of nation in the following way: a nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own.¹⁰

These definitions by Max Weber closely correspond to those of Vinogradoff, who conceived of the state as "a juridically organized nation or a nation organized for action under legal rules."¹¹ These ideas may be sharpened a bit to bring them into the present perspective for, though a state may be defined by the means peculiar to it, it does pursue ends and the nation does not belong purely or only in the realm of values. A *state* may be defined as the political association that maintains a monopoly of the use of legitimate violence or force in a given territory; a nation is the corresponding community of which the state is the political core. Many kinds of tension are possible between a state and the rest of the community represented by the nation. The peculiarity of the nation is that it is the kind of community which finds its synthesis in the state.¹²

When the nation is conceived as a community, much of the ambiguity that has surrounded discussions of it may be clarified. A community is not a single institution, but a complex of institutions worked up into a more or less unified whole. Like all

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 172, 176. Translated from *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1922, and *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik* (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1924).

¹¹ Quoted by Friedmann, *op. cit.*, p. 3 (See note No. 4).

¹² Edward Jenks, *The Nation and the State* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1919).

communities, the nation is not exclusively identified by any single institution that may enter its composition and it has ideological justifications that have not been rooted in fact. Shafer has listed what he conceives to be various illusions by scholars and patriots about the nation. These are:

1. The Supernatural; the nation as a creation of God, nature, mystical forces.
2. Physical environmental conditions; the nation determined by soil, climate, natural boundaries.
3. The physical and spiritual nature of man; the nation rooted in race, tribe, blood, instinct.
4. Economic institutions and needs; the nation as the product of the *bourgeoisie*.
5. Political security and prestige; the nation as the result of the struggle for existence and the desire for power.
6. Language; the nation unified within and separated from other nations by speech.
7. Social need; the nation as an outcome of the human need for social life.
8. History; nations as the products of their respective common pasts.¹³

The first three of the items on Shafer's list of so-called "illusions" about the nation do not express factual conditions but represent various ideological justifications for treating the nation as a unit. The last four of the items represent kinds of social and institutional conditions that have helped to shape the nation into a distinctive community of contemporary man. It is of no importance that the special factors have not been of equal importance in every instance. The most fundamental fact is that the state is the most important central institution in the modern national complex, and around the state various other institutions have tended to become arranged.

All students are agreed that, in time, the state was prior to the development of the modern nation. The general stages in the origin of the modern states have been outlined compactly by Shafer.¹⁴ In feudal Europe, beginning in France and England but

¹³ Boyd C. Shafer, *Nationalism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955), pp. 17-18.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 59 ff. See also Edward Jenks, *The Ship of State* (London: 1939), pp. 23-51.

manifest later in Spain, Germany, Italy, and Russia, the feudal system began to break down as the strongest and most fortunate noble families won territory and created monarchical governments which in time became national. Originally these families desired only territory, wealth, prestige, and power. They would have been astonished to suppose that they were laying the foundations for nations. In the beginning the king as chief feudal lord simply tried to enlarge his domain and feudal power through war, conquest, diplomacy, duplicity, marriage, purchase, inheritance, legal and illegal confiscations, and luck.

The process began in France with the reign of Philip Augustus (1180-1223) and required 500 years for its completion. In England the process got definitely under way with the conquests of the Norman, William the Conqueror (1066-1087). In France, by the end of the seventeenth century the monarch reigned supreme, but in England the kings were forced to share their power with parliament. In most other European countries royal families established central governments which were to become national at a much later time. In Brandenburg-Prussia the nucleus of the German nation was founded with Elector Frederick William I (1640-1688).

Once it emerges as a "method of organizing the public power," as Laski put it, the state forms a center around which community formation may operate: it provides stability, consistency, and completeness. As the machinery of centralized government develops with its primary devices for centralized administration, the administration of justice, procedures for taxation, and organs for defense, increasing numbers of persons find themselves dependent on the state for their livelihood. Moreover, at an early stage the conflicting powers within society cooperate with the state to secure peace. This has already been noted in the case of the city. The time came when the city turned to the state for defense of the city's economic policy; the state was able to consolidate powers which it could, when the time came, turn against the city.

Even when they do not express factual states of affairs, the various items thought to be important for the nation are significant to its existence. The nation has been thought to rest on a unity of government, territory, race, language, religion, and economic interests, and to possess a common tradition. The first

of these, the unity of government, was the indispensable precondition of the nation. Where the concepts, state and nation, are distinguished, the "nation takes on political, social, economic, and cultural connotations; the state refers primarily to legal authority." ¹⁵

The conception of the nation as the creation of God, nature, or some mystical force, does not express a factual state of affairs. It does, however, serve a legitimatizing function, promoting the conceptualization of the nation independent of the state. Similarly, the conception of the nation as a product of race, tribe, blood, or instinct must be conceived as a myth. As Friedmann has indicated, there is not a single modern state which has not forced a recalcitrant national group to live under its authority at some time or other, as illustrated by the Scots, Bretons, Catalans, Germans, Poles, Czechs, and Finns.¹⁶

Most of the time, however, a state of forceful cooperation gives way to active cooperation and national cohesion. The conception of the nation as expressing a genius of the race legitimatizes and independently symbolizes the growing community of sentiment of the nation. The conception of the nation as determined by soil, climate, and national boundaries, actually merely commemorates the monopoly of coercion secured by the state over an area in its development. The very definition of the state rests on the concept of a monopoly in a given territory of the use of coercion.

The other items thought to be important for the nation—unity of economic interests, religion, language, and historical culture—actually express the products of the community. These processes have the state as their core; and, in time, other institutions develop in a form more or less consistent with it.

As Snyder has indicated, before the age of nationalism nearly every village and region, in fact, almost every trade, profession, or social class had its special language. In medieval France, in the south a dialect called *langue d'oc* was spoken, while the Franks and Normans in the north along the Seine spoke in a dialect called *langue d'oïl*. The early Germans also had two main

¹⁵ Louis L. Snyder, *The Meaning of Nationalism* (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1954), p. 20.

¹⁶ Friedman, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

dialects, Old High German (*Althochdeutsch*) and Old Low German (*Altplattdeutsch*). There were parallel differences in other areas; but, as the modern nation emerged, local and regional dialects lost importance. As languages became national and uniform within the nation, they often reached a stage of idolization in which the nation was quite ready to defend the language as a symbol of national life. Even the development of scripts was pulled into the system of national determination.¹⁷

Religion was a dominant force in European society before the age of nationalism. The growth of nationalism was sometimes helped, sometimes hindered, by religion which peoples a close sense of unity and cohesiveness. Irish Catholicism helped keep alive the Irish desire for independence, and in Poland it was one of the main forces important for the demand to reestablish the nation. "Historically . . . nationalism may be regarded as a force that succeeded religion as a dominating power in the affairs of men; the two need not be confused . . . but there remained an unconscious and indirect relation between nationalism and religion. National consciousness is to some extent grounded in religion."¹⁸

The relation between nationalism and the new economic classes has been a decisive factor in the development of the national state.¹⁹ Two essential phases have been distinguished in the association between the state and new economic classes:

That of mercantilism when the political rulers of the state assume the leadership, and stimulate economic developments and interests for the furtherance of state power; and that of economic liberalism, when the economic classes feel strong enough to oppose the tutelage of the state and the emphasis turns from the furtherance of state power to the furtherance of wealth through free trade and the autonomy of economic interests.²⁰

Mercantilism was characterized by a national economic policy in contrast to the urban economic policy. While an essential item in state policy, mercantilism promoted the interests of new eco-

¹⁷ Snyder, *op. cit.*, p. 20 ff.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 23. See also Rudolf Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture Translated* by Ray E. Chase (Los Angeles: Rocker Publications Committee, 1937).

¹⁹ Friedmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 10 ff.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

conomic classes who were not primarily rooted in the city. When these new economic classes became strong enough, they were in a position to bid for independence. Friedmann's judgment is quite fair.

Whatever the opposition between mercantilism and *laissez-faire* may be in the field of economic theory, in the development of the national state they have essentially reinforced and supplemented each other. What the former prepared, the latter completed, in a truly dialectical development. As the strong state and nationalist ideology in succession created the political foundations of the modern national state, so mercantilism and *laissez-faire* together laid its economic foundations.²¹

As a new complex of institutions (linguistic, religious, economic, etc.) centered on the state begins to form, a new kind of shared experience is possible. As people begin to share in wars, revolutions, invasions, crises, and to produce their own traditions, occasions, events, and heroes, the nation increasingly acquires the property of a unique historical complex. All the other elements may form a historical synthesis. This is fundamental to Barker's conception.

A nation is a body of men, inhabiting a definite territory, who normally are drawn from different races, but possess a common stock of thoughts and feelings acquired and transmitted during the course of a common history.²²

Barker thought that in the past more than in the present the stock of common experience included common religious belief. In the present, more than in the past, it includes a common language. Common experience and a common instrument of expression provide the foundation for common thoughts and feelings, inclining men, if they do not have one, to form a separate state for expression of their common will.

Friedmann believed that there were essentially three movements leading toward the formation of the modern nations.²³ The oldest movement toward the formation of the nation occurred in countries enjoying political independence and a strong central

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²² Ernest Barker, *National Character and the Factors in Its Formation* (London: Harper and Bros., 1927), p. 17.

²³ Friedmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 20 ff.

government. In this formation the state was the core around which the nation gradually developed. This was particularly true for Great Britain, France, and the United States.

Once nationalism was in existence, it represented a complex which could precede the state—at least in some respects. The second great movement of modern nation formation occurred in the nineteenth century, when three powerful national states—Germany, Italy, and Japan—emerged. These were characterized by the development of a cultural nationalism which preceded political nationalism. In all cases combination and unification of many small separate units (Germany and Italy) or the transformation of an antiquated into a modern socio-political structure (Japan) occurred.

At the present time the third wave of nation formation is going on. It got under way among the peoples of central and south-eastern Europe in a struggle for liberation from foreign domination in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In these cases, agrarian elements and peasant formations are led by intellectual middle class groups. Commercial classes play a far lesser role than in previous formations.

SUMMARY

Sometimes one can discover the presence of a community formation by way of its ideology—a set of ideas and values developed in defense of an institution or a community. *Agrarianism*, for example, is the ideology of the rural community. It is based on the moral and social superiority of a rural way of life, and on the value of a community built on these. The negative aspects of agrarianism are found in its deeply rooted suspicion of urban ways of life. *Cosmopolitanism* is the ideology of the urban community. It rests on the conception of the superiority of the city's sophistication, urbanity, richness, and value. At the present time both agrarianism and cosmopolitanism have a serious rival in *nationalism*.

Nationalism is taken here to refer to the ideology of the nation which has taken shape since the seventeenth century, developing until it is one of the dominant themes in modern thought. In the eighteenth century nationalism involved little more than the belief that God had implanted the impulse to form nationalities in

various peoples. This evolved into a position characterized by an increasing suspicion and intolerance of internal dissidence, a readiness to use force to attain national ends, and the evolution of national histories, holidays, celebrations, and the like. In twentieth century totalitarian systems, it has sometimes taken a savagely destructive "racial" form. The nation is the community of which nationalism is the ideology.

The nation is like the city in that its synthesis is in secondary institutions. It is unlike the city in that the institutional synthesis is found in political rather than economic institutions. The key institution around which the nation forms is the state—the association that is able to secure an effective monopoly on the use of violence in a given territory. In all the original nations of the contemporary world, the formation of the state preceded the development of the nation. In France, England, and the United States, the state formed a central point around which other institutions could arrange themselves. Once the nation is present in some countries, however, a different form of nation-making is possible. Germany, Italy, and Japan developed as nations by the fusion of discrete or archaic (Japan) elements into national wholes. A third wave of nation forming, which continues in the non-European world of the present day, began in Central and Eastern Europe in which backward peoples were being fused by a middle class *intelligentsia*.

In addition to the state, the economy, language, religion, family, and a common history all play a part in the formation of a nation.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. Discuss the proposition: agrarianism, cosmopolitanism and nationalism are ideological justifications of communities.
2. Trace the development of the ideology of nationalism. What relation is there between nationalism, the state, and the nation?
3. What is the difference between the state and the nation? How are they related?
4. How does Max Weber define the state? Why does he define the state in terms of its means rather than its ends?
5. Distinguish between cultural nationalism, traditional nationalism, liberal nationalism and integral nationalism.
6. Outline the main stages in the origin of the modern state? To which does the United States belong?
7. Boyd Shaffer lists a series of things which he describes as "illusions of nationalism." In what sense are they illusions? In what sense are they realities?
8. Discuss the proposition: the state is the core institution of the nation.
9. Trace the relation between mercantilism and the modern state.
10. Trace the relation between *laissez-faire* economics and the modern state.

THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN NATION

The nation is one of the major community formations of our time. Its peculiarity lies in the fact that it is a type of community which, like the city, finds its point of synthesis in secondary institutions. However, in contrast to the city, the institutions serving as the central point are political rather than economic. The core of the institutional complex of the nation is formed by the modern state. The United States belongs to the first major wave of nation formation of the western world. It was characteristic of the first type of nation to form in the west in that the state preceded the nation.

THE AMERICAN STATE

The establishment of the American state occurred at a time when the relations of the state and nation in the western world were undergoing basic re-definition. The eighteenth century rationalists were in the process of adapting the humanism of earlier centuries to the requirements of the monarchical states, reconciling a universal conception of human nature and reason with the existence of special states. The essential property of man was thought to be his reason, and the vindication of the political association was found in the conception of the state as the instrument of reason. For this, the only requirement was the reconstruction of political society and the reform of unprogressive and traditionalistic features of the state, bringing it into accord with the rule of reason.

The popularity of these revisionistic, rationalistic traditions in the colonies at the time of the American Revolution was responsible for the unusual importance placed on a rigid written constitution, judicial review, a rule of law rather than of men, and the Bill of Rights. However, since the colonists were largely of English extraction with strong traditions of practical self sufficiency, the extensive legalism fostered by American constitutionalism has been modified by legislation and usage. In all practical affairs, the ordinary Englishman places his confidence in men rather than in rules. Among the outstanding features that have come to characterize the American state are limited government, federalism, a bi-cameral legislature, and a separately elected executive.

The Declaration of Independence in 1776 asserted the intention of the thirteen colonies to cooperate in war against Great Britain and implied that they would establish independent states. The Revolution had a number of consequences: the colonies became independent states united under the Confederation; the United States won title to North American territories extending to the Mississippi river; the royal and proprietary ruling classes were overthrown, broadening the basis of political participation; loyalist lands and estates were confiscated and broken up, pointing toward a more democratic property system; quit rents collected by the crown and royal proprietors were abolished along with entail and primogeniture; and the Anglican Church was disestablished in those colonies where it had been tax supported.

The successful revolutionaries found themselves in a situation not without its ironies. The American Revolution represented a fusion of the interests of the frontier yeoman and the lower middle class urbanite. When they won the revolution and threw off the British yoke, and forced the Loyalists into exile, they found themselves with a tradition of resistant political particularism, but with a state of their own. The successful revolutionaries expressed their suspicion of central government by their attempt to guarantee the safety of politics and property through a careful balancing of interests against one another and by the ready reception of the idea that economic enterprises are self-regulatory. The suspicion of central government was initially so strong that the former colonies were even reluctant to provide their new state

with any genuine autonomy. The Articles of Confederation (1781) represented a legal symbol of union, but the central government had no coercive power at all. However, practical good sense triumphed over the traditional suspicion of government, and the national constitution framed in 1787 was adopted in 1789. This has been described by MacMahon as a decisive step in counter-revolution. At the first Congress of the United States the union had a membership of eleven states. North Carolina and Rhode Island soon joined, and then the thirteen states grew to the present fifty.

Among the more important decisions of the Constitutional Convention of 1778 were the granting to the central government the right to tax individuals and power over interstate and foreign and interstate commerce. Money was nationalized. Provisions were made for the development of a system of federal courts with jurisdiction over cases involving the constitution and laws and over disputes between residents of different states. Finally, the office of president was created, to be filled independently of Congress for a fixed term of four years. The president was empowered to make all appointments, exercise initiative in foreign affairs, and was vested with great power in war time. This, MacMahon notes, does not seem to have been calculated to grant harmonious political leadership, but to guarantee that the administration would operate, come what may.¹

The early state very quickly became the focal point for a feud between Jefferson and Hamilton. Hamilton gave voice to the interests of the urban, commercial, and industrial strata. The major principles of the Hamiltonians included the political support of finance, industry, commerce, and shipping; a strong central government under the executive; a distrust of popular democracy and a preference for government by an *élite*; the view that the hope of the country lay in a balanced economy under commercial control. By contrast, Jefferson gave expression to the demands of the agrarians. Major principles of the Jeffersonians included preference for an order resting on small individual freeholders; a curtailment of urbanism, industrialism, and finance; sympathy

¹ Arthur Whittier MacMahon, *Federalism, Mature and Emergent* (New York: Garden City, 1955).

toward debtor interests; faith in democracy; and suspicion of a strong centralized government.

The written constitution offered relative inelasticity in the face of forces for change. While the Constitution could be amended, it was only by approval of two-thirds of the voting members of each house of Congress, or by petition from the legislatures of two-thirds of the state. In either case the amendments had to be ratified in at least three-fourths of the states. Only five such amendments have failed of ratification. The first ten amendments (the Bill of Rights) were practically a part of the original Constitution. At the same time, despite the relative inelasticity of the written Constitution, rather profound changes have been made in the spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the last word has usually been said by the courts.

The federal system rests on the principle that the central government possesses only such powers as are delegated to it, residual authority remains with the states which are thus able to do anything not forbidden in the Constitution. Matters expressly vested in the federal government are foreign affairs; defense (including the right to organize a militia and command it); taxation and borrowing money; foreign and interstate commerce; post offices and post roads; bankruptcy; patents and copyrights; weights and measures; and naturalization.

The entire panorama of factors—a suspicion of government, constitutional rigidity, the separation of authorities and the deliberate mixing of powers, the restriction of the federal government from all activities other than those explicitly granted to it, and the independently elected president with potentially extensive power—would seem to add up to remarkably dim prospects for the new state. The bitter conflict that almost immediately broke out between the Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians seemed to indicate that the worst was about to happen.

To some extent the division of authority and the mixture of powers encouraged the entry into national politics of the most various social groups. There were many roads to political influence. Moreover, the independently elected executive practically guaranteed the emergence of the two-party system. The stakes in the capture of the presidency were too high for the major interests of the country to ignore, however, no single section could

hope to capture the executive as long as it insisted on its special concerns. Inevitably the emerging national parties sought support in all sections. The result was a strong tendency to play down sectionalism.

Despite the fact that the Hamiltonians advocated a strong central government and the Jeffersonians opposed it, these two major divisions tended to force a continuous development of the federal government. The Hamiltonians established a national bank, strengthened the credit of the United States, pressed for a system of tariffs for the support of industry and commerce, and strengthened the federal government in the service of industrial, commercial, and financial interests. The Jeffersonians implemented the territorial aspirations of the frontier, carrying out the Louisiana Purchase. They made national politics into a forum for rural and frontier interests in other ways: in the democratization of suffrage, liberalization of land policies, national subsidies for internal improvements, and provisions for public education and the like.

From an early period it became evident that the operation of the party system tended to strengthen the federal government regardless of the official stand of the particular party. In the course of the periodic attempts by the national parties to capture the executive, attempting to destroy an established federal service turned out to be bad politics. By and large, each election found the federal government stronger than it had been. Despite the criticism of the opposition party, new services have continually been added and few established services have been withdrawn.

The expansion of the federal government soon began to provide extraordinary opportunities for the operation of the spoils system. Beginning in 1883, selection by examination was introduced. Since this time, the routine personnel of the federal government have tended to be under the merit system.

THE FORMATION OF THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES

The definition of the modern state contains the idea that it is a territorial entity in the sense that the state is the institution able to maintain a monopoly of the employment of force in a given territory. All modern states have tended to flow to such territorial

limits as they have been able successfully to defend. The territorial limits of a state are usually fixed by the power sphere of another state. This was also true of the United States. Sufficient forces were generated to set in motion a process of territorial expansion and the transformation of the United States into a continental power resulted. The expansion forces were strong enough to bring about a variety of wars (including the Indian wars), purchases, and territorial negotiations.

ACQUISITION OF THE TERRITORY AND PUBLIC DOMAIN OF
THE U. S. A.

<i>Year and Mode of Acquisition</i>	<i>Area in Acres</i>
1783 Treaty of Paris with Great Britain	541,364,480
1803 Louisiana Purchase	529,911,680
1803 Red River Basin	29,601,920
1819 Cession from Spain	46,144,640
1845 Annexation of Texas	249,066,240
1846 Oregon Compromise	183,386,240
1848 Mexican Cession	338,680,960
1850 Purchase from Texas	78,926,720
1853 Gadsden Purchase	18,988,800

The wave of expansion even leaped beyond the points of continuous contact with the growing area of the continental United States. Among the more important overseas acquisitions were of Alaska (by purchase in 1867, adding 586,400 square miles), Hawaii (in 1898, adding 6,423 square miles), the Philippines (in 1898, by cession from Spain, adding 115,600 square miles and granting independence in 1946), Puerto Rico (in 1899, adding 3,435 square miles), and the Canal Zone (in 1904, by treaty with Panama, adding 553 square miles).

The formation of the territory of the United States was no mere process of mechanical addition to the old areas, but involved the establishment of policies and procedures for integrating the new areas with the old. A fundamental step was taken in 1780, when the New York legislature ceded to the United States all claims to western lands. This laid the basis for the formation of the public domain, and made the acquisition, development, and disposition of the public domain a federal activity.

The mode of organization and disposition of the public domain

by the federal government was established most fundamentally in the Basic Land Ordinance of 1785, which provided for rectangular surveys (dividing the land into townships of six miles square). Townships were to be divided into thirty-six lots (of 640 acres each) with one lot set aside for maintenance of public schools and the sale of minimum lots of 640 acres at one dollar an acre. This ordinance extended the New England pattern of settlement to the new territories. The second fundamental provision for the organization and disposition of the public domain was the North West Ordinance of 1787, which provided that the territory was to be governed initially by a governor, a secretary, and three judges appointed by Congress. When the population reached 5,000 free males, a bi-cameral legislature was to be established. When the new state reached a population of 60,000 free inhabitants, it could be admitted to the Union on an equal footing with the original states.

The formation of the public domain, the provisions for its organization and disposition, belonged to the federal government. Until a territory became a state, the proper field of action for any public or semi-public concern in the territories was the federal government. The federal government was concerned and was an object of concern in all affairs affecting the territories; it developed much of its strength in connection with those territories. In the early state period the west turned to the federal government for adequate postal service. An act of 1794 provided additional post roads and stage transportation. An act of 1814 provided that mail service should be arranged from the nearest post office to the courthouse of every county in every state or territory. Mail lines were extended, and post roads were put into operation. The federal government was appealed to for assistance in building roads and canals. Its support was sought in handling the Indian problems of the territories; out of this evolved the federal policy of re-locating the Indians in the West. With the chartering of the Mohawk and Hudson Railroad in 1826 and the beginning of its operations in 1830, an era of railroad building was opened. Government support was soon secured for it. By the time it was over, an estimated 155,504,994 acres of public lands had been granted to the railroads, an area almost the size of Texas. The Union Pacific Railroad received 20,000,000 acres, the Santa Fe 17,000,-

000, the Central and Southern Pacific 24,000,000, and the Northern Pacific 44,000,000 acres. After 1900 highway construction was increasingly carried out with federal support. After 1911 airplane transportation was developed to a great extent by federal subsidies.

The formation of the territory of the United States is, thus, a study in the interaction between the states and the nation. The states grew stronger in connection with it, and the nation received further definition.

THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN POPULATION

The American population has grown at enormous speed from less than 4,000,000 at the time of the first census, in 1790, to over 170,000,000 in 1959.

THE AMERICAN POPULATION FOR SELECTED YEARS *

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number</i>
1790	3,929,214
1860	31,443,321
1900	75,994,575
1950	150,697,361

* U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*: 1957 (78th ed.), (Washington, D.C., 1957), p. 5.

In composition the population is predominantly white.

COMPOSITION OF THE AMERICAN POPULATION, 1950 *

<i>Class</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
White	134,942,028	89.5
Negro	15,042,286	10.0
Indian	343,410	0.2
Chinese	117,829	0.1
Japanese	141,768	0.1
All others	110,240	—

* *Ibid.*, p. 32.

Much of the growth of the population in the United States is to be accounted for by immigration. Still, in 1950, more than a quarter of a century after termination of the main wave, the total foreign white stock came to over 33,000,000.

FOREIGN WHITE STOCKS IN THE U. S. A. IN 1950 OF MORE
THAN 1,000,000 *

<i>Stock</i>	<i>Number in Millions</i>
England and Wales	2.0
Ireland	2.3
Germany	4.7
Poland	2.7
Austria	1.2
U.S.S.R.	2.5
Italy	5.7
Canada	2.2
Mexico	1.3

* *Ibid.*, p. 35.

The total immigration to the United States from 1820 to 1950 was about 40,000,000 people. Of these, about 33,000,000 came from Europe, 950,000 from Asia, and nearly 5,000,000 from elsewhere in America.

IMMIGRATION FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1820-1950 *

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number in Millions</i>
Austria	4.1
Germany	6.2
Great Britain	2.7
Hungary	4.1
Ireland	4.6
Italy	4.7
Sweden	1.2
U.S.S.R.	3.3

* U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the U.S., 1789-1945*, and *Statistical Abstract*, 1950.

The immigration comprises over thirty major European stocks alone.

Immigration is a two-sided affair; the immigrant must have reason to come, and the new country must have reason to receive him. However amorphous the immigration to the United States may initially appear, upon closer inspection it turns out to have a quite definite structure. This was apparent in slavery, although the slave was a kind of involuntary immigrant. Slavery appeared

in response to the rise of the agricultural capitalism of the plantation. It was profitable to the southern planter, to the New England slave trader, and to the New England textile manufacturer. In the long run, however, a slave and free technology could not permanently exist in inter-relation; the clash of slave and non-slave forces was a major factor in the Civil War. The undeniable point is that the place of the Negro in the American population is a reflection of the needs, both historical and contemporary, of the country as a whole.

At the time of the first census, the population of about 4,000,000 was 60 per cent English. The remaining stocks were closely related, being primarily North European: 8 per cent Scotch, 6 per cent Ulster Irish, 4 per cent Free State Irish, 3 per cent Dutch, 2.5 per cent French, 1 per cent Spanish. Between 1790 and 1840 less than 1,000,000 immigrants came. Though augmented by a considerable number of Irish and German migrations due to restrictive legislation against German Jews and economic and factional difficulties in Ireland, the main body of immigrants was primarily English and Protestant until 1840.

Between 1840 and 1880, the period of the "Old Immigration," there was a considerable stepping up of new arrivals. This immigration, which came to nearly 10,000,000, was primarily Scandinavian, Irish, and German. A few Scandinavians settled in western New York in 1825, but the substantial Swedish influx began around 1841 with the settlement of a group at Pine Lake, Wisconsin. In 1843, 1,770 came; the number rose to 4,106 in 1852 and then leveled off until the peak immigration between 1868 and 1883. The main flow of Irish immigration started in the 1820's with nearly 45 per cent coming between 1830 and 1840. The all-time peak was reached in 1851, with 221,253. The Irish, the first major group of Roman Catholics, were employed on canal and railroad projects. German immigration began in the 1830's, but was considerably augmented by political refugees from the Revolution of 1848. German colonies formed in New York, Baltimore, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Milwaukee. Peak immigration was reached between 1853 and 1854, with 356,955 immigrants. Between 1854 and 1863 Chinese immigrant labor appeared on the west coast, employed primarily on the trans-continental railroads. The Germans, English, Scots, and Scandinavians fused

with the New Englanders into a pioneering army to open the west, while the Irish settled in the towns.

Between 1880 and 1914 the so-called "New Immigration" from Eastern and Southern Europe occurred. Between 1901 and 1905 nearly 1,000,000 immigrants came from Italy, more than 500,000 arrived from Russia, and nearly 1,000,000 immigrated from Austria-Hungary. In the peak year, 1914, 73 per cent of the total immigrants came from Southern and Eastern Europe, as compared to 13.4 per cent from Northern and Western Europe.

From the start, immigration was a national, not a local, problem; it reflected national requirements. In the long run local communities (rural and urban) have only informal controls over their members; they cannot determine who moves in or out. The difference between the new and old immigration reflects the changing composition of national requirements. As long as the country was primarily a frontier, yeoman farmers and skilled artisans were what was needed. The old immigrants by and large fused easily with the Yankees of New England in opening up the country. The new immigration came in response to the rise of modern industrialism, which needed masses of unskilled laborers. This was foreshadowed by the Irish migrants, who worked on canal and railroad projects, and the importation of Chinese coolies after 1854 to work on the trans-continental railroads. As early as 1864 the Commissioner of Immigration authorized admission of contract laborers under an agreement based on a maximum of twelve months of labor for the immigrant's passage to the United States.

However, the industrialization of the United States and the unskilled labor that helped make it possible threatened the position of traditional American labor. The Sandlot Riots in San Francisco against Chinese coolie labor in 1877 led to a bill abrogating the Burlingame Treaty of 1868, which gave the Chinese the right to come to the United States. The bill was vetoed, but in 1882, the peak year of Chinese immigration (39,579), a bill to prohibit the immigration of Chinese laborers for a period of ten years was signed. A new Chinese Exclusion Act (1902) remained in effect until 1943, when Chinese immigration was permitted on an annual quota of 105.

Japanese immigration began to reach significant proportions

after 1891. By the first "gentlemen's agreement" (1906), Japan agreed voluntarily to limit immigration. In 1907-1908 a new gentlemen's agreement affirmed Japan's intention to stop the immigration of laborers to the United States. This remained in effect until the Immigration Act of 1924 excluding Japanese immigrants as aliens ineligible for citizenship.

Between 1917 and 1920 bills imposing a literacy test were voted by Congress over President Wilson's veto. In 1918 alien anarchists were excluded, and in 1920 provision was made for the deportation of enemy aliens and anarchists. In 1921 the first "quota law" was passed, limiting immigration in any year to three per cent of the number of each nationality according to the Census of 1910, with a maximum quota of 357,000. The new quota law of 1924 cut the 1921 quota in half, and moved the base for calculation back to 1890. By this law, immigration in any year was limited to two per cent of the number of the nationality as revealed by the census of 1890. This was intended to reduce the quotas from Eastern and Southern Europe.

From 1945 to 1952 measures were taken to facilitate the entrance under quota of displaced persons. In 1952 the McCarran-Walter Act, which was passed over the president's veto, codified the 1924 provisions on maximum immigration under the quota system. The ban against immigration of Asian and Pacific peoples was lifted. Screening measures to keep out subversive and other undesirable people were incorporated, and provisions were made for the deportation of Communists or persons with Communist-front affiliations, even after they had acquired citizenship.

In the present context, the merits of all these forces and the measures implementing them are not as important as the evidence they supply of the emerging desire in the United States for a homogeneous population of a definite type. Only the national community can hope to retain control of its population.

THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE

While not absolutely indispensable, common language is a most powerful nation-making force. Many nations officially adopted a version of the language as an item in state policy. In the United States a distinct American variety of English has come

into being without official policy in a manner that older nations might well envy.

The North American colonies were predominantly English, and English was the prevailing speech in the colonies.^{1a} The original migrations were comparatively small, usually less than one per cent of the existing population in any year. Moreover, many of the original immigrants spoke English. It was to the advantage of the immigrants to learn English, and most did so as soon as possible. By the second or third generation, all trace of foreign speech had usually been lost. Groups, such as the Pennsylvania Germans, which have clung tenaciously to their original speech are an exception.

Even today, of course, Americans are not completely English-speaking. New Mexico is bi-lingual, and many of its citizens speak only Spanish. Some Indians still retain their native languages. French is spoken in some parts of Louisiana. There are tiny islands, where other languages are retained, usually alongside English. But outside of New Mexico language is not a political problem, and where it is taught in parochial schools by individual groups, it is normally taught along with English.

The most extensive study of the peculiarities of American English has been made by Mencken.² The primary characteristics of American English, Mencken believes, are its general uniformity throughout the country, its disregard for grammatical, syntactical, and phonological precedents, and its capacity to borrow and invent new words and phrases.³ Mencken argues that in no other major nation, including England, does the language have an equal standing as a general folk speech for the whole. Even Canada has a large minority which resists speaking English altogether. Little Russian of the Ukraine is unintelligible in Moscow; the North Italian can hardly converse with the Sicilian, or the person speaking low German with one speaking high German. The difference in dialects in England is so great that it is doubtful whether a Lancashire miner and a Lincolnshire farmer can understand one another.

^{1a} For a review of these problems, see George R. Steward, *American Ways of Life* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954), pp. 27 ff.

² H. L. Mencken, *The American Language* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1936).

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 90 ff.

While a recognizably distinct American version of English was at hand by the opening of the nineteenth century, two things stood in the way of its ready diffusion: ' the lack of a national literature, and political disharmony. An undisguised Anglomania which confidently looked forward to *rapprochement* with the mother country at first dominated some of the highest political councils of the country. It was not until the administration of Andrew Jackson that frontier democracy became a dominant note in the highest political councils of the nation.

Jackson was the archetype of the new American who appeared after 1814—ignorant, pushful, impatient of restraint and precedent, an iconoclast, a Philistine, an Anglophobe in every fiber.⁵

In the first year of Jackson's first term (1828), Noah Webster's *American Dictionary of the English Language* was published. The next year Samuel Lorenzo Knapp's *Lectures on American Literature* appeared, being the first formal treatise on American letters. It discussed

Bryant's *Thanatopsis* (1817)
 Irving's *Knickerbocker* (1809) and other works
 Cooper's *The Spy* (1821) and other works
 Hawthorne's *Fanshaw* (1828)
 Poe's *Tamerlane and Other Poems* (1827)
 Schoolcraft's *Through the Northwest* (1821)
 Kent's *Commentaries* (1826)
 Marshall's *Washington* (1804)
 Audubon's *Birds of America* (1827).⁶

With the emergence of the frontier and back country on the national scene and the growth of a native American literature, the American language evolved rapidly. Many of the word inventions of the early nineteenth century have persisted. With the acquisition of new territories and the great immigrations from Europe throughout the nineteenth century, the numbers of loan words increased. For example, the French in Louisiana and along the northwestern border provided bayou, depot, picayune, levee, chute, butte, crevasse, and coulee. The Spanish west of the

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 130 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

Mississippi were the source of such terms as rancho, alfalfa, mustang, sombrero, canyon, desperado, poncho, chaparral, corral, bronco, plaza, peon, alcalde, burro, mesa, tornado, presidio, patio, sierra, and adobe. The German immigrants after 1848 contributed pumpernickel, haus frau, beer garden, lager beer, wienerwurst, frankfurter, bock beer, sauerbraten, schnitzel, stein, rathskeller, delicatessen, hamburger, kindergarten, and many others. New inventions and picturesque compounds remain characteristic.

American English has traditionally been conceived as falling into three dialects: that of New England, that of the South, and that of the Middle Atlantic states, the Midwest, and Far West.⁷ The differences between these dialects are far less than between those of France, where a Breton can hardly be understood in Gascony, or in the British Isles, where nine main dialects have been distinguished in Scotland, three in Ireland, and thirty in England and Wales. As Mencken noted, a Boston taxi-driver could work in Chicago or San Francisco with no risk of being misunderstood by his new fares, and once he had flatted his a's a bit and picked up a few localisms, he would be linguistically naturalized.

So far as language may be conceived as an index, the American language provides striking evidence of an extensive amount of national unity. It appears to be an elastic and powerful instrument for forging the unity of the nation.

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

In seeking the roots of the American nation, the invention of a federal government and its development have been sketched, the formation of a national territory has been outlined, the development of the American population into a partially self-controlled structure has been noted, and the evolution of the American language has been traced. But these merely provide the framework; the inner nation arises in the course of experience shared by the bulk of the members of the community.

The Frontier Experience. From the time of the first settlements on the Atlantic seaboard to the beginning of the twentieth century the most important common experience in North America was the gradual settlement of the continent. One of the great

⁷ Steward, *op. cit.*, pp. 32 ff.

contributions of Turner to the interpretation of American life was his so-called frontier thesis. Like many great discoverers, Turner forced his hypothesis to carry too much weight. There is, however, no doubt that he isolated one of the most general experiences of Americans. For Turner, the frontier was the single most important factor in American history. "The true point of view in the history of this nation is not the Atlantic coast; it is the Great West. Even the slavery struggle . . . occupies its important place in American history because of its relation to western expansion."⁸

The frontier promoted the "formation of a composite nationality for the American people." It stimulated the legislation which most developed the powers of the national government, mitigated against sectionalism, and promoted democracy in America and Europe.⁹

A frontier is characterized by a scarcity of population and relatively crude living conditions existing at the contact point between a stronger and more developed civilization and some sort of hinterland characterized by unsettled boundaries, unexplored or unclaimed territories, virgin soils, free or low priced lands, and relatively unrestricted immigration. The Bureau of the Census drew the frontier line at a density of six persons per square mile. Outside of North America, frontiers are represented by areas of West Australia, South America, Northwest Canada, Siberia, and Rhodesia. These often displayed very different properties from the American frontier.

While accepting Turner's differentiation of the various frontiers of the missionary, the hunter, the soldier, the stockman, and the farmer, Frederic L. Paxson placed somewhat greater importance on the culture of the American frontiersman.

It was the common law process [the formation of the frontier] similar to that which had in England built up the body of legal doctrine and political practice. The foreign experience that shaped American public growth before 1800 was so completely English that frontier society and institutions are plainly the result of old habits modified by new environment.¹⁰

⁸ Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1920), p. 3.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-30.

¹⁰ Frederic L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier, 1763-1893* (New York: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1924), p. 95.

As Paxson saw it, the frontier family could not escape the sense of loneliness, self-dependence, the lessening of old ties, and the intensified importance of immediate experience. There were many failures who did not make a success of farming and who lived in squalor until shiftlessness became habitual; but the frontiersmen valued their leaders for other abilities. Ignorance and self-confidence were bred together as the frontier became a community and a seat of impatient independence. This self-confidence operated against a background of factual equality. It was as difficult for the rich as for the poor to perform the frontier tasks of building a cabin, clearing the land, and raising children. Few of the luxuries that could be purchased were available, and there was little leisure for pleasure. Enduring the common rigors made the frontiersmen resentful of the pretensions of any persons who tried to live differently. Older distinctions resting on property and station were played down.

Moreover, Paxson insists, frontier life developed an intensified distrust of absenteeism of all forms. This was primarily because government was remote and beyond control. Also, absentee economic control was objectionable. Self-confidence, equality, and the demand for autonomy were already a fundamental part of the inheritance of the thirteen colonies, and were further developed in the course of the nineteenth century.

To Paxson the influence of the American frontier was dispersive. From the start the frontier probably selected those persons who were more stubborn, tenacious, ambitious, and non-conformist and who were ready to pay the price for their independence. The frontier threw them on their own resources. The first frontier was the coastal plain. In following decades the Atlantic ports developed into centers of business and government, and the settlers found their way west along the river valleys. The process was repeated many times over.

From the time the earliest resident made his appearance on the frontier line, it required about twenty-five years for him to build his home, the first child to grow up, acquire minimum capital, leave home, and repeat the cycle. In nearly every county in the United States and in every decade, this cyclical process occurred from 1600 to 1900. The free farmer, doing his own work and accomplishing only what he could with his own labor and

that of his family, was the typical unit of the process. During the twenty-five year cycle in any region the land passed from wilderness through stages of scattered farmsteads and became an agricultural community with such institutions as schools, governments, and churches.

Many new movements originated and gained momentum in the West, including more general suffrage, woman's suffrage, free schools, state education, and easier qualifications for political office. The parties of Jefferson, Jackson, Harrison, Lincoln, and Bryan had their strength in the West. By 1820 the frontier states touched the Mississippi; shortly thereafter they covered the whole of the United States; and by 1890 the Census Bureau announced that the frontier had closed.

Throughout the period the frontiersman became, by necessity, a jack-of-all-trades. He also developed considerable ruthlessness manifest in the treatment of both the Indians and the public domain. Hospitality constituted a sort of mutual aid. Through every phase of his entertainment and even his religion, there was a rough and ready quality. Neither the Puritan theocracy of New England nor the Episcopalianism of the southern colonies was suited to the frontier, which became the primary missionary field of the Methodist and Baptist denominations.¹¹

Every valley, hill, mountain, and plain tended to go through its heroic period of settlement, in the course of which it acquired its own peculiar series of local tales: feats of individual strength, heroic adventures, bears killed with an axe or a knife, Indians encountered and overcome. As these tales were told and re-told, strength became greater, eyes keener, and adventures more fearless. These tales formed a common mythological past for the descendants of the area.

One of the most important processes of the nineteenth century was the rapid evolution of frontier lore. The frontier experience as dramatized and transformed in its mythology was increasingly universalized and worked into the materials of a common literary source for the American nation. The development and transfor-

¹¹ In addition to the above references, see W. C. Macleod, *The American Indian Frontier* (New York, 1928); Walter Prescott Webb, *The Great Plains* (New York, 1931); and the excellent articles by Paxson and Rupert Vance in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

mation of frontier mythology has been traced with great skill by Smith. In this development, fact and fiction were soon inextricably intertwined.

Although Boone was not exactly the prototype of Cooper's Leatherstocking, there is a haunting similarity between the two figures. Cooper based a part of Chapters X and II of *The Last of the Mohicans* on a well known exploit of Boone in conducting the rescue of Betsy and Fanny Callaway and Jemima Boone, his daughter, from the Cherokees.¹²

Smith believed that for at least a section of the reading public both Leatherstocking and Daniel Boone were symbols of archaic freedom. Moreover, the Wild West hunter and scout of later times were descendants of Leatherstocking. They inherited the doctrines that civilization is wicked and nature a source of strength, truth, and virtue. Thoreau contrasted the vital wildness of the west with the dead tameness of civilization.

The first generation of fictitious Wild West heroes after Cooper's were symbols of freedom. This notion was strengthened during the 1830's by the development of the Rocky Mountain fur trade, which produced the fur trapper and the mountain man. He adopted more Indian ways than had the pioneers of the areas east of the Mississippi. His costume, speech, and outlook gave him a savage appearance. The best known mountain man was Kit Carson, who owes his fame to Jessie Benton Fremont's edition of her husband's exploring reports. Kit Carson was presented as an Indian fighter, a dare devil horseman, slayer of grizzly bears, and ancestor of the two-gun men who later peopled the Beadle dime novels.

Erastus Beadle, a Buffalo publisher, moved to New York in 1858 to launch a venture in cheap publications for a mass audience. The first of his "dime novels" appeared in 1860, and was followed by more than 300 stories. The eighth of the original series sold more than 4,000 copies, and the total sales for the years 1860 to 1865 was nearly 5,000,000. In the Beadle westerns the link with Cooper was the figure of a benevolent hunter without a fixed residence, advanced in age, with unequalled powers in tracking, marksmanship, and Indian fighting. The stories in the

¹² Henry Nash Smith, *Virgin Land* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 64.

dime novels evolved with the times, and by the 1890's they had come to hinge on conflicts between detectives and bands of robbers.

From the time of Daniel Boone, the popular imagination constantly transformed the facts of westward movement to accord with the myth. Boone was a symbol of archaic flight from civilization. Davy Crockett of Tennessee was the hero of a different cycle of southwestern humor. In his first fictional appearance, Buffalo Bill was in the main line of descent from Cooper.

In the twentieth century the Wild West hero as cowboy became the dominant type. The cowboy did not become a celebrated figure, however, until the range industry spread northward from Texas. In 1882 the citizens of North Platte, Nebraska, organized a big Fourth of July celebration which became the prototype of the rodeo with roping, riding, and shooting contests. The earliest use of the cowboy hero in the Beadle novels is an alleged biography of Taylor by Prentiss Ingraham, published in 1887. However, what the cowboy did often had little resemblance to ranch life.

The introduction of characters described as cowboys is little more than an effort to achieve an air of contemporaneity. It does not change the shape of Wild Western fiction.¹³

Very gradually after 1860 the agricultural husbandman began to make his appearance in American fiction.

Although the frontier as represented in fiction often has very little to do with the facts, such literature is the repository of many local myths or semi-mythological events. As the actualities of the local frontier were dimmed, its place was partly taken by a racy popular literature which helped to unify the popular imagination.

Through the realities of the wilderness and later through the literature and mythology associated with it, the frontier has been one of the great unifying experiences of American life.

The Immigrant Experience. Many millions of Americans who did not themselves or through their families have contact with the frontier, nevertheless became symbolic participants in it through their enjoyment of popular literature. The nearest rival to the frontier as a foundation of common background experience

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

of Americans is, perhaps, the immigrant experience.¹⁴ Between 1820 and 1950 some 40,000,000 persons came to the United States as immigrants. Initially, any group of immigrants was usually far more conscious of the differences, not only from Americans but from other immigrants, than they were of any similarities. Cast into a situation where they were competing directly with one another, different immigrant groups often found themselves in conflict. In the nineteenth century there was strong anti-Negro sentiment among the Irish; the conflict with the Chinese first began on the Pacific coast, also with the Irish. A German "know nothingism" broke out against the Irish; the Swedes and Norwegians often found unpleasant things to say about one another; and the earlier immigration of German Jews came into sharp conflict with the later immigration of eastern European Jews. Many of the disparaging terms for immigrant groups were invented by other immigrant groups; English immigrants described the Irish as Micks; the Irish described the Poles and Italians as Hunkies, Wops, and Dagoes; the German Jews described the eastern European Jews as Kikes.

There were, however, many similarities between the immigrants. As the nineteenth century wore on the immigrant was increasingly of peasant origin. Until 1846 the Irish immigration had largely been a movement of the sons of ambitious farmers and artisans. When the potato crop of Ireland was destroyed by the rot that year 500,000 Irish died and 3,000,000 survived only by aid of charity; it was then that the huge wave of Irish peasant migration began. The early migrants from Great Britain were, in large measure, artisans and civic types, but with the increased

¹⁴ An extraordinarily rich literature has developed around the experiences of the immigrants. See, for example, Edith Abbot, *Immigration* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), and her *Historical Aspects of the Immigration Problem* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926); Grace Abbot, *The Immigrant and the Community* (New York: The Century Co., 1917); John R. Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920); Julius Drachsler, *Democracy and Assimilation* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920); Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1951); E. Franklin Frazier, *Race and Culture Contacts in the Modern World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1957); Robert E. Park and Herbert A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925); W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (Boston: Badger, 1918); W. Lloyd Warner and Leo Srole, *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945).

tempo of enclosures after 1815, the migration included large numbers of peasants. When the capitalization of agriculture began to touch the heart of the European continent after the mid-century mark, large numbers of peasants were set in motion: after 1870 6,000,000 came from the German Empire, 2,000,000 came from Scandinavia. Particularly after the cholera epidemic in 1887, the Italian peasants were on the move; and from the eastern parts of Europe came 8,000,000 others—Poles, Jews, Hungarians, Bohemians, Slovaks, Ukrainians, and Rutherians. From the Balkans and the south of Europe came 3,000,000 people (Greeks, Macedonians, Croatians, Albanians, Syrians, and Armenians). With some justice Handlin treats the immigrant primarily as a peasant; it is certainly true that this was the modal type of the new immigration.¹⁵ A second common property of the immigrant's experience was the shock of crossing the Atlantic. It is easy to forget today how brutally disillusioning the uprooting was. "The crossing immediately subjected the emigrant to a succession of shattering shocks and decisively conditioned the life of every man who survived it."¹⁶ A remarkably large number of the immigrants had no other choice than to walk to the seaport, the total journey often covering 300 miles or more and consuming a month or more of time. On the way it was often necessary to deal with strange ways in an alien language. The migrant was preyed upon at every step of the way. The trip across the Atlantic was long, possibly extending to two or three months on sailing vessels. Wrecks were disastrous and frequent; seventeen vessels foundered on the run from Liverpool to Quebec in the 1830's. The conditions on shipboard were often so bad that there were fantastic tolls in life and health. The succession of major and minor disasters often continued for a time after arrival in America. Handlin describes every phase of the crossing as "a harsh and brutal filter"; by and large only the physically and psychologically tough and the fortunate survived. "The qualities desirable in the good peasant were not those conducive to success in the transition. Neighborliness, obedience, respect, and status were valueless among the masses that struggled for space on the way."¹⁷ The

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

¹⁵ Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted*, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

memory of the terrors of the crossing was one of the factors binding immigrants together in the new world.

A third common factor in the experience of the immigrant was his tendency to form into communities. Well-meaning Americanization workers often found that their civic and language schools were ill attended and that the foreigner preferred to live close to his own people, pulling a shell of his tradition close around him. Alien colonies formed in the great cities like islands in the sea.¹⁸

A massing of individuals of similar background occurred in the cities, making it possible for a fragment of traditional life to be constructed. In time the group tended to grow economically and socially more self-sufficient. In large industrial and commercial centers, there was even at times a grouping of people in the same block who had come from the same native village. The original settlement of immigrants often sent out colonists to other sections of the city, where the process tended to repeat itself. Well-to-do individuals and families came to reside in less congested sections of the city, where they found themselves a dwindling minority.

In the immigrant colony a network of social organizations develops, ranging from simple local clubs to complex nationwide associations. The mutual aid and benefit society, omnipresent in immigrant colonies, serves as an insurance company, social club, political center, and labor union. The church or synagogue is always a key point in the complex. National alliances or unions of the suppressed nationalities of Europe are also conspicuous among immigrant communities. Other organizations include social and recreational centers, national and parochial schools, newspapers and publishing firms, naturalization clubs, employment bureaus, orphanages, and hospitals. A highly conscious immigrant community may develop dealing with every phase of its life from insurance to foreign language theaters and federations for philanthropy and research.

Watching the destruction of the ethnic community is also an experience common to immigrants, for forces are constantly at work to destroy them. Most immigrant communities are unable

¹⁸ For an account of an immigrant community, see Drachsler, *op. cit.*, pp. 60 ff.

to close out the effects of the surrounding world. The results are manifest in the frequent lack of united leadership and the outbreak of factional quarrels. Time and again promising leaders withdraw from active participation in immigrant affairs and make their way in the general community. Formal religion tends to decline among the mass of immigrants. The secularization of communal activities is speeded by the lack of well-trained clergymen and the shift to English language services.

The great agency in the decline of the immigrant community has been the second generation. The younger members have no memories of oppressions, no experience of the crossing. In the same family different tongues are spoken, different newspapers read, different foods eaten, and different customs observed. Increasing numbers marry and work outside the former circle. Despite the attempt by the immigrant community to hold its own, the young tend to slip away. At times a succession of progressively modified community forms appears. A medley of groups may be found in the city in which previously identifying institutions—even physical traits—disappear.

Here are no more to be found the characteristic landmarks of each immigrant colony—its coffee-houses and restaurants, its churches and synagogues, its meeting halls and book stores, its steamship ticket offices and savings banks, its foreign flags and foreign signs and perhaps its foreign odors, too. Here even the practiced eye of the anthropologist would find it more difficult to pick out racial types than in the congested quarter where the massing of people brought out physical features in sharp relief. The versatile linguist, too, would miss the medley of alien tongues and dialects, while the lover of the queer in costumes would search in vain for the picturesque rags of the poor foreigner. It is as if some powerful, invisible, irresistible steam-roller had passed over the whole population and ruthlessly ironed out all differences.¹⁹

The peculiarities of the particular immigrant background have fallen away sufficiently so that what remains is not the particular form but a set of general effects from a similar origin, background, and most important of all, outlook and aspiration.

The interpreters of American life tend to fall into two groups:

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

(1) those who seek the foundation of its common experience in the frontier, and (2) those who seek it in the experience of the immigrant. As these things go, each tends to reject the claims of the other. However, they are both true; they represent two of the most generally diffused experiences of Americans. The third generation descendant of the immigrant derives as much enjoyment from popular representations of the American frontier as an actual descendant of a pioneering family.

The Experience Associated with Mass Production. In looking for the primary forms of shared experience in the American nation, beyond the frontier and its ideology or the immigrant and his evolution, those associated with mass production present themselves as in some respects more universal. Americans have participated in the process of mass production and enjoyed its fruits. It is unnecessary to review again the nature of the shared experience of Americans associated with mass production; it is sufficient only to recall that it tends to bring about systematic changes in action and attitude.

Common Crises. The shared experiences of Americans reviewed so far have all represented long processes in time. However, no account of these shared experiences would be complete without noting the effect of common crises, though these be of comparatively short duration.

Any common crisis, short of one that destroys the social group itself, tends to have a conservative effect on it. The attitude of a normal man in a crisis is not one of optimistic imaginativeness, but of a somewhat withdrawn nature or of defensiveness. Common crises force men to rely on one another, and to play down their differences; they seek a basis for joint action. The group at such times claims a higher measure of the individual's loyalty. The shift of the individual's identifications from himself to the group has been manifest in a decline of the suicide rate during war time. In a major crisis, moreover, people are more than usually ready to put their trust in a leader, who becomes the focal point of collective fears and hopes and who may, when the crisis is over, find himself reassigned to the status of a folk hero—a Washington, or a Lincoln.

Every one of the major wars of the United States from the Revolution and Civil War to World Wars I and II have provided

great shared experiences, have been marked by rising tides of patriotism, and have provided military and political heroes. Somewhat similar effects have been achieved by the panics and depressions of the nineteenth century and by the great depression of the 1930's. These common experiences may weave the nation more tightly together.

SUMMARY

The American nation was born in the eighteenth century at a time when the first nationalistic ideologies were forming. The American state was born in a successful revolution. The main patterns of interests in the new state quickly found the federal government one of their primary arenas. The Hamiltonians brought to national expression the interest of the industrial, commercial, and financial interests of the Atlantic seaboard. They advocated protective tariffs, a solid banking system, and government support of industry and commerce. The Jeffersonians gave expression to the interests of the indebted yeomen of the frontier with their demand for more and cheaper land, for broader democracy, and for lower qualifications for office. The new state tended to be pulled in different directions, but with each passing year it grew ever more strong and representative of the whole of the United States.

The formation and development of the American territory quickly became a federal concern and a product of forces on a national rather than a local level. The nation was the only community in the United States that could control the reception of new members from the outside. The amount and forms of immigration were a reflection of national needs.

The American language is an adaptable, inventive, supple extension of English. A common language is a most powerful nation-making force; the United States has developed the most unified language of any of the modern nations with the nearest approximation of a universal folk language.

A most important part of the formation of a community is its historical development, its experience shared through time. In the United States four great areas of common experience stand out: (1) the frontier and its accompanying ideology, so important that some students have felt that it is the key to American

history, (2) the immigrant experience, so prevalent as to have caused some students to claim it is exclusively significant, (3) the experiences associated with mass production, and (4) the experiences associated with the great crises—with major depressions and wars.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. Why did the formation of an American territory and population become national problems?
2. In what ways does the American language differ from most European languages?
3. Which of the various categories of common American experience do you feel is most important in the formation of the nation?
4. Locate the formation of the American nation in terms of the waves of nation formation described in Chapter 9.
5. Why did the immigration to the United States become a national rather than a local problem?
6. Do you think the frontier has had any permanent influence on the American character? Explain.
7. What effect has the immigrant experience had upon the formation of the American character?
8. What effects has mass production had on the American character?
9. Since both the city and the nation find their point of synthesis in secondary institutions, how do they differ?
10. Explain the early suspicion by Americans of the national government. Why did they drop it so quickly in every crisis?

PART III

THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
OF MASS SOCIETY

Introduction to Part III

In Part I the problem of the nature and effects of the mass society were posed. It was discovered that one of the major phenomena of the contemporary world is the rise of the mass society and the diffusion of its key features to ever widening spheres. In Part II the consequences of the mass society for community formation were reviewed. The mass society was seen to have direct and drastic consequences. Its critics have insisted that mass society is carrying out a revolutionary destruction of traditional communities. This is quite evident in the case of the rural community, but it is also true of the urban community. A true community is a system of institutions capable of realizing a completely autonomous way of life. The moment one views the city not merely as a massing of social elements but as an autonomous community, it is evident that the mass society liquidates this autonomy in new ways almost daily.

However, while the critics of the mass society have correctly identified its destructive properties, they have generally not identified, with equivalent accuracy, the constructive aspects of the mass society for community formation. The principles of community formation—stability, consistency, and the movement toward completeness of any given institutional system—also operate under the conditions of a mass society. The new community of contemporary man which embodies the characteristic features of the mass society is the nation which rises at the expense of the rural community and the city.

It follows from this that when one comes to grips with the details of American social life basic mistakes will be made if one does not take into account the fact that the three major types of community are in competition for the integration of American life. Or put another way, the specific institutions of American life are subjected to conflicting community claims. As a result, those aspects of American institutions fitting the requirements of traditional community forms are often treated at length, while

those aspects of American institutions fitting the requirements of the nation are ignored, treated cursorily, or presented as mere social problems.

In the attempt to come to grips with the details of American life without obscuring the competition of alternative communities to incorporate them, the theory of institutions has been reviewed. Human social institutions have been grouped into three broad categories: *socialization* (the transformation of pre-social materials into social form); the *mastery of nature* (the collective solution to the problems of the material basis of social life); and *social control* (the processes of collective decision making, decision execution, and discipline).

In the present section, Chapters 11, 12, and 13 are concerned with *socialization*, Chapters 14, 15, and 16 are concerned with the *mastery of nature*, and Chapters 17, 18, and 19 with *social control*. The theory of institutions and of their sub-forms is developed in Chapter 11, the early sections of Chapter 14, and in Chapter 17. Historical contrasts which have a bearing on the problems of the particular category of institutions in America are contained primarily in Chapters 12, 14, 15, and 17.

Understanding American social institutions necessitates acquaintance with the theory of institutions, the historical setting, and the institutional facts proper. In the present section the chapters most fully concerned with contemporary American social institutions are 12 and 13 (on socialization), 15 and 16 (on the mastery of nature), and 18 and 19 (on social control).

SOCIALIZATION AND THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONS

Many discussions of mass society conveyed the impression that it is a great, impersonal, artificial, structureless aggregation of people. The descriptions often give such a bleak picture that it is difficult to understand why people ever put up with mass society.

The two major examples of a mass society are provided by the United States and Soviet Russia. The reason given for the Russians' acceptance of the mass society is, of course, that they are forced to do so. However, if this is the case, why should Americans accept it? Americans are said to accept the mass society because they are "cheerful robots." Thus, strangely, Americans are thought voluntarily to do to themselves what requires all the force of the police state to accomplish in Russia. There is something radically wrong with this. Why should one assume that the Russians are corrupted only with difficulty from without, while Americans engage in an orgy of self-corruption?

In evaluating the interpretations of mass society, an indispensable first premise must be that it has developed, not because it is imposed by force or affirmed by self-corruption, but because it has solved some human problems better than they were ever solved before.

People were not always initially convinced or favorably disposed as each aspect of the mass society was introduced, but these elements of mass survived because the people were getting greater values than could be had without them. When Eli Whit-

ney introduced the principles of machine production and interchangeable parts into his manufacture of army rifles, he made a higher quality product cheaper than could be manufactured any other way. Moreover, the problem of replacement of parts and repair could be solved more cheaply than was possible with hand-made guns. Scientific management flourished, because it created determinable efficiencies.

The many occasions on which Henry Ford has been used to epitomize all that is objectionable in the mass society have often obscured the extent to which his psychology was typical of that of many Americans. Henry Ford was relatively untouched by the theoretical concerns frequently associated with higher education. He was the practical son of a Michigan farmer: utilitarian, democratic, and fascinated by gadgets. As a boy he spent much time taking watches apart and putting them together again; he dreamed of mass producing cheap watches. This orientation toward practical results led Ford to the idea of developing a cheap, practical, labor saving automobile. The way to achieve this objective, to his mind, was with a single model produced by standardized operations. This idea was dramatically embodied in his announcement that the customer could "have a car painted any color that he wants so long as it is black."

When to the horror of the businessmen of his day, Ford instituted a policy of a minimum wage of \$5 a day at a time when the going rate was \$2.40 for a nine hour day, and when he followed this up with a policy of price cutting that sent the cost per car from \$950 in 1909 to its low of \$290 in 1924, there was no doubt of the potential for economic democracy involved in mass production.

The critics of mass society are certain to be one-sided so long as they fail to appreciate the dynamic role played in its growth by the concept of economic democracy. The indisputable fact that more and better material goods are obtainable more cheaply and efficiently has constituted its basic attraction. Neither coercion nor corruption has been necessary to persuade modern men to accept mass production; American mass society has created the highest standard of living in the world.

The idea that mass society is a structureless system is almost as widespread as the assumption that it does not offer its members

any true values. That this does not completely convey the point the critics seem to have in mind, is indicated by the fact that these people often also assert that the mass society is over-structured. If one were to bring both of these ideas together into a single formulation, the critics of the mass society seem convinced that the structure of a mass society is external and involuntary; it is sometimes compared to a strait jacket. To change the image a bit, the critics seem to see its structure as a kind of orthopedic corset which holds up a weak spine. The individual in this society is frequently described as "spineless," "fragmented," "depersonalized," "segmented," "other directed," "will-less," and "fundamentally empty" in his "lonely crowd."

One of the clearest indications of the omnipresent assumption of mass society's lack of internal structure is the relatively complete disappearance of the term "community," which has a traditional aura of warmth, intimacy, and spontaneity. Sometimes the society is described as a pseudo-community or "*pseudo-Gemeinschaft*."

While it is true that mass society is bringing about the liquidation of some traditional forms of community (the rural community and the city), modern society is not without community formation of its own. The principles of community formation are dynamically at work in the heart of modern mass society and are creating a structure as distinct and "internal" as the structure of any previous community. Community formation in mass society is represented by the nation.

The structure of contemporary mass society is that of the national community. The complex of sentiments peculiar to it, nationalism, is sometimes described as an artificial attempt to revive primitive tribalism; but this should not obscure the fact that its relation to the nation is equivalent to the relation of tribalism to the tribe, agrarianism to the rural community, or cosmopolitanism to the city.

The real and significant liquidation of traditional ways of life occurring within the modern mass society is very like the destruction of tribal society by the peasant village, or the destruction of the peasant village by the city. The fact that mass society offers its people values not obtainable through other community forms and the fact that it is characterized by the internal development

of its own unique structure can only be ignored at the expense of a distorted picture of contemporary social life.

Mass society has as distinguishable a structure as any previous community has had. Moreover, the conflict between the nation and traditional forms of the social community is also manifest as a conflict of these sub-units.

THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONS

From the works of such sociologists as Hobhouse, MacIver, von Wiese, Cooley, Angell, Ward, Wissler, Ellwood, Keller, Sumner, Allport, Chapin, La Pierre, Lundberg, and Pannuzio, Hertzler formulated his own description of institutions. It represents a kind of collective summary of the whole.

Social institutions are purposive, regulatory, and consequently primary cultural configurations, formed, unconsciously and/or deliberately, to satisfy individual wants and social needs bound up with the efficient operation of any plurality of persons. They consist of codes, rules, and ideologies, unwritten and written, and essential symbolic organizational and material implementations. They evidence themselves socially and in standardized and uniform practices and observances, and individually in attitudes and habitual behavior of persons. They are sustained and enforced by public opinion, acting both informally and formally, through specially devised agencies.¹

Sociologists require a concept of institutions to complete their theories. Spencer may conceive of institutions as the organs of society, Sumner may define them as structures and ideas, Cooley may define them as fixed phases of the public mind, and Chapin may think of them as nucleated institutions as cultural complexes with four main elements (attitudes, cultural objects of symbolic value, objects of utilitarian value, and oral or written symbols), but they all agree as to the existence of standardized ways of doing things which give social life its peculiar properties.

When the concept of *institution* is used in an analysis of social life, the idea most frequently associated with it is *group*. At times *groups* and *institutions* are even defined in the same way, but there are some advantages in keeping the two ideas separate. Most students treat the group as an actual association of people

¹ J. O. Hertzler, *Social Institutions* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1946), pp. 4-5.

and treat institution as the form or pattern of the association. By the institution of the family, for example, one means the *way* in which domestic life is organized: the rule of appropriate behavior for husband, wife, and children, and other dependents, the responsibilities of each, the typical property, etc. Any specific family is a group. The same mode of family organization might be present in an infinite number of actual families. It is quite possible for a specific family group to transform the family institutions embodied in its behavior. This occurred among the Mormons when Joseph Smith reported to his followers that he had a revelation enjoining polygamous marriage on the faithful. The Mormon family was transformed from a monogamous to a polygamous form. There were other institutional changes, in turn, affecting the roles of husbands, wives, children, property, etc.

An institution cannot exist by itself. The institution of the family, for example, can be said to exist only in so far as it is embodied in the behavior of some specific family group or groups. Nevertheless, it is useful to analyze the family in terms of its institutions to search out the general form. This is the idea contained in the many conceptions of institution, such as "pattern," "set of relations," "order," "system of rules," "set of role definitions," "series of mutual expectations," and the like. In each the common form is being sought.

Here institutions may be taken to refer to the *standardized solutions to collective problems*. There is no particular brief to be made for this definition of institutions over the others except, perhaps, that it clarifies the difference between groups and institutions. A number of responsible authorities who treat the family as an institution have urged that the family regulates sex behavior. However, the particular form of prostitution of a society also does this. Moreover, the Kinsey reports have documented an enormous amount of pre- and extra-marital sexual behavior in varying degrees conforming to semi-legitimate norms. The problem of the regulation of sexual behavior thus must not be identified exclusively with the family. Groups represent people in interaction; institutions are the ways in which they interact. There is never any temptation to confuse the group with the way it solves its problems, for these are things of a different order. It would be like confusing one's feet with a pair of shoes.

When institutions are conceived of as collective problem solutions, a new approach to the types of institutions is invited. There are some general problems that must be faced by all societies, however simple or complex they may be. When social life grows more complex, the solutions to these problems also become increasingly complex. The theory of institutions is intended to account for the occurrence of regularities in the sub-units of social life. In turn, the type of society is determined by the nature of its particular sub-units. It is necessary to understand both the general problems common to all societies and the particular ways in which solutions may be specialized. To understand modern nations, analysis must be fixed on the highly specialized sub-forms in which the problems of man's collective life are faced and solved. An analysis of American society must take into account the fact that three major community forms have competed for the integration of American life, the rural community, the city, and the nation. It has already been necessary to draw a distinction between primary and secondary institutions to account for these community forms. Primary institutions are collective patterns which directly achieve collective goals; secondary institutions serve primary institutions.

It is possible to analyze institutions from the standpoint of the kinds of values realized in them. Some things have importance to people, not for their own sake, but for reasons lying outside themselves; such values may be described as *instrumental*. The sewage disposal plant is instrumental to life in the city and no end in itself; but such things as parks, despite some instrumental uses, are ends in themselves. It is conventional to describe the latter as desired for their own sake. So far as social life is organized for the attainment of instrumental values, it may be described as *how* people live; so far as it is organized for the attainment of intrinsic values, it may be described as *why* people live.

The most fundamental of all distinctions between the kinds of institutions is that between institutions for the attainment of instrumental values, and institutions for the attainment of intrinsic values. These two major branches of institutions are *social* and *cultural* institutions, respectively. Cultural institutions are the standardized solutions to the problems of collective life designed

for the achievement of intrinsic values—the solutions to the problems of *why* men live as they do in society.

Social institutions represent solutions to three general problems: (1) socialization, (2) the mastery of nature, and (3) social control.

THE NATURE OF SOCIALIZATION

Talcott Parsons has quite correctly observed that in the current literature the term “socialization” is primarily used to refer to the process of child development.² Parsons agrees that the family is the single, most important institution involved in socialization.

Membership in a kinship unit and status within it is universally the primary mode of initial status ascription of the new-born infant in all known societies. Following this, a highly significant part of the socialization process almost always occurs within the kinship unit, with kinship personalities serving as strategically important socializing agents.³

But Parsons extends the concept of socialization to include “the learning of any orientations of functional significance to the operation of a system of complementary role-expectations.”⁴ He includes not just the processes by which a child learns to adjust to social life, but also adjustment by adults as well. Socialization, in this sense, goes on throughout life; child development is only a dramatic special case.

Parsons agrees with Cooley that the primary groups of childhood establish the most fundamental personality patterns. These are thought to cause the formation of what Kardiner, Linton, and others have described as the “basic personality structure.” Socialization is thought of most fundamentally as the internalization of standards learned in the interactions of people and is said to rest on special mechanisms.

The five basic mechanisms of socialization, according to Parsons, are reinforcement-extension, inhibition, substitution, imi-

² Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), p. 207.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

tation, and identification.⁵ Reinforcement-extension is the process of rewarding one type of behavior and punishing another so the first is strengthened and the second is weakened. Inhibition is learning to refrain from some action. Substitution is transferring emotion from one person to another. Imitation is the process by which specific items of culture (bits of knowledge, skill, etc.) are taken over from other persons in the course of interaction. Identification consists of taking over the values of already socialized persons.

The properties of the social situation are also thought to be important for socialization. "The socializing effect will be conceived as the integration of ego into a role complementary to that of alter(s) in such a way that the common values are internalized in ego's personality, and their respective behaviors come to constitute a complementary role-expectation-sanction system."⁶ In the case of the child-adult, the adult has some control over the situation in which the person who is being socialized acts. The basic devices at the disposal of the socializers are control over rewards and punishments, the manipulation of instruction, and the presentation of models for identification.

The capacity for learning and manipulation of the learning situation operate together, and some behavior possibilities are internalized. This may occur in varied ways.

At least the indications are very strong indeed that there is no one humanly 'normal' pattern of internalized value-orientation so that all others could be considered to be 'neurotic' deviations from it; for example some pattern of 'mature personality' *in general*.⁷

However, Parsons maintains, the particular role structure of the given society will make some patterns more frequent and fundamental than others.

We are then justified in concluding that the weight of evidence is strongly in favor of the existence and importance of an element of 'basic personality' as Kardiner has called it, which is a function of socialization in a particular type of system of role relationships with particular values.⁸

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

Although not all persons account for socialization in quite the same way, Parsons has offered a conventional account of socialization as the process by which the biological organism is transformed into a social being. This is thought to be a product of the mechanisms of learning and of the deliberate manipulation of the learning situation by already socialized persons. The most immediate product of socialization is the basic personality typical of the given society. If one takes into account the full potential of what may be involved in socialization, however, this is only a special case of the process. If one takes as *the critical element of socialization the transformation of organic materials and various non-social events into socially relevant form*, the full potential of what is comprehended by socialization may be estimated. Some illustrations may clarify this.

Sex is one of the potentially most socializing and explosive forces. Kinsey and his associates argue that about half of all married males have intercourse with women other than their wives at some time while they are married.⁹ They report, however, that the incidence of extra-marital sex experience tends to be concealed more completely than almost any other, and they attribute this to social pressures.

Considering that the legal penalties for such sexual activity are rarely enforced, and that most males feel that such activity is highly desirable and not exactly wrong, it is particularly interesting to observe this considerable disturbance of the issue. Only the fear of social (as opposed to legal) consequences can explain this reticence about extra-marital sexual performance.¹⁰

While it is customary to speak of the *regulation* of sex life, it is obvious that this is relatively superficial compared to the *socialization* of sexual activity. It is an impressive fact that around half the married males do not seek sexual satisfaction outside of marriage. Moreover, the continual drop in the number of persons from lower social levels who engage in the practice would seem to indicate that the forces operating to socialize sexual behavior continue to operate throughout life.

The apparently anomalous fact that for college males the

⁹ Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy, and Clyde E. Martin, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1949).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 585.

amount of extra-marital sexual activity goes up with advancing years is not startling, if one takes into account the fact that advancing years tend to bring the professional and business man increasing prestige, standing, and money. The professional and business man increase their social attractiveness and contacts with the females. Under such circumstances the rise in extra-marital sexuality among college males seems to be comparatively slight. One may infer that powerful forces toward the socialization of sex are also operative among college males, though this is partly offset by increased access to erotic opportunities.

According to Kinsey and his associates, "there seems to be no question but that the human male would be promiscuous in his choice of sexual partners throughout the whole of his life if there were no social restrictions."¹¹ Without the genuine socialization of sex, the socially explosive possibilities contained in undomesticated sexual activity could have a remarkably unsettling effect on social arrangements. There is good reason, thus, to extend the concept of socialization to cover the transformation of sexual behavior into socially acceptable forms. There are also good reasons for extending the concept to cover the problems of health and religion.

Among the more important institutions in which socialization is carried out are the family, religious, educational, and welfare institutions.

SUMMARY

The assumption is often unconsciously made that the mass society does not offer genuine values to its members. Moreover, so far as it has an order, that of the mass society is often thought to be external and imposed from the outside. Neither of these assumptions can be accepted without qualification. The mass society did not arise all at once as an accomplished fact, but gradually. At each stage it grew because it offered more to its members than its competitors. Moreover, while the mass society is carrying out a great liquidation of some traditional ways of life, it is building structures of its own from within.

Just as other societies have frequently been analyzed into

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 589.

component institutions, so may the mass society. Though institutions have been defined in many ways, almost every definition contains the idea that an institution represents a standardized solution to a collective problem. A number of distinctions between kinds of institutions may be made: (1) they may be divided into *primary* and *secondary*, depending on whether they directly obtain the values for which the institution exists or serve other direct institutions; (2) they may be divided into *social* and *cultural*, depending on whether the values for which the institution exists are instrumental or intrinsic, for social institutions account for *how* the members of a given society live, cultural institutions account for *why* they live; (3) social institutions may be divided into three main groups in terms of the general problems they attempt to solve: (a) socialization, (b) the mastery of nature, and (c) social control.

Socialization had traditionally *been* referred to the social transformation of behavior occurring in the course of child development. This will always remain one of the core phenomena in socialization, however, there is considerable utility in extending the concept of "socialization" to cover *all forms of the transformation of organic materials and extra-social events into socially relevant form*.

In its expanded form, *socialization* covers not only the early forms of child training but training in a much more comprehensive sense (an idea advocated by Talcott Parsons). It also covers the transformation of various extra-social phenomena into socially relevant forms. The primary institutions which in most previous societies carried out almost all critical phases of socialization in its extended conception were the *family* and *religion*.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. Discuss the proposition: the mass society arose in the United States because it was in accord with the outlook of "cheerful robots."
2. In what sense was the psychology of Henry Ford typical of the psychology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century American?
3. Discuss the proposition: the mass society arose because it embodied the ideal of economic democracy.
4. Which of the definitions of institutions listed by Hertzler do you prefer? Why?
5. How does Hertzler's own conception of institutions differ from those of most other persons?
6. Distinguish between primary and secondary institutions. Illustrate from contemporary society.
7. How do you distinguish between instrumental and intrinsic values? Of what value is this distinction for the theory of institutions?
8. What is the difference between social and cultural institutions? Illustrate from contemporary society.
9. What are the major problems that institutions are designed to solve? Illustrate.
10. What is meant by the narrower and wider concept of socialization? Of what importance is the distinction?

SOCIALIZATION: FAMILY, RELIGION, AND EDUCATION

The oldest institutions to be charged with the task of socialization are the family and religion, although they have at no time been concerned only with socialization. The farther one goes into the past, the greater the array of economic and political functions they have performed. When the family and religion begin to lose functions in the course of specialization and the formation of new communities, their socialization functions are the last to go. This may indicate how fundamental these functions are.

THE FAMILY

The review of the major forms of the American community indicated that three major contexts have competed for the integration of institutions—the rural village, the city, and the nation. In modern times the last has grown at the expense of the other two. The rural village and the city are residues of historical development.

At the time the western world was organized into village communities, the family was the primary center of the institutional order. In ancient western society the family was a closely-knit patriarchal structure serving as the primary economic unit. The land was owned privately by individual families. Most of the objects needed were manufactured in the households. The family heads served as a kind of village council; even religion was in considerable measure a family affair.

In the medieval city the family shifted from the center of the institutional order, and its place was filled by secondary economic

institutions. The family also lost a number of its other functions. The guild, for example, often served as an insurance and welfare organization as well as a semi-religious structure over and beyond its functions as an association to promote economic interests. Nevertheless, economic production was still in considerable measure a family affair. Master craftsmen took apprentices into their household workshops and hired journeymen who worked there. Sumptuary laws of the city at times even prescribed the kinds of garments that could be worn on public occasions, reserving formal symbols of prestige to special family groups. When the city was threatened by competition from economic developments on the outside, the families of the masters often turned into petty dynastic structures.

The Colonial Family. At the time of the colonization of North America, village communities were established in the northern colonies, to some extent creating conditions similar to those of the peasant village of the early Middle Ages. The forms of the European (particularly English) city were reproduced in the new world. However, since the period of city formation in the United States coincided with the rise of the American nation, the phenomena of the family of the European city were only reproduced in a fragmentary way. The family in the United States developed through two main stages: from a type accommodated to village communities to a type accommodated to the modern nation.

The American colonial family has been described by Calhoun as "a property institution dominated by middle class standards, and operating as an agency of social control in the midst of a social order governed by the interests of a forceful aristocracy which shaped religion, education, politics, and all else to its own profit."¹

Because the American colonies were predominantly Protestant and puritanical, the family was thought an institution divinely appointed to carry on economic and religious functions and to perpetuate the race; it did not exist for pleasure. Relatively stern discipline was observed in the family. The early Puritans married young; males under twenty, and girls often at sixteen. Bachelors were disapproved of and watched by the constable and other town authorities. The family was patriarchal, and women

¹ Arthur W. Calhoun, *A Social History of the American Family*, Vol. I, *The Colonial Period* (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1917), p. 10.

had only limited freedom. Moreover, women faced interminable child bearing: families of ten to twelve were usual, and families of fifteen to twenty were not uncommon. However, colonial women received somewhat greater legal protection than their English cousins, both from beating and economic exploitation.

In the colonial village communities the family was the basic economic unit. All members shared in the work. Once the land had been cleared and the home had been built, the primary division of labor was sexual between field and home work, respectively. The head of the household raised crops and fruits, saved hemp and flax seed, tended the cattle and sheep. The head of the household was his own cobbler, carpenter, and blacksmith. The work of the housewife was concentrated on the manufacture of food, clothing, table linens, bed linens, blankets, the preservation of food, the making of candles, preparation of medicinal remedies from herbs, and the making of ale and wine. If, despite the endless tasks of the home, there was a surplus of labor, the children were sent out to work. Daughters not needed at home worked in neighbors' households until they married. Many families took bound children to raise in return for their labor.

Children were educated in the home. Their industries in the home varied, but there was much work even for small children. Outside of school, their time was quite fully occupied.

The households of southern colonies differed from those of New England. The huge plantations which always tended to increase in size led to isolation. The plantation household tended to become a self-sufficient little world in which both white and slave servants performed the daily tasks under the direction of the housewife. The numerous indentured servants often included trained artisans able to manufacture implements needed on the farm. Washington, for example, possessed in Mount Vernon a self-sufficient estate with a smith, flour mill, weaving mill, and other enterprises. He employed brick makers, masons, carpenters, coopers, and shoemakers. The family of the planter was therefore able to develop into aristocratic forms somewhat similar to those of the landed aristocracy of England.²

² In addition to Calhoun's study, see Mary C. Crawford, *Social Life in Old New England* (Boston: Little Brown, 1914) and Willystine Goodsell, *A History of Marriage and the Family* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934).

The frontier home of the average yeoman was a single-story cabin built of logs and located near a creek or spring. In the attic, reached by a ladder, were rough beds of log frames with rawhide bottoms. Cooking was done over an open fireplace. The furniture was such as could be produced by axe, maul, and wedge. Mud was used in place of mortar to chink the logs.

Inside the cabins the family life . . . embraced the whole range of domestic manufactures. The frontier graveyards show how hard the early life was on the women of the family. The patriarch laid to rest in his family tract, beside two, three, or four wives who had preceded him, is much more common than the hardy woman who outlived her husbands. The housewife came to her new home young and raw, and found for neighbors other girls as inexperienced. She bore the children, and buried a staggering number of them, for medicine and sanitation, inadequate everywhere, were out of reach for the cabin on the border. She fed her men and raised her children, cooked their food and laid it by for winter. She was at once the butcher, packer, and baker. The family clothes showed her craftsmanship, with skins playing a large part, and homespun or knitting revealing a luxury established. When one adds to the grinding and unavoidable labor, the anguish that came from sickness and danger, the frontier woman who survived becomes an heroic character, and the children who felt her touch become the proper material from which to choose the heroes of a nation.³

The brutality of frontier conditions tended to bring about basic changes in the structure of the family. Those women who were lucky and strong enough to take it worked side by side with their men folk and achieved practical equality. Moreover, the dislocation of people affected the settled as well as the new areas. New England supplied a large proportion of the pioneers; many of the young and vigorous were lost to their home communities, often leaving only the extremes of the moneyed and the less vigorous and the misfits behind. In the course of moving, home ties were broken and the strength of the kinship system was weakened. Alexis de Tocqueville thought that precisely the most able were inclined to move.

³ Frederic L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1924), pp. 114-115.

The greater part of the adventurers who migrate every year to people the Western wilds belong . . . to the old Anglo-American race of the northern states. Many of these men, who rush so boldly onwards in pursuit of wealth, were already in the enjoyment of a competency in their own part of the country. They take their wives along with them and make them share the countless perils and privations that always attend the commencement of these expeditions.⁴

Meanwhile, on the frontier, where husband, wife, and children worked together to clear and establish the farm, factual equality prevailed. With new land everywhere round about, it was possible for the sons to set up on their own very early. The social distance between a father and his sons was lessened if not destroyed. As a young American approached manhood, the ties of filial obedience weakened by the day.

In America there is, strictly speaking, no adolescence; at the close of boyhood the man appears and begins to trace out his own path.⁵

At the same time the Protestantism of the settlers tended to emancipate the women.

Among almost all Protestant nations young women are far more the mistresses of their own actions than they are in Catholic countries. . . . In the United States the doctrines of Protestantism are combined with great political liberty and nowhere are young women surrendered so early or so completely to their own guidance.⁶

The extensive weakening of traditional family structure was under way by the early nineteenth century.

The Nineteenth Century Family. While on the frontier the status of women and children was rising, the industrial revolution provided the opportunities in the factories for a new kind of financial independence of women. When industry was transferred from the family to the factory, the women and children who had performed the work while it remained in the home, followed this work to the factory. In Lowell, Massachusetts, for example, mill owners introduced the policy of paying young women employees

⁴ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1954), Vol. II, p. 214.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

two dollars a week and boarding them in company houses. Widows, spinsters, and young unmarried women, who would previously have been dependent on relatives, were able to pay their own way. The movement of women outside the home soon came to include the women of the middle classes, who became sales persons, clerks, typists, teachers, and the like. The era of the patriarchal family neared its end. The conditions of the frontier and industrialization of the east cooperated in the emancipation of women and children.

Increased opportunities for higher education paralleled the opening of industrial careers for women. In 1865 Vassar College was founded; the University of Michigan was made co-educational in 1870. The movement toward woman suffrage soon got under way.

The Family in the Twentieth Century. The deterioration of the family as an authority structure and as a productive economic activity went hand in hand. The relation of the family to the larger economy was increasingly contractual, established by one or more members.⁷ The modern family is not self-sufficient, though it is expected to be self-supporting. Individuals in our society derive their income in one of three ways: through contract, through civil status, and through family status. Men are still the primary breadwinners. The husband was the sole earner in three-fifths of the households with wage earners in 1949; only 8 per cent of the married men at the time were not in the labor force.

MARRIED MEN (WIFE PRESENT) IN THE LABOR FORCE *

Age	Per Cent in Labor Force
Under 25	95
25-34	98
35-44	99
45-64	94
65 and over	52
All	92

* U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-50, no. 22; Kyrk, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁷ Hazel Kyrk, *The Family in the American Economy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 12.

MARRIED WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE *

<i>Household Status of Husband</i>	<i>Per Cent in Labor Force</i>	
Husband present		22
Husband head of household	22	
Husband not head of household	33	
Husband absent		46
All		24

* *Ibid.*, p. 65.

Economically the family today is a consumption rather than a production unit. It could not possibly retain the old type of authority structure in the face of such changes.

As its economic and authority structure is weakened and changed, the family is increasingly reduced to the immediate conjugal unit of husband, wife, and minor children. The kinship structure important to the wider society can most easily be determined by what its taboos and laws protect. Incest taboos and the laws protect this unit; and marriage of father, mother, children, grandparents, uncle, aunt, niece, and nephew are forbidden everywhere.⁸ Almost exclusive emphasis is placed on the conjugal unit. Marriage is monogamous, and though the family name descends through the male line, descent is bilineal; thus the respective lines have equal claim on the conjugal unit so far as they have claims on it at all. The emphasis is on the immediate conjugal family which forms the basis of residence, consumption, and social action. This tends to increase the number of households and decrease the size of the families occupying them.

HOUSEHOLD POPULATIONS, 1890-1950 *

<i>Date</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Population per Household</i>
1790	557,889	5.79
1850	3,598,240	5.55
1900	15,964,965	4.76
1950	39,303,000	3.60

* U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the U.S., 1789-1945; Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1957*, pp. 46-47.

⁸ Chester Vernier and Fred Weller, *American Family Laws* (Stanford University Press, 1932), Vol. I, pp. 173 ff.

The pioneer married young because that was how he became economically effective. During the nineteenth century, as it became more expensive to set up a household, the age of marriage rose. The median age at marriage is, however, falling once again.

MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE *

Year	Male	Female
1890	26.1	22.0
1910	25.1	21.6
1930	24.3	21.3
1950	22.7	20.3

* U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports: Population Characteristics*, Series P-20, no. 38.

The ties of kinship and locality no longer firmly hold the American family in a specific geographic and social space. The conjugal unit enjoys an ever-increasing autonomy. Even when parents are asked to sanction the marriage choice, their judgment is often sought only as a formality. Marriage choices are comparatively free within an open system of competition. Personal satisfaction often becomes an almost exclusive preoccupation of the marriage partners.

The popular romantic love complex may be a potent force in breaking down traditional sex mores. While it tends to confine sex within marriage, it also creates a situation in which marriage has no meaning when love is gone. Romantic love completes itself in marriage and, as quickly, the loss of love in divorce—creating the situation sometimes described as “serial polygamy.”

In 1946 marriages reached the all time record of nearly 2,300,000. However, with 600,000 divorces more than one-fourth as many people were divorced as were married that year. A survey in 1949 revealed that three-fourths of those divorced in the preceding five years had re-married.⁹ The divorce rate in 1950 was 2.6 per 1,000 compared to a marriage rate of 10.4 per 1,000. The divorce rates have risen from five per cent of the marriages in 1880 to ten per cent by 1920, and to twenty-five per cent in recent times.

⁹ Paul C. Glick, “First Marriages and Remarriages,” *American Sociological Review*, December, 1949, pp. 726-734.

The forces that foster the romantic love complex and encourage a rising divorce rate tend to lower fertility. However, fertility is not lowered equally in all social strata. The studies of differential fertility, which were begun in the late 1920's and early 1930's, have led students to expect a roughly inverse relation of fertility to social class.¹⁰ When differential fertility was first discovered, it was viewed with serious alarm by a variety of eugenicists, demographers, and sociologists,¹¹ who were convinced that precisely the best elements of modern society were comparatively declining because of under-reproduction. Attention has increasingly been directed toward explanations of differential fertility.¹² While social economic status, economic security, religious interest, and personal adequacy have been advanced to explain differential fertility, Westoff is of the conviction that it is primarily related to the social and psychological implications of social mobility. The typical couple involved in vertical mobility, he argues, maintains a rationality of behavior, competitive effort, careerism, psychological insecurity, and exhaustion of nervous and physical energy.

The theoretical extension of these assumptions for differential fertility would be that social class differences in fertility planning and differential fertility itself are related to the differential frequency of socio-economic ambitions and social mobility within and between class levels—the middle classes exhibiting the clearest manifestation of this type of 'atmosphere' and having the lowest fertility.¹³

All of these studies seem to show that precisely where the modern mass society operates most directly on family structure, the decline in fertility is most extensive.

The two basic functions that are left to the family are the socialization of sex and the socialization of the early phases of

¹⁰ Charles F. Westoff, "The Changing Focus of Differential Fertility Research: The Social Mobility Hypothesis," in *Population Theory and Policy*, ed. by Jos. J. Spengler and Otis Dudley Duncan (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 400 ff.

¹¹ See E. M. Elderton and Others, *Eugenics Laboratory Memoirs*, XVIII (London: Dulau & Co., 1913).

¹² Roderich von Ungern-Sternberg, "The Causes of the Decline in the Birthrate within the European Sphere of Civilization," *Eugenics Research Association* (New York, 1931); Ronald Freedman and P. K. Whelpton, "Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, XXIX, no. 2, April, 1951).

¹³ Westoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 404-405.

childhood. To some extent these cut against one another and the extent to which there are no children increases the degree to which affective and sexual satisfaction alone will determine the continuation of the marriage. Marriages that break up usually do so in the first few years, when the couples are more likely to be childless and to a far greater extent among those who are childless. The peak of divorce occurs in the first four years of marriage. At its height it is about 15 per 1,000 among couples with children; it is 44 per 1,000 among couples with no children. As families grow smaller on the one hand and the age at which the children are moved outside the family for formal socialization is lowered, sexual and affective factors gain in importance.

Within the family, the father's role is residual. Less and less he appears as a point around which other members can form emotional ties. Gorer has taken the position that the critical reference point in American emotional and moral life is the internalized figure of an "encapsulated mother."¹⁴ Wylie has denounced a complex in America that he describes as "momism."¹⁵ The role of the woman in American society is thought by these students to be such as to create a "feminine" conscience in individuals.

RELIGION

Religion has been described as the social institution that transforms various extra-community phenomena and communal tensions not resolved by other means into socially acceptable forms. When it is fully developed, a religion may comprise a system of ethics, a scheme of ideas and beliefs, a system of ritual, and a set of organizational forms. A religious ethic may organize the relations of people to one another (father-son, husband-wife, friends, brothers, etc.) as well as man's relation to various supernatural beings. The theology may comprise an extensive set of propositions from the ultimate meaning, origin, end of life, to the proper path to salvation, in which religious rituals are components in a religiously correct way of life. The social-organizational principles (with leaders, modes of organization, provisions for meeting, etc.) are essential for the maintenance of the ethic, for training, for perpetuation, clarification, and defense of the the-

¹⁴ Geoffrey Gorer, *The American People* (New York: Norton, 1940).

¹⁵ Philip Wylie, *Generation of Vipers* (New York: Rinehart, 1942).

ology, and for performance of the rituals and the various activities of the church, sect, cult, or ecclesia as the case may be.

Some of the problems that men face—such as death or the hazards of nature—are universal. Others vary with the state of technology and the measure of mastery over nature; still others vary with the state of science—with an understanding of the nature of the heavenly bodies, the knowledge and control over disease, and the like. The content of religion therefore varies with the state of science and technology. Another source of variation flows from the social foundations of the problem of “evil.” Frustrations arise in every society from the difficulty of cramming human materials into the prescribed social forms of the time. Societies often generate explosive forces for which no release is available. In one form or another, techniques for dealing with such frustrations are always a part of religion, though not always in the form of a concept of “sin.” Since no two societies generate the same types of tensions; religion is culturally relative.

The religion of a peasant village community tends to be adapted to the organic cycle of nature, to the consideration of those natural hazards of weather and climate that may affect harvests. Rituals intended to secure fertility are prominent. The plant world often assumes especial religious meaning, and the religious calendar is adjusted to the growing season. An organic conception of man and nature occurs with great frequency in a religious scheme punctuated by orgiastic fertility cults and ritualistic dramas of death and re-birth.

In the ancient city radical departures from the traditional fertility cults of the rural husbandman occurred. A syncretism of religious forms symbolically expressed a new kind of social integration. Sky cults sometimes displaced rural earth cults; religious beliefs underwent a sublimation, development, and specialization; specialized religious figures appeared; religious structures became more elaborate, more formal, and more richly endowed. Religion had to change when it adapted itself to the city.

An illustration of religious adaptation to changing social requirements was the relation, traced by Max Weber, between ascetic Protestantism and the rise of capitalism.¹⁶ Protestantism

¹⁶ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), trans. by Talcott Parsons.

changed some of the features of traditional Christianity: in place of the traditional conception of religiously determined fate the far more legalistic conception of predestination appeared. Protestantism modified the sacramental theory of the church, individualizing the relation of the individual to God. The doctrine of original sin establishing the evil of the individual to begin with was given a new intensity. Only those whom God had chosen, the elect, were saved. Those whom he had chosen would behave in a religiously proper way. The individual, because of his original sin and failures in the course of his own life conduct, could never be sure he was among the elect. Only by exemplary conduct could he reassure himself that he was possibly included. The whole of his behavior was suddenly transformed into a field of religious strategy requiring of him sobriety in dress, act, and deed; hard work in the position God's predestination had cast him; the treating of success as evidence of proper performance of one's calling; the inability to spend the surplus of one's labor on frivolous things, hence, saving and the need to put surplus earnings back into one's occupation or business. The ethic of inner-worldly asceticism has been argued by Weber to be one of the contributing causes of the psychology of capitalism.

Protestantism made its strongest original gains in the European city; the country tended to remain Catholic. The richest original field of recruitment for Protestantism was among the middle classes, particularly the new urban social strata in whose behavior a revolution of the medieval economy was being brought about. In its rationalization of religious behavior, in its liquidation of traditional forms, in its shift away from the sacramental theory of the church and dependence on the priesthood, in its modification of the traditional religious prescriptions against usury, Protestantism was adapted to the non-rural ways of life that were developing in post-medieval Europe.

Christianity was not only modified to suit the needs of the city, but to suit the needs of the state as well. One can, in fact, use the emergence of the national religions as a fairly accurate index of the growth of national feeling in Europe,¹⁷ for they were both effect and cause of nationalism. Some groups, like the German

¹⁷ Boyd C. Shafer, *Nationalism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951), pp. 81 ff.

Pietists, simply transferred their loyalty from the church to the nation. Luther (1483-1546) preached the supremacy of the state over the church, a doctrine which endeared him to the German princes. Wycliff advocated a national church, and the Hussites of Bohemia identified the religious with the national cause. The same pattern of identifications (religion and nationalism) appears in the Puritan revolt against royal Catholic absolutism in England in the seventeenth century. And though Henry VIII broke with Rome more on personal than on national grounds, the effect was an enhancement of the relation between nationalism and religion. The national churches employed the vernacular in sermons, ritual, and hymns. A similar process of adaptation of religion to the state occurred in Roman Catholic countries. In France Philip the Fair quarreled with Pope Boniface VIII (1294-1303) and denied the papal authority in a number of areas. He finally went so far as to establish a French pope at Avignon. Whenever the link between the nation and religion was established, national consciousness was promoted. The typical way a nation adapted itself to religion in Europe was to press some version (Protestant or Catholic) toward national ends, establishing a national church.

Religion in Colonial America. In the colonial period a considerable number of the English forms of Protestantism were established in North America: Church of England people were dominant in the South; Separatists formed the Congregational churches of New England; Presbyterians from Scotland and northern Ireland spread gradually from New Jersey and Pennsylvania to the back country; Quakers and German pacifists were of some moment in Pennsylvania. In the colonial period there were only a few Roman Catholics (in Maryland), and fewer Jews. By the time of the Revolution, Deism from enlightened circles in England and France had spread to equivalent strata in America.

One of the most important processes in the religious life of the colonies was the modification of the more somber features of the Protestant psychology. Those forms of Protestantism in which the kinds of ethics, outlook, and psychology frequently taken as peculiar to Protestantism were most intense, had been almost completely adapted to city life in Europe. In the colonial areas of the New World, something almost inevitably had to change. One could almost say, that only to the degree that it was possible

to set up closed urban communities of the contemporary European type would it have been possible fully to realize the key features of the European Protestant sects. New England, in particular, thus became a kind of experimental laboratory of transplanted Protestantism.

There was considerable difference between the small band of Separatists (Pilgrim Fathers) who founded Plymouth in 1620 and the larger company which colonized Massachusetts Bay in 1629 (the Puritans). The Pilgrims were plebian in origin, two-thirds consisting of men who wanted to make a new start in life; they were social misfits who had been unable to make a living or who were at odds with the law. The Plymouth colony marked a new beginning of democracy in both church and state.

Nine years after the arrival of the *Mayflower* at Plymouth, a fresh colonization reached Salem in Massachusetts Bay. These were Puritans, who had found the yoke of Archbishop Laud and Charles I intolerable and who announced their freedom from English communion. They were urban types—squires, merchants, university graduates, yomen, and tradesmen—who soon evolved a totalitarian religious regime synthesizing church and state and modeled on the Old Testament. The Bay colony of the Puritans developed rapidly, increasing to 20,000 in ten years. It was soon on the way toward theocratic closure. In May, 1631, the General Court of Legislature of Massachusetts limited the franchise to members of the new Puritan church. Since admission of communicants was in the hands of the pastors, they controlled the government. Public taxation for the support of religion was introduced. John Cotton did not consider democracy a fit government for either the church or the commonwealth. As all the affairs of the commonwealth were increasingly consolidated into the hands of a narrow theologically inclined oligarchy, discontent was soon manifest.

Thomas Hooker, associated with John Cotton as co-moderator of the Cambridge Synod, had no sympathy with the oligarchical ideals of the minister and magistrates. He led a group of free men to the Connecticut river in 1636, and founded Hartford. Other congregations migrated from Massachusetts (such as Dorchester and Watertown) and cooperated to form a federation of free towns safely distant from the Boston theocrats.

A separation of religious tendencies was occurring, and on its home grounds intolerance grew more concentrated. In 1638 the Cambridge Synod catalogued 82 unsafe opinions varying from errors to blasphemy. No Anglican dared to practice his religion in the Bay colony; dissenters and Quakers were unsafe in New England. Conformity and exile were the only alternatives to mutilation, branding, and scourging. Even Quaker women were flogged from town to town, and the Baptists were vigorously persecuted. In July, 1635, Roger Williams was summoned before the General Court and charged with erroneous and dangerous opinions, beginning a series of conflicts with the authorities leading to the founding of a new colony at Rhode Island, for which he sought a charter in 1643. Rhode Island soon became a haven for all persecuted sects. In the minds of many students the experiments of Thomas Hooker and Roger Williams became the starting points for the distinctive political and religious policy in the United States.

There was room in the colonial environment for the clarification of religious tendencies. The moment theocratic control became too oppressive, it was possible for the recalcitrants to leave the communities that persecuted them and form communities of their own. As the dissenters left, the tyrants were free to practice their arts on each other. The time was certain to come when members of a community under exclusive dominance of its crabbed theocrats began to cast envious eyes on the freedom enjoyed elsewhere. Moreover, it was not easy to maintain a pessimistic conception of either human nature or the human situation. Pessimism arises from a balked disposition and a hopeless outlook. There was not much excuse for an attitude of hopelessness neither economically nor socially. Even the victim of the most violent religious persecution had only to migrate and form a community of his own to be free. In Europe all hopes for economic independence tended to rest on land and possession of one's own. In the new world there was an untouched wilderness to be exploited.

The Great Awakening was the first major spiritual movement in the colonies that overflowed the boundaries of the separate sections, unifying the whole. It set in motion an intensive sectarian spirit ever after typical of America. The excesses to which

revivalism could lead soon became evident in New England, where James Davenport, the great grandson of the founder of New Haven, abandoned his own parish in Long Island and roamed throughout New England denouncing the regular Congregational clergy as unconverted and calling upon the people to burn their luxuries. Jonathan Edwards found it necessary to explain fainting, convulsions, morbid terror, and other phenomena of mass hysteria generated by his sermons. Even after the revival was gradually discredited in the eastern cities, it spread like wild fire on the frontier. The Baptists, starting as a small sect with the Sandy Creek Association (1760) soon overran Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Whole communities were converted with intense excitement during mass immersions in the streams. When the Great Awakening began to weaken it received a fresh impetus through Methodist preachers, who began to come from England in 1766. The Great Awakening began with the Calvinism of Whitefield and Edwards, but ended with the pietism of Methodism. By this time religion in America had been permanently changed. Its more somber forms would not again dominate.

Drummond has observed that the Great Awakening was a component in the success of the American Revolution, for it promoted a common consciousness among Americans from Virginia to Massachusetts. "The revival spread like a flood over the thirteen provinces . . . sweeping away old traditions, stimulating independence and enthusiasm."¹⁸

The Revolution ended the dependence of the American denominations on European ecclesiastical authorities.

Gone was the link that bound the Episcopalians to the Bishop of London and the Roman Catholics to the Vicar Apostolic of London. John Wesley could no longer count on the unquestionable obedience of that nominally Anglican Society. . . . The Dutch and German Reformed had to reorganize as American churches. The Lutherans were henceforth bound only by sentiment and fellowship to Halle Pietism. The Presbyterians . . . now rose to the status of a nation-wide American Church.¹⁹

¹⁸ Andrew Landale Drummond, *A History of American Protestantism* (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1949).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.

During the Revolution the only possibility for the colonists to get together in the common struggle with England was in the formal observance of the principle of toleration. Deism rose to temporary importance among the revolutionary leaders, adding a note of rational clarity at a time when it was particularly needed. The new state disestablished the church in those colonies where it had been established. The principle of state support of religion was also renounced. In the nature of the case, the dissenting sects automatically assumed more importance, and the basis was laid for the emergence of the characteristic features of American Protestantism.

American Protestantism. Despite the preservation of some formal features of ascetic Protestantism and formal adherence to the pessimistic doctrines of the evil of man, corruption of the world, and damnation, religion in the United States tends to be optimistic. This is true both for fundamentalism (derived from seventeenth century Puritanism and eighteenth century pietistic Methodism) and liberalism. Fundamentalism, resting on the literal interpretation of the Bible, produced its most dramatic resistance to modernism in 1925, when at Dayton, Tennessee, William Jennings Bryan and Clarence Darrow engaged in a legal duel over the right of a Tennessee school teacher to teach evolution.

The points of regional strength of the various Protestant groups reflect the development of the country. In New England the descendants of the original Puritans (Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and Unitarians) are strong; the Quakers are strong in Pennsylvania. The Baptists are strong in the South; the Methodists in the Middle West and South; and the Lutherans (both German and Scandinavian) in the Middle West. The Episcopalians and Presbyterians have been prominent in very top strata of American society. The Presbyterians have had unusually great influence on education. However, the primary character of American Protestantism has been determined by the Baptists and Methodists.

Periodic revivalism and the multiplication of sects has tended to characterize American Protestantism from the days of the Great Awakening to Billy Sunday and Billy Graham. Throughout the nineteenth century whenever new sect movements arose and came into conflict with existing forms, they tended to move west.

This was true of the two primary religious movements of specifically American origin—that of Joseph Smith (Mormonism) and that of Mary Baker Eddy (Christian Science).

American Catholicism. Though there were elements of widely scattered Catholicism in the New World in colonial times, ranging from the See of Baltimore to the Spanish in Florida and the Southwest, the early Catholics on the Atlantic seaboard tended to be swallowed up in a predominant Protestant environment.²⁰ However, the French were popular in the Revolutionary War and Irish revolutionary immigrants were active in the early nineteenth century. Bishop England was able to promote the *Catholic Miscellany* (1823), the first real Roman Catholic newspaper in the United States. The basic changes in the Catholic church in the nineteenth century were to begin in the 1840's, when Catholics began to arrive in great numbers (with the flood of Irish and German peasants from the Old World). Since many of the newcomers did not speak English, they appeared very definitely foreign, giving American Catholicism its foreign coloration. Theological debates broke out in Protestant circles over whether Catholicism was compatible with civil and religious liberty, and other forms of conflict were not long in appearing.

In the nineteenth century there were major additions of identifiably foreign persons of humble origin to the growing Catholic Church. By the 1850's the distinctive pattern of American Catholicism was to emerge: state laws began to permit the Catholic bishops to hold church property; chancery offices were organized; and a variety of orphanages, hospitals, and homes for wayward girls developed. The predominantly urban character of American Catholicism was set from the beginning, as peasant Catholic masses formed immigrant colonies in the cities.

Inasmuch as the Catholic peasant masses had come in response to the demands of American industrialists, the labor movement of America was to assume a Catholic character. In the 1870's less than ten per cent of industrial and business leaders were Catholic. By 1880 Catholic efforts within the Knights of

²⁰ Henry J. Browne, "A History of the Catholic Church in the United States," *The Catholic Church, U.S.A.*, ed. by Louis J. Putz (Chicago: Fides Publishers Ass'n, 1956), p. 24.

Labor were important for the development of practical trade unionism. Catholicism adapted itself to American society, and has been proud of its wealth, its churches, the modernity of its schools and convents. It has pursued its peculiar moral and religious emphasis, being particularly active in defense of the family and opposed to birth control and sterilization; it has maintained its own schools. John J. Wright maintains that Catholicism became definitely American only after 1914, when bilingualism began to disappear from Catholic circles.²¹ He maintains that American Catholicism is unique in that it is not induced but is the exercised choice of American Catholics; it is activist rather than contemplative; and it is shaped in a peculiarly American way.²²

American Judaism. Since 1654, when twenty-three Jews landed in New Amsterdam, around 3,000,000 Jews have entered the United States.²³ The great flood of immigrants began in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Weinryb feels that it is still fair to accept the tripartite division of Jewish immigration: the Sephardic (descendants of Jews from Spain and Portugal) immigration during colonial times until 1815, the German-Jewish immigration from 1815 to 1880, and the east European immigration since 1880.

Each of these migrations tended to undergo internal restructuring under American conditions and to display phenomena similar to those of other American religious groups. According to the study by Howard Polsky, only a minority of the members of Orthodox synagogues personally carry out the basic requirements of Jewish law.²⁴ The strength of Orthodoxy seems most intense in the larger communities and is best preserved in the cities of the middle Atlantic and New England region. In larger communities there are several possible Jewish formations: non-traditional congregations can be founded as Reform or Conservative synagogues or as splinter groups. There are, thus, parallels to the Protestant divisions into Fundamentalism and Liberalism.

²¹ In Putz, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²³ Bernard D. Weinryb, "Jewish Immigration and Accommodation to America," in *The Jews*, ed. by Marshall Sklare (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), p. 4.

²⁴ Howard W. Polsky, "A Study of Orthodoxy in Milwaukee: Social Characteristics, Beliefs, and Observances," in Sklare, *op. cit.*, pp. 325 ff.

In response to the loss of traditional authority the American rabbi tends to turn into a religious specialist.²⁵

American Religion in the Twentieth Century. Herbert Schneider maintains that a number of institutional changes are occurring in contemporary churches: Institutional churches with urban congregations have a typical set of features: special staff, recreation facilities, club rooms, kitchens, and schools. They do settlement work, and provide professional social services; they even do psychiatric counseling, and run employment services.²⁶ At the opposite extreme are the store-front churches, mission rooms for evangelism, and impromptu charities. Church boards and administrative agencies have been consolidated for missions, social action, education, evangelism, and even the relocation of displaced persons. There has been a great expansion of youth associations for fellowship, recreation, and religious education. Organized on a non-denominational basis are such organizations as the Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., Y.M.H.A., B'nai B'rith, Christian Endeavor Society, and the Student Volunteer Movement. The educational work of religious bodies now includes all phases of education from elementary school work to university work. There are many associations and endowments for religious education, and for discussion and planning of religious programs in schools. Religious presses and publicity are now on a professional basis. Religious lobbies have been established by the larger churches, and some inter-faith bodies have paid lobbies which function as political pressure groups. Finally, inter-faith and international organizations have been established to defend religion against secularism.

In 1952, when the Roman Catholic Church reported a membership of more than 30,000,000, the Protestant churches reported more than 54,000,000 members. *The Yearbook of American Churches* for 1951 reported that there were 268 religious bodies with 284,592 places of worship. There were fifty-three churches with reported memberships of over 100,000 persons.

²⁵ Saul H. Mendlovitz, "The American Rabbi: A Religious Specialist Responds to the Loss of Authority," in Sklare, *op. cit.*, pp. 377 ff.

²⁶ Herbert Wallace Schneider, *Religion in 20th Century America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 24 ff.

RELIGIOUS GROUP MEMBERSHIP *

<i>Group</i>	<i>Membership in Millions</i>
Protestant	58.4
Roman Catholic	33.4
Jewish	5.5

* *Yearbook of American Churches*, 1957, p. 250.

PROTESTANT GROUP MEMBERSHIP *

<i>Religious Body</i>	<i>Membership in Millions</i>
Baptist	18.8
Methodist	11.9
Lutheran	7.1
Presbyterian	3.9
Protestant Episcopal	2.8

* *Ibid.*, pp. 298 ff.

Of the Protestant bodies, the Baptists remain the largest. The same phenomena manifest in the multiplication of sects in American religious history appear in the adjustment of religion to class at present.

RELIGION AND CLASS MEMBERSHIP *

<i>Body</i>	<i>Upper Class</i>	<i>Middle Class</i>	<i>Lower Class</i>
Roman Catholic	8.7	24.7	66.6
Methodist	12.7	35.6	51.7
Baptist	8.0	24.0	68.0
Presbyterian	21.9	40.0	38.1
Protestant (smaller bodies)	10.0	27.3	62.7
Lutheran	10.9	36.1	53.0
Episcopal	24.1	33.7	42.2
Jewish	21.8	32.0	46.2
No preference	13.3	26.0	60.7
Protestant, undesignated	12.4	24.1	63.5
Christian	10.0	35.4	54.6
Congregational	23.9	42.6	33.5
Latter Day Saints (Mormons)	5.1	28.6	66.3
Christian Science	24.8	36.5	38.7
Reformed	19.1	31.3	49.6
Atheist: Agnostic	33.3	46.7	20.0

* Liston Pope, "Religion and Class Structure," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1948, p. 256.

In considerable measure the social situation to which other religious forms had to adapt were fixed in the United States by Protestantism. To some extent other religions have had to assume its form to be effective. The problem of church and state was solved in the United States by separation. This has guaranteed the multiplication of sects, but it has also led to a situation in which religion could adapt to a multiplicity of local needs.

EDUCATION

In simple communities, health, welfare, and education are rarely separated from the family and religion. The pre-requisite for this is a division of labor in the original institutions of socialization. Only in the city and the contemporary national community has this separation occurred to any extensive degree.

An extensive restructuring of the institutions of socialization has been in progress and is characterized by a relocation of the point of gravity from primary institutions of socialization to the secondary ones. Socialization has been defined broadly enough to comprise not only the education of the young but all forms of the transformation of non-social behaviors and events into social form. However, these ancient institutions of socialization—the family and religion—have tended to lose functions.

Perhaps the most fundamental of all forms of socialization is the transforming of the young into social beings. Upon its success depends the entire continuity of society. To some extent every institution carries out its peculiar phase of the socialization of its members. Until recently, however, this was particularly the responsibility of the family and the church. They still retain some functions, but education has increasingly moved into this sphere.

An extensive study of education in early societies has been made by Thomas Woody.²⁷ Education, in his opinion, may be thought of as formal or informal, theoretical or practical, mental or physical and practical, but all this tends to change in more highly developed civilizations. In Egypt the movement from primitive life to civilization was accompanied by a great expansion of formal and intellectual education: writing had been invented, the keeping of records became a special profession, formal

²⁷ Thomas Woody, *Life and Education in Early Societies* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949).

education became bookish and a special source of power. The priests had a practical monopoly on the domain of learning which they reserved to themselves and the near relatives of their benefactors.²⁸

Formal education was extensively developed in Mesopotamia, where in addition to elementary reading, writing, and religion, advanced studies were conducted in law, medicine, and astrology. Education was the prerogative of the upper classes. The schools, taught by priests and scribes, were operated in association with the temple libraries. Their monopoly on writing gave the priestly trained scholars access to work as copyists, secretaries, lawyers, librarians, teachers, public clerks, and officials.²⁹

In the cities of classical Greece education became a function of the city community. In Sparta all education was for the soldier, with little attention paid to intellectual life.³⁰ In Athens, as in Sparta, education became an affair of the city state, but the difference in atmosphere made possible a more generous concept of education. It was addressed to the ideal of state service and inspired by a concept of the harmony of mental, physical, aesthetic, and moral development. There was a cleavage between the liberal education of the citizens and the practical training of non-citizens compelled to do ignoble work.³¹ The Palaestra and gymnasium became centers of training for professional athletes instead of citizen soldiers as in Sparta. In Rome education became more private and aristocratic than in Greece.

As a society becomes more complex, education must become more specialized. Formal, bookish, or literary education seems first to have arisen in connection with the temples, where writing was invented. Writing was originally a priestly monopoly, hence, when various sorts of writing skills became advantageous for the conduct of secular administration the priestly trained clerks had a virtual monopoly over official positions requiring literary skills. Early societies did not require any considerable number of scribes, clerks, and officials. The priests and officials had every reason to keep access to these positions, including the formal and intellec-

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 83 ff.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 287 ff.

tual education for them, as a relatively restricted monopoly. At the same time, the need by secular administration for officials with training as clerks, accountants, librarians, correspondents, and the like could, on occasion, lead to politically supported education. It was one way for secular government to free itself from dependence on the temple. Athens and Sparta demonstrated the possibility of a state-supported education available to all citizens, even though such citizens were comparatively few in proportion to the total population. In most places and times formal and intellectual education was conducted in close association with religion. When in the medieval world the church was one of the few guardians of writing culture, this was only a recent example of an ancient association.

In the medieval and post-medieval world there were an increasing number of social contexts demanding more specialized, more literary, and more formal educations. The administration of the church required an army of clerks, officials, librarians, lawyers, and copyists. In the growing cities there were increasing numbers of positions for persons skilled in administration, law, finance, correspondence, and the like. At a time when the majority of persons in the country, regardless of class, was illiterate, the cities often operated schools and enjoyed rather high levels of literacy. Protestantism was also a force for more literary education, not only because of its greater emphasis on an individual orientation toward the Scriptures and individual ability to read them, but because of the propaganda battle waged by its pamphleteers. Counter propaganda in Roman Catholic ranks, in turn, operated in a similar manner for its adherents. Particularly important in creating positions for which persons with specialized educations were required were the rising states. They required an ever growing army of officials and bureaucrats with specialized talents. The same was true of new forms of economic activity that came to be described in time as capitalism. After 1800 the full effects of nationalism and capitalism on the structure of education became manifest.

In the opinion of Rugg and Withers, there were really no people's schools until 1800.³² Such formal education as was given

³² Harold Rugg and William Withers, *Social Foundations of Education* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1955), p. 479.

the people of Europe was ordinarily confined to children of the upper classes and was under the control of the church. Even when the new humanistic secondary school (the Latin grammar school) developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it was restricted to a few hand-picked youths and was narrowly vocational, preparing individuals for posts in the church or in government. The Protestant revolts created religious elementary schools, but rarely went beyond providing more learning than enough to read the Orthodox Catechism and the New Testament with some elementary training in the three "Rs." The first real step toward universal, compulsory, and tax-supported education was taken by the benevolent despots of the eighteenth century. Freedom of speech and press was somewhat extended and national systems of education established under the state were envisioned. New universities were created. Science, modern languages, and a fuller program in the humanities was projected. The next step was taken in the educational revolution in France, where the ground work for a new conception of education had been laid by the philosophers: Montesquieu (1689-1755), Voltaire (1694-1778), Diderot (1713-1784), Condorcet (1743-1794), Rousseau (1712-1778), Pestalozzi (1746-1827), and Fellenberg (1771-1844). All had given thought to the problem of educating the masses. Rousseau's *Emile* (1762) was the most discussed book on education in the eighteenth century. Pestalozzi's *Leonard and Gertrude* (1781), reporting his experiments on educating beggar and orphaned children was to become a classic in educational method. A firm foundation had been laid for the idea born in the course of the new nationalistic fervor of the French Revolution of the nation in the public schools. The movement toward modern public education was under way before the birth of the United States as an autonomous state.

The few schools in existence in America in 1800 were primarily for the well-to-do who were destined by birth to enter the professions and fill positions of leadership. There were two types of secondary school—the Latin grammar school, and the academy. The grammar school was preparatory for college of which there were only nine in America. They were "class" schools financed in part by public taxation. The academy which developed in reaction to the grammar schools emphasized modern languages,

mathematics, and science. Shortly after 1820 the structure of the national system of schools, colleges, and technical institutions including "normal" schools for teacher education was created, largely on the initiative of individuals of local communities, though the federal government played a part in the development by providing sources of revenue to be set aside for education in the individual states. It did not otherwise take the initiative.

Public education was rapidly substituted for sectarian education. In 1850 there were still 6,000 private academies, and only 600 free public high schools. By 1900 there were 1,300 academies, and 7,000 free public high schools. By 1914 the number of public high schools had increased to 12,000. The first normal schools were established in Massachusetts (1839) and Pennsylvania (1848). By 1900 there were 170.

The graded school was partly copied from the current Prussian plan of the early nineteenth century. By 1890 the physical structure of a national system of schools and colleges had been constructed: a twelve-grade educational ladder divided into an eight-grade elementary and four-year secondary; free tax-supported public education with universal elementary and secondary education and even higher education at public expense.

The public school system is supported by general taxation and is open to all pupils without payment. Since the taxation primarily falls on real property, there are occasional conflicts between larger property holders and other groups of the community. Moreover, since some religious groups wish to maintain their own schools, there is resistance to the tax-supported schools. However, the general faith of Americans in tax-supported education is evidenced in its growth since 1890, when the national system was still schematic. Every one of the 18,000 chartered communities and 100,000 school districts has schools. From 1900 to 1950 the enrollment in schools increased from 15 to 34 million, secondary school enrollment increased from 500,000 to 5,600,000, and the number of high school graduates increased from 71,000 to over 1,000,000. From 1945-1946 private school enrollment was only eleven per cent of elementary, and nine per cent of secondary enrollment.

Until the present century, financial support of the schools has primarily been by local government, and there is still little cen-

tralized development of the school system. However, state (rather than local) financing has been increasing. The states' share of appropriations for public schools increased from around 20 per cent to around 35 per cent of the total from 1931 to 1946. Federal support of education has also been increasing. In 1862 the Morrill Act supported state agricultural colleges. Federal agencies have developed extensive in-service training programs. Military and other agencies operate colleges and universities. Federal expenditures on education total several billion dollars a year.

The development of higher education has been spectacular. At the time Washington was inaugurated as president, there were only nine colleges in the country. In 1950 there were 1,851 institutions of higher education. Almost two-thirds were degree-granting colleges, universities, and independent professional schools.

SUMMARY

The effects of the mass society on the traditional institutions of socialization (the family and religion) are largely to shatter their control over socialization. In contemporary American society the family is increasingly cut away from other institutions and reduced to the small conjugal form. The family's functions have largely been reduced to the socialization of sex and the control over the very early phases of child development. As the family has grown increasingly responsive primarily to the affective needs of its members, it has come to be dominated by the romantic complex, a phenomena tied to the increasing popularity of both marriage and divorce. The family has also seemed to find its most solid emotional core in the relation of mother and child.

The patterns of American religion were originally established by the transplanted Protestant sects of Northern Europe, particularly England. The multiplicity of sects was such that one of the few principles that could make conjoint action possible in the colonies was the rigorous separation of church and state. The more somber forms of the Protestant ethic were not adapted to the American environment. Even in the eighteenth century American religious life showed a displacement in the direction of more pietistic and optimistic forms with a proclivity to evangelical

revivalism which was to remain characteristic for more than a century.

Catholicism became a major component in American religious life only after the 1840's. Particularly after the Civil War the influx of peasant Catholic masses led to the emergence of American Catholicism primarily as an urban phenomena. Catholicism readily adapted itself to the American environment. Though there was some element of Judaism present even before the American Revolution, it became a significant component in American religious life only after the 1880's. Judaism, too, has developed distinctive forms in the American environment. The lack of an official religion gives all religious forms a sect-like tone (as voluntary structures self-chosen rather than automatic by birth).

No religious group is able to use political means to prevent any section of its members from setting up a religion of their own, and there is thus a tendency to fragment into sects, but also a tendency to adapt to the nuances of social life. Since religion in America cannot depend on automatic state-collected taxes, but must actively campaign for funds, American religion generally shows an unusually high penetration of various business techniques such as advertising, fund raising, and the like. The adaptation of American religion to social variations makes the conflict between fundamentalism and modernism particularly sensitive. American religious groups often have some difficulty even staying alive without being able to care adequately for the health and welfare needs of their parishioners. The active programs of charity and welfare serve primarily the symbolic function of maintaining religious identity rather than genuinely taking account of actual needs.

So radical has been the relocation of socialization from the family and religion to secondary institutions that often the social service center and the school are more truly the integrating point of the community than the family and the church.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. Why was it necessary for the romantic complex to exist largely outside of marriage in early societies?
2. Some persons trace the problems of the American family primarily to romanticism. Do you agree? Justify your answer.
3. In what ways was the original psychology of Protestantism modified under American conditions? How do you account for this?

4. Two of the major historical tendencies in American religious life are the tendency toward sect formation and toward evangelicalism. What do these mean? How do you account for them?
5. Outline and explain the main institutional changes in American religion in the twentieth century.
6. What influence did the frontier have on the structure of the American family?
7. What influence did the industrial revolution have on the structure of the American family?
8. What is Geoffrey Gorer's theory of the influence of the family on American character? Do you agree?
9. How does religion in America today compare to that in the colonial period?
10. What are the primary similarities between American Protestantism, American Catholicism, and American Judaism?
11. What influence does the complexity of society have on education?
12. How do you account for the rise of universal, compulsory, tax-supported education in modern times?
13. Outline the rise of public education in the United States. Of what importance is it?
14. Trace the role of the federal government in education.

THE MASTERY OF NATURE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY

From a mercantilistic standpoint, the American colonies represented a source of raw materials for British manufacturers and a dumping ground for their manufactured products.¹ Only about one-tenth of the population of colonial New England, where commercial and industrial life was most developed, was engaged in non-agricultural pursuits. Northern agriculture was largely self-sufficient, resting on free labor and producing food crops for the home market. Southern agriculture rested on large land grants, slave labor, and the export of cash crops, particularly tobacco and indigo. From earliest times labor was scarce in the colonies, but it became an especially important problem in the South, where attempted solutions to the problem included trying to enslave the Indians, using indentured servants, and using African slaves. In 1681 there were 6,000 white servants in Virginia and 2,000 slaves. The slave traffic grew with the development of the plantation system with an average of 20,000 imported annually from 1713 to 1750, so that by 1760 there were 400,000 slaves in the colonies.

¹ For full discussions of American economic history, see Harold Underwood Faulkner, *American Economic History* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1954); Broadus Mitchell and Louise Pearson Mitchell, *American Economic History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947); James Blaine Walker, *The Epic of American Industry* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1949).

The forests of the new world were invaluable for various naval supplies. In 1700 wooden ship supplies valued at \$160,000 were exported. In the same year the colonies exported 9,000 barrels of pitch, 17,000 barrels of turpentine, and 82,000 barrels of tar. Excluding fishing craft, some 1,000 vessels were owned by New Englanders in 1740; the number doubled in the next twenty years. Some 300 ships and 4,000 sailors engaged in whaling at the time of the Revolution. It has been estimated that in 1755 some 9,000 pounds of furs were traded with England and about 135,000 pounds went to France. The annual value of American manufactured products in 1790 has been estimated at close to \$30,000,000.

In 1700 colonial trade with England was already extensive: British imports amounted to 395,000 pounds, exports to 344,000. The colonists, controlled the coastal trade almost exclusively. New England grew wealthy from its fisheries, the construction of vessels, the manufacture of rum, and the conduct of the carrying trade.

The agricultural technology of the American colonists was not appreciably different from that of the medieval manor. In the northern colonies social forms very similar to the pre-manorial village community appeared. In the southern colonies the attempt was made to perpetuate the manorial system of England, even though it was breaking down there by this time. This, however, turned out to be impossible, and southern agriculture evolved instead into a form of colonial capitalism more similar to that of ancient Rome than to that of medieval England. From the beginning, the American rural husbandman was in the process of being transformed into a farmer rather than a peasant villager. By the time of the Civil War these developments had proceeded to a point from which there seemed no turning back.

When a community faces a crisis, there tends to be a shift within its economy to more primitive economic forms. In 1930 rural workers composed 39.1 per cent of all workers. In 1935, a depression year, they composed only 34.6 per cent of all workers on relief.² In areas where American agriculture was most com-

² Division of Social Research, W.P.A., *Workers on Relief in the United States*, March, 1935, p. 1; J. J. Rhyne, "Social Man and His Community," in *Cities Are Abnormal*, edited by Elmer T. Peterson (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), p. 141.

pletely market oriented, however, the reverse was true. Kansas had 1.4 per cent of all workers of the United States, but 1.7 per cent on relief. North Dakota with 0.5 per cent of the workers had 1.7 per cent on relief; Oklahoma with 1.7 per cent of the workers had 2.9 per cent on relief.

These statistics give only a hint as to what was taking place in the American economy during the Great Depression. The fact that in a time of plenty there was a depression indicates that the people had not learned how to make a national economy a stable system. Earlier economies had been subject to serious disruptions, but these were due to various kinds of interference from outside the economy itself; they were due to droughts, natural catastrophes, invasion by other groups, prolonged war, etc. Under earlier economies people had not experienced economic disaster in times of plenty. Nothing could more dramatically portray the fact that a radical shift from primary to secondary economic institutions had occurred in the national economy than the fact that the kinds of crises peculiar to it occurred precisely during times of opulence. With reverse irony, the economy boomed during the kinds of crises formerly experienced as disasters—World Wars I and II.

During the Great Depression agricultural labor suffered less than non-agricultural labor, but in areas where agriculture was most completely dependent on national markets agricultural labor suffered more than did labor in the cities. Millions of persons wholly or partially returned to farming and an increasing amount of production was turned to the home. In both farm and non-farm households, the amount of repair of clothing and household goods increased. Reversing a century-long trend, the clothing of women and children was made at home with greater rather than with less frequency. Many a medical doctor in a rural area found himself being offered various kinds of farm produce in place of money for his fees. In small communities there was often complex horse-trading between businessmen: one merchant, for example, would insulate another's home in return for a plumbing or wiring job. Whole sections of the population turned toward a more direct subsistence type of economy, complete with barter and forms of cooperative labor.

Depressions were of a very different order until the formation

of the national economy at which time they began occurring with increasing severity. One may assume that in previous depressions the return to a subsistence economy was made more speedily and thoroughly than in the Great Depressions. Moreover, "recovery" from a depression probably meant only that large blocks of persons had simply withdrawn, so to speak, from the national economy to take care of themselves by more primitive procedures. However, the more developed the national economy, the more people are affected by the depression and the more difficult it is to return to models of subsistence economy.

STAGES IN THE GROWTH OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

In developing the various principles of community formation—stability, consistency, and completeness—it is easy to become so enamored of the community-forming process that one overlooks other properties of the human situation. While there is a movement toward stabilization in those solutions to collective problems one calls institutions, this movement is important because of the potential instability in the institutional phenomena. The stability achieved is always a merely relative affair. There are remarkably few institutions in which there are not at least some alternatives. The problem of radiating waves of consistency in the behaviors that surround an institution is important, because there is no pre-established harmony between the institutional formulas of one area of human life and another. The waves of influence around one institution frequently come into conflict with those around another. It is particularly important that there are alternatives at the primary institution level, for the need to make one institution harmonize with another may lead to the promotion of one rather than another alternative. Here our interest attaches to two sources of innovation present in any community: (1) in the alternatives in the primary area of the institution, and (2) in the interference of one institution with another.

In the medieval manors, for example, it was quite possible for the manorial lords to insist on cash payments from their tenants rather than payments in kind. However, when they did, they tended to set in motion powerful forces leading to the destruction of the subsistence economy of the manor. Substituting cash

payments for traditional tributes encouraged the tenant to raise products for the market. When the cash payment became an established way of meeting feudal obligations, inflation could lower the real value of the money received by the lord, automatically lightening the burden of the serf. It could then appear advisable to the lord to free the serf altogether, re-hiring him for only what work was necessary. Thus the exploitation of some alternatives could destroy the system.

The possibility can be illustrated for the cities. Within the originally democratic city guild some individuals by shrewdness, diligence, and good luck may quite out-distance their fellows. This was true of the livery companies that arose in England. The livery implied the wearing of special clothing that symbolized power and prestige. While the liveries had continuities with the guild, they became quite different structures, for the workers were shorn of control over production and lost ownership of tools as an oligarchy of wealthy business men came to dominate various branches of industry. Twelve great livery companies in London included the mercers, grocers, drapers, fishmongers, goldsmiths, skimmers, tailors, haberdashers, salters, ironmongers, vintners, and cloth-workers. The livery companies are one of the transition institutions between the city and national economy.

The interference of one social context with another may be illustrated by the way in which the medieval urban community tended to destroy the manorial communities. In many of the cities a serf needed only to remain for a year and a day to become a free citizen of the city.

It is not our purpose to trace all the alternatives within both the manorial community and the urban community that offered alternative lines of development, nor is it our purpose to trace all the lines of interference between one institution and another that could initiate innovations. Such developments are treated with great fullness in the various economic histories. The point of importance for us is that a development of economic institutions was occurring outside the spheres of both the rural (manorial and village) communities and the cities. The framework of the new development of economic institutions was eventually provided by the nation.

THE AMERICAN ECONOMY FROM THE REVOLUTION
TO THE CIVIL WAR

Without doubt the British mercantilistic policies of protecting and stimulating home industry and maintaining a favorable balance of trade were components in the Revolution. England had sought to control colonial exports by prohibiting the sale of woollens and hats and by controlling the export of iron. The colonies were viewed as a source of cheap raw materials and a market for finished products. Since they were on the other end of British mercantile policies, the colonists found the gold supply constantly short, for it was drained off to England. Spanish, Dutch, and French sources of gold were also virtually closed by British mercantile policy. In the 1760's duties were placed on indigo, coffee, wines, silk, and calico. In 1765 the Sugar Act was supplemented by the Stamp Act requiring tax stamps to be affixed to licenses, contracts, deeds, wills, and the like. The British Quartering Act of 1765 was not calculated to increase the colonists prosperity. The colonists were systematically denied the right to issue paper money, though they were chronically short of money. The American Revolution was, in large part, a reaction against British mercantilism.

Around 30,000 Tories enlisted in the British army, and 35,000 more emigrated to Canada. In the colonies depriving the Tories of their holdings liquidated a type of aristocratic influence. During the war agriculture went on as usual, though often the French and British obtained supplies while Washington could not. Despite the war, tobacco and rice were carried to European markets by blockade runners. The war stimulated wool and cotton production. It also stimulated colonial shipping and privateering; an estimated 2,000 privateers were commissioned. More than 455 prizes were brought in by the Salem fleet; some 250 English ships were captured in 1776.

The war, which cost the colonies around \$100,000, was financed by the issue of \$2,000,000 in bills of credit by the Continental Congress. By 1779, over \$240,000,000 had been created in 42 issues of money. The war left agriculture, manufacturing, and the fishing industry in ruins; it left the finances of the country in disorder. Among the motives of those men drafting the Constitu-

tion was the desire to give the government powers to carry out certain basic activities necessary for business men—to regulate trade, coin money, protect industry, establish credit, and redeem securities.

The western lands were largely occupied between the Revolution and the Civil War. The access to land was progressively made easier. In 1775 western lands were offered for sale in lots of 640 acres at one dollar an acre; in 1800 the law was modified to permit an individual to buy 320 acres with easy credit arrangements. By 1820 an allotted purchase of 80 acres at \$1.25 an acre was possible. Finally, in 1862, the Homestead Act provided for land to be granted free. Throughout the period a number of speculative manias developed around the sale of western lands. These speculative manias sheared away local attachments, discouraged intensive improvements on the land, and encouraged repeated moves. The success of sea island cotton and later, with the cotton gin, of the tougher strains stabilized cotton, the plantation, and the slave system in the South. This development was related to the textile industry of the North and the market in the South for the Ohio farmers' corn and pork. In the South, tobacco, sugar, and rice continued to develop. In the North wheat production shifted west; northern and western farming began to show the influence of new machinery and new methods.

American shipping made a new start through the privateers of the Revolutionary War. In 1785 a new beginning in Far Eastern trade was also made. By 1810 some 980,000 tons of shipping were registered for foreign trade. Coastal trade had become an American monopoly. Between 1790 and 1810, American shippers moved into the spaces left open by the effect of the war between France and England. Because British men-of-war impounded American shipping, Congress passed the Embargo Act of 1807 which, however, hurt shipping in America more than it did in England. Further trouble culminated in the War of 1812 when the British captured 1,400 merchant vessels.

Between 1815 and 1840 Americans sold 540,000 tons of shipping to foreigners. In 1842 some 652 of the 882 ships in the world's whaling fleet were American. Between 1830 and 1860 there was extensive ship building, steam was introduced in ocean

service, and the first steel ships appeared. From 1800 to 1880 exports rose from 33,600,000 to 71,000,000 tons; imports rose from 91,000,000 to 353,600,000 tons. By 1860 the whaling industry had reached an annual production of 118,000 barrels of sperm oil, 216,000 barrels of whale oil, and 2,324,000 pounds of whale bone. The scarcity of whales and the discovery of mineral oils led to the decline of whaling after 1860.

Agriculture still dominated the economy, though increasing numbers of workers were engaged in the textile and metal industries, in milling, and in meat packing. A number of factors encouraged the rapid mechanization of American industry. The Revolution and the War of 1812 increased the demand for industrial goods. Labor was expensive and subject to rapid turnover, but raw materials were in abundance. Protective tariffs promoted the development of industry which the high costs of transportation from Europe made desirable. During the War of 1812, when the commercial blockade proved disastrous to American shipping, ship owners put their capital into cotton manufacturing. Capital invested in manufactures rose from \$50,000,000 in 1820 to \$1,000,000,000 in 1860. Despite English legislation to prevent it, the factory system was transported to America. A factory using the jenny was established in Philadelphia in 1787; an Arkwright mill was built at Pawtucket in 1789; and steam was applied to a saw mill in New York in 1803. By 1830 some 57 of the 161 plants in Pennsylvania used steam; power loom weaving of cotton appeared at Waltham in 1814; was applied to woolens in Connecticut in 1820.

Americans turned their attention toward mechanical improvements: Rumsay and Fitch experimented with applying steam to water transportation; John Stevens experimented with the railroad engine; in 1830 Geisenhainer smelted iron ore with anthracite coal; in 1851 William Kelly independently discovered the Bessemer method of decarbonizing molten metal by forced air; and Elias Howe (1846) invented the sewing machine. The patent office reported an annual average of 77 inventions between 1790 and 1911. From 1840 to 1850 over 6,000 patents were issued, and over 28,000 were issued in the next decade. In 1860 there were 1,091 mills in operation consuming a million bales of cotton a

year with a product valued at \$117,000,000. By that year 1,260 woolen establishments with a capital of \$31,000,000 were producing \$62,000,000 worth of cloth, and the linen produced outside the home was valued at \$700,000.

By 1810 there were 153 furnaces producing 54,908 tons of iron. By 1860 smelting was carried on from Pennsylvania and the Ohio valley to northern Michigan near Detroit. The steam engine was used in water transportation after 1808. Both the steamboat and the railroad engines increased the demand for metal. Locomotive building was concentrated at Philadelphia. In the 1850's solid iron rails appeared. Steel and iron manufacture was concentrated in New England prior to the Civil War.

In the period between the Revolution and the Civil War, the finances of the United States underwent a number of changes. The new government needed money, and in 1789 the first tariff was designed for revenue. In 1791 Hamilton advocated the use of tariff for protection. Though he subscribed to the *laissez-faire* doctrines of Adam Smith, he was convinced that American industry required protection and sound money. To establish sound national credit, he urged that the national government take over the debt of the states. He also proposed a national bank modeled after that of England.

The pressures on the monetary system quickly became polarized between the eastern capitalists who desired a hard currency and the western farmers who wanted easy credit. When the charter of the first bank expired in 1811, the bank went out of existence. State banks increased from 88 to 246 in five years; money in circulation increased from \$45,000,000 to \$100,000,000. Notes circulated with discounts up to 50 per cent. When the second United States bank was chartered in 1816, to establish some order in the financial chaos attendant on financing the War of 1812, its restraining influence on the wild cat banks of the frontier aroused bitter opposition. Andrew Jackson, who came into conflict with the director of the bank, Nicholas Biddle, vetoed the bill to recharter the bank. An orgy of speculation ensued. From 1827 to 1837 the number of banks increased from 329 to 799, while notes in circulation increased from \$48,000,000 to \$149,000,000. Crop failures in 1835 prevented the farmers from meeting their

obligations and rapidly produced the Panic of 1837. Congress passed a special bankruptcy law (1841), and 39,000 persons canceled \$441,000,000 worth of debts. After six years of depression, recovery was spurred by the California gold discoveries and railroad building. Over-speculation led to the third panic of 1857.

Transportation and communication underwent rapid development up to the time of the Civil War. The movement for better roads started with individually organized companies, which issued stock for turnpikes supported by tolls. By 1832 some 86 companies in Pennsylvania had built 2,200 miles of road in the state. By 1820 some 20 turnpike companies had been chartered in New Hampshire; there were 26 in Vermont. A decade earlier New York had 137. State governments gave assistance, and pressure was placed on the federal government. When Ohio was admitted to the Union, the federal government agreed to appropriate five per cent of the proceeds from the sale of lands for road building. Similar agreements were made later with Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri.

By 1860 there were over 1,000 steamboats in operation on inland waters. The era of canal building was inaugurated by the Erie. Tolls exceeded the interest charges before it was finished; \$8,500,000 were collected in the first nine years. The Erie canal offered the first all-water route west and an outlet for bulk products of the interior. Canals were begun in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and throughout the mid-west. Canal mileage in the United States rose from 2,270 in 1830 to 3,700 in 1850.

To a transportation hungry country, the value of the railroads was immediately realized. They were cheaper to construct, more rapid, and not confined to water, hence not affected by the seasons. Mileage of railroad construction rose from 32 miles in 1830 to 30,626 in 1860. In this period over \$1,250,000,000 was invested in railroads.

When Samuel Morse devised a practical telegraph in 1837, its advantages, too, were seen. In 1843 Congress appropriated \$30,000 for construction of a line between Baltimore and Washington. With government subsidies the Western Union constructed lines to the Pacific, and by 1861 5,000 miles were in operation.

THE AMERICAN ECONOMY FROM THE CIVIL WAR
TO WORLD WAR II

There were both economic ties and more fundamental economic antagonisms between the sections. Southern cotton was sent to the mills in the North, and northern products were exported to the South. However, in the long run a slave and a free labor system were destined to clash. Moreover, as an importing area, the South fought for low tariffs. In the competition for western land, the South favored sale of large tracts at low prices; the North favored small tracts at comparatively higher prices. It was in the competition for control over the west that the struggle was brought to a head. The immediate effects of the Civil War were to increase the demand for agricultural products (to feed the army), to increase the demand for industrial products, to stimulate the woolen industry, to favor (through taxation) the consolidation of industry. In the North the Civil War ushered in a new era of growth.

Agriculture. The great plains were the major unoccupied area at the end of the Civil War. The Union Pacific, the first transcontinental railroad, was completed in 1869. It brought a flood of hunters who exterminated the bison. For a brief period between the 1860's and the 1880's, cattle ranching flourished on federal lands. Agriculturally, the plains were mastered with barbed wire, the steel plow, the windmill, and the railroads to carry produce.

The railroads, which gave the farmers access to markets, were not an unmixed good. They competed for land, and charged monopoly freight rates where they could. They provided one of the first reasons for the formation of major farm organizations and took up the cry of the western farmers for easy credit and cheap money.

The mechanization of agriculture continued with ever increasing speed, and the entry of the government into agriculture became increasingly important. From the Civil War to World War II agriculture experienced two periods of prolonged depression and two periods of unprecedented prosperity. Abnormally bad times were experienced from the end of the Civil War to 1896. From 1860 to 1900 the number of farms increased from 2,000,000 to 5,700,000, and farm acreage doubled (from 400,000,000 to 839,-

000,000 acres). Domestic consumption did not increase proportionately, however, and in the 1870's more grain was exported than had been sold abroad in the previous fifty years. Farm costs rose, while prices fell; *per capita* expenditures on machinery rose. Banking facilities were inadequate, and in the great plains farmers often were forced to borrow at twelve per cent interest. Meanwhile, the southern farmer became a perpetual debtor, further harried by the boll weevil. It is little wonder that farmers began to enter politics on a major scale.

The period of prosperity from 1896 to 1914 was extended by the World War I boom. Agriculture was temporarily stabilized in the economy. Agricultural exports increased with wheat reaching an export peak in 1901, and beef in 1906. With these gains farmers lost interest in the burning issues of the late nineteenth century, and membership in farm organizations declined. World War I created great agricultural demands. In 1915 some 243,000,000 bushels of wheat were exported, as compared to 107,000,000 bushels annually before the war. Farm income rose more sharply than prices—from \$7,000,000,000 in 1910 to nearly \$18,000,000,000 in 1919. The value of farm machinery tripled. Land prices rose from \$39.60 an acre in 1910 to \$69.38 in 1920; and farm mortgages increased from \$3,000,000,000 in 1910 to \$8,000,000,000 in 1920.

While the rest of the country experienced a boom in the 1920's, agriculture went into a decline. Agricultural production dropped slightly, and the number of farms fell from 6,400,000 to 6,300,000. Export markets fell off. American diets were changing; people were eating less meat and potatoes, more dairy products, fruits, and vegetables. Farm income dropped from \$17,700,000,000 in 1919 to \$11,400,000,000 in 1930. Farm mortgages increased from \$8,400,000,000 in 1920 to \$9,600,000,000 in 1930. The farm cooperative movement was promoted in an attempt to solve the problem, and efforts were made to persuade the federal government to fix prices. In the Great Depression, prices fell to 68 per cent of the pre-war level. Farm income declined to \$6,400,000,000. A whole series of new government activities were supported, such as the Agriculture Adjustment Act, to establish "parity prices."

In World War II American farmers began to enjoy their great-

est prosperity. The gross national product doubled, and personal consumption expenditure increased 70 per cent. Export demand for farm products increased. Farm income grew from \$10,200,000,000 in 1914 to \$42,000,000,000 in 1940. In this period two per cent of the farms contained 40 per cent of the farm land, and 98 per cent of the farms were family size. One-tenth of the farmers received half of the farm income, and 40 per cent of the farmers had incomes of less than \$1,000 a year. During the war the shortage of labor and implements increased. By 1951 the value of farm machinery was \$15,500,000,000.

While a farm worker in 1820 produced enough to support four persons, in 1920 he produced enough to support ten, and in 1945 he produced enough to support fourteen people. In 1880 20 per cent of the national income came from agriculture; in 1950 only 21 per cent was agricultural. In 1860, 60 per cent of the gainfully employed were in agriculture, while in 1950 only 14.5 per cent were so employed. From 1890 to 1950 there was a 23 per cent reduction in the amount of land required to support a person.

Industry. One of the most important developments in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War was that expansion of railroad transportation to permit the creation of truly national markets. In 1860 there was practically no railroad mileage west of the Mississippi river. The Union Pacific and Central Pacific lines were begun in 1862 and completed in 1869; the Northern Pacific was begun in 1867 and finished in 1883; the Santa Fe was begun in 1869 and completed in 1884, and the Great Northern was completed in 1890. The United States had 53,000 miles of railroad in 1870, twice this mileage in 1880, and 254,000 miles by 1920. More than 150,000,000 acres of land were given by the federal government to the railroads. About 60 per cent of the cost of the construction of the railroads was borne by the government. The disrepute of the railroads, which began with the scandals of the Credit Mobilier, was increased by the manipulations of railroad financiers of whom Jay Gould was most notorious. In six years Gould expanded the capital of the Erie railroad by \$65,000,000 without adding a locomotive or train station. As a result of pressure begun by the Grange, there was a gradual movement to control the railroads. In World War I they were put under government control, but were returned to private ownership in 1920.

The Civil War precipitated industrial development: the value of manufactured products rose from \$2,000,000 in 1859 to \$68,000,000 in 1929. The agricultural implement business begun by Cyrus McCormick in Chicago in 1847 was worth \$23,000,000 in 1902. The meat packing industry began to develop before the Civil War with the innovations of Gustavus Swift, P. D. Armour, and Nelson Morris; developments in refrigeration made large-scale packing possible. By 1870 America had begun to export paper to Britain, and between 1900 and 1950 American *per capita* consumption of paper rose five times, reaching 250 pounds a year. From 1860 to 1900 shoe-making was transformed from handicraft to factory production. The motor car was invented and developed in France, and in the hands of Olds and Ford it was transformed. Olds was making 1,400 cars annually in 1901. Ford's output exceeded 10,000 in 1909, and within five years it exceeded 250,000. By 1940 General Motors was employing over 200,000 people and making over 1,000,000 cars annually. In 1880 the American output of pig iron exceeded 3,000,000 tons for the first time; in a decade it exceeded 10,000,000 tons, and by 1920 it exceeded 40,000,000 tons. In 1950 productivity was five times greater than it had been in 1850.

Finance. Depending on who was in the saddle, the federal government was either pressured to establish a national bank supporting a hard money policy, or pressured to get out of the banking business altogether. The first policy was in the interest of the eastern industrialists and capitalists; the second was in the interest of the farmers. The difficulty with the first policy was that it was experienced by the impetuous west as an obstacle; the difficulty with the second policy was that it put the state banks in the position of trying to do commercial banking on a savings bank foundation. The state banks were unable to make sufficient short-term commercial loans to maintain their banking profitably. The ordinary state bank could not turn its assets into cash quickly. Bank notes often became progressively de-valued; and the economy alternated between speculative boom and bust.

Before the Civil War some credit agencies had begun to develop. A number of Anglo-American houses were underwriters for American securities. The New York Stock Exchange was

formed in 1817, but the number of transactions was small before the Civil War.

Every war and its aftermath dramatized the need for a national currency of some stability, as demonstrated by the chaos that followed the speculative financing of the War of 1812. The Civil War was no exception, and the National Bank Act was intended to make the currency universal and prevent over-issue of bank notes. A ten per cent tax was levied against state bank notes to drive them out of existence. The national banking system strengthened commercial banking and made bank deposits more safe. It also replaced heterogeneous issues with a uniform currency. However, federal bonds were inelastic, prohibiting loans against real estate. In various ways it recreated the old difficulties for the farmer.

One of the most important events in national finance was the increase in investment banking in the late nineteenth century. Investment bankers floated large security issues to finance the great movements in business. By 1900 the New York Stock Exchange was handling around 266,000,000 shares of stock. American investment bankers began to share in control over business. J. Pierpont Morgan, the leading investment banker of his day, illustrated this in his extensive financial and industrial combinations.

But the banking system still had serious defects. National banks and many state banks were allowed to hold large legal reserves as demand deposits in large city banks. If these banks drew out too much at a time, the city bank would collapse. If the city bank got into trouble, banks in which they had their reserves on deposit might, in turn, be forced to close. The panic of 1907, following the collapse of one huge New York bank, set in motion such a series of failures. This led to the study eventuating in the Federal Reserve System.

Twelve regional banks were established as part of the Federal Reserve System with headquarters in Washington. These were intended to serve as central banks for commercial banks joining the system. National banks had to join; for state-chartered banks, this was optional. In 1952 some 1,900 out of 9,150 commercial banks with state charters were members; about half of all of the commercial banks in the country were members of the system. The Federal Reserve Banks hold the legal reserves of member

banks. For every dollar of their liabilities to depositors, member banks must have a certain per cent on deposit at their Federal Reserve Banks. Reserve banks have the power to alter reserve requirements, but this reserve tends to be about twenty per cent.

The system was intended to make the currency elastic during periods of prosperity, when currency ordinarily expands; in time of depression, the currency should contract. By permitting district banks to re-discount commercial paper for member banks, it was hoped that panics could be mitigated and funds provided in times of crisis. During World War I the Federal Reserve System supported the treasury's war financing program. Afterward it employed open market operations for financial control purposes. The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 expanded the power of the Board of Governors. In World War II the Federal Reserve System cooperated with the federal government in financing the war.

Investment banking reached its peak in the 1920's. Business came to rely on security issues to raise capital. The collapse of the Stock Market (1929-1932) damaged the prestige of investment bankers. The volume of trading on the New York Stock Exchange, which was 5,000,000 shares a day during the 1920's, averaged less than 2,000,000 in 1931.

Among the important recent developments are the expansion of life insurance and savings associations and the increasing importance of the federal government in financing American business. In 1950 personal savings amounted to \$226,000,000,000. Life insurance values stood at \$54,000,000,000, and United States government bonds at \$58,000,000,000. The expansion of federal government capital aid occurred in the 1930's. At the beginning of World War II, twenty-nine federal credit agencies had \$8,000,000,000 outstanding. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation extended credit to all types of business. Other agencies provided for home financing, aid and credit to agriculture, for construction, and for transportation. During World War II \$25,000,000,000 in industrial facilities were built, and after the war the Reconstruction Finance Corporation continued to advance credit and to guarantee loans.

Labor. As early as 1790 the local craft unions made their appearance. The early organizations attempted through collective bargaining to regulate the hours and working conditions and

sought to mitigate other hazards of the worker's life by mutual insurance societies and associations for sickness and funeral benefits. Strikes were rare. When they occurred the leaders were usually arrested and tried for conspiracy under English Common Law.

In the late 1820's the first national trade unions were formed. They worked for free schools, the abolition of imprisonment for debt, equal taxation, direct election of public officials, and mechanics' lien laws. After 1844 the trade union movement took on a humanitarian and socialistic form with proposals for communism, land reform, and the like, but in the late fifties there was a shift back to a strict trade union program. By 1860 more than twenty trades had national organizations.

War is complex in its effects on labor. Labor is in demand, and the prospect of continuing markets leads to the granting of concessions to labor. This is not always due to a burst of generosity or of patriotism, but to the need to entice workers to leave their usual jobs and enter the war industries. Unionism tends to gain. At the same time prices usually advance much more rapidly than wages. In the Civil War prices increased 100 per cent, and wages 60 per cent. During and immediately following the Civil War, the number of unions increased. By 1870 there were thirty-two national trade unions, and every important city had a trade union assembly, labor press, and workingman's library.

Some 800,000 immigrants entered the United States during the Civil War. In 1864 this method of supplying cheap labor was formally confirmed by the passing (1864) of an alien contract immigration law by Congress, permitting employers in the United States to make contracts with foreign workers, binding them to work for a term to pay for their passage. This was a belated return to the equivalent of the indentured servant system of colonial days. For a time it was possible for the big industrialists to break up any labor activity simply by importing new alien workers.

All of these developments were symptomatic of changes which were bringing to an end the small factory and creating the great industrial combinations. Representatives of many points of view competed for leadership of the trade union movement: old-line unionists sought only betterment of wages, working hours, and working conditions of the particular craft; a more politically-

oriented wing sought more general labor reform, and was concerned with such questions as economic monopoly and the general position of labor. Finally a radical group advanced programs for complete social reorganization. Old-line unionism eventually found expression in the American Federation of Labor; the general reform groups organized the Knights of Labor; and the socialists founded political parties.³

The Civil War and its aftermath brought the first major attempts to bring about some general integration in the American trade union movement. On a foundation of city assemblies of trade unions in 1866, W. W. Sylvis organized the National Labor Union which held seven annual conventions and rose to a membership of 600,000 at its height. It advocated a variety of actions including Chinese exclusion, the eight hour day, and a federal department of labor. The National Labor Union organized the National Labor Party which was taken into the Greenback movement and went the way of all third parties in America.

In 1869 Uriah S. Stevens, a Philadelphia garment maker, organized the Noble Order of the Knights of Labor, which favored such policies as an eight hour day, income taxes, inheritance taxes, workmen's compensation for injuries, and public ownership of a number of utilities. It advocated private cooperatives of workers. In 1873 there were six assemblies in Philadelphia. In 1875 a national convention was called. By 1883 it had a membership of 53,000. It achieved its greatest success in its successful strike in 1885 against Jay Gould's railway system. Between 1886 and 1890, however, the Knights of Labor declined even more rapidly than it had risen. By 1893 it had dropped to less than 75,000 members. A series of unsuccessful strikes weakened it; and after the Hay Market Riot between strike-breakers, police, and locked-out employees of the McCormick harvester concern, public sentiment turned against it.

During the declining days of the Knights of Labor, the American Federation of Labor was gradually taking shape. At Columbus, Ohio, Samuel Gompers, President of the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions, carried out an amalgamation with the American Federation of Labor. Gompers became the

³ Harold U. Faulkner and Mark Starr, *Labor in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 86.

new president, and for many years piloted the Federation on a wise, moderate, non-political course.

The core of the American Federation of Labor was formed by the carpenters, cigar-makers, printers, iron and steel workers, and iron molders. From a membership of 138,000 in 1886 it grew to twice that number in a decade. In its early days, the growth of the Federation was slowed by the strike at the Homestead mine in Pennsylvania and the Pullman strike. In June, 1892, the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers (of the American Federation of Labor) called a strike at the Carnegie Steel Mills at Homestead because of reductions in wages. The whole affair was deliberately planned by the steel company to smash the union. The Carnegie Company had imported several hundred Pinkerton detectives who fought a pitched battle with the strikers. The state then sent in 8,000 national guardsmen to assist the embattled strike-breakers.

Two years later the workers at the Pullman Parlor Car Company, organized by Eugene V. Debs, struck against a reduction in wages. The strike spread through the Midwest, disorganizing railway traffic. President Cleveland sent troops against the strikers. When Debs and other leaders refused to obey the injunction brought against the union to desist from striking, they were cited for contempt of court and were sent to jail. These experiences turned Debs into a confirmed socialist.

The federal and state governments were, however, beginning to take cognizance of labor. A Bureau of Labor Statistics was created in 1888. An eight hour day was extended to letter carriers, serving as an officially sanctioned model for private business. The Alien Contract Labor Law (1885) ended the practice of importing aliens under contract, and in 1893 the system of hiring-out convict labor from federal prisons was abolished. These devices for smashing trade unionism were thus eliminated.

The American Federation of Labor succeeded where other movements failed, in considerable measure because of the modest and the purely trade-union character of its aims. It was against contract immigration and the application of conspiracy laws to trade unions; it favored compulsory education, but was not inclined toward political action. The situation in the United States that permitted the American Federation of Labor to succeed

where so many other movements had failed was characterized by a lack of class consciousness. This, in turn, rested on the opportunities in the west, labor's possession of the ballot, the abundant opportunities for mobility, and the ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural heterogeneity of laboring groups.⁴

In 1920 the American Federation of Labor was composed of 110 national unions with 36,741 locals, 1,296 local trade unions composed of seven or more wage earners whose trade was not organized, 46 state federations, and 926 city central bodies. National and international unions were organized into departments in terms of their lines of work (building trades, metal trades, railroad employees etc.). By 1900 it had 543,000 members; by 1920 it had 4,076,740 members, though this figure represented considerable war inflation.

As it entered the twentieth century the American Federation of Labor had little interest in socialism and no inclination to organize an American labor party. Marc Karson attributes this to a number of factors: the vitality of American capitalism, the middle class psychology of American workers, the American faith in individual rights, some conservative features of the American political system, the anti-socialist position of the Roman Catholic Church which was the religion of a large proportion of American workers, and the anti-Socialist leadership of Samuel Gompers.⁵

The American Federation of Labor has never managed to synthesize all the forms of unionism. The "Big Four" of the Railroad Brotherhoods (Locomotive Engineers, 1863; Railroad Conductors, 1868; Locomotive Firemen, 1873; and Railway Trainmen, 1883) remained outside. In 1947 they had a combined membership of 450,000 and were more interested in creating mutual insurance and benefit societies than in starting labor unions.

The Socialists and Communists have, by and large, remained opposed to craft unionism. The early leader of the Socialist Party, Daniel De Leon, believed that labor should become class conscious and elect socialist candidates to public office, but he failed to win the conservative unions of the Knights of Labor and the

⁴ Selig Perlman, *A Theory of the Labor Movement* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1949), pp. 162 ff.

⁵ *American Labor Unions and Politics* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958), p. 286.

American Federation of Labor to this program. The Socialist Trade and Labor Alliance formed by De Leon was short lived.

The Communists under William Z. Foster for a time tried to bore from within the unions and seize positions of leadership. When this policy failed in 1935, tactics were reversed and the Communists shifted to the policy of setting up rival unions. Neither policy succeeded, and the time came when the old union federations cast out communist-dominated unions.

There were repeated attempts to shift the American labor movement to the status of a political party. The first important break came in 1897, when the Western Federation of Miners was formed. It and the American Labor Union, the Socialist Labor Party and some other groups (called into a conference in Chicago in 1905) organized the Industrial Workers of the World. Among its founders were De Leon, Eugene V. Debs, and William D. Haywood. They wished to form all laborers into a single movement and proposed taking possession of the instruments of production and abolishing the wage system. They advocated direct action with general strikes, the boycott, and sabotage. From 1909 to 1917 the I.W.W. was an aggressive organization, but its membership was never more than 75,000.

The most significant division in the ranks of American labor occurred in 1936, when the executive committee of the American Federation of Labor suspended ten unions which had joined the Committee for Industrial Organization. John L. Lewis took a strong stand for industrial unionism. These unions formed the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and soon built up a membership of one million. The C.I.O. quickly organized the automobile, steel, and rubber industries. By 1949 the A.F. of L. had 7,000,000 members, and the C.I.O. had around 6,000,000. Independent unions had around 2,000. Nearly 35 per cent of the agricultural workers were organized. The outstanding event in recent labor history has been the fusion of the A.F. of L. and C.I.O. in 1955 under the title of American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization.

The situation under which unionism had to operate has also undergone several changes. In 1903 D. M. Parry converted the National Association of Manufacturers from an association for the promotion of protective tariffs to an anti-union association. Anti-

union businessmen also organized the Citizens' Industrial Association. Other important anti-union associations are the National Founders' Association, the National Metal Trades Association, and the Structural Erectors Association. The tactics of the employers' associations have included black-listing, pledging members not to enter into closed shop agreements, furnishing financial assistance to employers during strikes, opposing union supported legislation. At the end of World War I considerable public hysteria was directed against the unions. Between 1920 and 1930 union membership declined from 5,000,000 to 3,400,000. In the 1920's employers introduced the labor spy, the injunction, the black list, the agent provocateur, and the company unions in their struggles. Welfare plans were also widely used to pull the teeth of the union.

Since 1930 child labor has nearly disappeared, and the number of older workers has declined. On the other hand, the number of women in the labor force has grown. The number of white collar workers has also increased enormously.

CAPITALISM

The confusion between capitalism as a politico-economic strategy within the national economy and the actual condition of the economy has been even greater than the confusion between mercantilism and the economic situation within which it operated as a strategy. In the case of capitalism the discussion still rages in some quarters.

As an ideology capitalism is the view that economic life achieves maximum efficiency when it is run by free, rational, private businessmen for private profit. A society may be described as capitalistic to the extent that its economic processes are in the hands of private businessmen and run for private profit. Some students insist on a variety of additional properties. Schumpeter, for example, argued that the institution of bank credit is essential to the functioning of capitalism. Max Weber believed that capital accounting—determination of income-yielding power of the enterprise by the methods of modern bookkeeping—was essential. Sombart insisted that to be capitalistic the economic system had to have a peculiar psychology, form, and technology. He thought the system had to be dominated by motives of acquisi-

tion, competition, and rationality; that business enterprise must be individualistic, free, private, and market-oriented; and that the technology was necessarily scientific and mechanistic.

For Max Weber, the existence of rational capital accounting as a normal condition for all large industrial undertakings depends on a number of conditions: the private appreciation and alienable ownership of the physical means of production—land, apparatus, materials, tools; freedom of the market; rational technology including mechanization; calculable law for the capitalistic form of industrial organization must be able to count on calculable adjudication and administration; free labor with individuals not only legally in possession to sell their labor without restriction in the market but economically forced to do so; and finally, the commercialization of economic life, the use of commercial instruments to represent share rights in enterprises and property ownership.⁶ So far as a capitalistic economy ceases merely to be an aspiration of some social groups and becomes a state of fact, it displays a set of features such as the list compiled by Weber. The national economy has never displayed these traits with any considerable degree of completeness.

One could ask, who were the bearers of capitalism? How did they differ from the bearers of mercantilism? And how did they manage to achieve some success against the mercantilists?

The bearers of the ideology of mercantilism were the heads of the national states and their ministers, joined in considerable measure by those businessmen who enjoyed state-supported monopolies. By contrast, the bearers of the ideology of capitalism were private businessmen who did not enjoy the privileged positions possible under the mercantilists.

The key figure, the capitalistic entrepreneur, is ideally, according to Sombart, an inventor, discoverer, conqueror, organizer, and merchant. Sombart maintains that during the period of full capitalism (1750-1914), the position of the entrepreneur tended to change, for there was a tendency to dissociate capital ownership from executive management. The movement from single ownership to corporate ownership was paralleled by the substitution of the hired executive for the owner entrepreneur. Another tendency was toward the integration of functions leading to the

⁶ Max Weber, *General Economic History*, pp. 275-278.

appearance of a limited number of super-entrepreneurs combining banking and industrial power primarily by means of simultaneous membership on the boards of several corporations. A variety of entrepreneurial types is found: the expert, the merchant, and the financier. They tend, Sombart believes, to represent stages of the increasing intangibility of entrepreneurial activity—early, middle, and late capitalism. The financier becomes important when the process of concentration has caught up with economic expansion.

In the period of full capitalism, Sombart maintains, entrepreneurs tend to be drawn from increasingly lower strata. Examples of German business giants from the middle or lower strata are Ballin (an emigration agent), Bosch (the son of a peasant), Dernburg and Helfferich (from scholarly families), Isidor and Ludwig Löwe (children of a grammar school teacher). In the United States, the number of entrepreneurs from humble origin was even greater: Carnegie (the son of a poor Scottish weaver), Ford (the son of a small farmer), and Harriman (the son of a poor minister). The bearers of capitalism were originally drawn from lower strata than the bearers of mercantilism, and they were initially in process of achieving power by virtue of purely economic activity rather than by the political control of economic opportunities. It should not be forgotten that in the American Revolution upper class Tory mercantilists were displaced by lower class private business men.

The problem of how the new bearers of capitalistic aspirations achieved some success against the mercantilists is accentuated by the fact that the mercantilists were initially in politically superior positions. The new rising capitalists were opposed at times by open force. The details of the process belong to economic and political history, but in general a process was set in motion within the rising national states which in its combined political-economic nature was somewhat similar to earlier processes in the city. In the early patrician city it was possible for lower strata to grow wealthy and to compete against their own authorities for a voice in political affairs. Almost everywhere in the western city the original patrician oligarchies gave way to more democratic administrations by the guilds. Guilds that were originally of lower status in turn arose in competition with the

major guilds. The revolutions carried out by the rising capitalists against the mercantilists were quite the equivalent to changes in the national economies.

The new states were growing at such a rate that their monetary needs were not met by the mercantilistic elements of the population alone. A rich growth of non-mercantilistic capitalism was occurring. The non-mercantilistic capitalists, though denied a voice in political affairs, were still called upon for financial and military support of the state as, at an earlier period, the average member of the city had been called upon for financial and military support of the city, even while he was denied a voice in its politics.

The argument of the rising capitalistic class was comparatively simple: economic efficiency was highest in a free market with open competition, which would create the incentives for the maximum possible efficiency. If an industry were too incompetent or if it did not produce commodities of adequate quality, it would be eliminated in the course of the competitive struggle. The remaining industries would automatically become more efficient. All government interference, thus, was thought an obstacle to economic efficiency. Government, to be sure, had expenses of its own which it could only supply by taxation, however, taxation should not exceed its requirements. In economic affairs the role of government should be confined to a minimum of policing functions, preventing fraud and other kinds of interference with the natural operations of the market. When the economy was exclusively in the hands of private businessmen, greatest possible social good results.

As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value, every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote

an end which was no part of it. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good.⁷

Such was the philosophy of what Schumpeter called "intact" capitalism or what Sombart called "high" capitalism. The political counterpart of this capitalism was *laissez-faire*, the doctrine that the greatest efficiency is promoted when the government interferes least with economic affairs. A sound money (unrestricted gold currency) and democratization (universal suffrage and the secret ballot) were also desirable. Public expenditure was to be limited to minimum essential services. Budgets should balance except where surpluses were needed to liquidate the national debt. One had no less than the authority of Adam Smith that an invisible hand would secure the public good.

A series of revolutionary changes in the structure of the nation brought *laissez-faire* capitalism into flower. The structure of the British nation was such that this occurred with comparative peace. In the United States and France, however, the revolutions were violent. It is a mistake to represent these revolutionary changes as exclusively a revolt against aristocratic society. While the landed aristocrats in many cases had achieved important positions within the growing national states, they were not completely identical with the mercantilistic capitalists. The revolutions that brought *laissez-faire* capitalism into full flower were directed against the mercantilists. Since colonial North America was opened primarily by the mercantilists, the American Revolution represented this revolt in relatively pure form.

The success of the capitalistic revolutions was not to weaken but to strengthen the nations, for they transformed the growing modern nations into more coherent communities. The national governments, as a result, became more representative of the nation as a whole. Economically, the period of *laissez-faire* capitalism coincides with the full development of the age of coal, iron, steel, and the rise of modern mass production. In the United

⁷ Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (New York: Random House, 1937), p. 423.

States, it covers the period from the Revolutionary War to World War I.

SOCIALISM

It is important to keep the ideology and theory of capitalism distinguished from the actual state of the national economy. Under the hypothesis of perfect competition in which the buyers and sellers are so numerous in a free market that no one is able appreciably to influence the prices by individual action, all firms tend to expand their production to the point at which the current price just covers the cost of producing an additional item of the product, all resources (including labor) are fully employed, and costs above a competitive rate of interest and management earnings will vanish. However, this is a remarkably poor description of economic fact. In sections of the American economy where the hypothesis of perfect competition is nearly realized, as in American agriculture, it has not been welcomed as a blessing.

The persistence of agriculture's basic problems—low productivity and unstable prices—has caused farmers to search for ways and means of escaping the disastrous effects which the reign of unbridled competition has, at times, produced in their industry. Finding themselves unable to undermine the adverse aspects of free market pricing by such economic means as were employed by other groups in the economy—patents, tariffs, corporate concentration, restraint of trade, minimum wages, etc.—farmers have exerted their political power to attain some of the same objectives. They have demanded—and in some degree, have received—government protection against the impersonal and “cruel” dictates of the automatic market mechanism.⁸

Government-supported production control in the form of acreage limitations and governmental policies of supporting farm prices at “parity” have been widely adopted. The importance of keeping doctrine and fact distinct is shown by the interesting phenomena that while the field of agriculture is one of the areas of the most persistent doctrinaire *laissez-faire* ideology, the actual facts of American agriculture show a transformation into a form only describable as “socialistic.” The role of the government in agriculture is so extensive as to cause one of America's major rural

⁸ Walter Adams, *The Structure of American Industry* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1950), p. 64.

sociologists to state: "There is scarcely a farmer in the United States at mid-century who is not familiar with the appearance of a federal government check; in 1930 there was scarcely one who was."⁹

It is as important to keep the distinction between socialistic doctrine and the facts of an economy (to which one or another form of the socialistic argument conforms) distinct as it is to keep the actual state of the national economy and the ideologies of mercantilism and *laissez-faire* capitalism distinct. Mercantilism, *laissez-faire* capitalism, and socialism, in fact, may be conceived as the ideological justifications of the strategies of various groups in the course of the development of the national economy.

G. D. H. Cole described socialism as a doctrine and a movement aiming at collective organization of economy by means of common ownership and collective control of the means of production and exchange in the interests of the mass of the people.¹⁰ There is nothing whatsoever inconsistent in describing as "socialistic" various types of activity and legislation that represent forms of government intervention in the economy that were difficult even to anticipate a few generations ago.

When socialism is viewed as an ideal type of economy under collective or political control, in contrast to one under the control of private businessmen operating under *laissez-faire* conditions, the doctrine may be seen to have had ancient anticipations. Plato in *The Republic*, for example, conceived of an aristocratic type of economy under the control of philosopher kings. Campanella's *The City of the Sun* (1623) recovered this ideal. Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516) propagated the conception of an ideal communistic community. Harrington's *Oceana* (1656) rested on the conception of an equal division of property. During the Cromwell Revolution (1649), the Diggers began to cultivate land which did not belong to them, carrying into fact an equivalent idea. In various ways the ideas of public control of the economy sometimes with and sometimes without communistic equality were developed. However, the doctrines of modern socialism belong to the nineteenth century. They arose in response to the industrial revolu-

⁹ Lowry Nelson, *American Farm Life* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 152.

¹⁰ G. D. H. Cole, "Socialism," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 20, p. 888.

tion and the rise of the modern working class which sought to defend itself against the effects of the industrial system. The aggregation of workers in the factories and of factories in industrial towns made the combination of workers a natural device for furthering their ends.

The modern concept of socialism dates to the 1830's, when it was used to describe the teaching of Robert Owen in Great Britain and those of Fourier and Saint-Simon in France. The condition of the new masses under early nineteenth century industrialism was often shockingly bad. As the new workers came to identify their condition with the machine it often led to the violent attacks on the machine itself, as in the case of the Luddites in England after 1811. Robert Owen did not initially have any interest in socialistic reforms; he was an industrialist and philanthropist who thought the evils of industrialism could be mitigated by the elimination of competition and by better education. His program came to form a center for the initiation of labor legislation, trade unionism, cooperative organization, and educational reform. In France Saint-Simon conceived of a new organization for the regulation of economic life based on a new humanitarian religion. Fourier, who has been described as a liberal cooperative socialist, conceived of a plan for building social units like Owen's scheme of villages of cooperation within which a healthy economic life could develop.

These and a variety of other socialist doctrines were brought into some kind of synthesis by Karl Marx and his followers (developed in writings from the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 to *Das Kapital* in 1867) in their so-called "scientific socialism." Socialism was made to rest on the materialist conception of history as a succession of class struggles. Marx (and Engels) maintained that capitalistic society was hopelessly torn between forces that would destroy it, leading the way to a new classless society through an intermediate stage of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Human labor was thought the chief factor in the production of goods—an idea derived from the Ricardian theory of value. Capital was thought to be an aggregate of labor value not consumed in the productive process. From this point of view interest on capital, entrepreneurial profits, and land rent are merely transposed forms of values arising out of the surplus value of labor.

Surplus value arises because the workers produce more than is necessary for their existence. The capitalistic system is a device by which this surplus value is consolidated in the hands of private businessmen.

The state, according to the Marxists, is merely an instrument in the hands of the capitalists for maintaining the system. As the system works there are thought to be three great classes: the capitalists (who own the means of production), the proletariat (non-owners who supply the labor which is the sole source of all new values), and the middle classes (who are partly owners, partly workers). It was predicted that as the tension between the classes grew, the middle class would be destroyed—some few being taken up into the ranks of the capitalists but the majority being demoted to the proletariat. The eventual struggle was considered unavoidable, and the transition to a communistic society was to be made through a dictatorship of the proletariat. Marxian socialism became one of the most influential branches of socialism after 1864 with the formation of Karl Marx's International Working Men's Association (the First International).

When one turns attention away from socialistic doctrine, which exists in a considerable variety of forms to the national economy, it becomes quite clear that the various forms of socialism represent politico-economic strategies within the nation (as mercantilism and *laissez-faire* capitalism had been before them). It is undeniable that a variety of the structural changes in the national economy have corresponded to the changes the socialistic programs have contemplated. Under conditions of perfect competition incomes resulting from pricing policies produced by market values will tend to be equalized, however, the moment that conditions of perfect competition cease to exist, this does not occur. If there were no other source of market distortion, the traditional method of transmitting wealth by inheritance would tend to operate negatively to conditions of perfect competition. The market tends to be structured not by the comparative equality of its participants, but by their inequality. Moreover, though traditional capitalistic theory emphasized the role of saving as the principle basis for the expansion of the physical apparatus of industry, every crisis, especially unemployment, has called saving into question. The withholding of income from spending on con-

sumers' goods is viewed at such time as having a depressing effect on the economy.

As the increasingly severe cyclical depressions became more glaring with their attendant unemployment and waste, there has been increasing force to mitigate the effects of unemployment by public measures. Even, the inner structure of private business tends to undergo change. The entrepreneur declines in importance before the growing body of administrative employees of the large corporation. The same tendency toward bureaucratization is present in labor unions. During periods of great economic crises industry as well as labor has thrown itself on the mercies of the state. Moreover, with the great wars of modern times, the national states have emerged as the most important buyers of industrial products. From many points, thus, the tendencies have been present, leading to the invention of numerous euphemisms for avoidance of the term "socialism," such as "fettered," "regulated," or "guided capitalism," but which permit analysis of the facts.

The common point in the socialist argument is that the conduct of industry for private profit is the source of socially destructive consequences. The common point in the program of the various socialists, according to G. D. H. Cole, is that the major industries and services ought to be brought under coordinated public control; they should be under the state, or local authorities, or under self-governing cooperative societies. The national economy has departed more radically than ever from the models of *laissez-faire* capitalism, which was never approximated with any degree of completeness both because of structural changes from within economic institutions themselves and because of the increased importance of government at all levels of economic life.

If one compares the successive phases of the development of the national economy to those of the city, the rise of the socialist argument and the changes in the economies of the nation-states correspond to those phases in the city economy when the *arti minori* rose against the *arti maggiori*. The period of the patrician domination of the city roughly corresponds to the mercantilistic domination in the nation; that of the domination by the major guilds corresponds to the period of *laissez-faire* capitalism. The economic foundation of the socialist movement has been in the

working class. Socialism has been a component in the organization of the working class and in making its voice felt in economic and political affairs. An enormous variety of organizations, policies, and items of legislation represent the adaptation of the various national economies to the needs of those strata and groups forming the anchorage of the socialistic argument. By and large, it has broadened and deepened the national economy to accommodate it to the requirements of these strata rather than leading to the complete reorganization of economy and society.

SUMMARY

The mastery of nature ranks with socialization as one of the fundamental problems of all societies. An economy is the set of institutions by which a given community achieves its particular mastery of nature. The major communities with their appropriate economies which form the background of American economic life were the village community, the urban community, and the national community with their respective subsistence rural economies, urban economies, and national economies. In the United States all three of these economies have been reproduced. Among the important events in American economic history has been the growth of the national economy at the expense of the village subsistence economy and urban economy.

To a considerable extent the success of the national economy in breaking down the economy of the rural community was a source of new problems. So long as the means for securing equilibrium in the national economy, the repeated break-downs to which it was subject were accompanied by temporary returns by a large proportion of the population to rural economic forms. As the rural economy was destroyed, it was less and less possible for it to serve as a recoil base for the national economy. Thus the depressions became more severe, and the day approached when the problem of achieving equilibrium of the national economy on its own terms had to be faced. A second problem that remains is the harmonious resolution of the conflicting claims of the national and urban economies. To some extent this is the conflict in the United States between big and small business.

The modern national economy was of slow growth; its general stages can be marked by the ideologies which mirrored the at-

tempts within the nation by various special groups to press the national economy into their own exclusive interest: mercantilism, capitalism, and socialism. Mercantilism was the ideology of the enlightened despots, their ministers, and those businessmen who cooperated with them. These groups promoted commerce and industry in a policy centering in a balance of trade intended to increase the cash resources and hence the tax-paying power of the people of the state. Mercantilistic policies helped to pave the way for the fuller development of the national economy represented by the rise of those groups which sustained the ideology of *laissez-faire* capitalism. This was the ideology of private businessmen within the national economy who wished to be free of political interference in their pursuit of their economic interests. Political revolutions considerably increased the power of private businessmen within the affairs of the national states. Private businessmen then were able to pressure the governments for the national and international promotion of private business objectives.

Finally, a new level of coherence in the synthesis of the national economy was marked by the appearance of the socialistic ideology, which was anchored in the working classes and which in its extreme form proposed the transformation of the national economy to accord with their interests. The socialistic argument sometimes took the form of a demand for the socialization of private property and the subjection of economic decisions to central control. All these ideologies—mercantilism, capitalism, and socialism—are extraordinarily poor descriptions of economic fact: they are best viewed as strategies of particular groups within the national economy.

Colonial North America was founded as a product of the policies and interests of English mercantilism. Within a framework provided by English mercantilism in the colonies, village communities and cities were established. Their economies never achieved an equivalent power over and against the American national economy compared to that enjoyed in Europe, where they were traditional community forms. The national economy was dominant in the United States from colonial days. Moreover, the American Revolution was in considerable measure a revolt of private businessmen and yeomen farmers against English com-

mercantilism. The success of the American Revolution, therefore, placed the private businessman in a position of more exclusive strength than he had ever enjoyed in Europe. American economic development falls more completely within the framework of *laissez-faire* capitalism than any other.

However, American private businessmen were nothing if not pragmatic. They avoided from the beginning the idea that the state and the economy should be kept separate, at least so far as it was possible for the private business man to use the state for the development of a banking and monetary system adequate to his needs, for the establishment of protective tariffs that would permit private industry to avoid competition with foreign industry, and so far as it was possible to pressure the government for various grants, gifts, and subsidies. American capitalism, thus, from the beginning pressed many of the devices of the mercantilists into the interest of the private businessman. Moreover, there is little doubt that the fabulous gifts of natural resources made by the federal government to industry were a component in its growth. It is calculated that the railroads alone received over 150,000,000 acres of land and that the government sustained no less than 60 per cent of the cost of building them.

The idea that the economy can be separated from the rest of the nation has never been in accord with American experience, for business has never hesitated to use political means to advance its interests. In the long run other than business groups have also turned to politics for the source of strength to promote their interests. This was increasingly the case of agriculture beginning most seriously with the Granger movement after the Civil War. It was also true for labor, though labor did not find a major political sponsor until the 1930's. The element determining access by a group to political assistance in promoting its economic welfare was simply its voting power.

Though at times radical movements have shaken the ranks of farmers and laborers (like the Greenback movement among the farmers or the I.W.W. among the workers), both groups have preferred to work within the economy rather than outside it. In the case of labor (as John R. Commons and Selig Perlman demonstrated), coherent and continued growth was possible only when labor avoided the trap of radical political action. American la-

borers have never been dissatisfied with America, only with some aspects of their particular condition.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. What is meant by an economy? Illustrate by the economy of preliterates.

2. Discuss the proposition: depression in time of economic plenty indicates the failure of the economy to evolve into a stable system.
3. Discuss the proposition: the increasing severity of depression during the 19th and 20th centuries indicates the increasing detachment of the national economy from a subsistence base.
4. How did the medieval urban economy differ from the modern national economy?
5. In what sense are mercantilism, capitalism, and socialism stages in the development of the national economy?
6. How do mercantilism, capitalism, and socialism as ideologies differ from mercantilism, capitalism, and socialism as stages in the national economy?
7. What changes in the structure of the modern nation were favorable to *laissez-faire* capitalism?
8. What is the difference between modern conceptions of socialism and ancient types?
9. Outline the main elements of Marxian socialism.
10. To what structural properties of the national economy is socialism addressed?
11. How did the American Revolution transform the economy?
12. In the pre-Civil War period what factors in the American economy promoted mechanization?
13. At the time of the Civil War outline the main economic ties and antagonisms between the sections of the country.
14. Outline the mechanization of agriculture after the Civil War. How do you account for it?
15. Trace the rise of industry after the Civil War. What factors were primarily responsible for it?
16. Why was the Federal Reserve system established? What was it intended to do? How was it to accomplish this?
17. What are the primary effects of war on labor? Illustrate your answer.
18. Why did the American Federation of Labor succeed where other labor movements in America failed?
19. Why did the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization fuse in 1955?

THE MASTERY OF NATURE: THE STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY

Colonial North America was established as a by-product of North European mercantilism. Plantation capitalism evolved in the South, while largely self-sufficient village communities developed in the North. Only a rudimentary structure of cities developed in colonial days, but they reflected the conflicting economic claims of local civic groups *versus* English mercantilistic interests. American economic development came at the time of the formation of the national economies of the western world.

The Revolution that established the political autonomy of the United States was the political counterpart of economic changes both in Europe and in North America which were to bring the private capitalist to the center of the national economy. The political doctrines of the private business man in Europe reflected his initially inferior political status: they vindicated his demand for freedom from all forms of political influence except those necessary for the defense and policing of the state. In North America the private businessmen found themselves in the political saddle as a result of the successful revolution. The contrast between their economic theories (for they subscribed to the doctrine of *laissez-faire* capitalism) and their actual political situation was not without irony. Why should one demand that the state mind its own business, when the state's business is one's own? However, Alexander Hamilton and his followers were too practical to

permit discrepancies between theory and practice to stand in the way of their efficacy. While subscribing to the theories of the *laissez-faire* capitalists, they used their position to turn the former policies of the mercantilists to the benefit of the private business men.

THE UNITED STATES AS A PURE CASE OF
LAISSEZ-FAIRE CAPITALISM

The United States, thus, represents a relatively pure case of a development of *laissez-faire* capitalism; it was less opposed by alternative economic formations than was any other. Despite the lip service paid to the separation of economy and government, the devices of mercantilism were used to protect and spur American industry. The private business men in America looked to the federal government for free gifts of America's fabulous resources, and at times, subsidies as well. The railroads, for example, received gifts of land (with all attendant resources) of an area larger than the State of Texas, and larger than the combined area of England and France.

A number of trends characterized the American economy in the nineteenth century: the settlement of the west tremendously expanded the potential markets for industrial products; industry continued to move from the home to the factory; as they ceased to produce things at home, the farmers had a re-doubled need for markets for their farm products, leading the east and west to exercise conflicting pulls on the financial structure of the economy. The plantation South and industrial North moved ever closer to antagonism and finally into the Civil War. Accompanying the increasing concentration of the population into cities was a proliferation of small businesses; however, larger combinations of business and industry began to bring order out of the competitive chaos of small concerns and industries. The formation of the modern laboring class got under way and found it increasingly necessary to organize for its protection; and the farmers also found it necessary to organize and to promote their interests by political pressure.

If one means by *laissez-faire* capitalism a system in which the rigorous separation of the economy from politics is maintained

and in which the regulation of economic life is brought about by a scheme of perfect competition, it is quite clear that such a system has never existed in the United States. One of the major pressures played on government has come from private businessmen, but major industrial and commercial formations have been hailed as splendid examples of free enterprise. It is estimated that at least 60 per cent of the cost of building the railroads was borne by the public. In accord with this conception of capitalism attempts by farmers or laborers to wield political power in their interests have been denounced as socialism.

As descriptions of economic fact, mercantilism, capitalism, and socialism have all been quite inappropriate. They are ideologies and the strategies of special groups rather than economic realities. The epitomy of nonsense is reached when even professional economists bewail the disappearance of *laissez-faire* capitalism in the United States, for how can one lose what never existed? Similarly, the terrors of socialism in America (when this is taken to be the reorganization of society exclusively in the interests of the laborer) are the fears of a non-existent prospect. The American laborer has been dominated by a middle class psychology and has been in a scramble to get into the middle class or, if he could not make it, to provide educational opportunities so that his children could. J. R. Commons and Selig Perlman have shown that the American laborer accepts his society and only wishes to improve his lot and better the chances of his children with it. American economic institutions appear in an intelligent light only when the ideologies of "mercantilism," "capitalism," and "socialism" are dropped as explanations of it.

THE AMERICAN ECONOMY AS A NATIONAL ECONOMY

American economic life becomes fully intelligible only when one starts with the assumption that it is a *national* economy. An economy is a set of behaviors forming the particular kind of mastery of nature of a community. Until one specifies the community to which it is appropriate, the description of an economy remains incomplete. The community establishes the particular set of requirements to which the mastery of nature is adjusted; the economies of the peasant village and the city, respectively, were

determined by the respective needs of these community types. The economic policy of the village community determined the economic means and ends from the apportionment of labor to the fixing of customary prices. The economic policy of the Renaissance city also tried to regulate all internal and external economic affairs, but in terms of the peculiar needs of the city.

Capitalism did not create the national economy. As a new economic strategy, it found itself at odds with the first general form of economic policy of the growing nation-states, mercantilism. Capitalism's exponents occasionally formulated the strange notion that an economy can operate in isolation from other features of a society. This has, at times, led to two novel consequences: the failure to recognize the fact that the nation is the appropriate community for a capitalistic economy, and to astonishment when various ties between economic and other aspects of the nation are discovered. Economic life is shaped not only by the business codes, union rules, and trade practices that grow up immediately within economic circles, but also by the statutory laws, common law, court decisions, government regulations, and the general rules and claims arising out of other spheres of activity. There is no area of social life without potential bearing on economic activity. How intimate is the relation between economic and political aspects of the nation is shown by such studies as Commons' *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*¹ and Thorstein Veblen's studies of the influence of prestige-striving on economic behavior.

Occasionally the disappearance of *laissez-faire* capitalism is bewailed; but, when a real crisis comes, all pretense of the independence of the economy from the government is abandoned. Even the business groups of the United States, frankly cast themselves on the mercies of government during the Great Depression. The Teapot Dome scandals show to what lengths business was willing to go to secure government-controlled resources. However, within ten years, as the editors of the Ickes diary notes, the oil industry was to plead for government regulation of their business.

¹ John R. Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924). Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: Macmillan, 1912).

The oil industry was among the first to press for Government controls in 1933, although there were wide differences of opinion within the industry as to the desirable extent of these controls.²

Within a few weeks representatives of the coal industry were also ready to cast themselves on the mercy of the federal government. In his diary Ickes wrote on April 21, 1933:

I had two interesting visits from representatives of the coal industry today. . . . They are asking for a bill setting up what amounts to a federal coal director. They want the Federal Government to take over the industry, establish minimum wages, regulate output, and set a minimum price.³

After repeated visits from the coal operators, Ickes attended the annual dinner of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States on May 4, 1933. Afterward he wrote in his diary:

The great and the mighty in the business world were there in force, and I couldn't help thinking how so many of these great and mighty were crawling to Washington on their hands and knees these days to beg the Government to run their businesses for them.⁴

Galbraith maintains that both American businessmen and economists have what he describes as a "depression psychosis."⁵ It began with the stock market crash of 1929. In two years the value of national production was cut in half, and the number of unemployed rose from 2,000,000 in 1929 to 12,000,000. Hundreds of thousands of formerly well-to-do citizens were unemployed or lived in fear of it. The bankrupt banker became a familiar figure as the unemployed worker. The depression evaporated in the war economy of the forties. Galbraith maintains that the depression stands as a national experience on the level with the Civil War. In contrast to it, World War II did not impress the majority of Americans very deeply, for only a minority experienced the homesickness, fear, and mutilation of the fighting soldier. So deep was the experience of the depression, however, that nearly every major business enterprise after World War II lived in the expectation of a major slump.

² *The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The First Thousand Days, 1933-1936* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1954), p. 13.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁵ Galbraith, *op. cit.*, pp. 67 ff.

Prior to the Great Depression it was conventional for businessmen and economists alike to justify economic activity in terms of the theories of the classical economists (Adam Smith, Ricardo, and Mill).⁶ The key to this system was the conception of "competition." It required that there be a considerable number of buyers and sellers in any trade or industry, each well informed as to the prices at which others were buying or selling. No buyer or seller may be large enough to exercise appreciable control of the common price. Theoretically, this situation leads to the full use of materials and labor, to an allocation of resources between present and future production, and to adoption of more efficient methods of production. It was impossible, according to the classical model of a competitive economy, for a progressive reduction in spending to get under way; that is, for a depression to occur. The competitive model guaranteed social efficiency and prohibited the possibility of severe depression. Moreover, according to Galbraith, it solved the difficult problem of power. No single individual, according to the theory, could wield an appreciable influence on the market, and the government was excluded from influence. Thus democracy could never be threatened either by economic or by political concentrations of power.

THE RATIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE
ON THE ECONOMY

This was a rationalization of the economic and political position of some groups rather than a description of the actual state of affairs. It became ever more remote from economic reality as time went on until finally, in the Great Depression, even the rationalization lost its plausibility. The significance of John Maynard Keynes' writings for modern economists and businessmen was in providing the conventional economists with a basis for interpreting depression. Keynes, who knew that he was departing from conventional interpretations, suggested that depression and unemployment were just as "normal" as full employment.⁷ In Galbraith's formulation, Keynes destroyed the assumptions in-

⁶ John Kenneth Galbraith, *American Capitalism*, *op. cit.*, and *The Affluent Society* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1958).

⁷ John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1936). See the summary by Galbraith, *op. cit.*, pp. 70 ff.

volved in Say's law that production provided the purchasing power to buy whatever was produced. In the classical concept of competition, the failure in spending that must, by definition, arise from saving was taken care of by the interest rate. Presumably, when savings were large and the prospects of new capital investment unfavorable, the interest rate falls, discouraging savers and encouraging investors.

Keynes detached the theory of interest from the supply and demand of savings, arguing that saving arises not from the interest rate but from the public's desire to hold money. This destroyed the argument for an equilibrium at full employment. What people try to save from any given volume of income is less subject to change than why business concerns may seek new investments. Low production and high unemployment were caused, Keynes believed, by insufficient investment. This led him to the position that public spending is the only true remedy for this recurrent condition of insufficient investment.

Keynes' impact on economic thought has been profound. In the thirties the United States urgently needed a new theory of the relation of government to economic life; Keynes provided such a theory. The nature of government intervention in economic affairs was defined by the idea of an excess of saving or deficiency of investment. Public borrowing and spending could take up the slack of deficient private investment aimed at absorbing savings and raising the level of output and employment. The government was therefore made the indispensable partner of business. The system also opened the way for a vast expansion of government services and activities. The ancient doctrine of thrift was brought into question. High profits and high personal incomes lost much of their justification for, by leveling income, one could reduce the amount of savings to be offset by investment at full employment.

When the relation between economic and political behavior had been so dramatically affirmed, the concept of a national economy was introduced into economic thinking. By insisting on the separation of economy and society, the classical economists obscured the intimacy of the relation between capitalism and the national economy. Meanwhile, the actual power of the businessman in national affairs permitted the use of national political

power in promoting business interests on an international scale (imperialism). Since business was also being carried on internationally, this could easily obscure the significant fact that specific national configurations of politico-economic interests were at work. The socialists were subject to the same myopia. By calling for international labor organization, they helped blur still further the tie between capitalism and a national economy. And so, in World War I, there was great dismay in socialist and communist ranks over the fact that in the crisis of national war the laborers of the various countries of Europe were quite loyal to their respective nations. In major crises people are loyal to the communities to which they belong. Thus Keynes' program of the cooperation between government and industry helped restore insight into the closeness between economy and society that had, in fact, always existed.

Since the spending required to bring investment into balance with saving could only be carried out on a national scale, the Keynesian system required measures of the national economy and estimates of its efficiency. Keynes' system provided a foundation for the measurement of economic behavior in terms of changes in the total national product.⁸ The concept of gross national product had come into general use by the beginning of World War II and served as a guide for mobilization policies. The new method of national accounting permitted formulation of a production program covering military and civilian use and the allocation of resources for immediate use and for investment.

BUSINESS

With some exceptions, the tendency in most areas of American business is for the number of firms to decline, leaving the field occupied by a few powerful concerns. This is typical in business concerned with the automobile, chemicals, farm implements, liquor, and radio as well as for those dealing with steel, tobacco, and rubber. Entry into an industry is easy only when it is new. Firms grow with an industry and realize the advantages of large-scale production. They also gain valuable experience in time. In good times it is easy for businesses to finance consolidations; in

⁸ Galbraith, *op. cit.*, pp. 79 ff.

bad times the weaklings fail and drop away. The time comes when a few great firms and a fringe of smaller ones represent the industry.

The power of the large concerns, on the one hand, and the clear violation they represent of competitive models of the economy, on the other, made them natural targets for groups finding themselves at a disadvantage in bargaining with them. America has, as a result, a long experience with anti-trust policies.⁹ The modern form of big business began to take shape after the Civil War. In 1879 the Standard Oil Company of Ohio adopted the legal form of the trust (whereby stockholders surrendered their shares and voting power to managing trustees in return for dividend-paying trust certificates). Standard Oil achieved a vast consolidation.¹⁰ The device was employed in sugar, whiskey, and other combinations. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act was passed in 1890. However, few cases were initiated, and in 1895 the Supreme Court ruled that the American Sugar Refining Company's monopoly did not fall under the statute dealing with commerce. From 1893 to 1897 a great merger movement got under way. In 1897 there were 84 new combinations with a capital stock of \$1,000,000,000. Between 1898 and 1902 there were 189 combinations with a capital stock of \$4,000,000,000. In 1904 the Supreme Court ordered its first dissolution of a monopoly under the Sherman Act—the Northern Securities decision which split up the Great Northern-Northern Pacific railroad combination of Edward H. Hariman, James J. Hill, and J. P. Morgan.

A crusade against trusts was launched by Theodore Roosevelt, and was continued under President Taft. In 1911 the Supreme Court dissolved the Standard Oil and American Tobacco company trusts. In 1914 the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act were passed. The same statutes exempted labor and farm organizations from the anti-trust laws. However, from 1915 to 1935 the attack on trusts flagged. The Department of Justice's drive on the largest of all, the United States Steel Corporation (1920) was thrown out by the Supreme Court for lack of proof

⁹ Simon N. Whitney, *Anti-Trust Policies* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958).

¹⁰ See Ida M. Tarbell, *The Nationalizing of Business* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936).

that it had abused its power. After 1938 under Thurman W. Arnold the most vigorous return to anti-trust opposition in American history was begun with an average of 69 suits filed per year.

In Whitney's study of the large corporation, the general ineffectiveness of anti-trust legislation was once again confirmed.

The majority of industries studied conform to the typical American structure—production of well over half the output by a handful of large corporations and of the rest by a number of small firms. Bituminous coal and cotton textiles were exceptions, with their largest corporations controlling a much smaller percentage of the output; but even here the merger movement is in process of creating the typical structure. At the other extreme, one company makes 80 to 90 per cent of shoe machinery of different types; one makes half the passenger cars and has only four competitors; and one makes 40 per cent of the primary aluminum and has only three competitors.¹¹

Corporations of the modern type first appeared as trading enterprises requiring large amounts of capital and subject to great risks. The corporation is a legal structure with a legal personality and the right to hold property, enter into legal arrangements, and conduct business in its own name. It is liable for its financial obligations; the shareholders in it have liability limited only to the stock they hold. The corporations are the fictitious persons which carry on the great bulk of modern business.

The corporation as the most important form of modern business organization accounts for more than 80 per cent of the total production of goods, workers employed, and wages paid.¹² The first of the major studies of the growth of the modern corporation was made by Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means.¹³ These men examined the proportion of national wealth, industrial wealth, and corporate assets owned by the 200 largest non-financial corporations of the United States, and concluded that

¹¹ Whitney, Simon N., *Anti-Trust Policies* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), vol. II, p. 403.

¹² David Lynch, *The Concentration of Economic Power* (New York: 1946), p. 9.

¹³ Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932). The Federal Trade Commission, *The Concentration of Productive Facilities* (Washington: U. S. Govt. Prt. Off., 1949).

these corporations held 57 per cent of the total assets of such corporations. The study by the Federal Trade Commission showed that in 1947 the 110 largest manufacturing corporations owned 46 per cent of the property, plants, and equipment used in manufacturing in the United States.

Among the interesting aspects of the corporation are the consolidation of business into decreasing numbers of hands and the separation of ownership and control involved.¹⁴ The ties between ownership and management vary from the extreme concentration of ownership and management in the Ford Motor Company to the wide diffusion of ownership found in the American Telephone & Telegraph Company.¹⁵ In 115 industries the median holding by officers and directors was 3.45 per cent. For 38 public utilities, it was 0.52 per cent; and for 23 railroads, it was 0.38 per cent. In 63 companies, the officers and directors owned less than one per cent of the voting stock. This has been interpreted as a consequence of the stockholders' refusal to accept the responsibilities of ownership.¹⁶ It has also been taken as foreshadowing a great revolution in modern society in which the managers take over other functions of modern business.¹⁷ There seems to be little merit in either of these ideas, though they help call attention to the fact that the motivations of the directors and managers of modern corporations are very different from those of the owners.

The modern corporation is a structure of economic, social, and political power. It is completely inaccurate to conceive of it as a merchant acting in a market. In a business economy organized by a comparatively few corporations prices are not determined by the market; they are administered by specific decisions of the firm to change its prices.¹⁸ The corporation will often resist raising its prices though market conditions would advise this if the

¹⁴ See Peter F. Drucker, *The Concept of the Corporation* (New York: John Day Company, 1946); George B. Hurff, *Social Aspects of Enterprise in the Large Corporation* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950).

¹⁵ R. A. Gordon, *Business Leadership in the Large Corporation* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1945).

¹⁶ Peter Drucker, *The Future of Industrial Man* (New York: John Day & Co., 1942), pp. 80 ff.

¹⁷ James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution* (New York: John Day & Co., 1941), pp. 77 ff.

¹⁸ Galbraith, *The Affluent Society*, *op. cit.*, pp. 216 ff.

state of its public reputation makes this inadvisable. And, on the contrary, it often raises its prices in the face of a declining demand. Business is increasingly concentrated in the large corporations which operate on quite different principles from those presupposed in classical economic theory. In many respects it is far more like a political party, and its officers are much more like politicians than they are like the traditional models of the business man.

LABOR

The labor force in the United States increased from 12,900,000 in 1870 to more than 60,000,000 in 1949. The decline in paid work by the young is not limited to children under 14 years, for there had been a considerable decline in the number of workers aged 14 to 19. On the other hand, there has been an increasing percentage of women in paid jobs, reflecting the increase in industrialism, the decrease in the size of families, and the simplification of house-keeping. The percentage of women in the labor force increased from 18.1 per cent in 1900 to 24.4 per cent in 1940. During the war the number of women in the labor force rose from 14,200,000 to 19,400,000.¹⁹

It has rarely been true in American history that the individual laborer and the individual employer have had anything like equal bargaining power. Their equality was only nominal, as one mouse facing one elephant. With the growing consolidation of industry after the Civil War, the inequality became even more extensive. Business was in a position to make much greater use of the legal and political apparatus against labor, and was in a position to manipulate immigrant laborers to prevent worker combinations. Nevertheless, by 1904 union membership reached 2,000,000. The lot of the unions continued to be difficult, and in 1930 union membership was at a mere 2,800,000, less than 10 per cent of the number of the country's non-farm employees. Important developments in American labor unions have occurred since 1935. In 1950 there were from 14,000,000 to 16,000,000 men and women in unions—about one out of every three non-farm workers.

¹⁹ W. S. Woytinsky and Associates, *Employment and Wages in the United States* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953).

The unions flourished during World War I, expanding from 2,600,000 to 5,000,000 million between 1915 and 1920. Much of this increase, however, was inflation. When employment in war plants declined, so did the number of union members. Union membership dropped to 3,600,000 by 1923. The period from 1924 to 1933 was one of stagnation. Among the major causes were the aggressive labor policies of large firms, the more general application of mass production techniques, and the declining demand for the kind of craftsmen who had made up the bulk of union membership, the creation of a labor surplus of skilled workers by technological unemployment, the decline of the textile and bituminous coal industries (formerly union strongholds), and the movement of parts of these industries to non-union regions, and the unsuitability of craft unionism to the growing mass-producing industries.²⁰ The prolonged mass unemployment of the early 1930's led to a re-evaluation of the role of labor in the economy.

A radical change of official policy toward labor was manifest when Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (July, 1935). The Wagner Act, which sought to promote equality of bargaining between employers and employees, forbade employers to interfere with the employees' right to collective bargaining, to refuse to bargain collectively, to dominate or interfere with the formation of a labor union, or to discriminate against a man because of his union membership. To enforce the act, a National Labor Relations Board was set up. The findings of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor under Robert M. La Follette put on record the facts concerning the use of labor spies, strike breakers, the use of tear gas and deadly weapons by employers, and the abridgement of free speech and assembly in company-owned towns. The general public was in sympathy with the National Labor Relations Board.

A decade of favorable labor legislation ended with the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, a measure prohibiting union contributions for political purposes. In 1946 the Lea Act forbade "feather-bedding" practices of the Musicians Union. In the same year the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act sought to curb some of the

²⁰ Woytinsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 235-236.

activities of the Teamsters' Union. This type of legislation came to a head in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 which re-wrote the National Labor Relations Act. It forbade certain "unfair" labor practices against which employers, workers, and other unions might appeal to a new N.L.R.B. set up by the act. Under its provisions no one could interfere with the right of a person not to join a union and union discrimination against a non-union member was forbidden. A union could not refuse to bargain collectively; some strikes and secondary boycotts were defined as unfair labor practices. Unions with union-shop contracts were forbidden to charge "excessive or discriminatory" initiation fees. Sixty days notice was required before a union with a contract could strike. Each national and local union was required to file its constitution, by-laws, annual financial statement, and the names and salaries of its officials with the N.L.R.B. Every officer of a local or national union had to file a sworn statement that he was not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with it, and that he did not believe in the overthrow of the government by force or by illegal or unconstitutional means. The Taft-Hartley Act revived and encouraged the use of the injunction in labor disputes; it was a serious blow to labor.

The main kinds of unions are *craft* (locals made up of workers who perform the same operation, *i.e.*, bricklayers), *trade* (groupings according to the materials with which men work, such as wood, metal, *i.e.*, sheet metal workers), and *industrial* (workers necessary to the production of a given commodity organized into a single union regardless of the work they do, *i.e.*, the United Automobile Workers or the United Mine Workers of America). There is no uniform pattern for the unions of the United States. Until they merged into the A.F.L. and C.I.O. in 1955, there were three major groups: the A.F.L., the C.I.O., and the Railroad Brotherhoods. The first two were federations of various types.

As in the case of business and government, there has been an irreversible trend toward the centralization of power in American unionism.²¹ The fact that it has to face the large concentrations of industry pressed unionism toward centralized control.

²¹ Robert R. R. Brooks, *When Labor Organizes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), pp. 245 ff.; Paul Sultan, *Labor Economics* (Henry Holt & Co., 1957), pp. 252 ff.

The early unions collected membership dues for benefits, strike relief, organizing costs, official salaries, and overhead. When coordinating agencies appeared to provide national bases for action, the officers pressed for an extension of financial power. This led to the adoption of *per capita* taxes by which the local union pays a fixed amount per member every month or quarter to the national union. By the threat of suspension or expulsion of the local, denial of insurance, strike, or other benefits, and granting representation in national conventions on the basis of *per capita* tax payments, the nationals forced the transfer of financial powers to the national body.

Back of all of this was the need by labor to meet the expanding area of competition exaggerated by labor and industrial mobility. The nationals define a "fair policy" for the worker (one uniform for workers similarly located elsewhere) coordinating policy for the local and pull resources of a large labor group for research and theory. The nationals build up strike funds to help locals and publicize the demands of labor. With the entry of the state and federal government in the determination of security programs, both business and labor attempt to control the conditions under which government grants are made.

It should not be assumed that the increasing bureaucratization of the union structure has only negative effects. Many of the union abuses are not so much the product of bureaucracy proper as of the period preceding the formation of a bureaucracy. They represent, in part, abuses that the bureaucratization is intended to eliminate or control in the same manner that civil service in government was directed against the inefficiencies of the patronage system.

The bureaucratization of union structure and the formation of large concentrations of union power belong to the same general process. The original split between the AFL and the CIO occurred in 1934, when John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers insisted that the organization of the mass production industries receive greater attention. When the split was carried through in 1936, the CIO rapidly extended its influence. Attempts were begun in 1939 to consolidate the two groups, but failed, though in 1940 John L. Lewis stepped down from the presidency of the

CIO. Lewis became increasingly hostile toward the CIO, withdrawing his United Mine Workers from it in 1942. However, the AFL and the CIO were still unable to get together.

The negative attitude of the public toward labor in the post-war period led to a new move for merger of the organizations in 1947, though the two union organizations did not become genuinely receptive to the prospect until 1949-1950, when the AFL established its Labor's League for Political Action (recognizing the need for an abandonment of political neutralism and entry into active political pressure), and the CIO expelled eleven unions on charges of Communist domination. The deaths of William Green and Philip Murray in 1952 provided the occasion for renewed discussion of unification. The CIO demanded as prerequisites of merger that the CIO principle of industrial unionism be accepted, that machinery to settle industrial strife be agreed upon, that racial discrimination be opposed, and racketeering eliminated. In 1953 the AFL revoked the charter of the International Longshoreman's Union because of racketeering. The federation was achieved in 1955.²²

Thus, as larger and larger combinations of business appeared, there was a somewhat slower growth of combinations of labor. The encounters between these giants vary from negotiations to industrial warfare. There is no question that the presence of the union radically restricts the freedom of the market. So does the corporation.

WHITE COLLAR LABOR: SALARIED EMPLOYEES AND INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONALS

Salaried Employees. Not all types of labor have been unionized to the same degree. In 1956 there were around 70,000,000 persons 14 years old and over in the labor force, while 97,000,000 persons were not.²³ There were more than 21,000,000 women in the labor force. Some 6,000,000 persons were in agriculture.

²² Joel Seidman, "Efforts toward Merger: 1935-1955," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 9, no. 3 (April, 1956), pp. 353-370. For a summary of the developments, see Sultan, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-171.

²³ For an analysis of the labor force, see Gertrude Bancroft, *The American Labor Force* (New York: John Wiley, 1958).

EMPLOYMENT BY TYPE OF INDUSTRY 1956 *

<i>Type of Industry</i>	<i>No. of Workers (in thousands)</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
Total	64,979	100.0
Agriculture	6,585	10.1
Wage and salary	1,692	2.6
Self-employed	3,570	5.5
Unpaid family workers	1,323	2.0
Non-agricultural Industries	58,394	89.9
Wage and salary	51,877	79.9
Self-employed	5,936	9.1
Unpaid family workers	581	0.9

* U. S. Bureau of Census: *Current Population Reports*, Series P-50, No. 72, Table 12.

There has been a growing body of persons in salaried occupations.

MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS: 1955 *

<i>Occupational Group</i>	<i>Per Cent Employed in an Average Week</i>
Professional, technical	9.2
Farmers and farm managers	6.0
Managers, officials, and proprietors (except farm)	10.2
Clerical workers	13.3
Sales workers	6.3
Craftsmen, foremen	13.2
Operatives	20.2
Private household workers	3.1
Service workers (except private household workers)	8.2
Farm laborers and foremen	4.5
Laborers (except farm and mine)	5.8

* U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-50, No. 67.

With the development of modern service and advertising techniques, this group of white collar persons has grown in size. It appears destined to increase further with each new development of automation.

The bargaining position of these groups in contemporary society is weak because of the overwhelming lack of unionism in their

ranks. This has led liberals, such as Galbraith, to amused cynicism.

There are . . . unorganized urban workers, those on the fringes of the labor movement, and perhaps most important of all, occupational categories which, in the past, have foresworn efforts to develop economic power. School teachers, clerical workers, municipal employees and civil servants have generally avoided organization as something not quite genteel or because it was believed that employers and the community at large would recognize their importance and pay accordingly.²⁴

Mills, who has analyzed this group at some length in *White Collar*, feels nothing for them but contempt.

They are worried and distrustful but . . . they have no targets on which to focus their worry and distrust. They may be politically irritable, but they have no political passion. They are a chorus, too afraid to grumble, too hysterical in their applause. They are rear-guarders. In the shorter run, they will follow the panicky ways of prestige; in the longer run, they will follow the ways of power, for, in the end, prestige is determined by power. In the meantime, on the political market-place of American society, the new middle classes are up for sale; whoever seems respectable enough, strong enough, can probably have them. So far, nobody has made a serious bid.²⁵

Galbraith seems to be of the opinion that the time is rapidly approaching when the white collar workers will organize. When they do, and possess some power of their own, perhaps Mills will find them more tolerable.

Independent Professionals. The independent professionals are in a somewhat different situation from the salaried employees. In the formative period of the modern national economies a number of forces were at work that tended vastly to increase the number of independent professionals. During the earliest period of the national state, the typical position of the lawyer was as a part of the permanent staff of the state or the church. However, when the proliferation of a large and growing class of private businessmen occurred outside the spheres of the church and state, a tremendous expansion of legal requirements also occurred. Small private

²⁴ Galbraith, *American Capitalism*, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

²⁵ C. Wright Mills, *White Collar* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 353-354.

businessmen often had no need and could not afford to place a lawyer permanently on their staffs, but they did have need for legal services from time to time. A vast multiplication of private lawyers who went into business for themselves occurred.

Many of the independent professions have arisen as fragments of former non-economic institutions. They assume an economic form under the conditions of modern society, but show a very incomplete adaptation to the classical model of economic behavior. Various kinds of privileged communications and forms of knowledge are available to lawyers and doctors. They are in a position to charge sliding-scales of prices. The patient or client is not permitted to be a pure "buyer."

At times the independent professions have formed professional societies which operate in much the same manner as a labor union or business association. Perhaps the most powerful of all is the American Medical Association, a federation of fifty-four state and territorial medical associations. From the time of its organization in 1857 to 1939 it grew to 114,000 members. It has vigorously promoted an independent medical profession.

The status of the independent professional is rapidly changing. In many cases, he is being transformed into a salaried employee. In rather scathing terms, Mills describes the transformation of the independent medical practitioner into a salaried employee in the pay of a large hospital or other institution, and the transposition of the independent lawyer into a bureaucratic cog in the law factory.²⁶

In 1950 there were 5,400,000 farms in the United States, of which 3,700,000 were commercial. The 1,700,000 non-commercial farms produced only about 2.5 per cent of the farm items sold commercially. Around 100,000 large-scale commercial farms had sales of \$25,000 or more. There were 380,000 large family-size farms with sales of from \$10,000 to \$24,000, and 720,000 medium-size family commercial farms with sales of products totaling from \$5,000 to \$10,000. The commercial family farm has increasingly turned into a relatively pure form of factory enterprise. The large-scale, non-family, commercial farm is a relatively small affair.

As American agriculture moved into the sphere of the market

²⁶ C. Wright Mills, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-141.

which it could not influence by its buying and selling, beginning with the Grange movement, it increasingly turned to politics. The farmers were more instrumental in forcing passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act than labor and the middle class urban groups. In the 1920's and early 1930's, the American farmers thought that marketing cooperatives were the answer to their needs for adequate bargaining power. However, market cooperatives have fatal structural weaknesses; they rarely include all producers of the product and they do not have complete control over their own members. Purchasing cooperatives are in better position.

The proposal for remedying the structural defects of the market cooperative was contained in the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929. The Federal Farm Board undertook to capitalize a system of national cooperatives, supported by government stabilization corporations. The farmers would then be represented in the market by one or a few powerful sellers with a power like that enjoyed by the steel companies, automobile companies, or the Aluminum Company of America. Galbraith observes: "Faced with the need for doing something for the farmer, the obvious course to Mr. Hoover and his colleagues was to remake the farmer as nearly as possible in the image of the typical industrial corporation."²⁷ The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and later legislation eliminated the technical weaknesses that had led to the failure of earlier voluntary or government-aided efforts.

SUMMARY

One fundamental way in which the development of the American economy deviated from the classical economic concept of capitalism was in the lack of a separation of the economy and politics.

After the Civil War there was a rapid growth of industrial combinations, leaving one area after the other in a single or few hands, a condition sometimes described as semi-monopoly or oligopoly. Despite the fact that actions against industrial combinations were ineffectual, the presence of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act permitted the illusions that, at least in principle, something could be done about it. With the prolonged depression of the

²⁷ Galbraith, *American Capitalism*, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

1930's and the frank and overt manner in which all groups, including business, cast themselves on the mercy of the government, businessmen and economists have been led to accept the view that neither the separation of government from business nor the existence in business of the classical type of competition adequately describes the state of the contemporary national economy. Many economists have come to accept Keynes' view that only sufficient government spending to take up the difference between savings and investment will keep the economy from plunging periodically into depression. Moreover, it has become increasingly clear that where a state of oligopoly exists, prices are not fixed in a competitive market but are administered in terms that often have little to do with purely market considerations.

In various ways Commons and Galbraith have tended to converge in their interpretation of these developments in the American economy. For Commons, the economy is not just an economic but a social organization, a way in which participants act regularized and controlled by working rules. Individuals are what they are by participation in the going concerns of which they are members (these going concerns control, liberate, and expand individual action). The twentieth century, to Commons, is a century of collective action. The three predominant forms of organization are corporations, trade unions, and political parties. It is in actions taken in their name that the focus economic and political conflicts locate. Three kinds of transactions epitomize modern economic life—bargaining, rationing, and managerial transactions.²⁸

Galbraith works out from and beyond Lord Keynes, and comes to essentially the same conclusion. He assumes that one must accept two fundamental propositions as fixed (the first established by Keynes): modern government must be a permanent party to economic activity (taking up the slack between savings and investment) if depression is to be avoided, and the competitive model of economic behavior is inappropriate to an age of oligopoly. There are values in oligopoly, according to Galbraith, not contemplated in the old competitive model of economic behavior, in that it provides for research and technical innovation in a way

²⁸ John R. Commons, *The Economics of Collective Action* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1950).

foreign to the classical theory.²⁹ Moreover, Galbraith is not disturbed by the excited salesmanship of modern business. To him, it is merely a rather amusing by-product of an affluent society.³⁰

There are two ways in which, in going beyond Keynes, Galbraith's views coincide with those of Commons. He maintains that while Keynes provided techniques to avoid depression he did not adequately provide for avoidance of inflation, which, he urges, destroys the entire system. It is Galbraith's view that only a great increase in centralized political control of economic activity in inflationary times can do this. This is similar to Commons' view that in the twentieth century rational and managerial transactions have become more important. Moreover, Galbraith has advanced the theory that the economic behaviors are not a product of marketing decisions but of negotiations between countervailing powers. The most important of all economic decisions, thus, are matters of negotiation, and bargaining (between labor unions and corporations, between professional associations and political bodies, and the like). Increasing political activity in economic areas and countervailing powers are the central points of his theory.

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²⁹ Galbraith, *American Capitalism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 89 ff.

³⁰ See Chapter VIII, "The Unseen Economics of Opulence," in Galbraith, *American Capitalism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 101 ff. However, Galbraith does not find the business so amusing when he contemplates the fact that one can be a great public benefactor by supplying toilet seats to schools, but is looked upon as a crank if one wishes to improve the teaching service. See *The Affluent Society*.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. How do you account for the fact that American labor has always rejected socialistic theories?
2. Why has John Maynard Keynes been of importance to American businessmen and economists?
3. What is meant by Galbraith's theory of countervailing power?
4. In what ways are the Wagner and Taft-Hartley acts different? Why has labor viewed the Taft-Hartley Act as its worst problem in recent years?
5. Why does Galbraith believe that the time will come when the white collar workers (salaried employees) will organize in unions?
6. In what ways has American agriculture sought to promote its economic interests in the twentieth century?
7. Discuss the proposition: the Revolution that established the political autonomy of the United States was the political counterpart of economic changes both in Europe and in North America which were to bring the private capitalist to the center of the national economy.
8. In what sense does the United States represent a relatively pure case of *laissez-faire* capitalism?
9. In what sense has *laissez-faire* capitalism never existed in fact in the United States?
10. Discuss the proposition: American economic life becomes fully intelligible only when one starts with the assumption that it is a *national* economy.

THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL

Since E. A. Ross first published his book on social control sociologists have used the term to describe any influence exercised by society on the individual.¹ There were, he believed, three laws of social control. They were (1) social powers are concentrated or diffused to the extent that people feel themselves in need of guidance and protection; (2) the more a few persons are ascendant, the more is it possible for social control to affect the course of social movement; and (3) the more distinct and self-conscious the influential minority, the more social control is apt to be colored with class consciousness. Ross believed social control was the social manifestation of such basic human sentiments as sympathy, the sense of justice, sociability, and resentment. The fundamental means of social control were public opinion, law, belief, social suggestion (including education), custom, religion, personal ideals, ceremony, art, personality, enlightenment, illusion, social evaluation, the ethics of survival, and the ethics developed by elites.

Social control may be in the interests of all society or in the interests of a small class. It had, he thought, some natural limits; each increment of social interference should bring more positive values than negative values; social interference should not excite against itself the passion for liberty; social interference should respect the sentiments that support natural order; social interference "should not be so paternal as to check the self-extinction of the morally ill-constituted"; and "social interference should not so limit the struggle for existence as to nullify the selective process."

¹ E. A. Ross, *Social Control* (New York: American Book Co., 1901).

Adequate social control, to Ross' mind, is inward, simple, and spontaneous. He did not think class control had these properties.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL
SINCE E. A. ROSS

In E. A. Ross' conception of social control, a peculiar type of society was presupposed. This appears most clearly in his idea of the relation between social control and the state:

The state is, in theory at least, a channel and not a source of control. It is supposed to be a device by which social power is collected, transmitted, and applied *so as to do work*. But, as a matter of fact, the state, when it becomes paternal and develops on the administrative side, is able in a measure to guide the society it professes to obey.²

Ross assumed the *laissez-faire* society as his model. The two possible sources of control of the individual are by society as a whole or by a small group that achieves ascendancy within it. The latter kind of control is "class control" and is inferior to "social control" proper. It follows that adequate social control is most fully possible when one is dealing with a society of small free producers.

Ross clearly accepted the *laissez-faire* economists' doctrine of the proper role of the state to act as umpire of the social order. With them he preferred a society in which internal competition of free men improved efficiency. Thus he argued that society should be free enough to permit the "morally ill-constituted" to eliminate themselves and also to permit the "struggle for existence" to increase efficiency.

Ross, thus, was careful to specify the limits of social control, and defined control as adequate only when it was inward, simple, and spontaneous. His specification of the means of social control is noteworthy for the almost complete absence of any reference to the actual instruments of social force—police, courts, lawyers, judges, armies, etc.

There is no particular value in reviewing all of the statements on social control by all the many sociologists since Ross who have considered the problem. By and large they have retained the same general position. This may be seen from two examples:

² *Ibid.*, p. 78.

Paul Landis took up the problem in the 1930's. It has, he argued, a broader and a narrow meaning.

Social control, conceived very broadly, encompasses almost the entire field of sociological thought. All applied sociology is aimed directly at the problem of controlling some particular phase of society, the correction of some evil, or the redirection of social energy toward some more ideal goal. Conceived in a narrower sense, social control can be applied only to those voluntary purposeful activities of man, which when directed immediately, would regulate some particular phase of human behavior.³

Landis' own preference for a more limited conception of social control is still remarkably comprehensive.

Social control serves a dual purpose: (1) that of maintaining society against the ravages of individual expression, and (2) that of making the individual a human being, and having made him so, helping him to defend himself against his own vices and appetites which tend to reduce him to the level of his original nature, an animal rather than a human level.⁴

Landis made the problem of social control largely co-extensive with socialization. One may assume that the reason for this was the persistence within the theory of social control of the *laissez-faire* model of society, with its correlated preference for controls resting on spontaneous, internal foundations.

The persistence of the same basic concept of social control into the post-World War II period may be seen from the study by Roucek and his associates.

Social control is a collective term for those processes, planned or unplanned, by which individuals are taught, persuaded, or compelled to conform to the usages and life-values of groups.⁵

Like Landis' definition, this largely identifies social control and socialization.

In the 1950's an important development in the theory of social control was made by Talcott Parsons. Possibly in deference to

³ Paul H. Landis, *Social Control* (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1939), p. 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 481.

⁵ Joseph S. Roucek, *Social Control* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1947), p. 3.

the traditional approach, he specified the identity of socialization and social control.

The allocation of personnel between roles in the social system and the socialization process of the individual are clearly *the same processes* viewed in different perspectives. Allocation is the process seen in the perspective or functional significance to the social system as a system. Socialization, on the other hand, is the process seen in terms of the motivation of the individual actor.⁶

While retaining this long-standing linkage of the two areas, Parsons tended, in fact, to specialize the theory of social control and restrict it to the problem of deviance from the standards of the common culture.

A mechanism of social control . . . is a motivational process in one or more individual actors which tends to *counteract* a tendency to deviance from the fulfillment of role-expectations, in himself or in one or more alters. It is a re-equilibrating mechanism.⁷

Parsons approached the problem of social control from the standpoint of a stable social process "in equilibrium" and tending to "continue unchanged." The study of social control, thus, begins with the sociology of deviance which is "a disturbance of the equilibrium of the interactive system."⁸ In their social interactions, Parsons notes, people often experience considerable ambivalence. This ambivalence in part represents a combination of a-social and social interests. As he phrases it,

The negative component of such an ambivalent motivational structure relative to a system of complementary expectations will be called an *alienative* need-disposition, the positive component, a *confirmative* need disposition.⁹

For example, a person who covets his neighbor's wife has an "*alienative* need disposition."

In Parsons' view, there are four basic ways in which one can deviate from a normal adjustment: (1) rejection, (2) seducibility (an abnormal identification), (3) compulsive responsibility, and (4) compulsive avoidance of responsibility. Each one of these

⁶ Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), p. 207.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

may have an active or a passive form. Hence, Parsons argued that there are eight "major directions of deviant orientation."

TABLE 1.^o
TYPES OF DEVIANCE

<i>Type of Deviance</i>	<i>Active Form</i>	<i>Passive Form</i>
Rejection	Aggressiveness	Withdrawal
Seducibility	Dominance	Submission
Compulsive responsibility	Compulsive enforcement	Perfectionism
Compulsive avoidance of responsibility	Incorrigibility	Evasion

^o *Ibid.*, p. 324.

For Parsons, social control has become the processes for "countering deviant tendencies and conditions." One of the interesting novelties of his theory of social control is his employment of a psychiatric viewpoint. In our society many deviants or at least those with an "alienative need-disposition" that gets out of hand, often end up on the couch of the psychoanalyst. As Parsons sees it, the psychoanalyst employs three basic devices: support, permissiveness, and the restriction of reciprocation.

One could ask, to what extent society itself acts like a psychoanalyst? Parsons does not find this a startling question at all. He insists: "It should immediately be evident on general grounds that the most fundamental mechanisms of social control (support, permissiveness, and restriction of reciprocation) are to be found in the normal processes of interaction in an institutional integrated social system."¹⁰ Parsons provided a number of interesting illustrations of social processes characterized by support, permissiveness, and restriction of reciprocation.

Institutionalization, Parsons urges, establishes time schedules and priorities for various social requirements. Not only are various social obligations strictly scheduled, but various kinds of "time off" are also provided. The field of bereavement provides a specific example of support. The shock at the time of bereavement often sets up a strong tendency to withdraw, for there is often a loss of incentive to keep going on. "Ritual on such occasions serves to organize the reaction system in a positive manner

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 301.

and to put a check on the disruptive tendencies.”¹¹ Durkheim and a number of other sociologists also conceived of death rituals as a means by which social solidarity is re-affirmed in the face of forces that could disrupt it. A major example of permissiveness is provided by American youth culture.¹²

According to Parsons, youth culture acts as a safety valve. By releasing energy in athletics and dancing, the amount of deviance is reduced. Youth culture has self-liquidating features, for in the youthful culture phase of his development the individual substitutes dependency on his peer group for dependency on his parents and in turn gradually becomes emancipated from this peer group dependency. The “rating and dating” complex of the young tends to protect the individual from deeper emotional involvements than he is able to accept, for the publicity of such relationships within the peer group serves as such protection.

Gambling is also an example of institutional permissiveness. It is said to perform important functions for large classes in the population, very similar to those of magic. It permits the acting out of tensions which are “symbolically associated with the economic sphere.”¹³

Finally, there are various forms of institutional restriction of reciprocation. With considerable insight he offers this interpretation of tact:

In personal relations “tact” is such an insulating mechanism. It consists in the calculated avoidance of expressing certain sentiments and of raising certain questions which, if they had to be directly faced might disrupt the relationship system. There is a gradual shading off from tact to the “white lie” which makes it possible, often by tacit mutual agreement, to keep potentially conflicting things apart. . . . Anonymity also serves this function. In general the segregation of both activities and population elements does so.¹⁴

The extreme case of this isolating function, Parsons maintains, is the criminal role.

Despite his statement to the contrary, Parsons separated social control from socialization. By giving a narrow and specific defi-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 305.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 307.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 308-309.

nition of social control, he saved it from its tendency to become identical with sociology. He transformed the image of society, from which social control was approached.

Ross presupposed a *laissez-faire* society; Parsons did not. The model of social control, to Ross, was provided by the rules of fair play of the market place; the model of social control for Parsons was provided by the procedures of the psychoanalyst. Ross was very specific in his opposition to paternalism on the part of society; he was fond of telling his classes that a society ought to provide every man the freedom to make "a damn fool of himself." In any case, society ought to provide sufficient latitude for the morally weak to eliminate themselves and for efficiency to increase. By contrast, Parsons presented a distinctly paternalistic image of society. Social control was moved from the world of *laissez-faire* to the world of the welfare state.

SOCIAL CONTROL: THE MAINTENANCE OF INFLUENCE AND POWER

One might ask whether Parsons, in freeing the concept of social control from dominance by one concept of society assigned it to an equally narrow conception of society. He clearly perceived the need to introduce a more limited definition of social control, but he may very well have defined it too narrowly (as the devices for handling deviance). Society has always been more complex than either an open market (Ross) or a psychiatric ward (Parsons), though some societies have both. There is clearly some value in a more comprehensive definition of social control than the restoration of deviants to active duty.

From the time of E. A. Ross social control has been defined as "how a society controls the individual." This peculiar formulation was dictated by the concept of society as an open market. Parsons' conception could be formulated as how a society restores the deviant to active duty. Parsons' formulation rests on the analogy between social institutions and the psychoanalytic procedure. The common problem shared by Ross and Parsons is how social order is maintained. There is no good reason why one should not formulate the concept of social control in a way which does justice to the basic ideas of both Ross and Parsons. In a

preliminary way, *the study of social control is the sociology of how social order is maintained.*

A society is not a physical object; it is a set of events. The ultimate components of these events are the actions of individual persons. When one speaks of social order, he can only refer to a kind of predictable regularity of action. A society is often said to be composed of groups. These are no more physical objects than is society, but compact and unified sets of individual actions. Thus the maintenance of social order always means the securing of some kinds of actions and the prevention of others. The terms we most frequently use for the bringing about of some kinds of actions and prevention of others (for the maintenance of social order) are *influence* and *power*. *Social control* may then be defined somewhat more specifically as *the maintenance of influence and power*. Social control finds its proper field not merely with respect to the theory of deviance, but in the theory of social power. The control of deviance is only one of the functions of power.

Conceived in this manner, social control appears as one of the great fundamental social problems along with socialization and the mastery of nature. There is no reason why social control should be confused with either of these other basic problems. Socialization transforms biological and other materials and events into socially relevant form, but this is no reason why it should be confused with the general problem of influence and power in on-going social life. Social control depends in good measure for its efficiency on the adequacy of socialization. Moreover, neither socialization nor social control mean much if the mastery of nature is not adequate for the survival of society. In short, all these things are necessary for an on-going society—socialization, the mastery of nature, and social control—but this in no way minimizes the value of keeping the properties of each problem distinct.

The most recent attempt to consolidate the theory of social power has been made by two contemporary social scientists—Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan. They have approached the problem of social power from the standpoint of groups. They conceive social process as the activities emerging from value positions. Policy is a proposed program for achievement of goal values and the practices for achieving them. Policy process is formulation of identifications, demands, and expectations concern-

ing the future. The exercise of influence involves affecting the policies of others. The weight of influence is the degree to which policies of others are affected; the domain of influence consists of the persons whose policies are affected; the scope of influence consists in the values implicated in the policies.¹⁵

Power, according to Lasswell and Kaplan, is the deference value with which political science is especially concerned. They believe it is best described in terms of its domain, scope, weight, and coerciveness. The forms of power are distinguished by them in terms of the value on which power is based.

Power is always exercised in terms of some value which may be viewed as the base value. This is the condition for participation in decision-making in the particular case. A form of influence or power is a kind of relationship specified as to base value and scope and enforced by relatively severe sanctions. Lasswell and Kaplan distinguish four types of deference values (power, respect, rectitude, and affection) and four types of welfare values (well being, wealth, skill, and enlightenment). Each one of these may be a base value of power, providing a scheme of eight forms of power.

FORMS OF POWER *

<i>Base Value</i>	<i>Form of Power</i>
Power	Political Power
Respect	Councilorship
Rectitude	Mentorship
Affection	Personal Influence
Well Being	Violence
Wealth	Ecopolitical Power
Skill	Expertness
Enlightenment	Advisory Influence

* Lasswell and Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

According to Lasswell and Kaplan, the forms of power are interdependent; a certain amount of several forms of power is a necessary condition for a great amount of any form. The amount of power tends to increase until it is limited by that of another power holder. Conversely, a low power position implies low posi-

¹⁵ See Lasswell and Kaplan, *op. cit.*, Ch. V, pp. 74-102.

tion in the scope of values, for forms of power are agglutinative and persons with some forms of power tend to acquire others.

The devices in the service of power holders are constraint and inducement. Constraint is the exercise of influence by threat of deprivation, inducement is the promise of indulgence. Coercion is a high degree of constraint or inducement. Choice is possible only in situations with low degrees of coercion. Action with regard to the eight basic values takes a different form, depending on whether it occurs under a situation of choice or coercion.

ACTIONS UNDER CONDITIONS OF CHOICE AND COERCION *

<i>Base Value</i>	<i>Type of Situation</i>	
	<i>Choice</i>	<i>Coercion</i>
Power	Negotiation	Submission
Respect	Consideration	Obeisance
Rectitude	Moral Freedom	Moral Subjection
Affection	Love	Servility
Well Being	Play	Toil
Wealth	Bargaining	Rationing
Skill	Artistry	Servitude
Enlightenment	Education	Indoctrination

* Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1950) p. 99.

SOCIAL CONTROL, GROUPS, AND COMMUNITIES

Lasswell and Kaplan are not the first who have thought that men wish to be healthy, wealthy, and wise. The analysis of the human pursuit of these and various other values would be simple if a single group corresponded to each value. However, there is a dual source of difficulty: (1) groups are rarely simple, for they often supply a variety of the basic values; (2) it is extraordinarily rare for a single group to monopolize access to a single value.

Every group is a structure of power. As Lasswell and Kaplan state, the leaders of a group are its most active power holders both effectively (in fact) and in the perspectives (in the opinion) of the group in contrast to the rank and file. The leaders acquire and maintain their positions because of their prestige. The leaders are likely to be recruited from the select among the group, characteristic of the tendency for high position on more than one dimension of group values to be consolidated with respect to

others. The leaders tend to serve as models for the rank and file who identify with them and adopt their perspectives.

The leaders are more likely to remain within the group than members of the rank and file; they tend to form a stable and constant element of the organized membership. The circulation of a leader varies inversely with the disparity between his skills and those of the rank and file. The leaders are to a large but varying extent indispensable. There is rarely a major replacement of one group of the elect by another (Pareto's theory), but there is a continuous intermixture of old and new elements. Every group not only has its official leaders but may have its "boss," an informal holder of effective power. Lasswell and Kaplan distinguish a number of types of bosses in terms of the value base of their power.

INFORMAL POWER *

<i>Base Value</i>	<i>Type of Boss</i>
Power	Political Boss
Respect	Patriarch
Rectitude	The-arch
Affection	Favorite
Well Being	Gangster
Wealth	Patron
Skill	Master
Enlightenment	Pundit

* Lasswell and Kaplan, *Power and Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

Lasswell and Kaplan included the party or machine boss, the tyrant, and the usurper as examples of political bosses. An example of the patriarch is the "elder statesman," a formal leader without formal power but still carrying weight in the decision making process. The the-arch is a person with high position with respect to moral values, serving as spiritual guide or father confessor to the ruler (like Rasputin). The favorite (like the king's mistress) has a position because of ties of affection, and may participate in decision making. The favorite's power is informal. The gangster is a boss whose power is based directly on control over means of violence, and includes the terrorist, the bully, and the warlord. Prestige is won by the gangster only in terms of the weight and scope of violence. The patron has informal power based on wealth, and wins influence by contributions to campaign

funds or by backing revolutionary movements. The master is a boss whose power is based on special skills. Caesar and Napoleon are said to have originally been bosses in this respect. Other than military experts are represented by the propagandists and the persons skilled in negotiation, the "fixer." The boss whose power is based on enlightenment is called a "pundit." He is like the "brain trust" under the Roosevelt administration.

Lasswell's and Kaplan's schematization of the types of informal power holders acquires concrete value only when it is taken as the expression of some of the relations that may be found in actual groups. If taken as a description of social reality, it is quite inadequate. Every group offers to its members access to a number of values; every group is a structure of power, even though the organization of power may be an accessory rather than a central value. An economic enterprise, for example, finds its primary purpose in the increase of wealth of its members. If it did not have devices for maintaining its structure, however, it would be less efficient as an economic enterprise. At times, the complaint arises from some members of an economic enterprise that individuals have been able to advance by "politics" rather than by "ability." Membership in the economic enterprise may give high prestige (as when the banker has access to the highest social circles of the town, simply because he is a banker). Various opportunities for friendships and, perhaps, eroticism may be provided by activity in the organization. An attractive secretary may employ her charms to run the business.

Thus, until one specifies the group or groups in question, the schematization of types of bosses remains incomplete. Many of the Lasswell and Kaplan bosses are the official heads of other groups. The president of a bank who contributes to the campaign funds of a political party is the head of one organization in his own right and a patron in another. Or the priest who achieves power in another group by serving as father confessor to its head may be both official head of his parish and the-arch. Moreover, single groups rarely have a single value base. Hence it is quite possible that a single group may have a variety of bosses—patriarchs, the-arches, favorites, masters, patrons, and pundits. The analytical schemata for the analysis of influence and power developed by Lasswell and Kaplan yield their specific values only

when considered in terms of the factual complexities of specific groups and communities.

Since every group is a structure of power and influence, it is capable of analysis as a composition of political forces. The problem of social control emerges distinctly only when the group becomes so large and complex that a specialized development of coordinating mechanisms occurs. Moreover, the problem of social control arises with respect to the need to settle the conflicts that are an ever-present possibility in the inter-relations between groups. These conditions appear even in the primitive world.

In his review of the problem of politics in the primitive world, Herskovits observed that there is no people without ways and means of controlling the conduct and directing the affairs of the whole.¹⁶ In one of the pioneering works in primitive law, Llewellyn and Hoebel quote one of their informants, as saying: "The Indian on the prairie, before there was the white man to put him in the guardhouse, had to have something to keep him from doing wrong."¹⁷ It may be assumed that none of the original groups formed by men had social control as a primary objective. If the human community is to grow in size and complexity, however, the problem of social control cannot remain on a level of the primary groups. Sooner or later the critical point is reached in the growth of every community when the independent institutionalization of power and influence is necessary. The comparative study of the independent institutionalization of politics was opened up by Henry Sumner Maine. As he saw the problem, the history of politics begins with the authority of the father, the *patria potestas*.¹⁸ The evolution of the power of the family head led to the notion that kinship in blood is the only possible basis for community in political functions.¹⁹ By contrast with this, Maine argued, that the principle of "local contiguity" is recognized as the "condition of community in political functions."²⁰

The origin of law and politics was thought to have occurred

¹⁶ Melville J. Herskovits, *Man and His Works* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 328.

¹⁷ K. N. Llewellyn and E. A. Hoebel, *The Cheyenne Way* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941), p. 2.

¹⁸ Henry Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law* (London: John Murray, 1894), p. 135.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

when families jointly settled on the land and found reasons to introduce the principle of territoriality as a basis for community control in place of kinship.

The extent to which this mode of thinking is still followed is shown by the definition of the state. Lasswell and Kaplan, for example, insist that "a state is a sovereign territorial group."²¹ Max Weber defined the state essentially the same way. The ideas of legitimate coercive power and territoriality are both contained in the idea that the state is an organized aggregation of persons inhabiting a common territory and containing supreme authority within itself. Though over-simplified, Maine's formulations are clearly in some respects true. The over-simplification is both empirical and theoretical. The preliterate world did not by any means present a uniform picture of the domination of the primitive community by family patriarchs. Herskovits has observed that social order among preliterates may be maintained by the police as in Africa or by moral suasion as in Papua. Sanctions may be enforced by kings as in Polynesia or by blood revenge as in Melanesia.²²

Of all areas inhabited by nonliterate people, Africa exhibits the most frequent occurrence of complex political structures. The Ashanti and Fanti nations which participated in the Gold Coast slave trade, like the Dahomey and Yoruba, had traditions of political stability for more than three hundred years. The Ashanti had a full complement of government officials from family heads to territorial rulers, their *entourages* and the king and his court. The Ashanti kingdom had a system of taxation, finance, courts to adjudicate disputes, and an army. Their courts tried cases of murder, suicide, certain sexual offenses, some kinds of abuse, insults, stealing, treason, cowardice, the practice of black magic, and violation of tribal taboos and oaths. Punishments were by execution, mutilation, flogging, and fines. Court procedures included taking of testimony and submission to ordeals.

On the other hand, among the African Bushmen, outside of an occasional chief there was so little formal "government" as hardly to warrant the name. The chiefs oversaw the burning-over of hunting territory, and led in combat. But the chief did not

²¹ Lasswell and Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

²² Herskovits, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

judge his fellows or even control the grown members of his family. There was no code of law except the customary habits and beliefs. Adultery, homicide, and theft were punished by blood vengeance; other offenses were in the hands of divine authorities.

Such governments as appeared in aboriginal North and South America tended to be quite democratic except, perhaps, for the most complex political systems of preliterates—the Inca Empire of Peru and the Maya, Toltec, and Aztec kingdoms of Mexico. In eastern North America, the “Five Nations” (Leagues of Iroquois Mohawk, Oneida, Onandaga, Cayuga, and Seneca) did not control local affairs (in which each tribe was autonomous). The council of fifty representatives acted only on matters common to all. Each tribe had its own internal organization with a council composed of its league delegates and various war chiefs. The sib groups of each tribe were represented on the tribal council. Though the representatives to the tribal council were men, women appointed the sib-chiefs who became tribal representatives of the league. In the Americas, in general, government was informal. At times, as during communal buffalo hunts or tribal gatherings, however, war societies or other organizations possessed police functions.

Thus it is necessary to modify Henry Sumner Maine’s formulation somewhat. The preliterate peoples display a complex array of political phenomena. Political ascendancy of kin groups in communal affairs is very frequent though, even here, it shows some variation. But kin domination was by no means the exclusive form of preliterate politics; there was a fairly extensive range of specialized political institutions.

Correcting some of the theoretical as well as descriptive oversimplifications in Maine’s account of the origin of politics is useful. The analysis of influence and power has been subjected to two sorts of simplifications in modern times. To some extent these have operated in opposite directions. There has been much discussion of the problem of sovereignty, the theory of supreme power, but this has tended to create the assumption that one is not dealing with power at all if he is not dealing with supreme power. The second source of simplification, the *laissez-faire* conception of society, has tended to reduce the functions of legitimate government purely to supervisory status.

Whenever society has become complex, the complexity has made necessary an increasing specialization of institutions devoted exclusively to the supervision, control, and direction of communal affairs. To the extent that specialized political institutions have made their appearance, all other configurations of power within the community have tended to be partly re-oriented with respect to them. The true reference point in estimating the scope of political institutions is not territory *per se* but the community they order and which they integrate. This may be seen by a brief review of the political institutions of the communities important to our study.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY

Migratory peoples exhibit greater individualism than settled peoples. Their communities are much smaller than those of settled peoples, and they face quite different problems. A migratory, herding people, for example, is normally much smaller than is a community of settled peasants. Migrant groups may be forced to move many many miles to different grass lands at different times of the year. Wherever herds are pastured, community structure may advisably be very loose, since smaller units respond more fluidly to the varied conditions of grazing flocks. At the same time, during annual or semi-annual migrations a high degree of marching discipline may be necessary. The problems of the herding community as a whole are, therefore, very special; its political institutions reflect these.

The village community, on the other hand, is not only larger but much more complex. There are greater aggregations of wealth in both land and animals, and more permanent dwellings are constructed. Even in the heart of modern society the young corporation executive may discover that his personal problems are many times complicated if he acquires too much personal property, for he may have to move from branch to branch of the corporation.

Maine's theories of the evolution of political institutions from the *patria potestas* to a territorial structure were derived in the course of his extensive researches into the pre-historic village communities. Since the most powerful figures in the village com-

munities from England to India were the family heads, it was a natural inference that kin dominance was everywhere a first stage in political evolution. For human society generally, this was inadequate; for Europe there was much to be said for it.

In the village community the forces were at work leading to a specialization of political institutions, and in this case, emancipating them from the dominance of kinship. In its earliest form, village government consisted of a council of family heads. The family heads in turn were by no means free to act with complete arbitrariness even with respect to their own families, for they were executors not absolute monarchs. The village community had to regulate joint cultivation, and provide for common defense. When village fortifications were built, the organization of communal labor was required.

Maine observed that the nineteenth century village community of India often underwent an internal restructuring, and one family came to monopolize village headship. This was related to a decline in village democracy. Everywhere in Europe the village community tended to be replaced by the manorial community. The manorial community represented the consolidation of political, military, and legal authority into the hands of the landed aristocracy.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE CITY

A city could not possibly get along with the political institutions of the village. The powerful families that supplied the members of the village council did not exist in the city. On the other hand, when the guilds emerged as the distinctive structures of the European city, they tended to supply city authorities from their ranks in much the same way as the families did for the rural village.

The city carried on a different way of life; it was much larger, it accumulated far more wealth, and it was characterized by an internal differentiation of classes—in these and in many more ways the problems it presented for social control were far more complex than those of the village. A tremendous specialization of political institutions occurred: the city developed its own administrative officials, its own code of laws, its own courts, its own police force, and its own army.

There was not only a complex development of formal political institutions in the city, but of informal political institutions as well. The political party made its appearance mediating the formal political institutions and the community at large. Also, the city became the scene for various revolts, demonstrations, and revolutions.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE NATION

One of the peculiarities of the nation as a community is the fact that it finds its peculiar institutional synthesis in the state. The point of synthesis of the village community lay in the agricultural way of life; in the city it lay in the secondary economic institutionalization represented by the market; the nation was unique in finding its synthesis in political institutions. In the first wave of modern nation-formation, the development of the state preceded the integration of the nation. Once the international situation was partly structured into nation-states, the integration of the nation could often precede the state.

The modern nation, therefore, was historically a form of community that grew up around the state. Nationalism was the ideological justification of the formation of a community with its center in the state. At the turning points in the formation of the modern nation, as when the revolutions of the new middle classes transformed the growing states from monarchies into parliamentary democracies, the ideology of nationalism became considerably more intense.

The formation of the state represented a new kind of consolidation of political power. In the late middle ages there were numerous claimants to power in Europe. The most important of these were the Holy Roman Empire, the Roman Catholic Church, the feudal lords, and the self-governing cities. As the states gained in power, they were increasingly able to thwart the remaining independent powers to the benefit of the state.

Accompanying the actual growth of state power was the continuous attempt to legitimize it. The doctrine of *sovereignty* was the legitimatization of the acquisitions of power by the growing states. Sovereignty has occasionally been described as the central concept of political science, representing to political science what value represents to economics. Since sovereignty al-

ways signifies the highest governmental or legal authority, this old fashioned definition of political science is fundamentally similar to that of Lasswell and Kaplan who define it as the science of power.

The idea of a supreme national monarchy was formulated clearly by Jean Bodin in the sixteenth century.²³ He defined sovereignty as the supreme and perpetual power over citizens and subjects "unrestrained by laws." The sovereign's will was the source of law. He was limited only by the law of God (keeping promises) and the law of nature (the inviolability of private property). The sovereign was not bound by custom. Custom had no sanction, while law had. The force of custom was precarious until the sovereign established a sanction and made it into law. Both law and custom depended on the sovereign power of the state.

The rapid consolidation of the state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was accompanied by the synthesis of the doctrine of sovereignty. In its completed orthodox form it appears in the writings of Thomas Hobbes.²⁴ The sovereign is the individual or assembly authorized by the original contract which established civic society to make decisions for achieving a peaceful life. Justice, for Hobbes, was merely the observance of contracts. Every act of disobedience by a subject was unjust, whatever the grounds for the act. No breach of the original contract by the sovereign was grounds for violation of the contract by the subject. Nor was there justification for resistance by a minority of the community, because it did not choose the sovereign. To Hobbes, sovereignty was absolute. It exercised final judgment as to opinion. It had unrestricted power over property, in contrast to Bodin's exemption of private property from the sphere of the sovereign. The sovereign had the right to determine all controversies, the right of judicature. It had the sole right to make war and peace; it was the sole source of official authority of counselors and magistrates.

²³ Jean Bodin, *The Six Books of a Commonwealth*, trans. by Richard Knolles (London: 1906). For a summary of Bodin's theories, see William Archibald Dunning, *A History of Political Theories* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947), pp. 81 ff.

²⁴ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. by Henry Horley (London: 1887). For a summary of Hobbes' ideas, see Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 263 ff.

It could be expected that those revolutions that integrated the state and the nation more closely would also be accompanied by some re-definition of the doctrines of supreme political authority. The process may be seen at work in Rousseau, Locke, and Montesquieu. Locke and Montesquieu liberalized the idea of sovereignty (to make it compatible with the new liberty that the rising middle classes of modern society required). Rousseau, however, attempted to reconcile the absolutistic conception of sovereignty with the changing composition of national society. Sovereignty was defined as absolute as by Hobbes: it was inalienable, indivisible, and inerrant.²⁵ However, he argued, the foundation of sovereignty could only be the general will (*volonté générale*). The sovereign was formed wholly of the general will of the individuals who composed it, and remained the exclusive judge of what was important.

The definitions of sovereignty were not descriptions of what actually existed. Nor was the theory of sovereignty a theory of how political affairs in fact worked. The doctrine of sovereignty was an ideology: a justification of the power actually acquired by the growing national states and a vindication of the right of the national states to acquire still more power. The doctrines of popular sovereignty contained in the works of Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau were justifications of the internal shift in the location of authority within the modern state.

The idea occasionally emerging out of the discussions of sovereignty that power is either absolute or nothing has caused much confusion. Every group is a structure of power; the moment it ceases to be, it disappears as a group. Every community is an interaction of groups, and a readjustment of the powers of the groups must occur sufficient for the maintenance of the order of the community. All complex communities have specialized political institutions, the specific task of which is to integrate the power of the community, not simply that of some particular group in the community. The council of family heads of the village community may have derived its membership from the families

²⁵ Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, trans. by Henry J. Rozer (London: 1895). For a summary of Rousseau's views, see Dunning, *A History of Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), pp. 1 ff.

(thus giving the family a voice in the affairs of the community), but it was expected to act in the name of all families. The structures of power that emerge tend to become adequate to the community within which they operate: the village council and headman of the rural village; the lord, his retinue, and courts of the manorial community; the civic administrators, aldermen, and judicial officials of the city; and the modern state of the nation.

In the United States and in Europe the growth of the state has been accompanied by a limitation and often outright destruction of the political structures of various local (rural and city) communities. The significant institutions of influence and power in the United States have become increasingly national rather than local in scope. It is to the national institutions of influence and power in the United States that we now turn.

SUMMARY

The three fundamental problems which human social institutions attempt to solve are socialization, the mastery of nature, and social control. The theory of social control was first explicitly laid down by E. A. Ross. This approach, which dominated sociological discussions for the first half of the twentieth century, conceived of social control as the manner in which a society disciplines its members. Furthermore, a specific image of society was implied—a kind of *laissez-faire* society composed of small merchants and enterprisers. The contrasting type of society was one in which the competitive model of society had been displaced by one dominated by large structures: monopolistic businesses or big government. This second type of society also controlled its members, but in the interests of a privileged class. Ross did not think this type of control was true social control but a form of “class control.” True social control, by contrast, was inward and spontaneous. The large majority of social scientists followed E. A. Ross’ lead in the interpretation of social control.

In the 1950’s Talcott Parsons reinterpreted the theory of social control in a manner tending to separate it from socialization. Social control for him is the control of individual deviance which is thought to be a disturbance in social equilibrium. There were, he thought, four major forms of deviation: rejection, seducibility, compulsive responsibility, and compulsive avoidance of respon-

sibility. Each has an active and a passive form. Parsons believes that social institutions use support, permissiveness, and the restriction of reciprocation to restore the deviant just as psychoanalysts do. Ross' theory of social control involved the conception of society as an open market. Parsons equated society with a psychiatric ward.

It is doubtful that viewing society as a psychiatric ward permits comprehension of the full range of social control, for social control is the study of how social order is maintained. It rests on the sociology of influence and power. The control of deviance is but one of the functions of power.

The most recent attempt to synthesize the theory of social power, by Lasswell and Kaplan, comprehends it in terms of operations, identifications, demands, and perspectives. Influence, to them, is the value position and potential of a person or group. The values are of two kinds: welfare and deference. The welfare values are well being, wealth, skill, and enlightenment; the deference values are power, respect, rectitude, and affection. Theoretically, each of these values may be the source of a special kind of power. Moreover, the kinds of power differ, depending on whether power is exercised under conditions of choice or coercion. The power may be wielded either informally (by bosses) or formally (by official leaders).

Such theoretical considerations bearing on the problem of power help to clarify the conditions in fact. Actual groups rarely rest upon a single value, but on a plurality of values. Moreover, the problems of influence and power arise not only in the structure of the particular group but, especially, in the relations of groups to each other. Hence as groups grow larger and societies become more complex, the problem of control becomes more difficult and there is an increasing tendency for power to be specialized and independently institutionalized. Thus, the task of social control tends increasingly to slip into the hands of specialized institutions as society grows more complex.

Social science theories of the origin and independent institutionalization of politics were dominated for a long time by the suggestion of Henry Sumner Maine that it occurred with the shift in social dominance from the *patria potestas*, resting on kinship, to political institutions resting on the principle of territory.

Actually the primitive world displays a remarkably complex array of political forms varying from forms of influence much less organized than the *patria potestas* to complex political structures complete with bureaucracies, armies, and most of the paraphernalia of the modern state.

Although Maine's formulation was schematically correct for Europe, the evolution of politics was more complex than a mere substitution in time of territorial structures for the dominant male of a kin group. The village communities of medieval Europe were increasingly brought under the manors, wherein the feudal aristocracy consolidated the functions of social control in its own hands. The political, legal, judicial, and military institutions of the cities underwent considerable specialization beyond those of the manor, and the political institutions of the state were far more complex and specialized than all the types they increasingly displaced.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. In what ways are E. A. Ross' and Talcott Parsons' theories of Social Control similar and different?
2. What, according to Parsons, are the major ways one can deviate from normal adjustment?
3. What are the values and limitations of Parsons' theory of social control?
4. What advantages are there in conceiving social control as the sociology of influence and power?
5. Outline the Lasswell-Kaplan theory of power.
6. Describe the political institutions of the village community.

7. How do the political institutions of the village community differ from those of the city?
8. How do the political institutions of the city differ from those of the nation?
9. What is the political significance of the concept of sovereignty?
10. Of what importance are the group and community to the problem of social control?

AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS OF INFLUENCE

The rural, urban, and national communities have each had their own political institutions. The drama of the displacement of local by national political institutions has been and continues to be one of the major features of contemporary life in the United States. This may be seen both on those institutions consolidating influence and in those consolidating formal political power in contemporary American society. Communication, the most fundamental of all means of influence, became more complex as more complex community forms developed. Writing and literature developed in the city and the channels of communications were specialized and consolidated into particular hands. The development of mass communications parallels the development of other institutions in mass society.

The second major agency of influence is represented by the informal or semi-formal organization of those individuals holding the dominant positions in the major associations of a community. Most groups tend to acquire a vertical structure in the course of carrying out the basic functions of society. Those at the top of these associations usually find that they have a common interest in retaining their positions of comparative dominance. Those persons in the lower ranks may combine for improvement of their respective lots. Hence, even under primitive tribal conditions, there were often graded organizations for the exercise of influence. In feudal society there was an organization of estates, and in the city classes were organized. In the rise of modern national

society, classes formed but on a national level. As modern mass society moves into a new stage of large organizational blocks, a new kind of elite and various kinds of institutionally defined ranks and grades of persons become the locus of influence.

COMMUNICATIONS AS AGENCIES OF INFLUENCE

Language and Social Control. Communication is the most fundamental and indispensable of all means of influence. Without it neither socialization nor the collective mastery of nature in their specifically human sense are possible. If the forms of social life were dependent on human instincts, social life would be remarkably impoverished. On the other hand, man has an amazing capacity for learning which, properly implemented, can sustain surprisingly varied forms of social life. The fundamental implementation of man's ability to learn was provided by communication.

The analysis of social life from the standpoint of the role played by communication has given rise to a special school of sociological theory—"symbolic interactionism." Symbolic interactionism took shape in the studies of socialization by William James, Charles Cooley, and particularly George Herbert Mead.

Following a suggestion of the German psychologist, Wilhelm Wundt, Mead took linguistic communication to be the distinctive property of man. He analyzed its relation to personality and society. Mead assumed that social life was in some sense a going concern before the human phenomena of the mind and the self arose within it. He believed language provided the mechanism that made the mind and the self possible.

The first task of symbolic interactionism was to examine the sociology of language. In the activity of living creatures some experiences are used as signs of other experience. When an antelope sees a lion and flees for its life; the sight is taken as a signal for action. When a sight is used as a sign for something else, it has a meaning. In this situation, the "meaning" of the lion is "danger," and it evokes relevant behavior.

The capacity to respond to signs is necessary for social life. One can speak of social life when creatures of the same kind interact—when antelope graze together, for example. When its most

sensitive member is alerted to danger, the herd takes collective flight. A colony of beavers undertakes a quite complicated set of mutual behaviors possible only by means of signs. In the course of the interaction of herding or flocking creatures, many of the behaviors of some individuals serve as signs for the orientation of the behavior of others and *vice versa*. The item of behavior taken as a sign, means the future course of behavior it is taken to indicate. In one of Mead's illustrations, when one dog bares its teeth and growls, and when another responds to this by an indication of a potential attack, it has become a sign with a meaning. When the other dog, seeing the bared teeth and hearing the growl, prepares for attack, it has responded to a sign, and its behavior becomes a signal for the first. Animal behavior, Mead indicated, often displays a veritable conversation of gestures.¹

The peculiarity of language, according to Mead, is that a set of significant symbols is substituted for the gesture (any item of the behavior of a creature which is taken as a sign of its potential action by another.² Significant symbols are deliberately made gestures which differ from ordinary gestures in that they have the same meaning to the creature making them as to the creature perceiving them. A gesture means the behavior it evokes; a significant symbol evokes a shared behavior—it has a common meaning. Language is not only a system of significant symbols but a system of rules for their use.

Language at once permits an enormous expression of the range of a society's shared behavior. It explodes the biological limitations in time and space. Animals sometimes respond to signs of distant events: a horse shies at the scent of a grizzly bear, though it is more than a mile up wind, or a hunting dog picks up the fresh scent of a fox that passed that way an hour before. Among animals, however, distance in space and time from the event to which the signs refer is always comparatively slight. A human society has signs of far greater power: it is possible for the society in one part of the world to prepare for the onslaught of bubonic

¹ George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 14.

² *Ibid.*, p. 71 ff.

plague from another, though the prospect is a continent away in space and several months away in time. Through language it is possible to respond with efficiency in the present on the basis of the experience of man several thousand years ago. It was quite possible, for example, for Thomas Jefferson and his associates to bring Plato's political thought to bear on the type of government they were setting up; it is equally possible for political scientists today to consider solemnly Jefferson's thought in terms of contemporary events. Moreover, with a world of symbols and rules for their use at his disposal, it is quite possible for a man to think of a dozen possible courses of action, the means to achieve his goals, and the consequences that could be expected in each case. Action itself becomes remarkably more effective as a result.

Every known people have language. In acquiring language every child is deeply infused with the shared behavior of his group. The development of personality and the enjoyment of life depend so much on social participation and the sympathy and understanding of others, that most individuals cannot endure being cut off from them for long, and may be driven to insanity, to suicide, or to acts of revenge. One of the most ancient ultimate procedures of controlling individuals was the use of one or another form of isolation.³

The form, direction, type, and withholding of communication are the most fundamental of all devices of social control. The simpler the society, the more completely social control is made up almost exclusively by the manipulation of communication. Every individual has a reputation—a particular composition of positive or negative collective sentiment, determined by the application by his associates of the standards of the society to him. A more or less continuous flow of communication surrounds every individual, adding to his reputation. Communication to him may have a positive form (praise) or a negative form (ridicule).⁴ Almost always praise is valued and sought and ridicule is feared and avoided. The smaller the social circle, the more completely

³ See B. Malinowski, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1926).

⁴ See Leslie Day Zeleny, *Practical Sociology* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1937), pp. 185 ff.

the individual tends to pilot himself in terms of the continuous flow of communication his acts generate. Under these circumstances, most individuals are terrified of gossip, as illustrated by the people of Mineville in Albert Blumenthal's *Small Town Stuff*.⁵

Communicative control may be direct, as in the case of argument and persuasion. When these fail, however, a more serious level of communicative control is evoked. This may vary from coolness to the forceful exclusion of the individual from some particular group or from the entire community.

COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY FORM

A revolution in communications accompanied the movement from the tribe and rural village to the city. That everyone knew everything about everyone else ceased to be true; gossip lost much of its force. With the invention of writing a formalization of communication occurred: this at once created a class of privileged communicators—those who knew how to write—and provided communicative weapons of new precision and power. When writing skills were put into the service of administration, it expanded and developed to a new extent.

As the size of the community increased, the structure of the community was in part reflected in the appearance of channels of communication. Persons controlling these channels were in a position to control the flow of communication to their advantage. Gossip—an instrument in the hands of the entire community—was supplanted by propaganda, the deliberate control of communication for the purposeful diffusion of opinion.

The centers of power came to employ various mechanisms to insure that it had complete knowledge of events occurring in lower circles. In the ancient world, for example, the Spartans used a secret police, the *Cryptia*. Under the supervision of the *ephors* it kept watch on the *helots*, and assassinated any who appeared dangerous. In modern times industrialists have used Pinkerton detectives and others as labor spies; the American army employs the informer system; and modern governments gather information about their own populations through the Nazi Gestapo or the

⁵ Albert Blumenthal, *Small Town Stuff* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932).

American F.B.I., the English Scotland Yard, or the Russian security police.

At the same time, wherever communication is formalized and organized into channels, it is increasingly possible for the higher status levels to withhold information from the lower. Many forms of secret and confidential communications are thus withheld from general circulation. Various kinds of spy systems are employed between important organizations within a country; large stores send professional shoppers to make estimates of the merchandise and prices of opponents, football teams send scouts, fashion designers and industrialists send spies to secure knowledge of future fashions or secret industrial processes.

COMMUNICATION IN THE MACHINE AGE

The great event that has accompanied the rise of the national community is the mechanization of communication. It began with the invention of printing at Maintz, Germany, when cast metal type, paper, ink, and the wine press were brought together in the idea of printing with movable metal type. Writing was standardized into type faces, and the rapid duplication of these was possible. The first dated piece of printing was a papal indulgence printed by Fust and Schoeffer (1454); the first book was Gutenberg's Bible (perhaps 1456). In less than fifty years printing was being done by Caxton in England and Aldus in Italy. Printing was rapidly diffused when it was put into the service of the pamphleteering duel between Protestants and Roman Catholics during the Reformation. The press quickly came to carry commercial news for merchants, and the anonymous pamphlet became the vehicle of revolution. Shortly after 1800 the press was powered by steam, and with the penny press the era of mass communications opened. In the nineteenth century the mechanical reproduction of auditory and visual communication became a reality with the telegraph, cable, camera, and photo-engraving. At the present time a new phase is opening with the communication between men and machines. Radar conveys to planes and ships detailed information as to ground or shoreline.

Robert E. Park argued that the first newspaper was devised for organizing gossip. However, it rapidly turned into something

more extensive, for it quickly began to assemble information on a scale far more extensive than the local community. Since the item was written and, thus, subject to checking and legal action in a way difficult for gossip, it was soon subjected to standards of reliability that would keep its editors out of jail. It quickly became apparent that the newspaper was an effective instrument in the organization of political sentiment and for advertising commercial products. Only six per cent of our cities with local daily

ENGLISH LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS IN THE U. S. A.*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Circulation (millions)</i>
1790	8	
1850	254	0.8
1900	2,190	15.1
1925	2,008	33.7
1955	1,760	56.2

* Richard E. Chapin, *Mass Communication* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957), p. 9. Total morning and evening English language daily newspapers.

newspapers have competing ownership.⁶ In 1900, 42.9 per cent of the cities of the United States with dailies had non-competitive ownership, but in 1954 94 per cent had non-competitive ownership. Gossip was in the hands of everyone; modern mass communications were controlled by a few.

There has been a general growth of mechanically based mass communication industries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There were thirty radio stations and 60,000 receivers in 1922; in 1957 there were 2,935 A.M. authorized stations. The number of authorized television stations increased from six to 469 (including eleven educational) from 1946 to 1955. In the United States there were 35,000,000 TV sets and 138,700,000 radio sets in use in 1955. The estimated expenditure on advertising increased from \$200,000,000 in 1880 to \$8,500,000,000 in 1955. By 1958 there were 155,000,000 radio sets and 49,800,000 TV sets in use in the United States, indicating a mounting rate of use. Moreover, radio and television stations tend to be consolidated in a relatively few networks.

⁶ Wilbur Schramm, *Responsibility in Mass Communication* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 4.

MAJOR RADIO NETWORKS AND AFFILIATES, 1953 *

<i>Network</i>	<i>Number of Affiliates</i>
ABC	353
CBS	217
MBS	560
NBC	204

* *F.C.C. Report on Chain Broadcasting: 1945-1952.*

TV NETWORKS AND AFFILIATES IN 1955 *

<i>Network</i>	<i>Number of Affiliates</i>
ABC-TV	217
CBS-TV	209
DuMont	158
NBC-TV	190

* *Telecasting Yearbook-Marketbook: 1951-1955.*

There is no doubt that communications are dominated by the mass media. In 1955 there were in the United States 1,755 daily newspapers with a circulation of 55,000,000; 3,364 radio transmitting stations and 138,700,000 receiving sets; and 39,000,000 television sets.

Modern mass communications have played an important role in the destruction of the local community. Communication ceased to be the link between information and action in the local community. News from the country and, to a considerable extent, from the world pours into the local newspaper. There was a time when a competitive situation existed and mass communications were visualized as the great hope of democracy, but doubts have tended to grow about this since the mass communications industries began to undergo the typical industrial consolidation.

The Commission on Freedom of the Press, under the chairmanship of Robert Hutchins, reviewed the changes in the mass media and came to the conclusion that the trend toward industrial concentration was irreversible, producing efficiencies that could be achieved in no other way.⁷ Admitting in principle the dangers

⁷ Commission on Freedom of the Press, *A Free and Responsible Press* (Chicago, 1947).

in the transformation of communications into a large-scale industry, the Commission was unwilling to recommend the policing of the communication system by state authority. When it proposed the organization of a voluntary agency to oversee the communication industry, however, considerable opposition was generated in the press.

The merit of these discussions is of no concern here. They are recalled only to emphasize the fact that the community to which mass communications are consistent is national in scope. Rural communities often have no radio station and no local newspaper. When there is a rural newspaper, it is often a weekly. Great cities are frequently in a similar position, being dominated by a single newspaper that may in turn be controlled from some distant point. Even the editorial policies may be determined by non-resident owners. This does not mean that the news is inferior. The mass of information pouring into the newspaper offices from all parts of the world makes it possible for almost anything to appear in the paper, while the information that may be of most vital importance to the local community is absent.

The newspapers and radio and television stations are absolutely essential for the organization of mass audiences for the purposes of mass business and mass politics. The most important of all agencies of influence, therefore, have the properties of national industries which can only be regulated on a national level. Opinion formation increasingly takes the form of skilled propaganda in the hands of experts. Even the formation of public reputations tends to glide into the hands of the publicity agents.

SOCIAL STRATA AS AGENCIES OF INFLUENCE

The theory of social stratification is in rather serious need of overhauling. Anyone asking for a clear account of the national picture, for example, is presented with a kaleidoscope of fragments. One frequently used device in the study of classes is to ask people what classes they belong to, thus transforming the problem into one of public opinion. In 1940 *Fortune Magazine* conducted a survey and asked people what class they belonged to: upper, middle, or lower. About 80 per cent of Americans called themselves "middle class." In 1945 Richard Centers asked

a nationally representative cross section of white adult men what class they belonged to, and received the following replies: ⁸

Upper class	3%
Middle class	43
Working class	51
Lower class	1
Don't know	1
Don't believe in classes	1
	100%

Social strata become self-conscious and assume semi-organized form for only one reason—the exercise of influence. However, the untrustworthiness of these categories for such analysis is revealed in the distribution of response charts claiming to be of the working class.

WORKING CLASS IDENTIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS [°]

<i>Occupational Group</i>	<i>Per Cent Describing Themselves as Working Class</i>
Large business	7
Professional	10
Small business	24
White collar	34
Skilled manual	71
Semi-skilled	83
Unskilled	75
Farmer owners and managers	51
Farm tenants and laborers	73
All groups	51

[°] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

Results like these require a theory of stratification and a theory of American society before they can be explained. If one were offered no more than this pattern of responses and asked to guess which country supplied it, one might well suppose that it came from the U.S.S.R., where there was wide belief in a dictatorship of the proletariat and where everyone wished such identification.

⁸ Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 78.

Using self-classification to study the social strata of America is obviously useless. There is considerable advantage in Mills' procedure, of simply assigning individuals to strata in terms of objective considerations.

Among contemporary American sociologists, the theory of stratification is dominated by one or other version of the idea of "social class." The general discussion pays lip service to the place of Marx's theory of classes, and the theories of Max Weber, but employs something essentially different.

Karl Marx turned the theory of classes contained in the writings of the classical economists into a theory of exploitation. According to Marx, there are three classes: those who own the means of production, those who do not but whose labor supplies the basic source of value for all human well being, and a group of part-owners, part-workers (the middle classes). He predicted the dissolution of the middle classes into the other two, and an oncoming titanic struggle between the other two classes to be terminated by the setting up of a classless society under the temporary dictatorship of the working class.⁹

Marx's views represented a considerable over-simplification. He was mistaken in predicting the disappearance of the middle classes, and he quite over-estimated the tendency of all producers and all workers to join ranks and pit themselves into a fight to the death.

Max Weber defined class in a manner that would make it sensitive to the actual multiplicity of economic situations in which men were distributed. For him a class was a plurality of persons with the same market-determined situation. From this point of view industrialists, owners of commercial establishments, wholesalers and retailers, landlords and financiers, as well as skilled and unskilled laborers, may all form different classes. Weber also distinguished status groups and parties from classes. Status groups are communities of individuals sharing the same estimations of social honor and supporting a given style of life. Parties are pluralities of individuals—often with origins cutting across class

⁹ Marx's views are contained in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (New York: International Publishers, 1932); Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (New York: International Publishers, 1942), and Karl Marx, *Capital* (New York: The Modern Library, 1936).

and status lines—who have joined together for the achievement of power in a planned manner.¹⁰

Further development of the theory of stratification along these lines has sometimes been suggested; this is the proposal of Lasswell and Kaplan, for example. To them a power aggregate consists of those having power. The power of a group varies with its degree of organization; an elite consists of those group members with the most power. Influence varies with power, the difference in influence of the elite and mass varying with the power of the elite. Elites tend to be skilled in the practice of inter-personal relations rather than in decision-making proper. Power groups develop into hierarchies or structures of power relations. A bureaucracy is a hierarchy of considerable power and diversification and with low circulation. A ruling class is one from which rulers are recruited and in whose interest they exercise power. A dependent class is one indulged in the power process without sharing in the rule. A subject class is one sharing least in power and other values. A class acquires supremacy in the degree that it contributes to the more intense values of the society. From the standpoint of these definitions and propositions, Lasswell isolates a number of types of elites.

BASE VALUE AND ELITE TYPE *

<i>Base Value</i>	<i>Elite Type</i>
Power	Officials
Respect	Nobility
Rectitude	Righteous
Affection	Popular
Well being	Virile
Wealth	Wealthy
Skill	Skill specialists
Enlightenment	Symbol specialists

* Lasswell and Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

Each of these kinds of elites exercises a peculiar kind of rule or pattern of ruler practices.

¹⁰ See the translation by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills in Max Weber: *Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 146 ff.

FORMS OF RULE AND ELITE TYPES *

<i>Elite Type</i>	<i>Form of Rule</i>
Officials	Bureaucracy
Nobility	Aristocracy
Righteous	Ethocracy
Popular	Democracy
Virile	Virocracy
Wealthy	Plutocracy
Skill Specialists	Technocracy
Symbol specialists	Idiocracy

* *Ibid.*, p. 209.

This is a considerable extension of Weber's structure which had only three base values—wealth, prestige, and power—and, hence, only three types of elites and three forms of rule. If taken as a set of ideal-typical possibilities, this scheme, like Weber's, may have considerable value. If taken as a description of actual groups, which are never constructed around a single base value, it is confusing.

Talcott Parsons has also proposed an extension of the Weber approach.¹¹ Stratification, he maintains, is the ranking of persons in accord with common values. Interacting individuals are members of social systems and their positions are "status-role complexes." These status-roles are the bearers of values and subject to judgment in terms of the particular quality, performance, or possession associated with each. An example of a status-role assigned purely in terms of quality is an individual judged important because he was born into a good family (this is an ascribed quality). An example of a status-role judged purely in terms of performance is an individual who is thought meritorious because he is a superb athlete even though he has no other merits. An example of a status-role assigned purely in terms of possessions is the man to whom attention is paid and deference solely because he is wealthy.

Parsons suggests that there are four possible theoretically pure social systems in terms of the values that may be most important

¹¹ Talcott Parsons, "A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," in *Class, Status, and Power*, ed. by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), pp. 93 ff.

to the status-roles: efficiency, system-goal, integration, and implementation.

Any given social system will have a 'paramount' value pattern which, in ideal type terms, we may classify as belonging to one of . . . four major types. . . . Thus the paramount values may emphasize efficiency of technical achievement as such without primary reference to the specification of goals; they may emphasize a paramount system-goal as the focus of valuation; they may emphasize the integration of the system, the relations of solidarity of the units with each other; or finally they may emphasize the implementation and preservation of ascribed system qualities.¹²

If one were to phrase this in the language of Lasswell and Kaplan, Parsons is arguing that people are stratified in any society in terms of one of four base values (Lasswell and Kaplan have eight): efficiency (skill), paramount system-goal (possibly rectitude), solidarity (respect, loyalty), and implementation (enlightenment). Thus Parsons, and with much greater clarity and completeness, Lasswell and Kaplan have all suggested extensions of the theory of social stratification along the lines laid down by Max Weber.

Despite the influence of these persons, the main lines of stratification theory have taken a different direction from those indicated by Max Weber. Beginning with Paul Mombert, the idea of social class has increasingly formed the core of stratification theory in the United States.¹³ Class for Weber represented a plurality of persons sharing the same market-determined situation; status represented a plurality of persons sharing the same positive or negative prestige. It has always been true that a favorable class situation could be used to increase one's prestige and a prestigious person is often in a position, as a result of his prestige, to acquire access to wealth. A newly rich man, for example, may use his wealth to send his daughters to the best finishing schools; an impoverished European nobleman may marry his daughter to a man of wealth to recoup the family fortunes. Observing that in the long run high class and status position tend to consolidate, Mombert suggested that the term "social class" be used for both terms,

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 100.

¹³ Paul Mombert, "Die Tatsachen der Klassenbildung," in Schmoller's *Jahrbuch*, vol. xlv (1920), 1041-70. See also his article on class in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

reducing class and status to the objective and subjective aspects of class, respectively.

American social scientists have overwhelmingly followed this lead. Even Talcott Parsons and his students in their empirical studies employ a concept of a social class as a stratum of persons whose positions (status-roles) are identified by a number of class and status indexes. Kahl, for example, uses six: prestige, occupation, possessions, interaction, class consciousness, and value orientations.

The most celebrated recent American sociological studies of social class have been those of Warner, his associates, and his students. Warner's method of establishing social class involves two procedures: Evaluated Participation (EP) and an Index of Status Characteristics (ISC).¹⁴ Evaluated Participation is a technique for the qualitative analysis of interview material. It rests on the assumption that the persons in the social system are aware of the ranking of each other. There are six components to EP: ranking by matched agreements, rating by symbolic placement, rating by status reputation, rating by comparison, rating by simple assignment to class, and rating by institutional membership. These are various ways in which individuals place each other. The Index of Status Characteristics consists of the ranking of persons in terms of four factors to which weights were assigned:

INDEX OF STATUS CHARACTERISTICS

<i>Index</i>	<i>Weight</i>
Occupation	4
Source of Income	3
House type	3
Dwelling area	2

Each element is rated on a seven-point scale, the rating is then multiplied by the appropriate weight, and a sum is computed. The sum is the ISC score for a family. The occupational categories are:

1. Professionals and proprietors of large businesses.
2. Semi-professions and smaller officials of large businesses.

¹⁴ W. Lloyd Warner *et al.*, *Social Class in America* (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1949).

3. Clerks and kindred workers.
4. Skilled workers.
5. Proprietors of small business.
6. Semi-skilled workers.
7. Unskilled workers.

Individuals were also rated in terms of the sources of income:

1. Inherited wealth.
2. Earned wealth.
3. Profits and fees.
4. Salary and sales commissions.
5. Wages.
6. Private relief.
7. Public relief and non-respectable income.

The following is the set of ISC scores and EP locations for the Old Americans of Jonesville:

<i>ISC</i>	<i>EP</i> *
12-17	Upper class
18-22	Upper class probably
23-24	Indeterminate
25-33	Upper middle class
34-37	Indeterminate
38-50	Lower middle class
63-66	Indeterminate
67-69	Lower-lower class probably
70-84	Lower-lower class

* W. Lloyd Warner *et al.*, *Democracy in Jonesville* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 127.

Warner's first study, undertaken with Elton Mayo, was made of a New England city of 17,000 called "Yankee City." After careful study, in the course of which nearly 100 per cent of the families were interviewed, Warner divided them into six classes:

Upper upper	1.5%
Lower upper	1.6
Upper middle	10.2
Lower middle	28.1
Upper lower	22.6
Lower lower	25.2

One of the most interesting findings of all these studies is the capacity of money to age with grace. The older it is, the more

elegant it becomes. The upper-upper represented an old family elite with sufficient wealth to live in the best neighborhood. The lower-upper were somewhat more wealthy than the upper-uppers, but their money was more recently acquired and their manners less polished. Upper-middle individuals were modern, successful business and professional men. The lower-middle people were petty business men, school teachers, and foremen in industry. The upper-lowers were laboring people, but a solid lot. The lower-lowers were disrespected persons who dug for clams and lived on public relief.

A second study concerned a southern town of some 10,000.¹⁵ A study was also made in the Middle West of a town of about 6,000 persons, described as "Jonesville."¹⁶ Warner's particular use of the term "social class" and the manner in which it has been studied have been applied to the small cities, to which this mode of procedure appears to be adequate.

Warner's procedure cannot be employed to study the national class system, for mutual prestige ratings and related styles of life are not known. On the other hand, it has been true that since 1820 data on urban and national occupations has been gathered by the United States Census Bureau. Alba Edwards reorganized his occupational data in terms of levels of socio-economic status.¹⁷ The United States Census Bureau modified the scheme somewhat in 1950. Some relation between occupation and other factors appears in this data.

Because social class could not be identified on a national level by prestige and because occupation data was available, some students have tried to determine whether occupations have general prestige rating.¹⁸ A particularly significant study was undertaken by the National Opinion Research Center under the direction of Cecil C. North and Paul K. Hatt. A representative sample of 2920 persons from the adult population of the United

¹⁵ Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gardner, and Mary R. Gardner, *Deep South* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941).

¹⁶ W. Lloyd Warner *et al.*, *Democracy in Jonesville* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949). See the summary in *American Life: Dream and Reality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

¹⁷ Alba M. Edwards, *U. S. Census of Population, 1940: Comparative Occupational Statistics* (Washington: Government Pnt. Office, 1943).

¹⁸ For a summary of various ratings of occupational prestige, see Theodore Caplow, *The Sociology of Work* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), pp. 30-58.

OCCUPATIONAL GROUP, EDUCATION, AND INCOME OF MEN IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1949 *

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Median Years in School</i>	<i>Median Income</i>
Professional, technical, and kindred workers	16.0	\$3958
Farmers and farm managers	8.3	1455
Managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm	12.2	3944
Clerical and kindred workers	12.2	3010
Sales workers	12.3	3028
Craftsmen, foremen, kindred workers	9.3	3125
Operatives and kindred workers	8.7	2607
Private household workers	8.1	1176
Service workers, except private household	8.7	2195
Farm laborers and foremen	7.1	863
Laborers, except farm and mine	8.0	1961
All workers	9.5	2668

* *U. S. Census of Population*, 1950, vol. IV, Special Reports (PE No. 5 B), Part 5, Ch. 13, Education (Washington: Govt. Prt. Off., 1953), Table 11. See the summary by Kahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 64 ff.

OCCUPATIONAL RATINGS *

U. S. Supreme Court Justice	96
Physician	93
State Governor	93
Cabinet member in the federal government	92
Diplomat in the U. S. Foreign Service	92
Mayor of a large city	90
College professor	89
Scientist	89
U. S. Representative in Congress	89
Banker	88
Dock worker	47
Night watchman	47
Clothes presser	46
Soda fountain clerk	45
Bartender	44
Janitor	44
Share cropper	40
Garbage collector	35
Street sweeper	34
Shoe shiner	33

* National Opinion Research Center, "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation," in *Class, States, and Power*, p. 413.

States was given a list of ninety jobs that they were asked to judge on a five-point scale from excellent to poor standing. A procedure was devised to translate percentage ratings of each job into a general score which theoretically could range from 100 to 20. The following are the findings for the ten top and bottom occupations.

When he studied the consistency in the rankings of the ninety occupations as a whole, Hatt found that it was not high.¹⁹ However, he discovered a number of groups (political, professional, business, recreation and aesthetics, agriculture, manual work, military and service) within which there was considerable consistency. Moreover, when these groups were further divided, the consistency increased.

C. Wright Mills' studies, *White Collar* and *The Power Elite*, certainly the most important general studies of the national stratification system, also rest on the concept of social class. He identifies them by occupation, then studies various related features of style of life associated with those occupations. The basic thesis of *White Collar* is that the middle classes in America are undergoing a transformation by the infusion of salaried employees, who are increasingly becoming the modal type of the middle class.²⁰ Mills believes that the old type of independent small business man and the independent professional are disappearing.

In *The Power Elite*, Mills' basic thesis is that the old type of nineteenth century patrician is ceasing to occupy the top ranks of American society. He remains, but, increasingly, he must share power with institutional-based power holders (government bureaucrats, corporation directors, managers, and military men). Moreover, Mills insists that the old style of life is being replaced by another, by the manufactured glamour of Hollywood, the professional prostitute, and the tinsel world of the celebrity.²¹

There are good reasons for the development of stratification theory beyond Max Weber's formulations. To a considerable extent the differences between the various conception of social class

¹⁹ Paul K. Hatt, "Occupation and Social Stratification," *American Journal of Sociology*, LV (May, 1950), pp. 533-543.

²⁰ C. Wright Mills, *White Collar: The American Middle Class* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953).

²¹ C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 82.

are more apparent than real, for to some extent their proponents have been attempting to account for different things. The occasional assumption that there is a single system of national stratification is confounded by the uncertainty as to just how many classes there are.

The one thing that is true of a social stratum that becomes self-conscious is that it represents an agency of influence. Moreover, a stratum is a peculiar kind of secondary institutionalization. It always, whatever its foundations, represents a horizontal plane from a number of vertically organized groups. Every group is in part a structure of power within which there are different degrees of power. Even in those simple communities, where the family or some extended form of the kin group holds primary power, there is also a difference in concentrations of power. Whenever kin groups are the most important structures of a society, the social strata that emerge are horizontal planes drawn from the different planes of them. In a society dominated by kinship groups—age grades are the typical social strata. Where these kinship groups find their focal point in the *patria potestas* that so interested Henry Sumner Maine, the dominant age grade will be that of the elder males—gerontocracy—who may rule the community. Often the young males of fighting age and the warrior group share power with the elders.

In the communities of European society in the middle ages, the distinctive structures were the manors. Each manor had a vertical organization from its lord to its meanest serf. The power of the lords lay in their domination of the property and military systems. However much the various feudal lords might contend over other things, they had a common interest in maintaining a position of comparative ascendancy. It was quite appropriate to describe the typical strata of the middle ages as estates. This was as precise a description of the medieval strata as age grades were of the rural village community.

In the world of the city, the key institution that organized socio-economic life is the market. The crucial structures that organized production for the markets, the guilds, had a vertical organization running from master through journeyman to apprentices. Moreover, the many guilds had quite different distribution of power in the urban economy as a whole. It is quite

appropriate to describe the typical strata of the city as classes and to see their standing as ultimately determined by comparative economic situations in the market.

When the modern state began to take shape, it was in competition with the remnants of medieval feudalism and with the configurations of communal power represented by the city. During the nineteenth century the proponents of *laissez-faire* capitalism were at their height. Max Weber clearly adapted stratification theory to the plurality of claimants for power of nineteenth century national society. He defined classes as a plurality of persons sharing the same set of market conditions and opportunities (which comprised the private business men). He defined status groups as communities sharing equivalent honor (which comprised the remnants of surviving aristocracies), and he defined parties as combinations cutting across other lines for the achievement of power (taking account of the strata created by the national state).

Stratification theory must move beyond this point. The twentieth century nation has been moving away from the types of market-dominated *laissez-faire* economies of the past century. Classes determined by market situations, grow less important by the day. The fragments of rural communities, the cities, and the nation, each supply somewhat different bases for the formation of social strata. To make things doubly complicated, there is a semi-caste distinction between the Negro and the white components of the population and lesser ones between some ethnic groups. An enormous number of temporary to semi-permanent ethnic colonies exist in American society; each has provided a little world of statuses in itself. There is an enormously complex array of strata. So far as there is emerging a single set of strata nation-wide rather than local in scope, its foundation lies in the huge structures that dominate national life: in corporations, in labor unions, in professional societies, in political parties, and in governmental hierarchies. The persons who have most nearly isolated the truly national strata of the present time are David Riesman, C. Wright Mills, and William H. Whyte. Meanwhile, Warner, his associates, and his students have given the best account of the social strata of local society.

SUMMARY

The most fundamental distinction within the field of social control is that between the institutions of influence and the institutions of power. The institutions of influence secure control through the exercise of informal sanctions, while the institutions of power have formal sanctions at their disposal.

Communication is the most fundamental and indispensable of all the institutions of influence, for without it socialization and the mastery of nature in their human forms would also not be possible. Since the days of G. H. Mead, American sociologists have held that the very peculiarity of human social life is its mediation by language which equips the members of a social group with a complex system of shared experience. Language is not only the instrument by which collective decisions are transmitted, but the device by which the continuous judgments of members of the social group are made effective.

In the small simple community the direct expression of opinion between people, on the one hand, and gossip on the other are more fundamentally important social controls than the various formal controls. As society grows more complex, there is no more direct strategy in the maximization of power than the attempt to preempt the right to manipulate communications. A new stage in the development of social control is marked by emergence of writing skills. When society grows more complex there are increased possibilities for retaining control over communications in the hands of a small group. Contemporary society is peculiar in its development of the agencies of mass communication.

The second major agency of influence is the informal or semi-formal group organized horizontally across the vertical lines of group structures—social strata. In simple societies the organizations of elders and age and sex classes illustrate the formation of social strata. In the city, with more complex groups, the possibilities for the formation of strata are many times increased.

In modern society the old foundations for the formation of social strata have been deeply shaken. The new elite of the mass society are in the process of formation at the present time. They represent horizontal formations of the persons occupying the upper ranks of the great organizations of the mass society.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. Why is communication sometimes described as the most fundamental of all agencies of influence?
2. What is the difference between an institution of influence and an institution of power?
3. Explain the statement: gossip is one of the oldest agencies of social control.
4. In what sense is it true that a revolution in communications accompanied the movement from the tribe and rural village to the city.
5. In complex societies, while the attempt is often made to establish restricted circles of communication, at the top of society there is often the use of secret bodies to obtain information about lower ranks. Is there anything in modern society corresponding to this? Explain.
6. In what ways are the communications of the mass society distinctive?
7. Explain the statement: social strata are among the fundamental agencies of influence.
8. What are the differences between the following types of social strata: age grades, estates, classes?
9. In contemporary society what are the primary differences between the strata of local society and the strata of the nation?
10. What is the social foundation of the emerging national elite of contemporary mass society?

AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS OF POWER

The institution most fully organizing formal power in the modern mass society is the state. The unity of the modern state stands opposed to the plurality of local governments. The sphere comprised by the state is circumscribed by the Constitution and the citizen with his civil rights. Between these fields operate the local governments, the extensive organizations of the public for the influence of policy (interest groups), and groups hoping to seize the controls by peaceful means (political parties). Through the political process and in the two classical functions of political power—the exercise of police power and military defense—there is a tendency for the continuous growth of national political institutions at the expense of local forms.

As in the case of the institutions of socialization and of the mastery of nature, the institutions of control of the modern mass society are increasingly national in scope. Government is the specific institution charged with the exercise of coercive social power. The formal records of the various principles in terms of which public power is exercised are represented by ordinances, laws, and constitutions. The three major functions of government are making, administering, and enforcing laws.

THE CONSTITUTION

In its broadest sense the Constitution is the entire body of legal and customary rules providing for the organization and procedure of government, the powers and functions of officials, and the rights and duties of individuals. Its framework appears in the written Constitution of the United States, the separately written

constitutions of the states, the charters of cities and laws enacted by state legislatures, and many enactments of local governments, counties, villages, towns, and school districts. State constitutions usually include a bill of rights of individuals, provision for separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, provision for taxation, local government, education, and the like. Cities usually operate on the basis of charters. The first granted in America were those to New York, Albany, Philadelphia, and about twenty others issued by royal governors in the name of the British king. The thirteen states took over charter granting. Most smaller cities, counties, villages, boroughs, towns, townships, school districts, and other local units are organized by local action under laws of the state legislatures.

The order of priority among laws ¹ is: (1) the written Constitution of the United States, (2) treaties of the United States and statutes passed by Congress, (3) administrative regulations and ordinances of the national government issued by the President and heads of departments to carry out laws and treaties, (4) the written constitution of the state in question as interpreted by its supreme court, (5) statutes of the state legislature, (6) administrative regulations issued by the governor and state departments, (7) ordinances enacted by cities and other local units of government, and (8) administrative regulations issued by officers and departments of local government. A change of the Constitution is possible by formal amendment to written documents, by judicial decisions, by modification of the written constitution through statutes, and by changes in custom.

A characteristic feature of the United States is the geographic distribution of powers between the national and state governments—its federalism.²

Delegated powers are those specifically mentioned in the Constitution as belonging to the national government. Implied powers are implied by delegated powers such as the power to make paper legal tender for payment of private and public debts which arises out of the national government's fiscal powers. Reserved powers

¹ William Anderson, *American Government* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1938), p. 95.

² William Bennett Munro, *The Government of the United States* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1950), p. 56.

Federal Powers

1. Taxation for federal purposes
2. Borrowing on the nation's credit
3. Regulation of foreign and inter-state commerce
4. Currency and coinage
5. Foreign relations and treaties
6. Army and navy
7. Postal service
8. Patents and copyrights
9. Regulation of weights and measures
10. Admission of new states

State Powers

1. Taxation for local purposes
2. Borrowing on the state's credit
3. Regulation of trade within the state
4. Civil and criminal law
5. Police power
6. Education
7. Control of local government
8. Charities and correction
9. Highways and traffic
10. Organization and control of corporations

belong to the state governments; they are those not delegated to the national government or prohibited to the states. Concurrent powers are possessed by both national and state governments as the power to tax. Forbidden powers are withheld from both national and state governments.

UNITS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT 1931-1932 *

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Number</i>
The nation as a whole	1
The states	48
Organized counties	3,053
Incorporated places	16,366
Organized towns and townships (in 23 states)	20,262
School districts	127,108
Other special districts	8,580
Total	175,418

* William Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

The Constitution defines the arena of power and leaves no doubt that the final arena of power is national. Americans are fond of describing the struggle for power as a three ring circus. The federal government is the center ring.

CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL RIGHTS

Citizens are those persons possessing full membership in a political community. For a time there was considerable discussion as to whether a person could possess dual citizenship in the

state and in the United States. By the Dred Scott decision (1857), it was possible for a man to be a citizen of the state without being a citizen of the United States. The Emancipation Proclamation freed most of the slaves without conferring citizenship on them. The problem was finally cleared up by the Fourteenth Amendment, proving that all persons born in the United States and not subject to foreign power were citizens. The United States recognizes both birthplace and parentage as alternative qualifications for citizenship. Citizenship may be acquired either by collective or individual naturalization (collective naturalization appears in the case of Texas and Hawaii, when the inhabitants are taken into citizenship by treaty). Accompanying the achievement of woman suffrage, the citizenship laws were modified so that a foreign-born woman does not automatically become a citizen by marriage to an American, nor does an American woman automatically lose her citizenship by marrying a foreigner. For juridical purposes, corporations are also citizens in the state in which they are incorporated. When there is a suit between corporations, whether they are from the same or a different state determines whether the case will go to the state or federal courts.³

In view of the extensive powers of government, the rights of the individual are of considerable importance. Among the compulsive internal powers are eminent domain, taxation, police power, civil and military draft, and penal power. Among the external compulsive powers are the power to restrain or prevent immigration, invasion, importation of goods, to make war on foreign states and occupy their territories. Among the non-compulsive powers of government are the power to own, hold, and use land and buildings, to make contracts, to provide services (roads and schools), to confer rights of citizenship, to grant charters, and to establish, regulate, and change needed departments.⁴

Between the limits marked by the constitution of government (in its broad sense) on the one hand and citizenship and civil rights on the other lies an arena for the achievement and exercise of formal power. In the modern nation this is the institutionally decisive area of social control.

³ Munro, *op. cit.*, pp. 81 ff.

⁴ Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 226 ff.

PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS

One of the most interesting areas in the study of social control is the struggle for political preference between the citizen and his government. A pressure group is a body of individuals organized to promote in peaceful manner their special interests. A pressure group may put its pressure on the political parties, but it rarely confines itself to them. There have been so many hundreds of groups with so many diverse interests that it would be difficult to list them all. Some historically important ones which have taken major interest in legislation are the American Medical Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the National Educational Association, the Association against the Prohibition Amendment, the American Legion, the National League of Women Voters, the National Consumers' League, the American Association for Labor Legislation. The objectives of pressure groups can be almost anything from the improvement of the quality of city government and the improvement of the federal merit system to the advancement of the most selfish of special interests.

Pressure groups have considerable influence on the political parties and party conventions. They attempt to force their programs on candidates and on parties. During campaigns they have often forced candidates to take a stand on their principles. They have urged their programs on office incumbents, favored and opposed the confirmation of appointments, praised and condemned the courts in the press, and organized petitions and letter campaigns to congressmen. In recent years the American Medical Association, for example, has engaged in a bitter struggle against national compulsory health insurance. In 1948 the AMA House of Delegates voted an assessment of \$25 on each of the 140,000 members (75 per cent of the doctors paid). In 1949 the Association voted \$25 a year dues on its members to bring in some \$3,500,000 per annum. The Association engaged public relations experts Whitaker and Baxter for \$100,000 a year. Within a year they had distributed 55,000,000 pieces of campaign literature and put in doctors' offices 65,000 posters with a picture of a family doctor sitting up with a sick child and bearing the caption, "Keep Pol-

itics Out of This Picture.”⁵ The mass communication media are major vehicles for the operations of pressure groups.

Of more general and permanent influence are the political parties which may be described as voluntary associations organized for the acquisition of power by peaceful political means.⁶ The political party may cut across class, status, ethnic, occupation, and other lines, for its significance is the joint pursuit of power. An association organized for acquisition of power by nonpeaceful means (revolution or war) is not a party.

Until the Civil War, the major issues dividing the parties were set by the Federalists and Republicans. The Federalists favored strong national government, loose construction of the Constitution, expansion of the implied powers of congress, a protective tariff, the excise, the Bank of the United States. They felt a strong hand to England and favored a strong national army and navy under national control. The Republicans felt closer to France and favored strong state and local government, states rights, and strict construction of the Constitution. They opposed the Federalist fiscal program and wished to turn the army into a militia under state control. Both parties were divided on the question of slavery. In the Civil War, with the Whigs and Democrats split over slavery, the newly constituted Republican Party elected Abraham Lincoln. The Republican Party was originally formed as the party of the debtor, laborer, and small farmer class, but it soon came under the influence of a combination of conservative and financial interests that controlled the presidency twenty-four years without a break. During the reconstruction period, the tariff and the relation of the government to business and currency were the primary issues. Vigorous third parties and agrarian movements demanded cheap money and the government regulation of such big business as the railroads, banking, and industry.

The period of 1885 to 1933 was one of Republican-Democratic rivalry. Bryan, running on a platform of bi-metalism and cheap money, was defeated in 1896. The Spanish-American War and

⁵ Milton Mayer, "The Rise and Fall of Dr. Fishbein," *Harper's*, November, 1949, pp. 76-84.

⁶ See Max Weber, *From Max Weber*, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-195; Lasswell and Kaplan, *op. cit.*, pp. 169 ff.; Saye, Pound, Allums, *op. cit.*, pp. 154 ff.; William Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 407 ff.; and Charles Edward Merriam and Harold Foote Gosnell, *The American Party System* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933).

the prosperity following it led to sixteen years of unbroken Republican domination until the conflict between Taft and Theodore Roosevelt split the party. The Wilson administration reduced tariffs, passed stronger anti-trust laws, and organized the Federal Reserve System. Wilson's control of congress ended in 1918, when the Senate refused to confirm the Treaty of Versailles. The Republicans held power without a break, despite the scandals involving members of Harding's cabinet. Though he was the best Republican President of the 1920's, Hoover's prospects for reelection were blasted by the world-wide depression. The Roosevelt-Truman administrations, spanning the New Deal, World War II, and the Fair Deal periods, were brought to an end in the rise of the conservative mood in 1952.

Since the Civil War numerous minor parties have arisen. The Prohibition, Socialist, and Communist parties have been most permanent. The Socialist Party has never influenced a national election, though it has occasionally achieved local election victories. The Socialist vote has rarely been more than half a million. The highest vote of the Prohibition Party was 271,000 in 1892. The highest vote of the Communist Party was around 100,000 in 1932.

There have not been many attempts to split the major into minor parties. The first was the Liberal Republican movement of 1872 inspired by the corruption in Grant's last administration. The Silver Republicans (1896) voted with Bryan, and the Gold Democrats nominated their own candidates. In 1912 Theodore Roosevelt first decided to "take a walk," and finally to run against Taft as the "Bull-Moose" candidate. In 1925 Robert M. LaFollette led a progressive party movement. In 1948 Henry Agard Wallace was nominated by the new Progressive Party; at the same time the southern delegates withdrew from the Democratic Party and formed the States' Rights or Dixiecrat Party.

Merriam and Gosnell argue that the minor parties have often acted as the formulators and clarifiers of issues.⁷ The minor parties have been more bold and incisive in their formulation of issues. The Free Soil Party, for example, raised the issue of the extension of slavery which all but wrecked the Whig and Demo-

⁷ Merriam and Gosnell, *op. cit.*, pp. 211 ff.

cratic parties. The Populist Party, after campaigning in 1892, was absorbed by the Democratic Party which adopted its plans for free coinage of silver and the income tax. The platform of the Progressive Party in 1912 was adopted by the Democratic administration of 1912-1917. The eight hour day was developed in the Labor Reform platform of 1872, and the Greenback platform of 1880. Universal suffrage, including women, was demanded by the Prohibitionists in 1872. The income tax was demanded by the Greenback Party in 1880, and the Populists of 1892. Direct election of United States Senators and government ownership of telegraph and telephone systems were demanded by the Populist Party of 1892. The inheritance tax was demanded by the Socialist Labor Party (1892). Social insurance was advocated by the Social Democratic Party in 1900. The Know-Nothing Party even tried to found a platform on nativism and Protestantism.

When the conventions and primaries are not in operation, party authority is located in a series of committees: national committees, congressional committees, state committees, and local committees. The party is in considerable measure supported by the spoils system; officials are selected on the basis of party service. This pattern developed most fully in the Jacksonian period. Every boss at every level finds it necessary to build a large group of workers who owe their election or appointment to him. The legislative practice of exchanging favors ("log-rolling") developed in regard to appropriations under the spoils system. Appropriations for public works are often determined by "deals," compromises, and adjustments on a spoils basis. Raids on the treasury vary from wasteful public expenditure for local support to collusion with contractors. Parties have also used gerrymandering as a device for party control. Even the judiciary has on occasion been a target of spoils. The police of many areas are corrupted.

The boss is a political leader who uses patronage and spoils as a primary weapon. He often has extensive power, including the nomination and election of various officers, the dispensation of favors, and the concentration of the power of government in a particular area. The boss usually has a professional political army trained in political warfare. The rural boss is usually based on patronage and minor spoils. The urban boss employs patronage,

spoils of underworld type, exploitation, public utility alliances, and other devices in the mobilization of power.⁸

Political parties are indispensable in the conduct of modern types of government. They formulate public platforms, select candidates, carry out criticisms of government, bring about the political education of the public, perform various kinds of social service, unify the departments of the government, and unify the nation. In time it became necessary to place some legal restrictions on the parties. In 1883 the Pendleton Civil Service Act made it illegal for civil service employees to be solicited for political contributions. In 1907 it became illegal for any national bank or other corporation organized under national law to contribute to political campaigns. In 1910 a Corrupt Practices Act required publication of election expenditures by political committees and candidates. In 1938 the Hatch Political Activities Act was passed to prevent political activities on the part of federal employees; it was amended in 1940 to extend its provision to state and local employees paid fully or in part from federal funds. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 prohibited union contributions to campaign funds.

CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

In theory the legislature, judiciary, and executive are separate, but they cannot be kept separate in fact. Legislation consists of all enactments that determine public policy in legally enforceable form.

The Legislature. The bi-cameral structure of Congress was bound up with the Connecticut Compromise of 1787. The Senate is composed of two senators from each state; the House of Representatives is made up of members apportioned according to the population, not to exceed one for every 30,000 citizens. The office of Speaker of the House is filled by members of the majority party. Much of the work is done by four kinds of committees—standing, special, conference, and joint. The Vice President is the commanding officer of the Senate. The Senate has special standing committees like the House.

⁸ Harold Zink, *City Bosses in the United States* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1939).

A few days before each meeting of the new congress, the parties hold a caucus. Party policy operates through a steering committee, floor leader, and whip which guide party policy and assemble members for votes. The powers of Congress include the positive action required of it for amendment of the Constitution; it has the decisive vote in a disputed election for President and Vice President; the Senate has treaty-making powers with the President and approves his appointments; impeachment proceedings may remove members of executive and judicial branches. Congress also has supervision of administration in the power to investigation. It has legislative power to tax, regulate commerce, establish uniform laws on bankruptcy; fiscal power in its rights to regulate the currency, establish banking activities, and borrow money. Congress also has copyright powers, patent powers, war powers, and power over territories.

The Executive. The President has a variety of powers. His legislative powers include power to recommend and veto legislation as well as treaty-making power. He has executive power to see that laws are executed, and power to appoint, control, and remove as well as regulate executive officials. His judicial powers include appointment of judges and the pardoning or reprimanding criminals. The Constitution made no provision for a cabinet; but, beginning with the State Department, there has been a continuous adoption of executive departments. A series of independent regulatory agencies have also developed. Government regulation of industry has developed continuously. The chief independent regulatory agencies at present are the Interstate Commerce Commission (1887), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1913), the Federal Trade Commission (1914), the Federal Power Commission (1920), the Federal Communications Commission (1934), the Securities and Exchange Commission (1929), the National Labor Relations Board (1934), the United States Maritime Commission (1916), and the Civil Aeronautics Board (1940). The Civil Service is one of the most important general developments of administration, placing large blocks of government outside the spoils system.

The Judiciary. Section 1, Article III, of the Constitution created the Supreme Court and made it the most powerful court of the land. The rest of the judiciary was subject to the will of

Congress. One of the first laws of Congress provided for thirteen district courts, each presided over by two justices of the Supreme Court and one of the district judges. The Supreme Court had limited original jurisdiction and broad appellate jurisdiction over district and circuit courts. The states are divided into districts for the circuit courts, which are principal federal courts of original jurisdiction. By far the largest number of cases originate in them. They have jurisdiction over all crimes and offenses against the United States, and civil jurisdiction defined in Title 28 of the *United States Code*.

There are also eleven courts of appeals, including the court of appeals of the District of Columbia which functions to relieve the Supreme Court of appellate work. Their decrees are final unless reviewed by the Supreme Court. They have three judges; two judges constitute a quorum. Their jurisdiction is to review all cases of district court except for a few where direct review by the Supreme Court is provided. Congress has also created a number of legislative courts subject to its will. The court of claims has authority to hear a variety of claims against the United States. The Customs Court has sole jurisdiction in actions arising under the tariff laws. Territorial courts have the same authority as district courts. The courts of the District of Columbia have special jurisdiction in a number of matters associated with governmental activities located in Washington.

Trends. The national government has been in a state of continual growth, some of it at the expense of local government.⁹ By 1910 the budget had reached \$1,000,000,000; by 1949 it was \$45,000,000,000, and the national debt was \$252,000,000,000; by 1956 it had reached \$276,000,000,000. In 1949 the federal government employed about 3,000,000 persons, and operated 1,800 separate departments and divisions. It operated a \$19,000,000 banking business, an \$84,000,000,000 insurance business, and had \$27,000,000,000 invested in goods. It spent \$1,000,000,000 a year to keep records, another \$1,000,000,000 to transport government property; it operated government vehicles valued at \$1,000,000. Two-thirds of the 3,000,000 persons employed by the government are in the executive branch and receive an annual pay roll of \$6,000,000,000.

⁹ Frank Gervasi, *Big Government* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949).

In 1949 more than a hundred enterprises were owned or financed by the government; they loaned money, guaranteed loans and deposits, wrote insurance, produced, distributed, and sold electric power and fertilizer, operated railroads and ships, bought and sold farm products, smelted and sold metals. More than \$20,000,000,000 were invested in these enterprises. In all these ways government in a mass society does violate the classical theory which would confine government to police and defense functions.

LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

In the village community the fact that every one's activities were in view of every one else, that informal communication was continuous, and that everyone was terrified by gossip meant that social control was a continuous operation. Much of this is changed when anonymity of large groups of people is a continuous possibility, when various forms of official secrecy are part of political policy, and when specialized institutions of control appear. When society grows complex, however, communication is formalized and mechanized; it becomes an industry and consolidated in the hands of a few.

In contemporary society even the simple distinction between law-breakers and law-observers is destroyed. As Bruce Smith has observed, with the universal use of automobiles and an ever increasing volume of restriction on the motoring public, every one is a law-breaker and a large, important minority are deliberate offenders. The imposition of fines and other penalties for traffic law infractions often leave the violator unconvinced of the justice of such action, and his resentment is directed against law enforcement.¹⁰ Negative public sentiment tends to build up against law enforcement authorities. American police methods and the devices for securing convictions often lead juries (which are small segments of the country at large) to discount the testimony of police witnesses. The two dominant factors in the American police problem are corruption, which inflicts all police forces to

¹⁰ Bruce Smith, *Police Systems in the United States* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949). The most able attempt to place the whole theory of criminology into the framework of social conflict and social control is George B. Vold's *Theoretical Criminology* (New York: Oxford, 1958).

some degree and has dominated some police establishments for generations, and the movement toward standardized administration. The policeman's lot, Smith believes, is not a happy one.

The distribution of police agencies follows the distribution of government. There are five major levels: police agencies of the federal government, particularly those attached to the Justice, Treasury, and Post Office departments; state police forces and criminal investigation agencies; sheriffs and deputy sheriffs in over 3,000 counties plus some county police who duplicate or displace the sheriff's functions; the police of a thousand cities and over 20,000 townships and a great number of magisterial districts and county districts, the police of 15,000 villages, boroughs, and incorporated towns, together with a small number of forces serving public quasi corporations. In all there are around 40,000 separate and distinct public police agencies in the United States, the great majority consisting of one, two, or three men employed on a part-time basis. Many are compensated solely by fees, and many are chosen without regard to physical or mental qualifications.¹¹ Little can be done to weld them into a homogeneous system despite state legislation and compacts concerning arrest and extradition and despite federal attempts to fill in the gaps by enlarging the criminal jurisdiction of the federal government.

Before 1930 there was no way of estimating accurately the amount of crime. Since then there have been some indices of nation-wide crime in the *Uniform Crime Reports*.¹² There are nearly 1,000,000 larcenies a year, more than 350,000 burglaries, 200,000 auto thefts. Homicide, rape, assault with gun and knife, run to around 80,000. These figures do not include "non-reportable" offenses such as embezzlement, fraud, receiving stolen property, forgery, counterfeiting, violations of narcotic and liquor laws, arson, carrying concealed weapons, prostitution and other sex offences, gambling, assaults, disorderly conduct, and vagrancy. Crime has been predominant in urban areas, but murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide (auto), and rape in rural areas now equal the urban rates. Cities with over 100,000 population, however, have a clear preponderance in crime; small urban communities tend to show moderate rates.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 32 ff.

Police success is often much greater for crimes against persons (constituting five per cent of the reportable offences in cities) than for numerous crimes against property. Of the crimes against the person, 80 per cent are cleared by police action, including 85 per cent of the homicides. Robberies are cleared by arrest in about 40 per cent of all reported crimes, burglaries 30 per cent, auto thefts 30 per cent, larcenies 20 to 25 per cent. The proportion of defendants convicted and sentenced ranges from 55 per cent for crimes against persons to 75 to 85 per cent for robberies. Male offenders outnumber females in a ratio of twelve to one. Criminal propensity is highest between the ages of 18 and 30 with the peak between 19 and 25 years.¹³

Rural and Suburban Police. The earliest American police officials were counterparts of the English sheriff and constable. The American sheriff is universal. The ancient peace powers are still exercised and popular election is the general rule. The sheriff is naturally involved in partisan politics; he rarely possesses prior police experience. He serves civil process and has custody of the county jail; in the south and southwest he is also a tax collector. Most of his official duties are performed by subordinates, who often employ irregular and corrupt practices. In the vast majority of American counties the police functions of the sheriff system have already collapsed.¹⁴

Next to the sheriff in order of universality is the constable. Popular election is the most common means of selection. In New York a general examination of services rendered by constables in fifty rural counties showed that they have no activity in criminal matters in forty-one counties. The rural constable is almost never a full-time public officer; it is necessary for him to have some private means of support. Many are without other employment, others are laborers or farmers. The evidence has shown that the constable has outlived his usefulness and his law enforcement activities have collapsed.¹⁵ In many suburban townships surrounding the great cities of the east, the office has been abolished. The expansion of county police schemes are indicative of the col-

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 44 ff.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

lapse of the sheriff-constable system.¹⁶ They often originate in the sheriff's office with the appointment of a deputy to serve as a uniformed patrolman. The most ambitious scheme of sheriff's highway patrols is that in effect in Los Angeles County, California. There are also special police forces directed and supervised by public authorities other than the sheriff such as the special police forces of legislative selection. A third type of county police force is the parkway police. A fourth type is composed of the prosecutor's detectives. A fifth is the county vigilantes which were organized through the initiative of the American Bankers Association. The rural counties are characterized "by police resources and facilities of almost tropical luxuriance and variety." This is a consequence of the inadequacy of each unit, but it does not follow that reform or consolidation is simple.

Urban Police. Though the urban setting with its racial and alien elements, complex politics, and business and labor problems have presented special police problems, the municipal police were not originally distinct. There is some evidence that the task of policing the growing cities chiefly attracted the shiftless, the incompetent, and the ignorant.¹⁷ In the nineteenth century there was considerable experimentation with urban police forms. Rotation in office came to enjoy so much popularity under the impetus of confused reformers that police fixers began to determine the price and conditions of each change. The cities were driven step by step to organize their police forces into a single system and put them under civil service.

The larger the city, the larger the ratio of police to population. For cities over 250,000 population, the average is about two and one-third police department employees per thousand. In cities between 50,000 and 250,000, the ratio is one and two-thirds employees, and in cities with 25,000 to 50,000 inhabitants the average is one and a half. Police activity is also distributed by size of city.

The number of officers per hundred patrolmen drops from 18.5 in cities under 50,000 to 11.8 in cities over 500,000. On the other hand, the number of non-police employees rises from 3.5 per cent in cities under 10,000 to 8.3 per cent in cities over 250,000. To this picture must be added the increasingly large quantities

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 120 ff.

of property and equipment needed by the police. These mount with the size of the city.

PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF POLICE ACTIVITY *

Activity	35 Cities over 250,000	184 Cities, 25,000 to 50,000
Office of chief	.6	3.5
Communications and records	6.4	5.2
Foot patrol	33.2	34.7
Motorized patrol	19.9	22.4
Indoor assignments	6.1	10.2
Detective bureau	11.9	8.1
Traffic bureau	11.4	12.0
Miscellaneous	10.5	3.9

* Abbreviated from Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

The main sources of waste in urban police activity appear in the performance of unnecessary and duplicated tasks, in the distribution of uniformed patrols, the lax supervision of day-to-day operations, and the inability or unwillingness to retire aged police officers. These remain despite the fact that the urban police force have tended to grow so large that practically all leading municipal police forces are now subject to state or municipal civil service commissions.

While at times brilliant police management has appeared in our cities, the record of police advancement has been marked by regrettable incidents of policemen framed and sent to prison or forced into ignominious retirement. Often civic leaders who have assumed police command to correct its ills have been forced quickly to relinquish their posts under the conviction that its problems are unsolvable.¹⁸

State and Federal Police. Most of the state and federal police forces are of recent origin, having been created in response to the malfunction of local police systems. The earliest state police forces, such as the Texas Rangers, were organized to provide a means of enforcing state-wide regulations. The development of state highway patrols has been rapid since the advent of the automobile and the network of state highways. In addition to state police agencies, including uniformed patrols, a number of states have

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

set up independent police forces, some concerned with criminal investigations, others with motor vehicle law enforcement, some to maintain liquor law enforcement. Smith believes that the state police have declined in quality as they have increased in numbers.

Law enforcement activities of the federal government were of slow growth; most emerged only recently. Often they were first created as minor investigative agencies, gradually acquiring law enforcement significance. The Coast Guard patrols the sea and lake shores of the United States, and is charged with general powers of criminal law enforcement. During war time, however, it is transferred from the Treasury to the Navy. Many agencies have minor police characteristics; the Public Health Service, for example, has such power in the prevention of the introduction of epidemic diseases. Some bureaus of the Department of Agriculture and various others also have police functions. Only some of these agencies have general police authority within prescribed territorial limits. Among them are the National Park Service, the Office of Indian Affairs, the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Division of Territories and Island Possessions, and the Office of Island Governments and the Police in the Territories and Canal Zone.

On the other hand, there are some federal civil police agencies. Those concerned with the protection of national revenue are the Intelligence Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue which deals with violations of internal revenue including income tax laws, the Enforcement Division of the Alcohol Tax Unit and the Division of Investigations and Patrol of the Bureau of Customs. The agencies concerned with the protection of property and enforcement of penal statutes generally are the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Secret Service Division, the Bureau of Narcotics, the Post Office Inspectors, and the Immigration Border Patrol.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has about 10,000 employees, of whom 40 per cent are directly engaged in investigations. The enforcement division of the Alcohol Tax Unit and the two border patrols total about 4,000 men. The entire federal police establishment numbers about 20,000.

The most colorful development in American federal police forms in the twentieth century is in the establishment by executive fiat of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1908 and its

survival despite considerable opposition of Congress.¹⁹ The story of the F.B.I.'s use of police state methods, drag nets to capture draft dodgers (and trapping the innocent at the rate of 200 to 1), illegal search and seizure, violation of *habeas corpus*, attempt to frame congressional leaders, refusal to cooperate with local law enforcement authorities, misrepresentation of statistics, pursuit of publicity, and achievement of some types of genuine police efficiency in some areas are told by Lowenthal and Cook.

The two fundamental trends in American law enforcement are presented by the tendency of a shift toward state and federal forces. The trend began with the first meeting of American Police Administration in 1871 for the establishment of central police services.

MILITARY PROTECTION

The political structures of any community are its specialized institutional forms of social control. The classical theory of government assigns two primary control functions to it: policing (internal control) and defense (protection of the integrity of the system from outside disturbance). When one community grows at the expense of another, its controls are in some measure expanded at the expense of the latter. In the development of the manorial community medieval Europe, the village community's right to defend itself was destroyed; the problem of defense was taken from village militias and assigned to the aristocratic estates. When the city arose as an integral community, it developed its own system of defense; its walls and its militias were under civic control. Those villages and manors displaced by a city lost their military competence, at least so far as the area of the city was concerned. A similar phenomena is manifest in the course of the rise of the modern state; it has gradually taken over the defense from all subordinate communities. The problems of the modern state were to disarm the feudal nobility, on the one hand, and to take over the function of defense from the cities. The time came when modern European states in part solved the first problem by converting the armed nobility into the officers of the crown.

¹⁹ See Max Lowenthal, *The Federal Bureau of Investigation* (New York: William Sloane, 1950), and Fred J. Cook, "The F.B.I.," in *The Nation*, October 18, 1958.

The time also came when the cities stopped building new walls; when civic growth took place outside the confines of the original walled city, the cities ceased raising and equipping municipal armies.

In the long run both control functions (policing and military defense) tend to be lodged in the most significant political institutions of the community. The very real chaos observed in rural and suburban areas and the enormous corruption in civic policing may be partly accounted for by the fact that the major developments of modern social life have been taking place outside the confines of the local community. The destruction of the structure of local law enforcement is the counterpart of the destruction of other features of local social life and is, apparently, as irreversible. The growth of state and federal police systems, similarly, mirrors the important fact that they are the agencies closer to the real location of the key forces of contemporary social events. Thus, although the rise of the modern state divided these two classical functions of social control, leaving law enforcement with the local community while it largely preempted the function of defense, in the long run they tend to be consolidated once again. The military institutions were restyled as militarism shifted from the feudal knights of the middle ages, to the militias of the cities, and finally to the standing armies of the modern state.²⁰

A restructuring of the military profession accompanied the evolution of the nation-state.²¹ As a variety of interests began to re-orient around the state, the enlightened spokesmen of the new state often saw its interests more clearly than did the monarchs. As Vagts phrased it, "a caste-ridden standing army composed of soldier automatons, the bulwark of the absolutist monarchy, was contrary to Nature, Rights of Man, and Reason."²² To be sure, the kings realized their positions rested in good measure on their control of military power, but the enlightened intellectuals thought true national strength rested on wealth, which was secured by peaceful trade. This coincided in part with the position of the new private businessmen. They were not always opposed

²⁰ For a full discussion, see Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1937).

²¹ Vagts, *op. cit.*, pp. 77 ff., and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

²² Vagts, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

to the existence of an army *per se*, but they were always opposed to an army composed of aristocrats. Adam Smith, for example, thought that a permanent army was essential for the protection of the nation.

Huntington argues that prior to 1800 there was no such thing as a professional army corps, but by 1900 such bodies existed in nearly all major countries.²³ Prior to 1800, the armies and navies were led by officers who were either mercenaries or aristocrats. War for the mercenary was a business; for the aristocrat it was a hobby. Under the mercenary system the officer was an entrepreneur raising a company of men whose services he offered for sale to the highest bidder. The replacement of the mercenary officer by an aristocratic amateur was part of the consolidation of power by the national monarchs.

The needs of the national armies were to clash with the aristocratic control of officer posts. Frederick William I in Prussia compelled the nobility to serve in the army. Frederick the Great, convinced that only the aristocrats possessed honor, systematically excluded the bourgeois from the officer corps. In the eighteenth century, both France and Prussia limited military education to aristocrats. In 1789 the French army had 6,333 nobles and 1,845 commoners and 1,100 soldiers of fortune in its officer corps. Prussia in 1806 had only 700 non-nobles in a corps of 7,100.²⁴ Within the schools the nobles often put up stiff resistance to the new technical and bookish training. Hence there often appeared technical schools to train officers and engineers largely staffed by bourgeois officers.

In 1809 in Prussia, in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, a new set of reforms was instituted. The reforms of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Grolman in Prussia formulated the ideal of the professional military officer. In the nineteenth century, in the wake of the American and French revolutions, the concept of the nation in arms was developed. The concept of war also underwent development. Clausewitz suggested that war was an autonomous science in its own right, subject to the purposes of the state; in

²³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 19 ff.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

fact, he thought of it as a continuation of politics by other means.²⁵

Modern science and industry were bringing about a transformation in warfare as profound as the change in economic life. There was less and less place for the military amateur with his feudal conceptions of social superiority. In Prussia, Scharnhorst introduced the idea of examinations as a prerequisite to promotion. He also raised the pay of officers to lessen their dependence on outside sources of income. As early as 1818 the French made an attempt to exclude non-professional considerations from military advancement. In the course of the nineteenth century political influence and purchase were gradually eliminated from the British army. After the defeat of 1871 French officers even began to organize themselves informally for their military education.

As in many others matters, the United States did not fully reproduce the European military pattern. For one thing, it lacked the feudal stratum. What most nearly corresponded to European feudal elements, the Tories, were on the opposite side from the revolutionaries. For another thing, the American conflict was with the English monarchists and mercantilistic elements.²⁶ The war opened at Lexington and Concord with an attack by militia men on British regulars. The colonies came out of the war with a reinforced belief in the militia. The minutemen, however, were insufficient to raise and keep the necessary soldiers in the field, and as early as January, 1776, Washington asked for coercive measures to bring the regiments up to strength. All during the war Washington fought to form a permanent army with training and discipline. Before the war was over many European techniques had been introduced, but, many changes were occurring in the patterns of warfare as Americans employed various guerilla tactics and used camouflage to the dismay of British regulars.

The Constitution established civil control over the military branches in government. Congress alone can raise and support armies, vote funds for their support, provide for army government, and declare war. The President of the United States, a civilian, is commander-in-chief of the army and navy in war time. The right of the people to keep and bear arms was written into the Constitution. Further, the quartering of soldiers in households

²⁵ Karl von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York: The Modern Library, 1943).

²⁶ Vagts, *op. cit.*, Ch. III, pp. 96 ff.

without their consent is forbidden in time of peace and only possible with strict limitations in time of war. While Congress was given unlimited power to raise armies, principal reliance was placed on the militias of the states. The standing army was kept small.

The training of officers was finally provided for by the establishment of the military academy at West Point. To prevent the rise of an hereditary officer caste, the cadetship was distributed through the senators and representatives of all states and congressional districts. Army discipline was concentrated on immediate usefulness in civil disturbances, on war rather than on ceremonial occasions. The army was restricted by considerations of usefulness, including guarding the frontier and public works. Reliance was placed on volunteers for the standing army in time of peace. This tended to recruit the army in peace time from foot-loose youths of the lower strata of society.

In their review of American military policy, Bernardo and Bacon observed that, in the Revolution, a heavy price was paid for inexperienced statesmen and the ignorance of military officers.²⁷ By the end of the conflict some 400,000 men had been pressed into service at a cost of \$370,000,000. A quarter of this number, with adequate training and equipment, would have been sufficient to achieve victory in much less time. Washington never had more than 17,000 men, and at Trenton and Princeton, when his needs were greatest, he had an effective force of less than 4,000.²⁸ The most important effect of the war on later military practice was to fix the manpower recruitment policy which expressed strong distaste for standing armies and long terms of military service.

No modern state can continue to exist without defensive forces. Though enamored of the idea that a militia was sufficient, the new nation was pressed by embarrassments on its frontiers and at home to provide for a small standing army. It began to evolve the policy of maintaining a small regular force to cope with internal disorder and act as a nucleus for large military forces to be levied in time of war. In 1798 the quasi-war with France

²⁷ C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, *American Military Policy: Its Development Since 1775* (Harrisburg: The Military Service Pub. Co., 1955).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

stimulated interest in naval affairs so that by the end of the year twenty ships were in service as compared to three for the preceding year. In 1809 the strength of the army was less than 3,000; the navy had 200 officers and 2,104 men attached to small gunboats. The War of 1812 again dramatized the need for military forces. For twenty-five years after the War of 1812 the steamship did not produce major changes in the concept of national defense, but by 1841 moves were under way to develop the steamship as a ship of the line. By this time there were also improvements in ordnance research.

From 1808 to the eve of the Civil War, the population increased eight fold and the militia increased with it, although the annual appropriations of \$200,000 for military needs remained the same. When war broke out, the government was quite unprepared for it. In the course of the Civil War the South, handicapped by meager resources, explored every available weapon and tactic. Since it had few fighting ships, the Confederates made use of marine mines and torpedoes. On the land they laid belts of land mines. The Southerners performed experiments to improve the destructive capacity of artillery shells. Both sides made use of aerial observation by means of balloons. The cavalry was also accepted as a tactical weapon.

The Civil War was a mere dress rehearsal for the wars of the twentieth century. By the end of World War II the expeditionary army was more than twice the size of the American expeditionary forces of World War I. In 1918 the United States had an army of 4,057,101 men, of whom 2,086,000 served overseas. In May, 1945, the expeditionary forces were 8,291,336, of whom 5,472,282 had service overseas.

If it was to take its place among the modern nations, the United States was no more able to avoid the emergence of an ever larger professional officer corps, a standing army, and some system of peacetime military service than the other nations of the world.

SUMMARY

In the simple societies such as the tribe and peasant village, specialized institutions charged with the formal exercise of coercive social power were the exception. When society grew more

complex, government emerged to consolidate legitimate coercive power into its own hands.

The constitution is the entire body of legal and customary rules providing for the organization and procedure of government, the powers and functions of officials, and the rights and duties of individuals. The constitution of the United States is composed of the written Constitution, treaties, federal administrative regulations and legislation, statutes of state legislations and state administrative regulations, ordinances of the cities and other local units and their administrative regulations. The United States is characterized by the geographic distribution of powers between the national and state governments—by its federalism.

In the field between the constitution of government and the citizen's rights is an arena for the achievement and exercise of formal power. A complex struggle for political preference is made by pressure groups, which are bodies of individuals organized to promote their special interests in a peaceable manner and political parties which are voluntary associations organized for the acquisition of power by peaceable means.

In the course of the struggle for control of the formal machinery of government, two major tendencies are discernible: (1) a tendency to expand the field of government to ever wider spheres, and (2) a tendency for an increasing consolidation of the federal government at the expense of local forms.

The tendency for law enforcement also assumes a federal form corresponding to the increasing consolidation of the national government at the expense of local forms. In the national contests of modern times there has been an increasing development of military institutions as military needs occupy an ever more significant place in the evolution of the nation.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. What reasons are there for conceiving of the problem of social control as coextensive with the problems of influence and power?
2. What are the main differences between local and national social strata in the United States? Of what importance for social control are social strata?
3. In what sense is it true that the state is the primary formal institution of social control?
4. Of what importance are pressure groups and political parties for social control?
5. Police and military power are the classical control functions of government. How do you account for the fact that the modern state originally tended to assign the former to local governments but retained and strengthened the latter in its own hands?
6. How do you account for the fact that the problem of law enforcement has tended to shift to the larger units of government?
7. In what ways does modern militarism differ from previous types?
8. What is meant by the constitution in its broad sense? What are the peculiarities of the American Constitution?
9. How do pressure groups and political parties differ?
10. Outline the major trends in government in the United States. How do you explain them?

PART IV

THE CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS
OF A MASS SOCIETY

Introduction to Part IV

In describing the present division of the material as the "Cultural Institutions of a Mass Society," we have accepted the popular use of the term "culture." The social scientist uses the term "culture" to refer to "the way" one learns to act in society. Popularly, the term is used to refer to various ways of acting (particularly during one's leisure time) considered to be "refined." To the social scientist the way one acts in a family is just as much a part of culture as the "refined" sentiments expressed and enjoyed in a circle of poets. In popular usage, however, only the latter is "culture."

In Part III *socialization, mastery of nature, and social control* were referred to as social institutions; the cultural institutions of Part IV are *play* and the *arts*. Both are a part of culture in the social science meaning. No harm is done by following popular usage, however, so long as it is realized that technically the institutions of the workaday world are just as much a part of the apparatus of culture in the social science sense as those of leisure time.

When people play and use their leisure time for the pursuit of the arts, they do not, despite occasional appearances to the contrary, become different people. Married couples, for example, who appear quite content with each other in day-to-day life find themselves willing participants in the social practice of sitting beside some other person's spouse when they go out for dinner. It sometimes appears that compared to the monogamous fidelity of every day family life there is the symbolic promiscuity of society. Or again, women who are ever so reserved in every day dress appear on formal occasions with bare backs and midriffs. This has, at times, led to the observation that in our society women who wish to appear naked in public are only permitted to do so on highly formal social occasions. Again, persons who make a considerable point of "never drinking alone" at times get drunk

and make spectacles of themselves in the name of "social drinking."

Such apparent reversals of roles between work and leisure time activities have, at times, led to compensation and catharsis theories of play and the arts. However, this can hardly be more than a partial explanation of leisure time use, for very often the toys of one generation become the tools and weapons of the next. Long before the steam engine was transformed into one of the fundamental machines of the modern world, for example, it existed as a toy. One can hardly treat the toy steam engine as a compensation or a catharsis for an unrequited need; the serious need for it developed only afterward.

Among the exciting new branches of study are the sociology of play and the sociology of art. A review of some of the major theoretical reflections that have come to occupy these new disciplines is contained in Chapters 20 and 22. The examination of the clash and change of American interests in play and the arts is contained in Chapters 21 and 23.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF PLAY

The most basic of all distinctions between the kinds of values that men pursue in society is the one between the instrumental and intrinsic values; the first defines means, the second ends. As collective solutions to human problems, institutions may be broadly differentiated in these terms. Social institutions center in instrumental values; cultural institutions center in intrinsic values. The first regulate *how* men live in society; the second determine *why*.

In human groups it is never true that a single value corresponds to a single group. A given value may be realized in a number of groups. The same consideration applies to instrumental and intrinsic values; every group offers some composition of both. When there is nothing else, activity itself is often an intrinsic value to living creatures.

The effect of restriction of activity and withdrawal of stimulation has been studied by psychiatrists. Heron,¹ for example, reports that if the surface on which a snail is resting is shaken repeatedly, it ceases to respond. A sea anemone that is disturbed by a drop of water falling on the surface will cease to react if it is repeated over and over. While organisms even of a simple type tend not to respond to a repeated stimulus unless the lack of response carries with it some negative reaction, higher organisms actively avoid monotonous environments. If it has alternatives, a rat will use different routes to food in a maze. In fact, a rat will actually face a considerable electric shock for the opportunity to explore.

¹ Woodburn, Heron, "The Pathology of Boredom," *Scientific American*, Vol. 196, no. 1 (January, 1957), pp. 52-56.

At McGill University, D. O. Heb, Heron, and others made a study of the psychological effects of the withdrawal of sensory stimulation on human beings. Male college students were paid \$20 a day to lie on beds in lighted cubicles twenty-four hours a day with time out for meals and use of the toilet. They wore translucent plastic visors which transmitted only diffuse light, cotton gloves, cardboard cuffs, and had U-shaped foam rubber pillows around their heads. Thus visual, tactile, and auditory perception were controlled and restricted.

Among the most interesting findings reported was the apparent inability of the subjects to think clearly about anything for any extended length of time. A battery of tests was given before and at various intervals during the experimental isolation. At every test after the first the subject's performance was more impaired. The content of thought gradually changed. At first the subjects tended to think about their studies and about the experiment; later, they thought about their personal problems, and finally they began to reminisce about past events and to capture some detail of a past incident. Eventually it became difficult for them to concentrate, and many subjects experienced "blank periods" during which they were apparently devoid of thought.

Emotional reactions changed. The experimental subjects became emotionally unstable and irritable, but also, at times, easily amused. These states tended to oscillate rapidly, causing them to behave in childish ways. At times they felt that the experimenters were against them, making things unusually tough.

After long isolation most subjects began to see "images": others experienced blank visual fields or flickering light. The hallucinations sometimes were of particular and recurrent types. They often began with simple forms—dots or geometric patterns—becoming gradually more complex, and finally changing into elaborate forms and scenes. Some persons complained that their eyes grew tired from watching the hallucinations. They had little control over the content of the hallucinations. One man saw dogs, another eyeglasses. One subject trying "to get" a pen saw successively an ink blot, a pencil, a green horse, and finally a pen. The hallucinations were not restricted to vision. Some heard people talking; some heard music playing; another heard a church choir singing. Some subjects reported sensations of touch, and some

had experiences of otherness or bodily strangeness. After emerging from isolation, the subjects reported that things looked curved, or too large or too small. Some reported that things seemed to move. The judgments of size were very erroneous.

Changes in the electrical activity of the brain of the subjects were charted. During and after long periods of isolation, there was a tendency for some slow waves, normally present only in sleep, to appear. Moreover, the frequencies in the region of the principal brain rhythms slowed down. Most subjects fell asleep soon after being placed in the cubicle. After waking they became more and more restless in a pattern of increasingly intense and unpleasant spells. Many subjects whistled, sang, or recited poetry. They were excessively garrulous when they came out for meals. When moving about they appeared dazed and confused, and had increasing difficulty in finding their way to the washroom. The individual's thinking was generally impaired; he was childish in his emotional responses, his visual perception was disturbed, and he suffered hallucinations.

All of this has bearing on the problem of play. When groups offer no other intrinsic values, they at least offer an additional activity among the varieties available to the individual. Even in this respect activities vary, presenting a complex of internal variety, drama, and excitement. Adults sometimes become so wrapped up in their grown-up concerns that they lose sight of it. However, when children in play pick out adult roles to imitate, it is because their perception isolates the intrinsic values of these roles. To the child these roles are sources of mastery, of color, of importance.

Just as groups that are primarily instrumental present some intrinsic values, activities that are primarily intrinsic in nature also present some instrumental values. People may, for example, go to the theatre for diversion, but a whole array of persons—actors, designers, producers, costumers, and attendants—may make a living out of it. However, there is still a critical difference between activities primarily addressed to the attainment of intrinsic values and those addressed to the attainment of instrumental values. The meaning of the former type of activity lies in the activity itself; the meaning of the latter lies in some external sphere. This also means that the events of the former are experi-

enced as more spontaneous, more creative, than events of the latter. Activities of the intrinsic type are freer and less constrained. This does not mean that the activities and institutions in which cultural values are realized are without order. Quite the contrary is often the case; in their cultural institutions men realize a kind of order that they might well dream about for their social institutions. However, the source of the order of cultural institutions comes from within; the order of social institutions comes, at least in part, from without. Among the areas of social life where the pursuit of intrinsic values is primary, play and the arts are outstanding.

THE NATURE OF PLAY

In the nineteenth century a number of theories of play were advanced, beginning with that of the German poet and philosopher Schiller (1759-1805) and the sociologist Herbert Spencer. They thought that play was the employment of surplus energy. As Schiller put it, "the animal *works* when a privation is the motor of its activity and it *plays* when the plentitude of force is this motor, when an exuberant life is excited to action."² Spencer accepted this, adding that the urge to play is instinctive. Play tends to take the forms of the adult activity of the species. Play, for Spencer, was the origin of art, a preparation for the actions of later life, and a compensation³ for dissatisfactions due to the failure of normal expression of impulses.

The theory that play is recreational was advanced most vigorously by Lazarus (1824-1903).⁴ He reasoned that like sleep, play restores mental and physical exhaustion. The change of activity is usually, but not necessarily, of a different type. G. T. W. Patrick, however, felt that for the characteristic occupations of civilized life which are sedentary and require concentration and abstract thinking, play takes the form of racially primitive activities. These people get most complete rest from hunting, fishing, canoeing, swimming, camping, mountain climbing, and the like.

² Friedrich Schiller, *Essays Aesthetical and Philosophical* (London: Bell and Sons, 1875).

³ Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: D. Appleton, 1873), pp. 627, 631.

⁴ Moritz Lazarus, *Über die Reize des Spiels* (Berlin: F. Dummler, 1883).

The Swiss scientist, Karl Groos, argued that play was founded on the instincts.⁵ He believed the living creature had innate capabilities essential for preservation of the species and that play was the practice of these capacities before they were actually required. "Play is the agency employed to develop crude powers and prepare them for life's uses. . . . Play depends . . . on the elaboration of immature capacities to full equality with perfected instinct, and secondly on the evolution of hereditary qualities to a degree for transcending this, to a state of adaptability and versatility surpassing the most perfect instinct."⁶ Moreover, "imitative play is an important agent in supplementing instincts, usually tending to render them more plastic."⁷ A somewhat similar position was offered by William McDougal, who argued that in play instincts are modified and expressed differently from the same activity when it is serious.⁸

The psychologist, G. Stanley Hall, was one of the foremost exponents of another type of biological explanation of play. He thought play was a kind of recapitulation of racial history.⁹ In play the activities of man's ancestors are rehearsed. The child goes through stages of animal, savage, nomadic, agricultural, and tribal life states. By the expression of instinctive tendencies in this successive reiteration of the history of the race, these instinctive forces are dissipated and weakened.

A similar argument was made by E. Appleton.¹⁰ Play activities satisfy needs of growth. Play precedes the ability of the organism to function in a given way. Also somewhat similar, but taken out of a recapitulationistic framework, is the theory that play is a kind of catharsis or safety valve of pent up emotions. Play rids the individual of such emotions and frees action for development.¹¹

Almost all of the explanations of play have some plausibility.

⁵ Karl Groos, *The Play of Man* (New York: D. Appleton, 1901). See Part III on "The Theory of Play," pp. 371 ff., for a review of the theories of play at the time.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 375.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 376.

⁸ William McDougal, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (Boston: John W. Luce, 1921).

⁹ G. Stanley Hall, *Youth* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1906), p. 74.

¹⁰ E. Appleton, *A Comparative Study of the Play of Adult Savages and Civilized Children* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1910).

¹¹ E. Claparède, *Psychologie de l'Enfant et Pédagogie Expérimentale* (New York: Longmans Green, 1911), p. 128.

The idea, for example, that play represents activity arising out of surplus energy has much to be said for it. Healthy and happy individuals play more and with more zest than do those who are less healthy and happy. Similarly, there is little doubt that all persons look to play for recreation. Once one drops the rather simple biologism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which assigned play an instinctive basis or conceived of it as a recapitulation of the development of human culture, it is clear that in play some preparation for future social life may occur.

In the twentieth century there has been an attempt to develop more comprehensive theories of play, at times described as "self-expression" theories of play. Mitchell and Mason, for example, developed such a theory.¹² Among the basic assumptions of their approach are (1) man is an active creature and activity is a primary need; (2) the physical fitness of the organism has an effect on the type of activity it engages in; (3) the psychological inclinations of the individual predispose him toward certain types of activity, and (4) therefore, all that is necessary to explain play is that the individual seeks to live up to his abilities and to express his personality. Among the factors that focus individual forms of play are the habits which the individual forms and which incline him toward some activities, the physical environment which places certain limitations on play activity, and the social environment which provides the individual with some contacts leading toward particular habits and attitudes. In this there is a compensatory element. When the individual seeks self-expression and finds his behavior blocked, he is forced to seek compensatory satisfactions. The self-expression theory of play has often been closely linked to socialization.

George Herbert Mead held a specialized version of the self-expression theory. To him play was a stage in self development preceding the organized game.¹³ Play, he maintained, was always play at something; it was play at being a mother, teacher, policeman, or the like. The playing child takes different roles and uses his own responses in building a self. This is quite different from

¹² Elmer D. Mitchell and Bernard S. Mason, *The Theory of Play* (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1948), pp. 79 ff. For a review of the various theories of play, see pp. 63 ff.

¹³ George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 150 ff.

activity in the game in which the child must be ready to take the attitudes of everyone else involved in the game, for the roles have definite relations to one another. In the game, therefore, in terms of the roles, every role is implied in every other. In the play stage of their development, children are prone to make up rules on the spot to help themselves out of difficulties.

In play the child takes the roles of particular other persons. The playing child will often take, in turn, all the characters of an interaction process. "In the play of young children, even when they play together, there is abundant evidence of the child's taking different roles in the process; and a solitary child will keep up the process of stimulating himself by his vocal gestures to act in different roles almost indefinitely."¹⁴

While Mead restricts play to childhood and to a very special kind of childhood activity, he conceives of play primarily as self-expression, or perhaps as self-formation. Jean Piaget takes much the same position.¹⁵ He does not think of play as some particular activity, but as activity of a certain form or kind. Activity, in his opinion, is either directed toward the mastery of things and materials of the external world or, internally, toward the mastery of the self. A number of criteria have been thought to identify activity as play. Among these are spontaneity, pleasure, lack of organization, freedom from conflicts and over-motivation (surplus energy). Piaget suggested that, although most of these criteria help to identify play, any single one of them may at times identify work as well. He argued that in the long run play is most completely to be identified as an activity dominated by assimilation.

Play is distinguishable by a modification, varying in degree, of the conditions of equilibrium between reality and the ego. We can therefore say that if adapted activity and thought constitute an equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation, play begins as soon as there is a predominance of assimilation. This criterion seems to be generally applicable, from the merely functional assimilation characteristic of practice games, to the varied forms of assimilation of reality to thought found in symbolic games. Since all thought involves assimilation, and ludic assimilation is only distinctive in that it subordinates accommoda-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 365.

¹⁵ Jean Piaget, *Play, Dreams, and Imitation in Childhood* (New York: W. W. Norton Company, 1951), pp. 147 ff.

tion instead of being in equilibrium with it, play is to be conceived as being both related to adapted thought by continuous sequence of intermediaries and bound up with thought as a whole, of which it is only one pole, more or less differentiated.¹⁶

While the theories of Mead and Piaget largely confine play to childhood, they formulate the mechanisms of play with greater clarity than do those of Mitchell and Mason. Mead believed one of the most important forms of play was a kind of free and spontaneous role taking; Piaget said activity was playful in considerable measure to the degree that it assimilated things and ideas to the self instead of accommodating the self to the world; with Mitchell and Mason the general property of play is self expression. The theories are complementary.

A development of special interest in the theory of play as self expression may be traced through the works of Georg Simmel and Max Weber to Johan Huizinga. It contains a revised conception of the social consequences and social significance of play.

Georg Simmel's theory of society rested on a distinction between the contents (materials) and the forms of social life. A society, according to Simmel, consists of the interaction among individuals. This interaction is based on certain drives, interests, and purposes (this is its content); but the interaction may take a variety of forms. The form and content of social life were thought to be autonomous; that is, the same purposes could be realized in various ways and a given way of doing things could be a vehicle for different purposes. For example, competition as a form of interaction can be found in various spheres of life: in courtship, business, politics, aspirations for honors, etc. On the other hand, some particular content (love, interest, for instance) may be manifest in the forms of competition, negotiation, purchase, etc.

The same kind of analysis can apply anywhere; cognition originally appears as a means in the struggle for existence. Exact knowledge is useful for the maintenance and promotion of life. It may, however, be pursued for its own sake, autonomously apart from its service in practical life. Science may become a value in itself, autonomously collecting and shaping its objects according

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

to its own needs.¹⁷ The interpretation of realities in terms of spatial systems, rhythms, or sounds originally served the organization of life for practical purposes; when these forms are pursued for their own sake, however, it is art. The law originally served to order life conduct for practical purposes, but justice may become a form in its own right, determining how the contents of life should be arranged without reference to any higher agency.

This complete turnover, from the determination of the forms by the materials of life to the determination of its materials by the forms that have become the supreme values, is perhaps most extensively at work in the numerous phenomena that we lump together under the category of play. Actual forces, needs, impulses of life produce the forms of our behavior that are suitable for play. These forms, however, become independent contents and stimuli within play itself, or rather, as play. There are, for instance, the hunt, the gain by ruse, the proving of physical and intellectual strength; competition; and the dependence on chance and on the favor of powers that cannot be influenced.¹⁸

Simmel maintained that when forms are lifted out of the flux of life and freed of their inherent gravity, and express themselves in their purity, play acquires both the gaiety and the symbolic character which distinguishes it from work. Art and play are similar in this manner, for both were forms originally developed by the realities of life but which have created spheres of autonomy in the face of the realities giving birth to them. On the other hand, if emptied of content they become artifice or "empty play."

According to Simmel's argument any sphere of life may have its play form, even social life in general. This, in fact, is the meaning of *sociability*; it is the play form of association itself. Sociability appears whenever a number of persons interact solely for the purpose of interaction, and when interaction determines the content of action. Sociable man exists nowhere except in social relations. Persons acting sociably withdraw both the claims of personality and the practical claims of social interaction in order to associate for the sake of associating. To the degree that the individual cannot do this he cannot socialize; thus there are limits of sociability or sociability thresholds. The axiom of sociability

¹⁷ Georg Simmel, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, trans. by Kurt H. Wolff (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950), p. 41.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

is that each individual offers a maximum of social values such as joy, relief, and liveliness compatible with the maximum of values he receives. Sociability is always democratic, for it rests precisely on the principle of free exchange.

The connection between sociability and play explains why Simmel extended sociability to cover other play forms, practically all games. In games people lead their own lives and are propelled by their own attraction, even if the game has monetary stakes. The idea of the "social game" means not only that the game is played in a society but that people may actually "play" society. Any sphere of life may have its play form. The play form of eroticism is coquetry. The coquettish woman enhances her attractiveness when she gives her consent as an almost immediate possibility, but is ultimately not serious about it. Her behavior alternates between yielding and withdrawal. This is not courtship completed in physical sexual satisfaction, but courtship play for its own sake. Coquetry, according to Simmel, has its charms precisely because the reality of erotic desire, consent, and fulfillment are left far behind and embodied only in the interaction of the silhouettes of their serious purposes.

Conversation is the play-form of communication, in which the communication for its own sake is carried on. The art of conversation has its own laws; the topic of conversation is merely the indispensable medium through which its attractions are unfolded.

While Max Weber did not accept Simmel's distinction between form and content, in the course of his study of the city he made observations somewhat similar to those of Simmel. In discussing the various forms of the city in the Western world, Weber attempted to characterize the cities of ancient Greece in contrast to those of ancient Rome and medieval Europe. As he saw it, the cities of ancient Greece expressed a style of life peculiar to a young man's culture. In the early development of the Greek city the noblemen began to wrestle in the ring. The *agones* were the matches between individual athletes which came to occupy a place at the core of Greek development equivalent to the tournaments of the Middle Ages.¹⁹

The individual contests or *agones* came to be the style-giving

¹⁹ Max Weber, *The City* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), trans. by Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth, p. 228.

forms of most important official and non-official conduct. The gymnasium with its spear fighting, fist fighting, wrestling, and prize races came to occupy a central place in Greek life as a most fundamental meeting ground of the citizens. All events of social and official life tended to acquire similar form.

The ritualistic song of honor to the gods was supplied by the musical *agones*. To be sure, eminent men displayed the quality of their possessions through horses and wagons they permitted to run for them. However, in the nature of the form, the plebian *agones* had to be recognized as equal. The *agones* were organized with prizes, umpires, contest rules, and interpenetrated the whole of life. Alongside the Epics it became the single most important bond of the Hellenic world in contrast to all barbarians.²⁰

Weber believed that even Greek sculpture showed the early effects of this development with its nakedness, showing nothing but weapons. In contexts dominated by the *agone*, prestige feelings suffered an extensive loss of distance. It was not easy to maintain dignity in the naked tournaments of the Greeks. From the naked games in the gymnasium to the rhetorical art of the Attic demagogues, Greek culture was dominated by the play forms of young manhood.

Simmel argued that any area of social life could produce its play form; but Max Weber rejected the distinction between form and content. Weber, nevertheless, indicated that a whole civilization could receive its peculiar stylization in terms of its characteristic types of play. Following these suggestions, Johan Huizinga offered the challenging suggestion that play is the origin of all that is creative in culture and civilization.²¹

According to Huizinga, play is a special form of activity that penetrates the "archetypal" activities of man: language, mythology, law and order, art, poetry, wisdom, and science. "All are rooted in the primeval soil of play."²² Play, he believes, is not identical with laughter, for children's games—football and chess, for example—are played in seriousness without the inclination to laugh. The comic is also subsidiary to play, for the comic is closely

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

²¹ Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950).

²² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

connected with folly, while play is not foolish. The characteristics of play are found in its voluntariness or freedom, its disinterestedness (it stands outside the immediate satisfaction of wants and appetites), in its order (play contains its own rules to which it alone responds), and in its tensions (some type of contest determines its inner drama).

Play is a voluntary activity or occupation executed within certain fixed limits of time and place, according to rules freely accepted but absolutely binding, having its aim in itself and accompanied by a feeling of tension, joy, and the consciousness that it is 'different' from 'ordinary life.' Thus defined, the concept seemed capable of embracing everything we can call 'play' in animals, children, and grownups: games of strength and skill, inventing games, guessing games, games of chance, exhibitions and performances of all kinds. We ventured to call the category play one of the most fundamental in life.²³

Culture, according to Huizinga, "arises in the form of play." Even activity serving a vital need like hunting takes on a play-form in archaic society. Play always has an antithetical character; as a rule it is between two parties or teams. The role of play in archaic life is suggested by the extent to which the primitive mental and social worlds were dominated by dualisms. Tribes, for example, were divided into two opposing halves or *phratries*. In China and elsewhere, seasonal contests were employed to secure agricultural fertility, and winter festivals had a dramatic character. For many people dice-playing was a part of religious practice, as in the game of dice of Siva in the world of the *Mahabharata*. The potlatch ceremonies of the Kwakiutl Indians expressed an agonistic principle revealing that basis of archaic society. In Greece, "virtue, honor, nobility, and glory fall at the outset within the field of competition, which is that of play."²⁴ The Greeks held contests in everything including beauty contests for men, symposia contests in singing, riddle solving, keeping awake, and drinking. "In play . . . the antithetical and agonistic basis of civilization is given from the start, for play is older and more original than civilization."²⁵

In the growth of a civilization the agonistic function attains

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 64, 71.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

its most beautiful and conspicuous form in its archaic period. As civilization becomes more complex, the cultural soil is smothered under layers of ideas, systems of thinking, knowledge, doctrines, rules, regulations, moralities, and convictions which lose touch with play. When civilization grows serious, it assigns only a secondary place to playing.

Among the primary areas of social life for which play provides the basic structure are law, war, knowledge, poetry, myth, and philosophy. In Greece, for example, litigation was considered an agon—a contest bound by fixed rules and in sacred form in which the contending parties invoked the decision of an arbiter.²⁶ All fighting that is bound by rules bears the formal characteristics of play. We can speak of war as a cultural function so long as it is waged within an area in which the members regard each other as equals or antagonists with equal rights.²⁷ For archaic man, knowing is magical power. Competitions in esoteric knowledge are deeply rooted in ritual and form an essential part of it. The questions which hierophants put to one another are riddles in the fullest sense of the word; but for their sacred import, they exactly resemble the riddles of parlor games.²⁸ All knowledge, which naturally includes philosophy, is polemical by nature and, thus, cannot be separated from agonistics.²⁹ Poiesis is a play function; it proceeds within the playground of the mind, in a private world which the mind creates. Play is so innate in poetry and in every form of poetic utterance that the bond between is indissoluble; the same is true of play and music.³⁰ Certainly the theriomorphic factor in ritual, mythology, and religion can best be understood in terms of the play attitude.³¹

As the studies of the consequences of withdrawal of activity and monotonous environment reveal, activity and variety of activity are valued in themselves. Mead and Piaget have indicated that play is a kind of self expression within whatever materials society offers. For Piaget, play is a continuous assimilation of what is offered by the world to the self. Simmel and Weber have

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

envisioned the extensions of play far beyond the spheres of socialization, and Huizinga has conceived of it as a living element in civilization itself. In any case, it is clear that in his play man often builds a world nearer to his heart's desire than is possible in the world of work.

PLAY AND THE COMMUNITY

Most of the theories imply an adaptation of play to the given type of society. Even the older theories, which defined play as the practice of instinctive responses or as a recapitulation of man's cultural development, derived their plausibility from the observation that the play of children does, in fact, bear an important relation to adult life. Twentieth century theories of play (illustrated by Mead, Piaget, and Huizinga) have intimately associated it with socialization.

The theory that play represents a practice of instincts in preparation for their serious use (Karl Groos) had to be abandoned once it was demonstrated that man was characterized by the lack rather than the possession of instincts. On the other hand, it is true that in childhood play people often acquire habits which for good or ill persist throughout adult life. The idea that childhood play recapitulates the development of culture had to be dropped, since it rested on the assumption of the inheritance of racial memories, for which there is no empirical basis. At the same time, it derived some of its plausibility from the "primitive" elements in the play of children. It has become increasingly clear that there is such a thing as a distinctive childhood culture—often incomplete and fragmentary, to be sure, but quite demonstrable. Each generation of playing children learns various play forms from the previous age group and, in turn, transmits them to the next generation. It is quite possible for remarkably old play forms to persist among children. They enjoy a kind of autonomy of their own.

The twentieth century students of play have provided the basis for understanding the primary form of child's play in any society. The favorite material of children's play, Mead has suggested, is the array of adult roles of the particular society. The nature of play, Piaget insists, is the domination of the process of assimilation over accommodation. The roles enacted in children's

play come from the particular society; the content of the assimilation is from the same source.

While cultural forms of remarkable antiquity may persist in children's play, the primary form is determined by the adult social world. The world of children is in good measure the play-form of adulthood. The play of children, therefore, inevitably shows adaptation to particular community types.

Adults also play, and in the nature of the case their play is not completely identical with the play of children. An element of escape or catharsis is uppermost at those times when adults return to child play forms.³² The most characteristic adult play explores contrasts, extensions, and alternatives of adult skills, performances, and responsibilities. However, again the play forms of any group of adults bear a complementary relation to the forms of work peculiar to the community.

ATTITUDES TOWARD PLAY

The city presents an environment favorable to the rapid evolution of play forms. This appears even in the anti-urban agrarianism of Spengler.

The great Epic, which speaks and sings of the blood belongs to *Pfalz* and *Burg*, but the Drama, in which *awakened* life tests itself, is city-poetry, and the great Novel, the survey of all things human by the *emancipated* intellect, presupposes the world-city. Apart from really genuine folk-song, the only lyricism is of the city. Apart from the 'eternal' peasant-art there is only urban painting and architecture, with a swift and soon-ended history.³³

Spengler maintains that however bizarre the forms of play in the city, they are all marked by one property, the attempt to escape from tension.

Tension, when it has become intellectual, knows no form of recreation but that which is specific to the world-city—namely, *detente*, relaxation, distraction. Genuine play, *joie de vivre*, pleasure, inebriation, are products of the cosmic beat and as such no longer comprehensible in their essence. But the relief of hard, intensive brain-work by its opposite—conscious and practiced fooling—of intellectual tension by the bodily

³² Mitchell and Mason, *op. cit.*, pp. 16 ff.

³³ Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, trans. by Francis Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1929), Vol. II, p. 93.

tension of sport, of bodily tension by the sensual straining after 'pleasure' and the spiritual straining after the 'excitements' of betting and competitions, of the pure logic of the day's work by a consciously enjoyed mysticism—all this is common to the world-cities of all the civilization. Cinema, expressionism, theosophy, boxing contests, nigger dances, poker, and racing—one can find it all in Rome. Indeed, the connoisseur might extend his researches to the Indian, Chinese, and Arabian world-cities as well. To name but one example, if one reads the *Kama-Sutram* one understands how it was that Buddhism *also* appealed to men's tastes, and then the bullfighting scenes in the Palace of Cnossus will be looked at with quite different eyes. A cult, no doubt, underlay them, but there was a savour over it all, as over Rome's fashionable Isis-cult in the neighbourhood of the Circus Maximus.³⁴

However, while Spengler imaginatively isolated some of the properties of urban play forms, his anti-urbanism blinded him to other properties of the European urban environment which were to draw the lines between work and play with special strictness and provide the distinction with religious reinforcement. The sober, hard working strata of the city were shocked by the corruption of the city. In the fifteenth century, at the time of the rise of the Italian city, a number of preachers started revivals. The most important of all, Jerome Savonarola (1452-1498), who began to preach at Florence in 1482, deeply stirred his congregations. Savonarola backed his attack on the morals of the clergy. In huge public bonfires people burned their cards, false hair, jewelry, trinkets, indecent pictures, art objects, and the like. Gamblers were tortured, and the tongues of blasphemers were pierced. A police was set up, empowered to search houses.³⁵ But the forces he opposed rose against him, and the members of the commonwealth grew restive under his reforms. He was seized by the Seignory, tortured, and forced to confess that he was not a prophet, and was hung in 1498.

During the sixteenth century the proliferation of play forms was under way. Tobacco was beginning to be used as a narcotic for its own sake. Journeys for pleasure were frequent, and a system of inns developed to accommodate such travelers. Strangers of both sexes often shared the same bed. Bathing once a week had

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

³⁵ Preserved Smith, *The Age of the Reformation* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1920), p. 17.

become usual, and a common form of entertainment was the "bath-party" in a public bathhouse. The theatre was rising in popularity. Among popular sports were bear and bull baiting. Tennis was growing in popularity. Cards and dice were popular, and chess was played. Young people loved dancing.

Protestantism heightened some of the tendencies toward individualization and moral reform that were strong in European Christianity. Protestantism broke with the sacramental theory of the church, and weakened the relation between the congregation and the priesthood. Religion was made into a much more individualized matter of the personal conscience. As the sacraments and ministrations of the priesthood lost importance, conduct in the affairs of every day life gained religious significance.

Inner worldly asceticism was promoted with varying degrees of intensity in the various branches of Protestantism. Exemplary work on one's calling was taken as evidence of religious correctness. Success in one's work acquired a religious value. At the same time, it did not make sense to men so inclined to dissipate the religious meaning of life in frivolities. Wherever it dominated political affairs, the Protestant spirit operated negatively on forms of display, frivolous amusement and even the arts. Sumptuary laws were provided in many places prohibiting people from dressing beyond their proper station. Excessive fare at feasts was also regulated. In 1517 an English proclamation regulated the number of dishes to be served according to the rank of the highest person present. Games of chance were often forbidden. Francis I ordered a lieutenant with twenty archers to visit taverns and gambling houses and to arrest players with cards and dice. Henry II forbade games of chance to minors and debauched persons. There were frequent laws prohibiting tennis, bowls, dicing, and cards. There were regulations governing the number of taverns and the amount of wine that could be kept in a gentleman's cellar. At the time of Cromwell plays were forbidden in the precincts of the city of London. In Scotland the Book of Discipline forbade attendance at theatres. Luther thought them "fools' work," and Calvin thoroughly disapproved of them.³⁶

Max Weber, who studied with especial care the bearing of the

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 484 ff.

Protestant Ethic upon the work psychology of early capitalistic society, noted that in enhancing the sphere of work the Puritan idea of calling also had bearing on the concept of play.

This asceticism turned with all its force against one thing: the spontaneous enjoyment of life and all it had to offer. This is perhaps most characteristically brought out in the struggle over the *Book of Sports* which James I and Charles I made into law expressly as a means of counteracting Puritanism, and which the latter ordered to be read from all the pulpits. The fanatical opposition of the Puritans to the ordinances of the king, permitting certain popular amusements on Sunday outside of church hours by law, was not only explained by the disturbance of Sabbath rest, but also by resentment from the intentional diversion from the ordered life of the saint, which it caused.³⁷

The king wished to destroy the anti-authoritarian ascetic tendency of Puritanism which he thought was dangerous to the state. Hence he protected the pleasure-seekers against a rising middle-class morality. For their part, the Puritans were not averse to sport simply as a matter of principle.

Sport was accepted if it served a rational purpose, that of recreation necessary for physical efficiency. But as a means for the spontaneous expression of undisciplined impulses, it was under suspicion; and in so far as it became purely a means of enjoyment, or awakened pride, raw instincts, or the irrational gambling instinct, it was of course strictly condemned. Impulsive enjoyment of life, which leads away both from work in a calling and from religion, was as such the enemy of rational asceticism, whether in the form of seigneurial sports, or the enjoyment of the dance-hall or the public house of the common man.³⁸

When the Puritans came into power they had the *Book of Sports* burned by the public hangman.³⁹ Europe thus transmitted to modern times not only an increasingly varied set of play forms but an ambivalent attitude toward play itself. The traditional view was positive and receptive; the Puritanical view could receive play only as a peculiar reinforcement of work.

³⁷ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. by Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), pp. 166-167.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 167-168.

³⁹ H. D. Traill, *Social England* (London: Cassell and Co., 1905), Vol. IV, p. 167.

SUMMARY

Play is one of the fundamental cultural institutions in any society. A number of theories of play were developed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including the theory of play as activity due to surplus energy (Schiller and Spencer), play as recreation (Lazarus and Patrick), play as practice of the instincts (Groos and McDougal), play as cultural recapitulation (G. Stanley Hall and Edith Appleton), and play as self-expression (Mitchell and Mason, G. H. Mead, Piaget, G. Simmel, and J. Huizinga). The idea has even been advanced by Huizinga that play is the creative core of culture and civilization itself.

Although the biologicistic conceptions of play as practice of the instincts, or as a product of special instincts, or as recapitulation of racial experience were abandoned, the facts that such theories tried to explain remain. Particularly for the young, play is an important part of education and socialization. If nothing else, this clarifies the intimate relation between play and community form. The young of all people employ the features of the adult world as play forms. The adults of every community see in play sources of recreation and enjoyment that bear some relation to their work roles. While the full study of the relation of play and community remains to be made, there is no doubt as to their closeness. Among other things, communities differ in the way they draw the distinction between work and play. The more complex the community, the more distinctly the line between work and play is drawn. At a fairly early stage in the development of communities resting on secondary institutions, a special leisure class appears and play undergoes stylization in terms of social strata over and beyond the earlier differentiations of play by generation and sex. Because of the richness of European social history, an amazingly varied array of play forms were transmitted to contemporary society.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. Which of the various theories of play do you prefer? Why?
2. Do you accept Huizinga's thesis that play is the creative core of civilization? Defend your answer.
3. In what ways has the Puritan conception of play tended to break down?
4. In what sense does the study by Heron display the value of activity *per se* to living organisms? Of what importance does this have for the phenomena of play?
5. Outline G. H. Mead's theory of play as an essential stage of self development. How does it differ from Piaget's theory?
6. Outline the similarities and differences between Simmel's and Huizinga's theories of play.
7. What are the primary relations between play and the community?
8. How does play in the city differ from that in the rural village?
9. Outline the peculiarities of play in the medieval world.
10. How did the Puritans visualize the relation between work and play?

CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS OF A MASS SOCIETY: PLAY IN AMERICA

A number of general conditions set the stage for the evolution of leisure time activities in the new world. A complex stock of play forms and modes of leisure usage were available to the colonists. At the same time the early colonists were predominantly of north European middle class stock in the ranks of whom Puritan attitudes toward leisure were most strong. Finally, the frontier conditions led to the establishment of community forms of a simpler type than were current in Europe.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF LEISURE IN COLONIAL AMERICA

Foster Rhea Dulles opens his history of popular recreation in America with observations on the power of the Puritan attitudes toward leisure.¹ Idleness and leisure were suspect; from Virginia to New England laws restricting leisure were enacted. In Virginia in 1619, for example, any person found idle was to be bound over to compulsory work. Dice and cards were prohibited, drinking was regulated, there were penalties for excesses in apparel and Sabbath observance was enforced. These attitudes were carried to such extremes that according to Charles Francis Adams one New England minister refused to baptize children born on the Sabbath, for he thought they had been conceived on Sunday. To his dismay, his wife gave birth to twins on Sunday.²

¹ Foster Rhea Dulles, *America Learns to Play* (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1940), pp. 3 ff. This is the best general history available of popular recreation in America.

² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

Pleasure tended to assume a rather morbid form in a Puritan community. It included spying on one's neighbors, upholding the public morals, and contemplating death. There were, however, increasing numbers of non-Puritans among the New Englanders; of the 16,000 persons migrating to New England from 1630 to 1640, only 4,000 were church members. The non-Puritans resisted the restrictions on enjoyment, making the tavern the natural meeting house. Besides drinking, many colonists attempted to stage plays, hold dances, and celebrate Christmas. The legislation of early New England forbidding tavern sports, such as card playing, reveals the presence of these activities.

The Puritanical attitudes toward amusement were anchored primarily in town-based social strata. They were difficult to maintain without theocratic controls. Nine out of ten colonists were yeoman farmers, increasingly living in isolated farmsteads or village communities. In the south, where the plantations were naturally dispersed, the break from Puritan restraints occurred early. Among the large mass of yeoman farmers of the northern colonies, the English love of games and sports persisted; in fact, it was encouraged by pioneer life. The farmers engaged in hunting and shooting contests and other country sports. A variety of amusements developed in connection with barn raising. Every town had its meeting house and tavern. At the county fairs, corn huskings and barn raisings along with folk dancing were engaged in, ballads were sung, and there were shooting matches, foot races, and wrestling.

The county fairs attracted many forms of amusement and amusement seekers, but social gatherings were more often associated with such communal work as house raisings, sheep shearing, log rolling, and quilting and other kinds of bees. Horse racing, chasing a greased pig, and dances on the lawn occurred in association with such activities. On festive days there were cock fights, bull baitings, and bear baitings.³ Under the influence of the Dutch, bowling was popular in New York. The Dutch also enjoyed dancing, card playing, a type of backgammon, tick-tackling, ball, bowls and nine pins, boating, and joy riding in wagons

³ Geoffrey Francis Dow, *Every Day Life in the Massachusetts Bay Colony* (Boston: 1935), pp. 114 ff.

and carriages. The Dutch skated in winter, and participated in winter ice carnivals.⁴

In the southern colonies, distinctions were being drawn in leisure along class lines. As early as 1691, at the semi-annual fair at Williamsburg, a special set of athletic games was instituted for the social set. Horse racing also made its appearance there, and cock fighting was far more distinctive of the plantation area than in New England.

The taverns became the assembly places for various forms of colonial amusement. Shooting matches were often held at the local tavern, which was also the most usual place for cock fights, animal baitings, and dances. Dance music was frequently provided by small orchestras. Traveling performers and men with trained animals also made appearances at the taverns.

By the eighteenth century in colonial America, social differentiation was occurring in the northern as well as the southern areas. In the early days of the century dancing teachers were available in Boston, and various aesthetic refinements were taught—feather work, filigree, and glass painting. The assembly had made its appearance. There were increasing attempts to introduce the theatre, but they were not successful until toward the end of the century. Concerts in part took the place of the theatre with virginals, spinnets, violins, bass viols, flageolets, flutes. The considerable relaxation of leisure-time norms in part rested on the fact that wealthy merchants had displaced the theocrats in the New England social system. The emerging patricians enjoyed the commercial amusements of their world.

In the middle colonies social life was most gay. Philadelphia had a famous dancing assembly, and fishing parties were held on the Schuylkill. Throughout the middle colonies horse races were held, and cock fighting was indulged in. There was a notable theatre famous for its concerts. The gentlemen dressed in London styles with powdered wigs, colored coats, laces, and ruffles. The young dandies sported silver-handled swords and displayed jeweled snuff boxes.

Wealthy New Yorkers enjoyed pleasure boats, shooting matches, cock fighting, animal baitings, balls, and assemblies.

⁴ Edward Channing, *A History of the United States*, I (New York: 1905), p. 536; Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

New Yorkers welcomed the theatre at an early date. Its first permanent theatre opened in 1767. The first American comedy to be regularly produced was Royall Tyler's *The Contrast* (1787). The American Company of Comedians had a repertoire including all of the Shakespearean plays as well as other Elizabethan and Restoration dramas.

In the southern colonies, high life had begun to flower with gentlemen in blue coats and scarlet waistcoats betting tobacco and slaves on horse races and cock fights and flocking to Williamsburg, Annapolis, and Charleston for the social season. High society was centered around the balls, fish feasts, dancing schools, and christenings. The southern gentleman was a rider and hunter, proud of his horses and pack of hounds, imported fowling pieces, riding frocks, waistcoats, scarlet neckcloth, and gold lace. He frequented the balls and plays at Williamsburg, Annapolis, and Alexandria.

When the Revolution broke out, the Sons of Liberty of the local committees of correspondence represented the masses rather than the classes and made moves to prohibit the amusements of the upper classes. Horse races were banned. The American Company of Comedians was forced to leave for the West Indies. The balls and assemblies were at times broken up by radical agitators.⁵

AMERICAN POPULAR ENTERTAINMENT FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR

Between the Revolution and the Civil War, there were three major American social situations important for the development of popular entertainment—the eastern seaboard, the plantation south, and the frontier. The frontier was most like the early village communities along the coast.

The Frontier. The life of the frontiersman of the Old Northwest was more free than it had been on the coast, for settlement there was made by transplanted Americans rather than by men transplanted from the Old World. Hunters and trappers blazed the trails, and rural settlers who cleared the land and built log cabins soon followed. Artisans, merchants, and tradesmen came in turn. They drank home brew at their barbecues, log rollings,

⁵ Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

and camp meetings. They gambled over horses and cards, and engaged in rough sports.

Hunting and fishing were the primary diversions for the men. Competitive squirrel hunts were frequently engaged in by rival teams. Shooting matches were popular in all areas. In the east, rifle clubs and trap shooting appeared. Entrants in contests paid a fee for each shot. The most dangerous of such games was shooting a tin cup full of whiskey off a man's head at thirty paces.⁶ Racing was as universal as shooting matches. Beside foot races, jumping contests, and wrestling, throwing the long bullet, hurling the tomahawk, and flinging the rail were favorite frontier diversions.

On festival occasions and holidays, buffalo, oxen, sheep, hogs, and fowls were slaughtered. Sometimes the dancing occurred in open clearings and on the prairies. The folk danced the scamper down, double shuffle, western swing, and half moon. Rough horse play often accompanied wedding festivities. Even while Methodist circuit riders denounced with threats of hell's fire, the amusements of the ungodly (dancing, card playing, horse racing, gambling and drinking), the camp meeting was itself often an occasion of exciting entertainment. The crowds were intoxicated by revivalist oratory and hymn singing, and were worked up to ecstatic pitches leading to various kinds of hysterical phenomena.

The Changing East. The Revolution marked a break with direct ties with England, encouraging the development of home manufactures. The process of industrialization slowly but definitely got under way. A revived Puritanism was the foundation of denunciations of pleasure from the pulpit not only in New England but in the evangelical churches everywhere. Foreign travelers in the United States, from Frances Trollope to Charles Dickens, complained that before the American spirit of business there was no place for amusement, but Charles Lyell was relieved at the signs of gaiety during the Mardi Gras at New Orleans.⁷

As somewhat greater periods of leisure became available, the attempt to convert leisure into opportunity for self-education led to the vogue of public lectures. The lyceum movement brought public speakers to nearly every town in the country beginning

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

in 1826. Within five years a national organization was formed with nine hundred local lyceums.⁸ Speakers on almost every conceivable topic were welcomed. The craze even reduced the audiences of the theatres. During this period the theatre was evolving into a form of entertainment open to all classes of people. Variety and minstrel shows had appeared. The first amusement parks, public dance halls, saloons, and beer gardens were established. Horse racing was revived, and there was a rise of other spectator sports.

Though its progress was slow, the development of the theatre was continuous after 1800. The south was more receptive to the theatre than the north, and theatres were established in all of the principal southern cities. Soon after the War of 1812 a company of players organized by the English actor, Samuel Drake, made its way to Kentucky by wagon and flatboat. By mid-century more than fifty stock companies were established and flourishing throughout the country. In the east the theatres were huge; the Park Theatre in New York accommodated 2,500, the Bowery 3,500, and the Broadway 4,000. The generalized audiences at the new theatres were beginning to affect the programs. Even when Shakespeare was presented, dances, popular music, jugglers, acrobats, and the like were interpolated between the acts.

As the audiences became more plebeian, specialty performances increased. Eventually the legitimate stage and popular entertainment were divorced. From the time the first troupe of French ballet dancers arrived in the 1820's, they were a hit. From the 1840's there occurred a slow development of a new type of burlesque anticipating the contemporary revues. The theatre was evolving into an agency of popular entertainment.

By the 1850's nearly every city had a museum with its collection of curios and variety acts at which black-face comedians and other entertainers performed.⁹ Phineas T. Barnum sensed the potential for popular entertainment in the museum and created a sequence of popular attractions: the Fiji mermaid, General Tom Thumb, and the bearded lady. Barnum has been thought to represent democracy in public entertainment, just as Andrew Jackson

⁸ Cecil B. Hayes, "The American Lyceum," Bureau of U. S. Education, Bulletin No. 12 (1932); Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

⁹ Dulles, *op. cit.*, pp. 122 ff.

represented it in politics. He skillfully exploited the prejudices of his day: the value of work, self education, and even the religious disapproval of amusement! In addition to assembling a fabulous collection of dwarfs, jugglers, rope walkers, pantomimists, and acrobats, he experimented with melodrama and variety acts. Jenny Lind became the idol of millions, paving the way for the successful tours of many other singers and musicians. During her nine month tour, the gross receipts from her appearances climbed to \$712,161.

The minstrel shows were more than amusing acts; they became characteristically American with gay walk-arounds, tall stories, and a cross fire of shrewd jokes. They became as popular in New York and Boston as in the Mississippi valley. The American form of the circus was also evolving in the same period, gradually assuming the form of a combination of wild animal exhibits, equestrian performances, band music, and comedy. By the 1830's there were some thirty traveling shows on tour in the country. Enterprising managers introduced a ring under the big top, and the circus began to emerge in full form. At the time Barnum entered the field, the circus was not as yet the greatest show on earth, but in the 1850's nothing could rival his Grand Colossal Museum and Menagerie.

The South. In the South, between the Revolution to the Civil War, an unparalleled prosperity was realized. With it the entertainment of plantation aristocrats aspired to a semi-feudal splendor. There were deer hunts and chivalric tournaments with young men dressed as knights jousting while wearing their ladies' colors. There was a great gulf between the often fabulous sumptuousness of the leisure of those at the apex of plantation society and the humble mass of southern yeomen. In contrast to the music, dancing, charades, cards, riding, and gambling of the rich men, the poor whites often had only opossum and raccoon hunts and the simple rural pleasures of old. They were often weakened by poor diet and hook worm. Their recreation was found in farm festivals, corn pickings and corn huskings, jugs of whiskey, county fairs, and military musters. There were horse races, cock fights, and at times traveling circuses, while rough sports often clashed with the spirit of the camp meetings.

AMERICAN RECREATION FROM THE CIVIL WAR
TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The Civil War radically transformed popular recreation just as it did other phenomena of American life. At a blow the plantation aristocracy and all of its amusements were liquidated. The war was followed by the rapid extension of the railroads and the realization of the potential of the wind mill, barbed wire, the Colt .45 revolver, and the steel plow for opening up the west. Meanwhile industrialization of the economy was accelerated and was accompanied by a pyramiding of multi-ethnic stocks in the cities. Finally, the Civil War and the vast opportunities for business profits in the post-war period created a new hierarchy of *nouveau riche* opulence.

Frontier and Rural Entertainments. As one follows the career of rural entertainment in frontier and rural North America from the east coast of colonial days to the Ohio valley of the Old Northwest, to the Mississippi valley and on to the cow and mining towns of the Northwest and Far West, the forms of entertainment increase in color and violence, as each new generation of frontiersmen was recruited out of the one before.

After 1830 the Mississippi valley rapidly developed into a primary avenue of amusement as well as commerce.¹⁰ Palatial river boats made their way between New Orleans and St. Louis with their loads of gay, dancing, gambling passengers; these river boats with their gilded salons and huge murals painted, as Mark Twain would have it, by some gifted sign painter—attracted traveling entertainers of all kinds. Dramas, musical extravaganzas, and minstrel shows were given in concert salons. In the 1850's some two thousand professional gamblers operated on the river boats; faro, monte, and chuck-a-luck were favored games. Poker was introduced from New Orleans and spread up the river. The Civil War and the railroads destroyed the north-south flow of traffic and Mississippi commerce. The amusement business went into decline.

The cow towns and mining camps picked up where the Mississippi river amusements left off. The whiskey mills, gambling

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 153 ff.

dens, and dance halls dominated their recreation. One of the most extravagant of them all was Virginia City, Nevada, where the Comstock Lode yielded a third of a million between 1860 and 1880. Mark Twain was there during its height. He wrote:

There were military companies, fire companies, brass bands, hotels, theaters, "hurdy-gurdy houses," wide open gambling palaces, political pow-wows, civic processions, street fights, murders, inquests, riots, a whiskey mill every fifteen steps . . . and some talk of building a church.¹¹

Prize fights, one of the main amusements of Virginia City, were accompanied by betting and drinking. Gambling, prostitution, dancing, and drinking were often combined in one lurid package.

Theatrical entertainment was popular in the mining camps, bringing to the miners a glimpse of a wider world. The plays, minstrel bands, variety shows, and dramatic companies had a more enthusiastic reception in the mining camps than anywhere else. There they were often able to recoup their fortunes.

While the periodic binges of the cowboys in the cow country of the 1870's and 1880's were less frequent, they were similar to those of the miners. They were the entertainments of men without women. Horse racing was popular on the range. Though many of their entertainments were individual, in the cow-towns created by the extensions of the railroad to the western plains, a floating population of cowboys, ranchers, freighters, hunters, officials, prostitutes, saloon keepers, and gamblers collected. Brawls and shooting affairs were frequent. Gambling attracted the cowboys as it had the miners. In the cow-towns an amazing collection of bad men, drifters, and prostitutes collected to prey on the cowboys who frequented the saloons and dance halls during the cattle drives.

With the flaming life of the cow towns and mining camps the amusements of frontier and rural America, in a sense, flared to a special brilliance and then died. There came a time toward the end of the nineteenth century when rural life in the United States, including its forms of recreation, went into serious decline. The rush to the cities was under way to such an extent that reformers

¹¹ Mark Twain, *Roughing It* (New York: 1889), II, 27 ff. Quoted by Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

and others spoke of the "lure" of the city. At the same time, the telephone, automobile, and radio had not yet arrived to break down the isolation of the farmer, often miles from his neighbors and still farther from town. The poverty of the rural dweller's amusements has been documented.¹²

While the traditional recreations of the rural dweller in considerable measure remained, the young people of the farm measured their access to recreation by the commercial entertainments available in the city. The depopulation of the farms accelerated the rate of mechanization; at the same time, the substitution of machines for cooperative labor lessened the occasions when farmers could meet and enjoy each other's company as they worked together in their common tasks. While the farmer still had his rifle or shot gun and perhaps a pack of dogs, game was growing scarce and there were increasing restrictions on hunting.

The Grange meetings, church socials, school festivals, country dances, Fourth of July picnics, annual fairs, and the coming of the circus were looked forward to with anticipation. The rural need for entertainment gave the Grange much of its vitality. In Iowa, an anti-horse thief association, having succeeded in protecting local livestock, was quickly converted into a social club.¹³ The local Granges organized debates, spelling bees, singing schools, and special forms of entertainment. The school house socials were often crowned with barn dances. At the annual Grange picnic, which was more exciting than the school house social, families assembled from miles around. There were speeches, basket socials, bands, sports, wrestling, horse-shoe pitching, and baseball.

At the state and county fairs the farmers competed for prizes. Horse races, prize contests, and exhibits were essential to the fair from the days when Elkanah Watson introduced the modern county fair early in the nineteenth century. Plowing contests, speed trials, and other contests first employed to show the advantages of careful animal breeding, assumed an importance in their own right.

The circus, which visited the rural villages as well as the

¹² Hamlin Garland's *Main Travelled Roads* (1891) relates the austerity and lack of entertainment under such rural conditions.

¹³ Everett Dick, *The Sod-House Frontier, 1854-1916* (New York: 1937), p. 384; Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

cities, was the most striking of all forms of rural entertainment. When James A. Bailey's genius for circus life was joined with Barnum's talent for showmanship, the greatest collection of wild animals, acrobats, equestrian performers, and clowns ever assembled was made. Even the arrival and setting up of the circus tents were of major interest to the farmers who arrived at special excursion rates and camped out on the circus grounds.

Entertainment of the Small Town. Between the Civil War and the beginning of the twentieth century, the center of the social life of the United States still lay in the small town. The rural environment was beginning to decay, and great changes were afoot that were largely to destroy the city as an autonomous community, but they had not yet reached their full potential. The small towns were dominated by the old type of middle class people with their democratic traditions and the traditions of the Protestants. The church was still dominant over the mode of life of the community, and was still supported by the better elements of the town in its ban on drinking, gambling, and its rigid control or prohibition of dancing. The ladies' aids, Christian Endeavor societies, and missionary societies competed in their socials and festivals. The Congregational, Methodist, and Baptist groups competed both in good works and good times.¹⁴

At the fairs, bazaars, and socials the amusements were often justified because the proceeds were to be used for good causes. One paid for fortune telling and guessing games. A modification of the beauty contest was contained in the device of having the prettiest girl sell kisses. In summer the churches sponsored lectures, poetry readings, instrumental concerts, and ice cream socials.

Besides the church suppers and socials sponsored by the ladies' aids, there were trolley parties, progressive tiddledywinks, surprise parties, and taffy pulls. When cards were no longer frowned upon by the social circles of the small town, the popular games were euchre, 500, seven-up, and progressive fifty-eight. Dancing was not universal, but various clubs and associations gave annual balls. Every town had one or more lodges. The lodges had initiation ceremonies, carnivals, and various social

¹⁴ Dulles, *op. cit.*, pp. 249 ff.

functions. The women had auxiliaries formed on the lines of the men's fraternal orders. There was also an amazing proliferation of clubs which implemented a zealous pursuit of pleasure (Shakespeare and Beethoven circles, old maids' socials, and the like). There were twelve hundred associations organized in the General Federation of Women's Clubs before the end of the nineteenth century.

Another aspect of the recreational life of the small town centered in the local opera house where lecturers, road companies, and variety shows appeared. The annual session of the Chautauqua, a nation-wide institution developed out of the camp meeting course for Sunday school teachers started in 1874, became the climax of entertainment for many small towns. It soon embraced the whole range of adult education. Summer courses were supplemented by winter lectures. In the 1890's there were seventy chautauquas, and by 1919 there were 10,000, with a nation-wide audience estimated at 40,000,000.¹⁵ The chautauqua was at once cultural and educational. For a week those attending enjoyed inspirational lectures and concerts and a variety of forms of entertainment—jugglers, yodellers, whistlers, and jubilee singers. In the afternoon there were sometimes sports. The best entertainment, however, was presented at the opera house by traveling road companies. A wide variety of dramatic productions was available. Musical shows had the most trouble gaining acceptance in the small town.

Outdoor activities were important in the recreational life of the small towns with their lawns, back yards, and playing fields. Baseball matches were held between rival teams. Basketball was largely introduced by the Y.M.C.A. in its search for a suitable indoor sport for young men. It became popular so quickly that, like football, the problem of professionalism soon arose. Moreover, gambling developed in connection with it.

For a time the interest in croquet amounted to a craze. In the 1890's tennis increased in importance. Roller skating arose to popularity in the 1880's, but after a time interest in it declined. After the 1890's bicycling rapidly evolved into a major interest. In 1890 a million bicycles were in use, and annual production

¹⁵ Jesse Lyman Hurlbut, *The Story of Chautauqua* (New York: 1921), pp. 384 ff.

soon amounted to more than this number. Every young man—and many women—had a bicycle, and every city had its bicycle club. Other outdoor activities included driving in summer and sleighing in winter.

The Recreation of the Metropolis. The large industrial city was composed of heterogeneous elements engaged in a variety of commercial and industrial pursuits. Industrial crises periodically threw great numbers out of work; there were always some technologically unemployed. Theatrical entertainment which did not offer the excitement of competition could not fully satisfy their need. Barnum had shown how ripe the urban masses were for the spectator sports. Even as early as the 1820's crowds of up to 50,000 from all walks of society assembled to view boat races and regattas.

The urban masses frequented sporting halls for the cock and dog fights. They bet on yacht races, faro, and chuck-a-luck. The rough elements furnished the material for underworld gangs. Sporting events of a professional nature soon developed for their entertainment, with owners of transportation facilities becoming sports promoters. It was not long before grandstands were erected and admission prices were charged.

Horse racing was the first of the popular spectator sports, and soon attracted a wide range of society. As early as 1823 a crowd of from 50,000 to 100,000 was attracted to the Union Course on Long Island. Racing flourished in all parts of the country except New England.

Rowing and sailing regattas also became common before the Civil War. Many boat races were for sweepstakes and elicited heavy betting. Membership in the yacht clubs meant social position. However, ordinary persons were free to watch and bet on the races. In 1824 a boat race in New York harbor for a \$1,000 purse attracted a crowd of 50,000 persons.

Foot races were wholly professional, and at first were run through the streets, with men on horse-back riding ahead to open paths through the onlookers. In New York in 1835 a purse of \$1,000 was offered for any man who could run a ten-mile course in less than an hour. One of the nine contestants made it.

Though prize fighting was not yet a spectator sport, champions had begun to win popular followings. The prize fights were

brutal affairs. In one contest lasting nearly three hours one fighter was knocked down eighty-one times before he fell dead. Prize fighting, too, was becoming material for the urban spectator sportsman. This interest in sports was spurred tremendously by the growth of amateur athletic organizations in the 1870's.

The rise of sports accompanied the increasing urbanization and industrialization that followed the Civil War. Lawn tennis was introduced to polite society, and archery was revived in the same circles. Roller skating attained general popularity. Track and field events were promoted by amateur athletic clubs; gymnasium games were popularized by the German *Turnverein* and the Y.M.C.A. The decline of informal sports associated with country festivals finds its counterpart in the rise of urban professional sports.

The pioneer mass sport was baseball which the early settlers had brought from England. The beginnings of the organized sport of baseball were noted around 1842, when a group of New York businessmen began playing it at the Elysian Fields in Hoboken, where they organized the Knickerbocker Club under Alexander J. Cartwright. By the 1850's more democratic clubs began to take up the game. Baseball spread slowly, displacing town-ball in New England and cricket in Philadelphia. It became highly organized when the National Association of Base Ball Players was formed in 1858. By that time 2,000 persons paid fifty cents admission for a match at Fashion Race Course. It rapidly evolved into professional baseball, and attracted the gambling fraternity. In 1871 the National Association was displaced by a new association of professional players. Amateur playing became a favorite in high schools and colleges. It was encouraged by the Y.M.C.A., becoming a primary symbol of America.

Croquet brought men and women together for an outdoor activity in summer. From the fashionable class of the east, it traveled west with the homesteaders and became popular in the small towns of the prairie states. Archery was revived, and lawn tennis was introduced from England around 1874. Roller skating was introduced by James L. Plimpton in 1863, and the social leaders made it fashionable in their attempt to restrict it to the refined classes. Rinks were built in nearly every town. In Chicago the Casino accommodated 4,000 persons (3,000 spectators and

1,000 skaters). There was a brief vogue in the 1860's of velocipedes, but the great craze occurred around 1876 with the introduction of the high-wheeled bicycles. There were bicycle parades, clubs, competitions, drills, hill-climbing contests, and races.

The only sport popularized by the colleges was intercollegiate football, developed from a game played in England from the days of Edward II. A revival of football at Harvard and Yale occurred around 1872. The Big Three of the eastern colleges (Harvard, Yale, and Princeton) dominated the field. A total of 4,000 people attended the first Princeton-Yale game in 1878, and within a decade attendance was close to 40,000.

The development of sports and the rise of spectator recreation occurred primarily in the large cities where Puritan influences were declining. In 1850 there had been only eighty-five urban communities with populations of more than 8,000 each; in 1900, there were seven times that many. The urban masses were made up of persons of all nationalities. Since the cities had not yet developed their park systems and municipal recreation programs, entertainment had to be passive, commercial, and cheap. The circus, variety show, and burlesque had developed separately from the legitimate stage. A new popular theatre centering in farce and melodrama had emerged. The stock companies were being replaced by the star system. The same influences as were apparent in the dime novel produced the melodrama of the popular theatre with vivid portrayals of murder, arson, burglary, rape, and seduction. The burlesque shows, which came in after the Civil War with the rage of the can-can, were particularly popular with the homeless males of the big cities. Buffalo Bill launched his Wild West Show, which played to over 1,000,000 people in one season. A revived vaudeville entertainment was also introduced.

Other entertainment of the metropolis included dime museums, dance halls, shooting galleries, beer gardens, bowling alleys, billiard parlors, music halls, free-and-easies, and concert salons. The trolley ride became a feature of week-end recreation, and amusement parks began to attract the urban masses. The transit companies began to offer daytime trips at reduced rates, and provided popular band music to drum up interest.

The great event in prize fighting was the emergence of a dramatic champion in John L. Sullivan (1882-1892). From his seventy-five round encounter with Jack Kilrain in New Orleans he won a purse of \$20,000 and a diamond-studded championship belt presented by *The Police Gazette*. He toured the country offering amounts of from \$50 to \$1,000 for anyone who would stay four rounds with him. Mobs fought to see him. He was finally defeated by Gentleman Jim Corbett, who reigned over the ring for five years and was then disposed of by Robert Prometheus Fitzsimmons, who invented the solar-plexus punch. The match lasted fourteen rounds, and offered a purse of \$15,000.

Among the interesting developments in recreation in the post-Civil War metropolitan world were those among the top strata of the society.¹⁶ The colonial aristocracy in the eighteenth century was noted for the lavishness of its banquets. It turned its attention to entertainments which it considered appropriate to its state. In the south, the old association of leisure and sports was close. A jockey club was early established in South Carolina. Virginia was the cradle of American horse racing. Saratoga was already a going institution in the eighteenth century, and in the twentieth century the racing season attracted men like Alfred Gwynne Vanderbilt, Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney, Marshal Field II, Pierre Lorillard, and women like Mrs. Oliver Iselin. In the early nineteenth century there was a rapid proliferation of exclusive yacht clubs. A new era of good will dawned with the five *Shamrock* yachts of Sir Thomas Lipton who, because he had started his business with a small grocery store, was branded as a tradesman and black-balled for thirty years by the Royal Yacht Squadron of England.¹⁷ Among famous yacht clubs were the Southern Yacht Club of New Orleans (1849), the Brooklyn Yacht Club (1865), the Boston Yacht Club (1865). Because he was black-balled by the New York Yacht Club, Jay Gould formed the American Yacht Club which was patronized by owners of steam yachts like his own.

¹⁶ The richest single assemblage of data on the recreation of high society appears in Dixon Wecter's *The Saga of American Society* (New York: Scribner's, 1937). A compact summary of the recreation by members of the fashionable world in the late nineteenth century is contained in Dulles, *op. cit.*, pp. 230 ff.

¹⁷ Wecter, *op. cit.*, p. 453.

In many instances popular amusements first began as "aristocratic" leisure forms. Several of these rapidly evolved into popular forms of entertainment, in which case they were often dropped by the members of high society. Such was true of baseball, croquet, tennis, and roller skating. However, the games requiring expensive equipment—racing, pool, and yachting—were usually safe from the rabble.

Opera took deep roots in social New York. In the beginning it contained six large boxes belonging to stockholders. The number was expanded, and by 1880 one oligarch refused \$30,000 for a box. *Parvenues* led by William K. and Cornelius Vanderbilt constructed their own house, the Metropolitan Opera. American society's patronage of art has always been more acquisitive than creative.

The activities of the upper classes in the post-Civil War period are of much interest here. The Civil War created a number of *nouveau riche*, and the post-Civil War advance of industry created many more. At no period of American history has the behavior of the newly rich been more closely approximate to the potlatch ceremonies of the Kwakiutl Indians. At the banquets and balls women wore jeweled tiaras, pearls were inserted in every oyster shell served at some of the suppers, fountains of wine were displayed. In Virginia City a miner drove a coach and four horses with silver harnesses.¹⁸ In the ball by which Mrs. William K. Vanderbilt crashed the gates of society in 1883, the entertainment was described as the equivalent of that of Cleopatra or Louis XIV. At one banquet cigarettes were wrapped in hundred dollar bills, and the guests found black pearls in their oysters.

Though the orgiastic forms of entertainment practiced by the very rich were confined to a relatively small coterie, they received immense publicity in the Gilded Age. The universal attention paid in the nation's press to the extravagant balls of the millionaires, their yacht races, polo matches, coaching parades at Newport, and the like were, it has been argued, a major factor in the transformation of the attitudes toward recreation that were occurring at the time.

¹⁸ George Makepeace Towle, *American Society* (London: 1870), I, 292 ff.; Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

PLAY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA

By the opening of the twentieth century there was little doubt that recreation in America was undergoing as radical a transformation as other aspects of life. The deterioration of the rural community had gone so far as to make it comparatively inefficient in supplying entertainment out of its own resources. The church was losing control over recreation, its place being taken by the school and the local Grange. The high points in yearly entertainment appeared in the county or state fair and the circus. The small town had become the locus of Puritanical controls, though there were numerous signs of change. Under the guise of the chautauquas, the entertainment of the small towns was undergoing expansion. Moreover, the new forms of entertainment originating in fashionable circles and in the larger cities became crazes of the small town. The striking new changes were occurring in the metropolis, the location of the great national industries.

The three major developments under way at the end of the nineteenth century were confirmed and carried through: the transformation of early Puritan attitudes toward play, the professionalization and commercialization of recreation, and the rise of a public recreation movement.

The Transformed Conception of Leisure. A wide variety of contemporary students have reported a transformation in the interpretation of leisure in contemporary America. Many, however, also report that tenacity of traditional Puritan conceptions. Margaret Mead, for example, maintains that in traditional American culture, leisure must be earned except for the old. Leisure is seen as play for the child, recreation for the adult, and retirement for the old. The child has to earn his leisure by growing and learning and the adult by working; unearned leisure must be paid for later.¹⁹ Eating, drinking, sleeping, love-making, friendliness, theatre going, reading, all are seen in relation to work, while Christmas and other holidays are bonuses. Pleasure-loving people are merely those who emphasize one part of this sequence more than others.

¹⁹ Margaret Mead, "The Pattern of Leisure in Contemporary American Culture," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 313 (September, 1957). Reprinted in *Mass Leisure*, edited by Eric Larrabee and Rolf Meyersohn (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 10-15.

The persistence of the Puritan attitude is also reported by Clement Greenberg.²⁰ Even for those who do not work, he believes leisure is a function of work. Protestantism made the separation between work and leisure especially exclusive, and in compensation for work leisure became the occasion for flight from purposefulness, for rest, respite, and recuperation. As an effect of Puritanism, work became the main business of life and the basis for the reality of all classes of industrial society. As Greenberg sees it, when the line between work and leisure is drawn too strictly, both deteriorate. "If man is to continue discovering and realizing his possibilities in history he will, at this point, have to broach the problem of culture and work—which is to say, of his mastery over work—more radically than he has so far."²¹

With the delightful impudence he often achieved in his essays, Bertrand Russell posed the problem of the changing evaluation of leisure.²² He says that like most of his generation he was brought up on the saying, "Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do," and that it has dominated his entire life. "But although my conscience has controlled my actions, my opinions have undergone a revolution." He expresses the pious hope that "after reading the following pages, the leaders of the Y.M.C.A. will start a campaign to induce good young men to do nothing. If so I shall not have lived in vain."²³ The world, Russell maintains, has changed in a manner that no longer requires the morality of work "which is the morality of slaves, and the modern world has no need of slavery."²⁴

Historically, duty was a means used by the holders of power to induce others to work for them, but this is no longer needed. The very fact that in time of war enormous blocks of the labor force can be withdrawn from useful production for destructive purposes indicates that modern techniques have enormously diminished the amount of labor necessary for the requirements of life.

²⁰ Clement Greenberg, "Work and Leisure under Industrialism," *Commentary*, vol. 16, no. 1 (1953), pp. 57-61, reprinted in *Mass Leisure*, pp. 38-43.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

²² Bertrand Russell, *In Praise of Idleness and Other Essays* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1935), reprinted in *Mass Culture*, pp. 96 ff.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

Incongruously, modern man thinks that everything that is done ought to be done for something else, never for its own sake. Hence though some persons think that the movies lead the young to crime, the work that goes into producing a cinema is respectable, because it is work and brings a money profit. The butcher and baker who provide food are praiseworthy because they are making money, while one who eats it is merely frivolous unless he eats only to get strength for work. The pleasures of an urban population are passive, while active energies are all taken up in work. Russell therefore argued for the immediate introduction of a four hour day. He urged that every person possessing scientific curiosity could then indulge it; every painter could paint without starving, regardless of how excellent his pictures; young writers would not need to write pot boilers; professionals would be able to develop theoretical ideas; and medical men would have time to learn about the progress of medicine. There would, Russell claimed, be happiness and joy in life.²⁵

The argument has been advanced that attitudes toward leisure are in fact changing. Martha Wolfenstein believes that a "fun morality" is emerging in contemporary America.²⁶ Rather than feeling guilty because of having too much fun, one may now be ashamed for not having enough. This is manifest in the changing ideas of child education. The *Infant Care Bulletins* of the Children's Bureau for 1914, 1942, and 1945, were analyzed on this basis. Since the infant embodies unmodified impulses, Wolfenstein reasoned, the conception of his nature should be a clue to the attitudes toward the impulsive side of human nature. In 1914 the infant appeared to be endowed with dangerous impulses (autoerotic, masturbatory, and thumb-sucking). The child was described as rebelling fiercely when the impulses got out of control. Vigilance was enjoined on the part of the mother. However, by 1945 the image of the baby had been transformed into one of nearly complete harmlessness; intense impulses had disappeared, the infant being assumed to possess diffuse and moderate im-

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 104. See also "The Right to be Lazy," by Paul LaFarge, *The Right to be Lazy* (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1948), in *Mass Culture*, pp. 105 ff., and "The Great Emptiness" by Robert M. MacIver, *ibid.*, pp. 118 ff.

²⁶ Martha Wolfenstein, "The Emergence of Fun Morality," *Journal of Social Issues*, 74, (1951), reprinted in *Mass Leisure*, pp. 86-96.

pulses. The baby was assumed to be interested in exploring the world in a tolerant and easily amused manner.

Wolfenstein believes that the opposition between the pleasant and the good is deeply bound up with older morality. However, the reverse of this appears at present, when it is maintained that what is pleasant is also good. The baby's image was changed from that of a creature of insatiable sexual impulses to a benevolent image. Play, in the recent period, has become associated with harmless and healthy motor and exploratory activities. All activities of life are now to be fused with play, causing both mother and baby to enjoy the routine of life. Play has ceased to be wicked, and has become a new duty. In the early period the ideal mother's character was one of strong devotion (with "self-control," "wisdom," "strength," "persistence," and "unlimited patience"); parenthood has been reconceived as a source of enjoyment. Play, amusement, and fun have been divested of associations with wickedness.

It is not only in child care that Wolfenstein claims to find the new "fun morality." She and Nathan Leites called the new obligation of pleasure "fun morality" to distinguish it from "goodness morality."²⁷ They find a new type of American film heroine to be emerging, the masculine-feminine girl who makes the achievement of fun easy by initiating flirtation and keeping it casual and at low intensity, while supporting the male's self-esteem.

Thus, Wolfenstein believes, the old Puritan attitude takes a secondary revenge and we secretly worry about not having enough fun, just as we formerly worried about having it. Norms of achievement are now applied to play, and play-time tends to be haunted by self-doubts as one's capacity to have fun.

A position somewhat similar was taken by David Riesman in *The Lonely Crowd*.²⁸ The general thesis of the study was that the world of Puritanism dominated by the Protestant ethic had given way to a new world regulated by public opinion and public relations. A new kind of "other directed" man was taking the place of the old-fashioned "inner directed" man. Since the new

²⁷ Martha Wolfenstein and Nathan Leites, *Movies: A Psychological Study* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950).

²⁸ David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1950).

"other directed" men are continually being deprived of much of their individual autonomy, Riesman looked to play as a possible restoration of the individual's wholeness. Here, however, he found not only a restriction ("privatization") of play to special classes, but an obstinate resistance to the full use of play in the traditions of the past. "A whole historic spectrum of play, in sport, art, idleness, and other ceremonial escapes, was destroyed or subverted by the Puritan wing of inner-direction." However, he believed this was changing. "Today the other-directed man retains few play ceremonials and those he has are seldom fixed and objective. They are fluctuating and innovational and demand a kind of subjectivity that is far different from the earlier, perhaps less complicated fun-making of earlier character types."²⁹ Later Riesman was to say: "The hopes I had put on leisure in *The Lonely Crowd* reflect, I suppose, my despair about the possibility of making work in modern society more meaningful and more demanding for the mass of men—a need which has come upon us so rapidly that the taste of abundance we have had in the past now threatens to turn into a glut."³⁰

The radical break with Puritan conceptions of leisure and pleasure is seen in Nelson Foote's discussion of "Sex as Play." Foote may well be correct in his argument that "the view that sex is fun can . . . hardly be called the invention of immoralists; it is everyman's discovery."³¹ However, when a social scientist of Foote's stature chooses to lift the problem of sex from the Puritan context of a necessity for reproduction of the race to the status of a problem of leisure, he has given official recognition to a transformed attitude. He urges that contraception completes the divorce of sexuality from procreation, and he quotes the Kinsey reports to the effect that no appreciable part of marital or extra-marital coitus is consciously undertaken for effecting reproduction.³² Foote cites the Kinsey research on 2,094 white females who had coitus about 460,000 times with about 476 pregnancies,

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 343.

³⁰ David Riesman, "Leisure and Work in Post-Industrial Society" *Problems of United States Economic Development*, Vol. I (New York: Committee on Economic Development, 1958), pp. 223-234, reprinted in *Mass Leisure*, p. 372.

³¹ Nelson N. Foote, "Sex as Play," *Social Problems*, Vol. I, No. 4 (April, 1954), pp. 159-163, reprinted in *Mass Leisure*, pp. 335-340.

³² Foote, *ibid.*, p. 335; Alfred C. Kinsey, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1953), p. 313.

indicating that there was approximately one pregnancy for each 1,000 copulations.³³ Foote feels reassured by these statistics that coitus simply could not be undertaken under such conditions purely for practical purposes. He concludes that the problem of sex has moved from the sphere of Puritan attitudes.

One could speculate upon whether it is the Puritan tendency to frown upon play or the puritan tradition that sex is sinful, or both in combination, which still obscures and confuses the significance of the manifest situation. As our advertisers imply daily in a thousand ways, the attractions of sex make it the favorite form of play for millions of Ameri-

As Foote sees it, one of the exciting tasks of the social scientist will consist in the "exploration of the morals and values which might emerge from the forthright public acceptance of sex as play."³⁵ He even anticipates that "in an America which is coming to honor leisure and play . . . not only is our interest in sex capable of infinite elaboration through all the arts, but intercourse itself is likely to gain recognition as an art."³⁶

Against the general current of interpretation which inclines toward the view that the amount of leisure has increased and attitudes toward play are being reversed, Huizinga can see only an increasing destruction of the play element of civilization. He argues that the nineteenth century left little room for play; in fact, even in the eighteenth century utilitarianism, prosaic efficiency, and the middle class conception of welfare operated against it.³⁷ To be sure, sports and athletics have conquered great national and international fields as social functions. However, with increasing systematization and regimentation the pure play of sport is lost. Those who are playing are professionals, lacking in spontaneity. The tie between ritual and play has been severed, and no longer is it true as in archaic cultures that sacred festivals are indispensable to health and happiness-bringing activities. In sports technical organization and scientific efficiency are maxi-

³³ Foote, *op. cit.*, p. 335; Kinsey, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

³⁴ Foote, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 340.

³⁷ Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950), pp. 191 ff.

mized to a point threatening the play spirit with complete extinction.

Art has been de-functionalized, making it a more free and independent occupation for individual artists. The compulsive striving for originality distorts the creative impulse and "impels art down the steep slope of Impressionism into the turgidities and excrescences of the twentieth century."³⁸ And science loses its properties for play which is still manifest in the scientist's *penchant* for systems. "Modern science, so long as it adheres to the strict demands of accuracy and veracity, is far less able to fall into play as we have defined it, than was the case in earlier times and right up to the Renaissance, when scientific thought and method showed unmistakable play-characteristics."³⁹

On the other hand, modern life, according to Huizinga, yields the counterfeit of play, "a quality that has something in common with play and yields the illusion of a strongly developed play factor. This quality I have ventured to call by the name of Puerilism." The products of this new attitude are a "world-wide bastardization of culture; the entry of half-educated masses . . . into the traffic of the mind, the relaxation of morals and hypertrophy of techniques."⁴⁰ He concludes that the play element has been on the wane since a flowering in the eighteenth century. Even where civilization seems to be played, it is false play.

Professionalization and Commercialization of Entertainment. The growth of large masses of people with time on their hands has been a phenomena of urban industrial centers.

The change in the work week in American industry has been described by Zeisel.⁴¹ In 1850 the average work week was the equivalent of eleven hours a day, six days a week. In non-agricultural industries in 1856, it averaged close to forty hours a week or eight hours a day for five days a week. In the overall economy, it has declined from seventy hours in 1850 to forty-four hours in 1940, dropping still farther—to forty-one and a half hours in 1956. The factors involved in this include public concern for the

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 205 ff.

⁴¹ Joseph S. Zeisel, "The Work Week in American Industry, 1850-1956," *Monthly Labor Review*, Vol. 81, no. 1 (January, 1958), pp. 23-29, reprinted in *Mass Leisure*, pp. 145-153.

health and welfare of workers, and state laws restricting work for women and children. The level of living has risen and the desire for leisure has become more important. The productivity of the American economy made it possible to reduce work time while output rose. It is estimated that 60 per cent of the increase in productivity has gone into higher wages, and 40 per cent into more leisure. While relatively few companies paid for holidays and sick leave as late as 1920, there has been an increase in these benefit programs.

Another aspect of the same situation has been outlined in Wolfbein's study of the length of working life.⁴² In 1900 there were some 3,000,000 people sixty years or over (one in twenty-five of the population). In 1950 there were over 12,000,000 persons 65 years or over (they accounted for one in twelve of the population). The median age of the labor force has changed with an aging population from 33.3 years in 1900 to 38.5 years in 1950. In 1950 four-fifths of the men 60-64 were still in the labor force, dropping to two-fifths in the age group 70-74. From 1900 to 1950 the average amount of time spent by a man in retirement has tripled (from 2.8 years to 8.7 years).

Thus a massing of people, a decline of the work week, an increase in the number of paid vacations and amounts of sick leave, and an increase in the length of retirement even while productivity increases, set the stage for the vast professionalization of entertainment on the one hand, and its commercialization on the other.

Writing in 1955, the editors of *Fortune* Magazine estimated that the leisure and recreational market measured at least \$306,000,000,000.⁴³ J. Frederick Dewhurst and Associates attempted to estimate the composition of recreational needs of America on the basis of Department of Commerce studies.⁴⁴ In 1950 it was estimated that strictly recreational goods and services cost \$10,200,000,000 compared to \$1,900,000,000 in 1933. In 1950 vacation

⁴² Seymour L. Wolfbein, "The Changing Length of Working Life," *Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association*, Detroit, Michigan, December, 1954, pp. 248-257, reprinted in *Mass Leisure*, pp. 154-171.

⁴³ The Editors of *Fortune*, *The Changing American Market* (Garden City: Hanover House, 1955), p. 197.

⁴⁴ Frederick Dewhurst and Associates, *America's Needs and Resources* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1955), pp. 346 ff.

and travel expenditures were estimated at \$12,000,000,000. In the same year \$8,100,000,000 were spent for liquor, and \$4,400,000,000 for tobacco. Expenditures for sports clothes came to more than \$5,000,000,000. Thus an estimate of \$40,000,000,000 for recreation is said not to be out of line.

In 1947 more than 600,000 workers were engaged in the manufacture and distribution of recreational products. The Census of Business (1948) showed 330,000 persons employed in commercial amusement activities. Federal and state revenues from recreational goods and services from the largest cities totaled \$822,000,000 in 1950: taxes on theatres and concerts came to \$371,000,000; \$138,000,000 were collected in taxes by states on pari-mutuels; and \$58,000,000 were taken in on hunting and fishing licenses.

In some areas the tourist trade accounts for a large part of the income. In New England and the Rocky Mountain area, recreation produces a large proportion of the income. It supplies 22 per cent of the income of New Hampshire, ranking next to manufacturing and four times greater than the income from agriculture.

Some miscellaneous figures from various areas give some idea of the range of recreational activities and the commercial importance they assume. The American Automobile Association in 1953 estimated that 66,000,000 people take annual vacations by automobile.⁴⁵ In 1950 some 341,000 persons held private non-commercial pilots' licenses.⁴⁶ With a decline in attendance in 1952 at the movies estimated at 9,000,000 weekly and with a drop in annual receipts of \$1,100,000,000, the motion picture industry felt itself embattled by television.⁴⁷ By 1947 it was estimated that there were more than 66,000,000 radios in use, rising to over 100,000,000 in 1952, including 27,000,000 radios in automobiles. The number of television sets produced increased from 7,500 in 1946 to 6,500,000 in 1950. While television cut into spectatorship at sports, sports found new sources of income in the sale of T/V rights. In 1947 T/V rights for the World Series were sold to radio

⁴⁵ American Automobile Association, "Americans on the Highways," 1953.

⁴⁶ U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the U. S.*, 1951, pp. 948 ff.

⁴⁷ John T. Rule, "Movies and TV: Murder or Merger?" *Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1953.

for \$175,000, and to T/V for \$65,000. In 1953 radio rights amounted to \$200,000, and T/V to \$925,000.

There are new developments in hobbies. More than 34,000,000 cameras are in the hands of non-professional photographers who spend \$400,000,000 a year on equipment. In 1952 some 5,000,000 builders for fun purchased \$60,000,000 worth of home tools for wood working. In 1950 some \$689,000,000 were spent on flower seeds and potted plants; 3,000,000 persons spent more than \$20,000,000 on model airplane construction. There are around 100,000 amateur radio operators in the United States.

Those who participate in sports also spend much on various kinds of equipment. There are the 18,000,000 fishermen who bought licenses in 1953; there were 18,000,000 who rode bicycles; 17,000,000 who roller skated; 15,000,000 who bought hunting licenses; 5,000,000 who played horse shoes; 4,000,000 who played golf; 6,000,000 who played shuffleboard; 2,000,000 who skated; 5,000,000 who played volleyball, up to 20,000,000 who went bowling, 15,000,000 who played table tennis, 10,000,000 who played billiards; and 50,000,000 who played coin-operated machines. Estimates on attendance at spectacles include the 125,000,000 who saw soft-ball games, 105,000,000 who saw basketball games, 50,000,000 who attended horse races, 40,000,000 who attended auto speed races, 25,000,000 who attended boxing matches, 63,000,000 who saw league baseball games, 20,000,000 who attended roller-skating contests, 10,000,000 who attended ice-skating contests, 7,000,000 who attended wrestling matches, 7,000,000 who saw the races of the American Motor Cycle Association, and 6,000,000 who went to rodeos.⁴⁸

According to the *Fortune* study, the rulers of the leisure market were families with incomes over \$4,000. In 1953 over 45 per cent of the families' incomes were above \$4,000, and they received 72 per cent of the income. Nearly half of the nation's 51,000,000 family units were of importance for the leisure market. They concluded that "the leisure market may eventually become the dynamic component of the whole American economy. For while consumer appetites for necessities may become sated, where is the limit to the market for pleasure?"⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 361.

⁴⁹ *Fortune Magazine*, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

The Rise of Public Recreation. Mass demands for leisure nurtured in the industrial centers could not be denied, and saloons, beer gardens, burlesque theatres, and vaudeville houses flourished in spite of the reformers. By the middle of the nineteenth century they had become big business. Moreover, urban dwellers found their opportunities for participant sports in gymnasiums and outdoor places. Spectator sports, particularly baseball, became increasingly popular, and the trolley cars permitted people of urban environment easy and cheap transportation to nearby beaches and open places.

It became evident toward the end of the nineteenth century that if the churches were too unyielding in the face of the demand for recreation, they would suffer. An organ of the Methodist Episcopal Church expressed a new sentiment: "If amusing young people aids to save them, then the work is fully and gloriously worthy of the church."⁵⁰ In the 1880's and 1890's the churches began to provide for libraries, gymnasiums, assemblies, games, concerts, and other amusements. One built a \$400,000 People's Palace. The Y.M.C.A. became a leader in the promotion of sports, and by the 1890's had 261 gymnasiums scattered throughout the country.

However, the entertainment contained in the lecture hall and church did not fully satisfy. On the other hand, commercial recreation was too costly for much of the population, and church-provided amusement did not fill the demand. By the beginning of the twentieth century tax-supported public recreation appeared, at first directed toward play facilities for children but gradually adopting the ideal of public recreation for all.

The first step toward public tax-supported recreation occurred in Boston in 1885 when a sand pile placed in a mission yard was tried as a device for recreation for children. It proved to be so popular that it rapidly spread, and sand piles began to appear on school grounds everywhere. Boston developed a ten-acre tract of land into an open air gymnasium for children. Brookline, Massachusetts, developed two acres for similar purposes, and other cities soon followed.⁵¹

⁵⁰ *Literary Digest*, XII (Dec. 21, 1895), p. 228; quoted by Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

⁵¹ For accounts of the rise of the public recreation movement, see George Hjelte, *The Administration of Public Recreation* (New York: The Macmillan Co.,

At the beginning of the twentieth century some cities (New York, Rochester, Milwaukee) began systematically to use school facilities for recreation. Although at first suspicious of possible paternalism, labor unions have increasingly been receptive to industrial recreational programs by management. Some labor unions have rented buildings as commercial facilities, established vacation camps, organized bands, and employed recreation experts. The Industrial Recreation Association was formed by twelve companies in 1942. In 1950 some 20,000 firms were reported to have some type of employee recreation program with an annual expenditure of \$450,000,000. Among the most popular forms of these industrial recreation programs are those for bowling, softball, baseball, picnicking, and dancing.⁵²

Among the most significant events in the early history of municipal recreation after its advent in Boston was the opening of a park of about three acres in New York City as a product of the efforts of Jacob A. Riis. Seward Park was turned into a well developed demonstration playground with apparatus, wading pool, game space, and a gymnasium with baths.⁵³

Among the major events in the development of municipal recreation in Chicago, \$5,000,000 was voted for the creation of small parks by the South Park Commission in 1903. In 1904 a board of playground commissioners was appointed in Los Angeles. In 1906 the movement toward public recreation received new impetus from the organization of the Playground Association of America. (In 1930 the name of this organization was changed to the National Recreation Association.) As early as 1899 school buildings in New York City were opened as evening recreation centers. In 1907 social and civic centers were opened in the Rochester, New York, schools. The first Play Congress was held in Chicago in 1907. In 1917 the P.R.A.A. organized a program for servicemen for the War Department; later this came to be known as the War Camp Community Service. In 1924 a Conference on

1940); C. Gilbert Wrenn and D. L. Harley, *Time on Their Hands* (Washington: American Council on Education, 1941); John L. Hutchinson, *Principles of Recreation* (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1949).

⁵² C. E. Brewer, "The Industrial Recreation Program," *Recreation*, June, 1951, pp. 140 ff.; Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 363.

⁵³ See George D. Butler, *Introduction to Community Recreation* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949), pp. 57 ff.

Outdoor Recreation was called by President Coolidge, and in 1926 the National Recreation School was organized. In 1932 the first International Recreation Congress was held in Los Angeles. In 1933 the federal government established the first nation-wide emergency works program which included an expansion of recreational facilities and services. In 1939 the Society of Recreation Workers of America was founded. In 1941 the United Service Organization, established for war recreation service, began operation, and a Federal Security Agency war recreation program was started. In 1946 the Federal Inter-Agency Committee on Recreation was formed. At present some 2,000 communities support public recreation through some type of agency. Nearly 6,000 full-time recreation leaders are active, with more than 40,000 part-time recreation leaders and 89,000 volunteer leaders in municipal recreation programs.⁵⁴

With the development of fast and inexpensive travel, communications, and week-end migrations within the state, the population has tended to rush from the cities for recreational purposes. An indirect move toward state recreation service began with the establishment of parks, forestry, fishery, and conservation services. Many states have begun to develop regular recreational programs. Some municipalities have received permission from the states to develop and maintain certain state areas for recreational purposes. Though this plan has not worked very well, many states have enabling laws permitting municipalities within the state to organize and administer public recreation on the local level. Around thirty-six states have such laws, following the lead of New Jersey in 1915. Since enabling legislation has proved inadequate, however, state programs have been gradually established. By 1948 eighteen states had inter-agency committees for this purpose.

Similarly, the federal government has tended to become involved in recreation. In 1946 the Federal Inter-Agency Committee on Recreation was established. Six federal agencies voluntarily joined (the Extension and Forestry Services, the Fish and Wild Life and National Park Services, the United States Office of Education, and the Veterans Administration). The Children's Bureau has made a number of studies of recreation. The Exten-

⁵⁴ Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

sion Service makes recreation a part of the program of extension clubs and projects, and helps rural communities develop recreational facilities. It also trains 4-H Club leaders and volunteers in recreation leadership. The Fish and Wild Life Service maintains an equilibrium of wild life: the leisure of 16,000,000 to 20,000,000 anglers and hunters is involved in its work. The Forest Service attempts to make resources available to the greatest number of people and discourages urban populations and industrial concerns from developing projects adjacent to the forests. There are around 18,000,000 visitors annually to the national forests. The Office of Education has begun to be interested in the leisure needs of school children. The National Park Service has promoted numerous leisure activities in connection with the parks: picture taking, camping, fishing, picnicking, swimming, trips, winter sports. National park campsites accommodate 38,000 at one time. A number of other agencies also have importance for recreation.

Recreation became a federal problem during World War I and especially during the Depression. The Civilian Conservation Corps attempted to meet the demand for desirable recreation with a program emphasizing motion pictures, sports, games, table tennis, and the like. The Works Progress Administration (1935) supported a great number of recreational functions. Over \$500,000,000 were spent on 12,000 parks and recreational facilities. The National Youth Administration (1935) in 1937 had 14,500 young people (twelve per cent employed by the agency) who served as leaders of recreation. Moreover, 16,000 persons were employed in developing facilities in parks and recreation centers. In World War II recreation became a vital aspect for maintaining the morale of service men.

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES FOR RECREATION IN 1950 *

	(in millions of dollars)
Total	\$403
Federal	24
State	52
Local	327

* U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Compendium of State Government Finances*, 1950.

In general the federal government has tended to expand its facilities for recreation during crises and to withdraw them in normal times. However, recreation has become a federal issue, depending on the state of the nation.⁵⁵

In 1950 almost half of all communities of 2,500 population or over in the State of California had year-round recreation programs. In Pennsylvania, by contrast, there were 1,827 communities with no organized recreation programs.⁵⁶ A few examples of the number of municipal recreational facilities in 1950 is indicative of the scope of public programs. There were 45,502 baseball diamonds, 1,953 handball courts, 3,274 ice skating areas, 14,747 playgrounds, 6,630 indoor recreation centers, 1,616 swimming pools, and 13,085 tennis courts.⁵⁷ This hardly begins to take care of the demand; public recreation is destined to grow.

SUMMARY

The cultural heritage of present society includes attitudes toward leisure. Of special importance for American society were those attitudes toward play and leisure born in the middle class urban strata of northern Europe, which became the foundation of Protestantism. When the sacramental theory of the church was replaced by a more individualized form, and when reliance on the individual conscience in considerable measure replaced reliance on the ministrations of the priesthood, the world of every day work was transformed into a field for the strategy of salvation. All forms of purely spontaneous recreation and play became suspect in this atmosphere, and play had to be legitimized in terms of its support of a work-a-day life. From the European tradition, the United States inherited rigid Protestant conceptions of leisure and play.

In colonial America, town life, particularly in New England, was dominated by the Puritanical conception of leisure. However, in the South, the Middle colonies, and on the frontier, Puritan attitudes tended to weaken. In eighteenth century America some class differentiation of entertainment forms had already occurred.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁵⁶ Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 371.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 374.

In the United States from the time of the Revolution to the Civil War, the frontier, the beginnings of industrialism in the northeast and plantation society in the south tended to bring about modifications in leisure time behaviors. The rise of spectator sports and mass entertainment was already apparent in their first stages. From the Civil War to the opening of the twentieth century the mining and cattle frontier received and intensified the popular entertainments of the frontier of the Old Northwest. At this period the locus of Puritan attitudes had become the small town. In the industrial centers of the metropolis, the shift to mass, professionalized, and commercial entertainment really got under way. The most lurid forms of entertainment during this period were displayed by the *nouveau riche* of industrialism, who attained to a barbaric excess in this aptly termed "gilded age."

In the twentieth century three major trends confirm the development in leisure beginning in the late nineteenth century: the breakdown of Puritan attitudes and the changed interpretation of leisure, the increasing dominance of professionalized and commercialized mass entertainment, and the rise of the tax-supported public recreation movement which is still primarily municipal but which tends to become more statewide and federal with each passing decade.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. In what ways does play tend to be related to a given community type? Illustrate your answer.
2. Of what significance is the rise of spectator sports?
3. What was the condition of recreation on the farm at the end of the nineteenth century? In the small city? In the large city? How do you account for the differences?
4. Of what significance is the increase in professionalism and commercialism in the field of recreation?
5. Of what importance is the rise of public recreation?
6. Johan Huizinga believes that our civilization is losing the capacity to play. Do you agree? Justify your answer.
7. How did the play of Americans on the frontier differ from that on the eastern seaboard in the nineteenth century?
8. How did American play forms in the post-Civil War period differ from those in the period prior to the Civil War?
9. How do you account for the popularity of the chautauqua in the late nineteenth century? Why has it disappeared?
10. What are the primary effects of mass production on American forms of play?

THE SOCIOLOGY OF ART

It is easy to understand why the theory has often been advanced that the origin of art is to be found in play. Such a theory seems to occur particularly often to individuals raised on Puritan conceptions of play. To hard working, middle class Puritans, play and art were both confined to the non-work periods of one's time. Despite the fact that the Puritans often transferred the same attitudes of suspicion to art that they had for many kinds of play, given the choice, they preferred to have their children busy at one of the arts than at gambling or drinking or certain other types of leisure time use.

Not infrequently the children of earnest Puritans decided that their elders had the order of nature reversed. Skill in some of the arts might be defined as a form of adult play, but it could become the child's work. The child found that he was expected to put in long tiresome hours of practice on his music lessons, for example, with the same unflagging zeal as his elders put into their work.

No people is so humble as to have nothing in which we can not recognize at least the beginnings of art. In all complex societies the sphere occupied by art tends to grow, though many simple people have quite developed arts. Moreover, the complex societies attempt to explain art. Since the days of Ancient Greece the western world has not been without its explanations of art.

THE NATURE OF ART

An ancient and influential interpretation of art, formulated clearly by Aristotle, treats its form as imitation, and function as catharsis.

Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic poetry, and most lute-playing and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation. . . . They differ from one another in three ways, either by a difference of kind in their means, or by differences in the objects or in the manner of their imitations. . . . Just as color and form are used as means by some . . . the voice is used by others. . . . In the above mentioned group of arts, the means with them as a whole are rhythm, language, and harmony. . . . A combination of harmony and rhythm alone is the means in lute-playing and lyre-playing. . . . Rhythm alone, without harmony, is the means in the dancer's imitations. . . . There is further an art which imitates by language alone, without harmony, in prose or in verse.¹

Art, Aristotle perceived, deals with many of the things that appear in experience, though it has a free hand in organizing them. He thought tragedy was the greatest of the arts, since it fused all the rest. The objects which the artist imitates are not things but activities of agents. These activities are not necessarily either good or bad; they represent all the diversities of human character.

A tragedy . . . is the imitation of an action that is serious and also as having magnitude, complete in itself; in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in the parts of the work; in a dramatic, not in a narrative form; with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions.²

Aristotle observes that a strong sense of peace follows the participation by the spectator in the torments of the hero to his tragic end.

In contrast to Aristotle's comparatively urbane acceptance and justification of art, Plato viewed it with a reformer's suspicion. To him the spirit of art was "dangerous." In his utopia he proposed that all musical instruments other than the lyre, flute, and shepherd's pipe should be banned. He wished to permit only music which would "cultivate simplicity and nobility of soul." Tragedy and comedy, particularly, should be excluded. Moreover, the actor was a most dangerous social type.

¹ Aristotle, *De Poetica*, trans. by Ingram Bywater, in Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), par. 1448.

² *Ibid.*, par. 1449.

When any one of these pantomimic gentlemen, who are so clever that they can imitate anything, comes to us and makes a proposal to exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that in our State such as he are not permitted to exist; the law will not allow them.³

The conflicting evaluations of art by the urbane sophisticate and by the moralist and religious reformer are ancient.

When an interest in the arts re-emerged in modern times, the parallels to the Platonic and Aristotelian views on art appeared between the Puritans and the humanists. The enlightenment rationalists of the eighteenth century, who were the heirs of the humanists, advanced new theories of art. Their ideas were summarized by Kant.⁴

Kant was convinced that the three main spheres of experience were represented by knowledge, goodness, and pleasure. A judgment of taste, he thought, was a reference of some object to the subject in terms of its potentials for pleasure and pain. Such a judgment of taste is "contemplative"; it does not matter whether or not its object exists. The judgment satisfies in a special way, for it is detached from any practical or immediate interests: it is a "disinterested interest." Empirical judgments of taste occur only in society; animals have satisfactions but no taste. Taste is a faculty for judging everything.

In painting, sculpture, architecture, even horticulture, so far as they are beautiful arts, the "delineation" or form is the essential thing. What pleases because of its form is fundamental for taste. Judgments of taste occur in society and rest on a universal feeling of sympathy and the possibility of communicating our innermost feelings. Art is a product of the free play of man's faculties; production is guided by taste—that is by pleasure which is universally communicable without being based on concepts. Nature is beautiful when it looks like art; art can only be called beautiful when we are conscious of it as art while it is spontaneous as nature. For Kant each type of activity of man (thinking, acting, and feeling)

³ Plato, *The Republic*, trans. by B. Jowett (New York: Modern Library, n.d.), pp. 99-100.

⁴ Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), "Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment in *Gesammelte Schriften*", ed. by E. Cassirer, 10 vols. (Berlin: 1912-1922).

has its own type of judgment: rational thought, moral judgment, and judgment of taste. Art is the product of experience guided by the judgment of taste.

The romantic thinkers of the nineteenth century, beginning with Hegel, accepted Kant's general division of experience, shifting the emphasis within it somewhat. For Hegel, these types of activity become spheres for the self-realization of the human spirit.

Universal demand for artistic expression is based on the rational impulse in man's nature to exalt both the world of his soul experience and that of Nature for himself into the conscious embrace of mind as object in which he rediscovers himself. . . . This is the free rationality of man, in which art, as also all action and knowledge, originates.⁵

In art sensual shapes and tones are not offered for their own sake, though art operates with sensuous material. These are the vehicles for higher, spiritualized objectives. "The sensuous is *spiritualized* in art or in other words, the life of *spirit* comes to dwell in it under sensuous guise."⁶ For the same reason, art cannot aim at imitation. The true business of art, Hegel believes, lies elsewhere, in the self-expression of the spirit.

The romantic conception of art as spiritual activity was given special depths by Schopenhauer, who conceived of it as the appeasement of the will, and Nietzsche, who thought of it as the defiant affirmation of the will.

Under the influence of the rise of biological science in the nineteenth century, there were attempts to explain art scientifically. In his experimental aesthetics, G. T. Fechner (*Vorschule der Aesthtik*) treated the aesthetic as a branch of the study of pleasure and pain (echoes of Kant). Under the belief that there were instinctive preferences, Fechner had experimental subjects make choices of forms and draw geometrical figures. He also measured the proportions of things in every day use. He believed that he could demonstrate that very long rectangles and perfect squares are displeasing to people, while the most pleasing rectangles are constructed in proportions which he describes as the *golden mean*. Also under the influence of nineteenth century scientism and

⁵ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Fine Art*, trans. by F. P. B. Osmason (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1920), Vol. I, p. 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

biology, Herbert Spencer and Karl Groos gave the same explanation of the origins of art as they had of play.

Finally, in the work of Sigmund Freud a partial fusion was brought about of the explanations of art by Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, on the one hand, and the biologist on the other. The result was somewhat similar to the explanation of Aristotle. The artist was a frustrated individual who transformed his needs into symbolic form, successfully sublimating these desires both for himself and his audience.

The artist has also an introverted disposition and has not far to go to become neurotic. He is one who is urged on by instinctual needs which are too clamorous; he longs to attain to honor, power, riches, fame, and the love of women; but he lacks the means of achieving these gratifications. So, like any other with unsatisfied longing, he turns away from relating and transfers all his interest, and all his libido too, on to the creation of his wishes in the life of phantasy, from which the way might readily lead to neurosis. There must be many factors in combination to prevent this becoming the whole outcome of his development; it is well known how often artists in particular suffer from partial inhibition of their capacities through neurosis. Probably their constitution is endowed with a powerful capacity for sublimation. . . . But the way back to reality is found by the artist thus: He is not the only one who has a life of phantasy; the intermediate world of phantasy is sanctioned by general human consent. . . . A true artist has more at his disposal. . . . He understands how to elaborate his day-dreams, so that they lose that personal note which grates upon strange fears. . . . He possesses the mysterious ability to mould his particular material until it expresses the ideas of his phantasy faithfully; and then he knows how to attach to this reflection . . . so strong a stream of pleasure that, for a time at least, the repressions are outbalanced and dispelled by it.⁷

This is remarkably similar to Aristotle's doctrine of art as imitation and catharsis.

In the twentieth century both Kant and Hegel have their followers. Simmel, for example, has maintained a Kantian point of view, giving his treatment of art a form directly parallel to his

⁷ Sigmund Freud, *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, trans. by Joan Riviere (New York: Garden City Publishing Co.), pp. 327-328.

view of play. The primary followers of Hegel have been Benedetto Croce and R. G. Collingwood. Croce, for example, treats art as "pure intuition." As he formulates it for poetry:

Poetry must be called neither feeling, nor image, nor yet the sum of the two, but 'contemplation of feeling,' or 'lyrical intuition' or (which is the same thing) 'pure intuition,'—pure, that is, of all historical and critical reference to the reality or unreality of the images of which it is woven, and apprehending the pure throb of life in its ideality.⁸

Collingwood is the foremost exponent of Croce in the English speaking world.⁹ Both thinkers, like Hegel, treat art as the self-realization of the human spirit in sensuous materials.

Human tools and skills have always been relevant to the arts. Many art objects are the direct products of tools and skills; others depend on the products of the technology (like musical instruments) or use various material products as aids and props (like scenery, masks, or costumes). The industrial revolution radically transposed the products available to men. These products and the tools for their production could not, in the long run, be without influence on the arts.

One of the most important developments in aesthetic theory in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the attempt to take account of the influence of the industrial revolution on the arts. A veritable library of materials has developed around this problem. The theories of Walter Benjamin may serve to illustrate the new types of considerations that have dominated the interpretation of its consequences for art.¹⁰

Benjamin maintains that the techniques of modern mass production have brought about a world revolution in the meaning of art. Although the work of art could always be imitated, and though pupils copied the work of masters in learning their craft, mechanical reproduction is something new. The Greeks were only able mechanically to reproduce works by founding and stamping (terra cottas and coins were the only works of art they could mass

⁸ Article on "Aesthetics," in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, p. 264.

⁹ R. G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938).

¹⁰ Walter Benjamin, "L'œuvre d'art à l'époque de sa reproduction mécanisée," *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, Vol. V, 1936, pp. 45 ff. The following discussion follows Benjamin's article.

produce). With the woodcut graphic art became reproducible, and finally, printing made the mechanical reproduction of writing possible. In the nineteenth century lithography raised reproduction to a new level, permitting the graphic arts to cast their products in daily new forms. The mechanical reproduction of the graphic arts was at last to keep pace with printing. In a few decades lithography was surpassed by photography. Toward the end of the nineteenth century the technical reproduction of sound was mastered; by the simple turn of a knob, pictures and sounds could flow into a house in the same way as water, gas, and electric current flowed in.

The thing that is most fundamentally transformed by the techniques of modern mass production, according to Benjamin, is the unique individuality of the work of art. The uniqueness of the work of art constitutes its history; the complex of events which make it the single existence it alone represents. In painting this is represented by the historical changes in the property relations in which it entered. All this is changed for the mass produced object. A photographic reproduction exists only in copies, and there is no basis whatsoever for designating any one copy as the original. Benjamin urges that the techniques of mass reproduction detach the object from tradition, substituting a plurality of copies for unique existence. He speculates that the social significance of the modern arts such as the movies is to be found precisely in its destructive cathartic aspects and the liquidation of traditional values of the cultural heritage.

Benjamin believes that even the mode of perception of modern man is transformed by the new method of production. He describes this transformed perception as a "destruction of aura." Aura is the historical uniqueness of a phenomena; it is a kind of distance. Modern men, Benjamin insists, try to overcome the uniqueness of every object by accepting its reproduction. Every object is seized in great closeness in its image. Picture magazines and news reels offer a likeness or reproduction of the event rather than the event. "To peel an object from its shell," Benjamin maintains "to destroy its aura, is the signature of a perception whose understanding for the similar in the world" has grown so intense that even the object initially valued for its uniqueness is repro-

duced.* Modern man, Benjamin believes, has ceased to live in a world of real and unique events and lives in a world of ever changing transitory copies.

The uniqueness of a work of art is inseparable from its integration in a tradition. In the past, Benjamin argues, this meant that the work of art had its primary meaning as an object of a cult and as a basis of ritual. In ancient times very beautiful art objects were often placed in situations in which they could not be used for exhibition but could only be destined for the eyes of spirits or of God. In the transition to modern times, art was torn from these contexts. The doctrine of art for art's sake, Benjamin believes, (as a kind of secular theology of art) was a last ditch stand against the destruction of the cultic meaning of art. When mechanical reproduction became the rule, however, it was no longer possible to employ "authenticity" as a criterion of art. The function of art was reversed; "instead of being based on ritual, it became anchored in politics."

Particularly with photography exhibition value began to displace cult value at every point. Cultic value, however, did not disappear all at once. Portraiture was the center of early photography; the souvenir of loved ones was the last refuge for the cultic value of the image. However, once one abandons the photograph, exhibition value appears superior to ritualistic value. Such, Benjamin believes, was the significance of the discovery of Atget who, around 1900, took photographs of deserted Paris streets, photographing them as if they were the scenes of crime. The scenes of crime were also deserted, and photographs of them were soon introduced as circumstantial evidence.

In view of this, Benjamin maintains, much useless thought has been devoted to the question whether photography is an art without raising the prior question as to what the invention of photography does to transform the nature of art. The artistic performance of the stage actor is presented to the public by the actor in person. The performance of the screen actor is, however, presented by an apparatus. The apparatus need not respect this performance as an integrated whole. From sequences of posi-

* These and later quotations are my and Hans Gerth's translations from Benjamin's discussion. Since the unprinted original essay in German was employed for this purpose, references to the French translation cannot be made.

tional views the editor composes the material into a complete movie. The movie actor cannot adjust to the audience during his performance. When the audience empathizes with the movie actor, it is by empathizing with the apparatus. Its attitude is one of testing, an attitude to which cultic values could not be exposed. The movie actor, in fact, is mere material for the camera. The movie responds to the shriveling of the aura of personality of the actor with an artificial build-up of reputed personality. The cult of the star sponsored by the movie capital preserves the spell of personality which has become a phantasmagoria of its commodity character.

The production of a movie is an unprecedented spectacle. In the studio the apparatus has penetrated reality to an extraordinary degree. Perceived reality, as presented in the movie, has become a pure product of technique. The contrast between the movie producer and the painter is like that between the magician and the surgeon. The magician maintains the ordinary social distance between the patient and himself and cures by the laying on of hands; the surgeon penetrates the body of the patient and abstains from facing the patient man to man. The painter similarly maintains a natural distance from the given; the cameraman penetrates deeply into the web of the given and reassembles the multiple fragments—close ups, distance shots, slow motion views, and the like—on a new law. Benjamin believes, the cameraman different from the painter in much the way the audience of the movie is different from the audience of the painter. As psychoanalysis explored man's unconscious mind, the camera initiates us to an unconscious optics. The painting invites the spectator to contemplation; but the movie audience cannot contemplate; it has hardly grasped a scene before it is changed. The spectator's processes of association are continually interrupted. This is the shock effect of the movie. The movie is a source of distraction rather than concentration. According to Benjamin, reception in a state of distraction increases noticeably in all fields of art and is symptomatic of profound changes of perception; such reception finds in the movie its true means of exercise. The movie meets this mode of reception half way; it thrusts cultic value into the background by making the public assume the posture of expert and by preventing contemplation.

Benjamin believed that the developments in mass production with their consequences for the perception of modern man have had important influences on the traditional arts. Dadaism (both pictorial and literary) were attempts by traditional artists to obtain effects which the public seeks in the movie. The dadaists even sacrificed the market value of their work to this objective. Their material was created to achieve studied degradation; their poems were "word salads" containing obscene turns of phrase and waste products of language; their paintings were studded with buttons and tickets. The dadaists sought a relentless destruction of the aura of their creations, transposing their productions into reproductions. Before their pictures (those of Arp or the poems of August Stramm), it is impossible to take time for contemplation. Dadaism sought a vehement destruction by making the work of art the center of scandal with the primary requirement of outraging the public. Dadaism epitomizes what happens to traditional art in the contemporary world.

On the other hand, the one traditional art which seems most progressive in the modern world is architecture. This, Benjamin believes, is because architecture has always represented the prototype of a work of art, the reception of which is consummated by a collectivity in a state of distraction. While other arts have come and gone, architecture has been continuous. Buildings are appropriated to perception by use and perception—by touch and sight. For architecture, habit even largely determines optical reception. When tasks are presented to human perception insoluble by optics, they are mastered gradually by habit under the guidance of tactile appropriation. The distracted person, too, can form habits. Thus, Benjamin feels, architecture is the one traditional art able to evolve new positive forms in an age of distraction.¹³

There is general agreement as to what art is, though the emphasis is placed on different things, and different moral evaluations are introduced and respond to different social settings. All agree that art is a way of using leisure time which variously enhances, extends, and completes other activities in society. They all agree that art has some bearing upon non-artistic activity,

¹³ For a full development of a position similar to that of Benjamin, see Arnold Hauser, *The Social History of Art*, 4 vols. (New York: Vintage Books, 1957-58).

though this varies from the view that art may have negative moral implications (from Plato to the modern Puritans) to the idea that it serves to blow up tensions generated in every day life (from Aristotle's catharsis, through Freud's sublimation, to Benjamin's diversion) hence has a stabilizing social function. All students agree that man seeks self-fulfillment in art (contained in its most developed form in the positions of Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Croce, and Collingwood). All students agree that art is partially determined by its relation to the rest of life. (Kant thought that judgments of taste are possible only in society, Plato thought it could have negative moral and political implications, Benjamin sees the whole history of art in terms of the movement of art from the sphere of religion and magic to those of commerce and politics.)

ART AND THE COMMUNITY

Although students of art from Greek days to the present have assumed that art and society are related, and while they have traced many significant relations between art and other social events, the task of tracing the detailed ties between art and particular community form, as in the case of play and the community, remains to be done. A step in this direction is taken in the studies of primitive art.

Primitive Art. The intimacy of the relation of the art of primitives with other features of primitive life is taken as fundamental by Hooper and Burland:

The people accept a level of satisfaction, and when this develops under the hands of artists it achieves a beauty of its own. It is conditioned not only by popular taste, but by accepted symbolism which often arises from poetry and mythology. The artist imposes his sense of significant form, and his feeling about the universe. But basically his work is like it is, because his work is that of his people and his home.¹⁴

They maintain that most primitives cannot study other people's art, because they are afraid of the strange. The primitive artist ornaments things of his every day life and carves images of his gods. Hooper and Burland feel that art, including that of the

¹⁴ J. T. Hooper and C. A. Burland, *The Art of Primitive People* (London: The Fountain Press, 1953), p. 64.

primitive, belongs so completely to the civilization that makes it that we cannot make primitive art nor even copy it.

Gene Weltfish rather narrowly affirms the relation between technology and art.¹⁵ Art is assumed to rest on a given level of technology, and since technology developed only very slowly, so too did art. Tools, Weltfish insists, make man master of the animal kingdom. One of the earliest is the hand hammer. It gradually developed as a tool and a thing of beauty over a period of one hundred thousand years.¹⁶ Weltfish believes that the paintings on the caves of southern France developed from crude beginnings to mature form over a period of ten thousand years.¹⁷ About 20,000 years ago, after the tools of primitive man appeared, many sculptured female figures were modeled. In time the stone age artist craftsman began to carve his "Venus" in bas relief on large slabs of limestone. The change in art expression came with industrial growth at a time when the making of flint tools was relegated to second place and man began to make tools of bone and reindeer antlers.¹⁸ Art, in his view, "emerges not as an abstract vision but as a celebration of the skill of work well done and enjoyed."¹⁹

Among primitives, it is argued, there is no sharp distinction between decorative and fine arts.²⁰ Expression in the visual arts appears on utilitarian objects. At times the primary objective of the artist is to enhance the object, but at other times the motive of the artist is to express his aesthetic ideas, leading him to use the object as mere background to his aims. The prerequisite of art is always the satisfactory solution of the technical problems of the craft. Man then "feels like the climber who reaches the summit. He can afford to play, to express his pleasure in achievement by varying his technical operations to suit his fancy. When the mechanical demands of the craft are in the background, art begins."²¹ In a secondary sense art is re-shaped by the ideological atmosphere of the particular mythological and religious life

¹⁵ Gene Weltfish, *The Origins of Art* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1953).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

of a people. Both sources of influence tend to shape art to a particular community form.

Perhaps the richest of all the studies of primitive art is that of Franz Boas, who operates on the assumption that the behavior of everyone is determined by the traditional materials transmitted by culture.²² Each culture, in turn, can be understood only as an historical growth determined by the social and geographic environment in which each people is placed and by the way it develops the material coming to it. When technical treatment reaches a standard of excellence sufficient to permit the processes involved to produce typical forms, Boas maintains, we call the process an art and, however simple, judge the products from the standpoint of formal perfection. Industrial pursuits (cutting, carving, molding, weaving) as well as various physical activities (singing, cooking, dancing) are capable of achieving technical excellence and fixed forms. Boas concludes that wherever a definite type of movement or sequence of tones or fixed forms develops, it tends to be transformed into a standard by which its perfection (beauty) is measured.

Without stability of form of the object manufactured in common use, there is no style. Stability of form rests on high technique. A perfect standard of form depends on developed technique and response to a feeling of beauty. Works of art may also affect people through the associations that may hold between the form and ideas held by people (over and beyond the influence of form alone). When forms become symbols a new dimension is added to enjoyment. Aesthetic pleasure may be released by natural forms. However, a melody, carving, painting, dance, or pantomime is an aesthetic product created by man's own activities. Art has both formal and significant elements, neither of which may be ignored if the theory of art is not to be one-sided.

In the graphic and plastic arts, possession of developed techniques furnishes accuracy and steadiness of movement that may lead to regular effects. Some sense for the value of rhythmic vertical and horizontal lines may be derived from nature; others may

²² Franz Boas, *Primitive Art* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955). His study contains a review of the theories of Wilhelm Wundt, Max Verworn, Richard Thurnwald, Yrjö Hirn, Ernst Grosse, Emil Stephan, Alfred C. Haddon, Gottfried Semper, Henry Balfour, Alois Riegle, F. Adams van Scheltema, and Alfred Vierkandt. See pp. 13 ff.

be produced by symmetrical processes. Marginal patterns sometimes originated through technical necessity. In making birch bark baskets, for instance, stitching at variable distances is required, thus enhancing and patterning the rim. Natural divisions of objects like the body or flap of rawhide boxes sometimes suggest unified treatment; symmetry, variety, and rhythmic repetition are seized upon, carried through, and enjoyed for their own sake. Formal interest is conveyed directly, according to Boas, by the impression conveyed by the form.

It should not be assumed that formal enjoyment prevails only in decorative art and that representative art (dance, music, poetry) must always be expressive. Formal elements quite analogous to those of decorative art appear in representative art that is ornamental. Moreover, in dance, music, and poetry rhythm and thematic form may follow stylistic principles that are not necessarily expressive. The combination of form and representative elements gives art an emotional value in addition to the purely formal aesthetic effect. At times the contrast between representation for its own sake and for the sake of the work of art appears clearly. The break between symbolic representation and realism occurs when the arts render the form of the object in forceful outline subordinating all detail to the concept of the mass as a whole.

Boas maintains that in the preliterate world the development of literary art was more universally distributed than was well developed decorative art. Tribes like the Bushmen and eastern Eskimos, for example, have few manufactured objects of artistic value but an abundance of literary works. The song and tale are to be found universally. Poetry without music is found only in civilized communities, except for chanted formulas, but there are songs in which the words are subordinated to music in all parts of the world. Primitive poetry is primarily lyric, often dithyrambic, the elements expressing definite ideas being later developments. The song, Boas believes, is probably older than poetry, which gradually freed itself from music.

The two important forms of primitive artistic prose are narrative and oratory. Since primitive prose is based on the art of oral delivery, it is closer to modern oratory than to printed literature. In the free prose narrative, importance tends to be laid

on completeness of the succession of events. In primitive narrative as well as poetry, rhythmic repetition is a basic trait which may be carried through for both form and content. In the recital of myths repetition is sometimes achieved by the addition of meaningless symbols, turning the recital into a chant. Similarly, rhythm is important for most primitive music. Stress or emphasis on important points is often achieved by repetition in speech and song; symmetry, or its equivalent, is achieved by the order of repetition and the use of structural phrases.

Boas maintains that among all primitives emotions expressed in motor activities assume definite form. As an art form, the dance may be purely formal and devoid of symbolic meaning. The more formal the dance, the more pure the esthetic enjoyment. However, symbolic movements are frequent within the formal dance. Symbolic movements are employed not only in accompanying the song, but in oratory as well. In Boas' view, the development leads on toward true pantomimic and dramatic performances.

Thus, art is assumed to arise from technical pursuits and the expression of emotion and thought when these achieve fixed form. The aesthetic effect resting on control of technique emerges from the joy of mastery and the pleasure of formal perfection. The formal principles of the graphic and plastic arts are symmetry, rhythm, and formal emphasis. Formal art is often given meanings endowing it with an emotional value outside beauty of form alone. The closer the association between a form and an idea, the more clearly the expressionistic character of the art appears. This is true of the graphic and plastic arts as well as music. In the former, geometrical forms, in the latter, sound clusters or musical phrases are associated with definite meanings and evoke special emotions or concepts. Realistic representation and geometrization arise from different sources. In graphic art perspective representation of an object may be attempted as it appears at a given moment or the artist may decide that the essential point is to show characteristic parts whether they are visible in a single view or not. The former method stresses accidental features, the latter fundamental qualities; the former is impressionistic, the latter expressionistic. Boas believes that the two types of art cannot be developed from one another.

In his study of the art of the North Pacific coast, Boas examines an art of a highly symbolic character in which the selection of symbols defined the style. However, in this art the arrangement of symbols was subject to the same formal treatment of the decorative field which controls the arrangement of geometric motives. When this occurs, the degree of realism depends on the relative importance of geometric and representative elements. Thus, Boas concludes, the pattern of artistic expression is a product of multi-caused historical factors. Sometimes stability arises from the permanence of pattern in which a useful form has lost its function, but which persists as a decorative element. The transfer of forms from one function to another may be important. Fixity of pattern does not permit the artist to apply natural forms unmodified to decorative problems, for he is limited by the pattern. There are similarities between the plastic arts of space and the art of time (poetry, music, and dance). Among the common traits are rhythm, emphasis on closed forms (musical phrases, decorative ends consisting of burdens or of codas), and the attachment of symbolic significance to form. The desire for expression is universal, and Boas believes that the mass of primitive population feels the need for beautifying their lives even more keenly than civilized men.

In the nature of the case, since they are dealing primarily with small isolated groups, the students of primitive art come close to the evaluation of art in terms of the individual communities in which it is anchored.²³ For example, in his studies of the art of the north Pacific coast of North America, Boas distinguished two styles: that expressed by men in wood carving and painting, and that expressed by women in weaving, basketry, and embroidery. The men's style is symbolic, the women's formal. The symbolic art is realistic and meaningful, while the formal art of the women has no special significance. The symbolic art almost wholly disregards the principle of perspective, employing significant symbols in arrangements dictated by the forms of the decorative field. Symbolic decoration was found by Boas to be governed by rigorous formal principles. At times a dissection or

²³ A classic study of this type is Franz Boas, "The Decorative Art of the Indians of the North Pacific Coast of America," *Bulletin American Museum of Natural History*, Vol. IX, (1897), pp. 123-176. Revised in *Primitive Art*, pp. 184 ff.

distortion of animal forms was carried through in order to fit animal motives into fixed ornamental patterns (as when an animal is, so to speak, split down the spine and curved around the sides of a bowl, or a painting is expanded into a circular pattern to cover a circular area). Moreover, the northwest coast artist did not hesitate to use purely geometric elements (the double curve as a filler in an oval field with a flat base) in symbolic representations. The basic art forms developed in wood carving spread to blanket designing, box painting, and the making of many utensils of every day use. The anchorage of the particular art form in the community was strongly affirmed by Boas.

The art style can be fully understood only as an integral part of the structure of Northwest coast culture. The fundamental idea underlying the thoughts, feelings, and activities of these tribes is the value of rank which gives title to the use of privileges, most of which find expression in artistic activities or in the use of art forms. Rank and social position bestow the privilege to use certain animal figures as paintings or carvings on the house front, on totem poles, on masks, and on utensils of every day life. Rank and social position give the right to tell certain tales referring to ancestral exploits; they determine the songs which may be sung. There are other obligations and privileges related to rank and social position, but the most outstanding feature is the intimate association between social standing and art forms. A similar relation, although not quite so intimate, prevails in the relation of religious activities and manifestations of art. It is as though the heraldic idea had taken hold of the whole of life and had permeated it with the feeling that social standing must be expressed at every step by heraldry which, however, is not confined to space forms alone but extends over literary, musical, and dramatic expression.²⁴

A glimpse of the intimacy of the relation that may obtain between an art style and a particular community, such as afforded by Boas' analysis of Northwest Coast Indian art, suggests some of the ways in which aesthetic theories may some day have to be modified. Aristotle took tragedy to be the highest of the arts; one could speculate that a Kwakiutl counterpart of Aristotle might well have said that house carving or perhaps the carving of totem poles was the highest of the arts. While the heraldic symbolization of rank seems to have been an informing principle

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 280.

of the art styles of the Northwest Coast, the stylization of the *agon* appears to have been the informing principle of ancient Greek art styles. To the enhancement of distance produced by the successful employment of heraldic devices corresponds the loss of distance in the naked encounters of the Greeks. The *agon* appears in its fullest development in the Greek tragedy. Aristotle was at least right in his assertion that it was the highest of the arts for Greece. In his formula of catharsis, Aristotle may have been formulating the feeling-tone of Greek art. A Northwest Coast aesthete, on the other hand, might have described the effect or function of his arts as an enhanced sense of exalted pride.

In any case, it is clear that at least among preliterate communities provided the matrix within which sufficient mastery of techniques was possible to permit the emergence of perfect forms adaptable to purely formal judgments of perfection. It is evident as well that inter-penetration of formal and representative elements is amazingly variable and changing in time. No one art can be said to be highest for all people at all times, though it is quite correct to say that the given art may have so much primacy for a given community that a whole array of associated arts is stylized in terms of it. The formal theory of art that arose in the eighteenth century (expressed most comprehensively by Kant and advocated sporadically ever since), correctly identifies a component of art wherever it is found. However, the art even of the most primitive of peoples usually has both representative and significant components without which it is impossible to understand the structure and variability of artistic styles. The theory of art as pure, lyrical self-expression of the human spirit (evolving from Hegel to Croce and Collingwood) also may be seen to identify a universal component of art. However, the extreme type of art for art's sake doctrine this entails is inappropriate to the arts of many people. The art of most times and places is usually embedded in utilitarian, religious, or political contexts. Only in very complex communities is it possible for art to emerge in such a highly purified form as to justify it as an art for art's sake. Finally, the study of primitive art underlines the value of approaches like that of Benjamin—tracing art back to its technological and social-institutional foundations. The examination of primitive art seems to indicate that the origins of art were

not in religious contexts or at least not in religious contexts alone, but in utilitarian contexts.

If there is a general lesson to be learned from the study of primitive art it seems to be that the appearance of art is promoted by the stability of a community form within which a progressive mastery of basic techniques is possible. Whenever sufficient mastery of basic techniques is possible to permit the occurrence of standard forms, these tend to be subject to purely formal criteria of beauty. Sometimes long periods of time seem to be necessary to accomplish this reality. However, there seems hardly to be an activity, so long as it is capable of producing standard forms, which may not be seized upon for aesthetic manipulation and enjoyment (carving, stone cutting, weaving, painting, pottery making, dancing, singing, story telling, etc.). Stability of community form seems important to provide the conditions necessary for the increasing technical mastery necessary for the appearance of standard forms. It also seems to be important to permit the fusion of formal and significant or meaningful elements. There seems to be no people in the world which does not try to account for itself somehow. Given sufficient time (that is, community stability for a long enough period), a people's particular concepts of significance will penetrate some if not all of its arts. This was illustrated by the heraldic devices of the Kwakiutl and the *agon* of the ancient Athenians. The art of all people tends to show the exciting intersection of formal and meaningful requirements. In this intersection much of the story of the birth and transformation of artistic styles is told. It is undoubtedly the role of the meaningful or significant in art that led Benjamin to the view that the original context of all art is religion.

There obviously cannot be a one-to-one correlation of art and community type, for art is a sphere of free creations. However, the terms and materials for this free creation are provided by communities, and in the end the finest of its techniques and skills, the most typical of its ideas, the most refined of its aspirations, tend to find expression in its art. There is no known case of community change without a transformation in the arts.

Civilized Art. Primitive art is the art of people living in tribal and village communities; civilized art is the art of people living in cities and nations. No pretense is being made here of treating

civilized art with any degree of completeness, for it is the subject of the vast literature assembled in the name of art history. Here we are only concerned with some of the salient features of the art of people living in cities and nations in contrast to the art of people living in tribes and village communities.

Cities and nations differ from tribes and villages in that they are communities resting on secondary rather than primary institutions. The most striking of all general differences between the arts of primitive and civilized societies is the emergence in the latter of the distinction between the fine and useful arts. When the art historian speaks of art, he usually means objects created specifically as art objects and not for use. The fine arts are, therefore, characteristically *secondary cultural institutions* in a society, the synthesis of which lies in secondary institutions.

The technical basis of the fine arts arising in civilized communities is a division of labor that most pre-literate communities cannot support. In most pre-literate communities every man is a generalized craftsman who (except at times for very specialized things) makes all the things he uses; every woman does the same. The pre-literate community tends to be a community of experts. Differences of skill are recognized, and considerable rivalry may arise in connection with them, but the least efficient Eskimo hunter, for example, is as dependent on weapons of his own construction as the most skilled artisan.

In civilized communities, on the other hand, the person skilled in a particular process may concentrate on it alone. Higher levels of excellence become possible at the same time that many persons do not practice the particular skill at all. Within more restricted limits the processes observed in primitive communities may be manifest: once technical mastery sufficient to produce standard forms is achieved, the forms may be subjected to independent judgments of formal perfection. The aesthetic object is then the product of the technical specialist; the gap between his skills and those of the average workman has been greatly widened.

There are social as well as technical bases in civilized communities for the emergence of a distinction between the fine and useful arts. The shift of the point of synthesis of community life to secondary institutions places the control of community affairs in the hands of those who operate the secondary institutions

(those who run the market, the government, and the temples). Social strata receive a new importance, for those who run the society are separated from those who do its work. A leisured strata emerges when these groups are in a position to skim off much of the surplus wealth that the community creates.

Many primitive communities are differentiated by generation and by sex and sometimes these differentiations are the anchorage for different artistic styles as, for example, among the Kwakiutl where the formal geometric arts of the women are distinguished from the symbolic representational arts of the men. A new kind of artistic differentiation, in terms of social strata, is possible in civilized communities.

The leisure classes of civilized communities are in a position to practice and enjoy the arts on a much more comprehensive level than are the primitives. They are also in a position to press the craft specialists and other experts in aesthetic matters of the community into the special service of their ends. The penetration of formal and meaningful (representational) elements may take place within the fine arts of "fine people" in much the same manner as it once did in the arts of the entire community. The meanings embedded and expressed in the arts of a specialized stratum are, however, more apt to reflect its particular outlook rather than that of the community as a whole. One of the ways in which the art of civilized communities differs from the art of primitive ones is in sustaining a more varied array of artistic styles. Very often the competition of alternative art styles in civilized communities brings about a rapid secularization and transformation of the arts. In the Greek tragedy, for example, there was a comparatively rapid evolution from the heroic and religious to the psychological drama. One of the primary tasks of every art historian is tracing the competition and change of artistic styles. While it might take perhaps ten thousand years for the art represented by the cave paintings of Southern France to evolve from crude beginnings to mature form, the time period in the evolution of an artistic style in a civilized community from its first introduction to its highest form may occur in as many decades.

While the conditions for the emergence of art in primitive and civilized communities are the same, the arts operate under specialized conditions in a civilized community, permitting them to

achieve more highly developed forms. Moreover, the tendency of fine art to be part and parcel with the special style of life of leisured groups transforms the artistic consciousness in a civilized community in other ways. Aspiring social strata ape the artistic tastes of their social betters. Able, but low born young men, may find careers as the artists and entertainers of higher strata. In exalted social circles judgments of morality may be transformed into judgments of taste, and the mark of the higher social being may be found precisely in his function as patron of the arts. Moreover, when rising social strata begin to assimilate the tastes of the social elite too completely, the elite may once again differentiate themselves by drawing new and fine distinctions between men of taste and the vulgar herd. German intellectuals have occasionally called attention to the assumption, widespread in some nineteenth century aristocratic circles, that humanity only begins with the rank of baron; all other social types are sub-human. In his provocative answer to the question, "What is noble?" Nietzsche observed that being noble includes, among other things, being a patron of the arts.

Peasant Art. While there has been no general treatment of peasant art in relation to community, sufficient evidence is available to indicate that it falls into a category somewhat different from either that of primitive or of civilized art. This is important if one is not to fall victim to the mystical agrarianism of persons like Spengler.

According to Spengler, the art of the city is an art of visual form, while peasant art is a growth of the soil. "The peasant and his dwelling remained in all essentials Gothic, and Gothic it is to this day."²⁵ In literature the epic is said to be typical of a peasantry, while the drama and novel are characteristic of the city. The folk song belongs to a peasantry, while lyricism is typical of the city. In contrast to "eternal" peasant art, there is only "urban painting and architecture with a swift, soon ended history." And when the city and its arts collapse, the peasantry triumphs once again.

It is true that when the great cities of the Greco-Roman world declined, a wholesale liquidation of the arts accompanied the

²⁵ Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1929), Vol. 2, p. 93.

process. However, the arts of the medieval village communities seem never to have completely returned to a primitive state. The ancient cities sent radiant waves of influence into the surrounding countryside. This occurred with a frequency so easily demonstrable that some early social scientists thought it was a general law of civilization. Gabriel Tarde, for example, argued that waves of imitation flow from city to country.

When for whatever reason the culture centers are destroyed, the fashions of the court and the upper social strata vanish as well. At such times the peasantry is no longer subject to its cultural influences and often experiences a hardening and fixation of form. The so-called peasant styles, thus, are often in fact imitations of the styles of distant courts or other culture centers. In backward areas of Bavaria and Austria, for example, there remain peasant styles which had their origins in the courtly life of the eighteenth century. The ancient frescoes of the Ganges valley of northern India picture technical processes and persons in the dress of the time. The various styles of dress of the peasants now living in the shadow of these ancient ruins are similar to those portrayed in the frescoes. It is not unfair to assume that at one time these styles were the fashions of an active urban life, and that one has here an example of the manner in which the brisk fashions of a culture center may harden into the immemorial customs of the folk.

Manorial Art. In medieval Europe the collapse of the Greco-Roman civilizations permitted the return of social structures to the compass of the rural villages. However, the decay of the Roman latifundia and the effect of militant warrior tribes led to the gradual consolidation of European society into manorial communities.

The militant, land owning, castle dwelling leisured stratum of aristocrats stood opposed to the peasantry which was rapidly acquiring serf status. The division between the fine and useful arts, so far as one existed, was drawn between the arts sustaining the style of life of the castles in contrast to the arts of the peasantry and the serfs. The more skilled craftsmen were drawn into manorial service. Some of the useful arts of the castle—and the art of the saddle-leather makers—developed, in time, to a remarkably high level of perfection. Among the literary arts, the

art of the old tribal gleeman evolved into that of the troubador. The manorial arts reached their highest development in the courtly arts that eventually absorbed and displaced them.

Art in the City. However important the manorial arts may have been, they pale into comparative insignificance before the dramatic unfolding of art in the city. It was in the city that art was purified, refined, stimulated, and sponsored. The typical art historian often conscientiously mentions the arts of the peasantry, the manor, and monastery, but he finds his primary material in the evolution of the civic arts.

The high points of development tend to coincide with the high court and civic periods. In the west, for example, nothing parallel to the artistic excellence of classical Greece can be found until the period of creativity in the cities of the Italian Renaissance. It was the Renaissance artists most able to appreciate classical Greek sculpture who were to enter upon an epoch of artistic creation as original in its own way as was that of the Greeks. Hagen described this as "not the rebirth of antiquity, but *the birth of Nature in art. . .*"²⁶

Walter Benjamin was speaking of much the same thing when he talked about the birth of a new mode of perception at the great turning points in the development of art.

SUMMARY

Aristotle thought art aimed to imitate action and provide man with an emotional release or catharsis. Kant summed up a major eighteenth century view that art was in essence a formal judgment of the pleasurable. The conception of art as form has been repeatedly affirmed since Kant. The Hegelians and their modern heirs (Collingwood and Croce) conceived of art as the pure, lyrical self-realization of the human spirit. Freud, in views not essentially dissimilar from those of Aristotle, thought of art as symbolic activity serving to sublimate otherwise frustrated emotional drives. In response to contemporary developments, Walter Benjamin has suggested that modern technology has reversed the traditional meaning of art; it has transformed art into an implement of commerce and politics.

²⁶ Oscar Hagen, *Art Epochs and Their Leaders* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), I, pp. 4-5.

Even the briefest review of the relations between art and community indicates that most of the theories of art have fastened upon significant elements of aesthetic activity. To be sure, art does not imitate either activity or nature, but it works with the materials of both. In various ways the theory of art as catharsis and as self-expression calls attention to forms of satisfaction that the art affords to man. The Kantians isolated the indispensable formal element without which no art exists, and Benjamin identified some of the primary social factors that may shape a people's art. While there is no one-to-one correlation of art and community type, for art represents a free creation with the techniques and themes a community develops, art necessarily bears an intimate relation to the given community that sustains it. A precondition of art is the development of techniques to such a stage of perfection as to permit the emergence of standard forms, subject to judgments of formal beauty. An art is, however, not composed of formal values alone. Representational or meaningful elements are also organized and expressed in various ways by an art. The intersection of formal and significant elements is one of the foundations of artistic styles.

Since every community presents a different array of techniques, on the one hand, and meanings on the other, an art can not be without relation to the particular community type. In primitive communities the plastic and graphic arts tend to remain decorative, literature is oral and closely associated with mythology, and the dance is closely tied to ceremony. One of the major ways in which the civilized communities differ from primitive communities is in the provision of specialized techniques and in supplying the technical and social foundations for the emergence of fine arts.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. In what ways are Aristotle's and Freud's theories of art similar?
2. How do the arts in America illustrate or disprove Benjamin's thesis that the arts have tended to shift from the sphere of religion to that of economics and politics?
3. In what ways do primitive and civilized arts differ?
4. How do the arts of the village community differ from those of the city?
5. In what ways did aesthetic theory in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries attempt to take account of the influence of the industrial revolution on the arts?
6. Which of the primitive arts, according to Boas, is most completely developed? What are the reasons for this?
7. How does Boas explain art styles?
8. Explain the proposition: there cannot be a one-to-one correlation of art and community type?
9. Explain the proposition: the fine arts are secondary cultural institutions.
10. Discuss the relation between technology and art.

SOCIETY AND ART IN THE UNITED STATES

EUROPEAN ROOTS OF AMERICAN ART

The situation presented for the development of the arts in the new world was necessarily complex. The settlement of the New World came shortly after the arts had been brought to a brilliant state of development in the cities of Europe. This was true not only for the cities of Italy (as may be seen from the dates of some of the great artists of the world—Leonardo da Vinci, 1452-1519; Titian, 1490-1576; Raphael, 1483-1520; Michelangelo, 1475-1564)—but also for the cities of the north (Hans Holbein the Younger, 1497-1543; Albrecht Dürer, 1471-1528). Architecture had been brought to a brilliant synthesis. Music had been deepened and enriched by Palestrina (1626-1694) and Orlando Lasso (1530-1594). By the sixteenth century some 100,000 books had been printed and reprinted in Germany alone. The number published in Germany increased from 150 in 1518 to 990 in 1524. Poetry was developed by persons such as Ariosto, Tasso, and Spencer. All varieties of wit were appreciated, from the poisonous sallies of Peter Aretino to the gusty laughter of Rabelais (1490-1533). The religious plays of the Middle Ages were being converted into the secular drama of the Renaissance.

PROTESTANTISM AND WESTERN ART

However, in the middle of this development came the battle between Protestants and Roman Catholics. After the Reformation, ecclesiastical architecture either tended to the excessive

plainness of the Protestants or the excessive ornamentation of the Roman Catholics. In the arts, as in other things, the Protestants defined themselves in conscious opposition to the Catholics:

Even when the Reformation was not consciously opposed to art, it shoved it aside as a distraction from the real business of life. Thus it has come about in Protestant lands that the public regards art either as a 'business' or an 'education.' Luther himself loved music above all things and did much to popularize it,—while Erasmus shuddered at the psalm singing he heard from Protestant congregations! Of painting the Reformer spoke with admiration, but so rarely! What could art be in the life of a man who was fighting for his soul's salvation? Calvin saw more clearly the dangers to the soul from the seductions of this world's transitory charm. Images he thought idolatrous in churches and he said outright: 'It would be ridiculous and inept imitation of the papists to fancy that we render God more worthy service in ornamenting our temples and in employing organs and toys of the sort. While the people are thus distracted by external things, the worship of God is profaned.' So it was that the Puritans chased all blandishments not only from the church but from life, and art came to be looked upon as a bit immoral.¹

The same process was at work in the north. In England there was a marked decline of lyric poetry and folk music as well as drama after the Elizabethan Age. After exciting beginnings, there was also a decline of English music.²

Protestantism did not have similar effects on the arts in all places. Martin Luther (1483-1546) loved congregational singing of simple texts in the vernacular. Many Catholic hymns that had been translated into German were transplanted to America by Pietist groups.³ On the other hand, the followers of John Calvin (1509-1564) were of the conviction that it was only proper to sing words taken over from the Scriptures. Calvin's strictures were followed by the English Puritans. German Protestantism supplied the socio-religious context for the emergence of the musical genius of Johann Sebastian Bach (1675-1750). While

¹ Preserved Smith, *The Age of the Reformation* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1920), pp. 689-690.

² Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. by Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), p. 272.

³ John Tasker Howard and George Kent Bellows, *A Short History of Music in America* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1957), p. 12.

Puritan musical life in the American colonies was epitomized by the *Bay Psalm Book* (1640),⁴ the Moravians at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, were composing music in the style of Bach. Like the Pietists, they realized the value of instrumental music.⁵

Protestantism, in re-defining leisure as a support for work-a-day activities, paved the way for the emergence of a new prose literature. Since the only legitimate way a Protestant could employ his leisure was for the improvement of his body or his mind, he turned either toward exercise or toward self-improvement literature, both moral and practical, in his spare time. At first the new demand for literature was met in part by the writings of clergymen, such as Richard Baxter (1615-1691), or of religious writers, such as John Bunyan (1628-1688), whose *Pilgrim's Progress* was perhaps the most widely read of all Puritan books.

As the demand for a new kind of prose literature grew, it could hardly be permanently satisfied by religious literature. Daniel Defoe struck out new lines by his style of realistic observation in *Colonel Jack* (1722), *Roxana* (1724), and the immediately successful *Robinson Crusoe*. The converging demands for entertainment and moral improvement were gradually synthesized by Samuel Richardson (1689-1761), who hit upon the idea that morality might be helped and young persons improved by a series of letters between imaginary persons. The product was *Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded*. When the device of the hero was employed as a vehicle for the author's conception of the good life, revealed in adventures, triumphs, tragedies, sins, and follies, the requirements of the new audiences for simultaneous entertainment and moral uplift were met. By the middle of the eighteenth century English novels came into the hands of colonial Americans, and imitations of such English novelists as Richardson, Fielding, and Smollett began to appear.

PURITAN ATTITUDES IN THE NEW WORLD

A major factor complicating the situation of the arts in the new world was the transfer to the colonies of the old world conflict between the Puritan and non-Puritan. One effect of American Puritanism was the repeated return during the evolution of Amer-

⁴ The first book printed in the English-speaking colonies.

⁵ Howard and Bellows, *op. cit.*, pp. 34 ff.

ican taste to Puritan simplicities and the frequent transformation of judgments of taste into moral judgments. Many of these transformations of aesthetic into moral judgments have been traced by Russell Lynes.⁶ In architecture, for example, almost every basic change has been heralded as "more honest" or "sincere." The Gothic revival was acclaimed as more honest than the Greek revival. Eastlake's "sincerity" consisted in putting furniture together with dowels rather than with nails and screws, an offshoot, Lynes observed, of William Morris' crafts movement. Similarly, the methods of building the Queen Anne house were said to be more "honest" than those employed in building Italian villas or Mansard houses. The modern style of architecture was also proclaimed to be more sincere and honest.

One of the reasons, I believe, why the Modern movement has lasted longer than many assaults on the bastion of American taste is quite simply that it appeals to a morality that is deeply imbedded in our history. It seems to be harking back to American Puritanism, a morality which stressed the virtues of modest, clean living, and disdain for what we call vulgar display. Like the modern movement, puritanism was a revolt against an overlabored aesthetic.⁷

The effect of this Puritan tendency at times appeared in pure form as in the severe quality of Shaker objects which were never decorated or painted with designs.⁸ At times modern architecture, in search of aesthetic effects, seems to achieve the opposite. Severe, unornamented, architectural forms give an overpowering image of grim purity.

COMMUNITY FLUIDITY AND THE AMERICAN ARTS

However, not all the problems of the arts in America are contained in the contrast between conflicting claims of the Puritan and non-Puritan. We have seen that a precondition of the development of the arts is a community stability sufficiently prolonged to permit basic technical processes to achieve standard forms. If the arts are to have a meaningful dimension, there must be sufficient community integration to provide a shared symbolic world.

⁶ Russell Lynes, *The Tastemakers* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1955), pp. 102, 103, 106, 109, 244, 337, 385.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

⁸ John A. Kouwenhoven, *Made in America* (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1948), p. 119.

From the beginning in America, there was neither stability of community form nor homogeneity of ideological tradition. Until the end of the nineteenth century large blocks of Americans operated under pioneering conditions. While such conditions promote a high degree of general self-reliance, making every man a sort of jack-of-all-trades, they do not allow for a stabilization and perfection of technique required by a high art. Moreover, even in the most homogeneous period of United States history, the population was of heterogeneous background. In 1790 the American population was only about 80 per cent English. Given time, of course, a heterogeneity of cultural stocks can establish new cultural traditions and strike out new pathways; but in the United States until World War I there was no time for cultural re-constitution before new migration waves occurred.

Even in the colonial period there was no homogeneity in the patterns of community formation. Village communities were formed in the north; plantation communities developed in the south. Each had its peculiar potential for aesthetic development, but before these potentials could be realized new changes were afoot. In the nineteenth century a rapid evolution of cities occurred, and finally, toward the end of the century, the integration of the national community got under way.

The three major experiences in America that had to be absorbed before an autonomous development of the arts could occur were the pioneering experience, the tremendous and varied immigration, and the industrial revolution. To make the problem of the emergence of the arts doubly complicated, the conflict of the Puritan and non-Puritan views of art has been recurrent. These dramatic and tradition-shattering experiences have either followed on the heels of one another as when America moved straight from a pioneering situation into the world of the industrial revolution or simultaneously as when the needs of incipient industrialization for cheap labor led to the importation of the peasant masses.

THE AMERICAN ARTS TO THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

In the colonial period America looked to Europe for the models of its art. At the same time, it was so expensive to import things

that the colonists manufactured most items they needed. This manufacture was done at home.

Colonial Art. Carl Drepperd⁹ has observed that while Americans had to manufacture most items in the pioneering period, the products were neither traditional nor orthodox. Instead of blurring good or classical art forms, as does old world folk art, the American pioneers improved established forms. The New England butterfly table, for instance, was an improved form of the old English gate-leg table; the Windsor chair in Philadelphia was a modification of an old world form. The so-called folk art was, in fact, minor pioneer art, mostly home made. In Pennsylvania the German immigrants readily took over the Norse style of five to ten-plate wood burning stoves cast by English and Welsh iron masters. The stove plates were decorated with biblical scenes or quotations from the Bible. Stove patterns were often copied from textile patterns. When shiploads of Swedish antiques were brought to America in the nineteen-twenties, they readily found sale as authentic Pennsylvania pieces. However, when a Pennsylvania dealer tried the same trick with antique furniture from Germany, he had no success, for his importations were experienced as un-Pennsylvanian.

In the colonial period the fine arts were a product of frontier conditions and Puritanism. The theatre had a particularly difficult time. The first English play, *Ye Bare and Ye Cubb* (1665) was written and produced by three amateurs in Virginia. They were prosecuted and acquitted. The first theatre was erected at Williamsburg (1716). The first American acting company was organized in Philadelphia in 1749 by Walter Murray and Thomas Kean. The company had a repertoire of twenty-four plays which it performed in a number of cities. In 1752 the Hallam Company came to America from England with a repertoire of forty Elizabethan and Restoration plays. The first permanent theatre was the Southward in Philadelphia (1766). The *Prince of Parthia*, written by Thomas Godfrey (1736-1763) is presumed to be the first professional stage play by an American dramatist. During the Revolution most theatrical companies moved to Jamaica, for in the colonies there was a strong resurgence of Puritanical atti-

⁹ Carl W. Drepperd, *American Pioneer Arts and Artists* (Springfield, Mass.: The Pond-Ekberg Co., 1942), pp. 143 ff.

tudes. Resolutions of the Continental Congress recommended legislation prohibiting public entertainment, particularly the theatre.

The limners, the earliest American painters, were probably self taught. Their portraits were naive, realistic, and detailed, but in time the traditions of European portraiture were transferred to America. Early sculpture was primarily confined to gravestone carving, though at times sculptors were commissioned to carve effigies. Early architecture recreated in the new world some styles from Spain in Florida and west of the Mississippi, from France in the Mississippi valley, and from England on the Atlantic coast.¹⁰ Log cabins which were introduced on the Atlantic coast by the Swedes, were made the prevailing type of frontier construction by the Scotch-Irish. English Jacobean style of construction was introduced in the colonies in the seventeenth century; timber construction was used in New England, brick and stone in the middle colonies, and brick in the south. In the eighteenth century English baroque was adopted. The term Georgian has been applied to American adaptations of this English style; they were houses of two or three stories built on a rectangular plan with regularly spaced windows, dormers, and a small entry (the porch being replaced by a spacious center hall with two chimneys, one on each side of the hall). Georgian architecture gradually replaced the early Dutch with its separate gables and the Flemish projecting roof curved at the ends. The early churches were comparatively simple; in the south the small parish churches followed the English Gothic style, in the north under Puritan influence they took the form of meeting houses with a long aisle, galleries on three sides, and the pulpit on the long side opposite the entrance.

During the eighteenth century there was a slow but distinct development of music in the colonies. After 1730 there were increasing numbers of concerts. The first recorded secular song in colonial America was written in 1759. Some musical societies were formed around 1760, and the first music school was opened. William Billings (1746-1800), the first New England composer, organized singing societies and composed patriotic songs during the Revolution. In a colonial area with strong Puritan leanings,

¹⁰ Thomas E. Tallmadge, *The Story of Architecture in America* (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1927), pp. 25 ff.

one could, perhaps, expect the richest development to occur in literature. The evolution of literary interest may be seen from the best seller list to the time of the Revolution.

Best Sellers

- 1640 *Bay Psalm Book*
- 1662 Michael Wigglesworth, *Day of Doom*
- 1682 Mary Rowlandson, *Captivity and Restoration*
- 1683 *New England Primer*
- 1699 Jonathan Dickinson, *God's Protecting Providence*
- 1707 John Williams, *The Redeemed Captive*
- 1719 *Mother Goose's Melodies for Children*
- 1725-64 Nathaniel Ames, *Astronomical Diary and Almanack*
- 1732-57 Benjamin Franklin, *Poor Richard's Almanack*
- 1741 William Penn, *No Cross, No Crown*
- 1768 John Dickinson, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania*
- 1775-76 John Trumbull, *McFingal*
- 1776 Thomas Paine, *Common Sense*
- 1776-83 Thomas Paine, *The American Crisis*
- 1783 Noah Webster, *American Spelling Book*
- 1787-88 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist*

The list reflects a gradual decline of religious interest, increased interest in politics, and the rise of secular self-improvement motives. The American colonial arts were those of an English frontier with a slight mixing of other forms.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR

Major wars and revolutions are rarely without basic influence on institutions. Cultural institutions are particularly sensitive to such crises. At such times men are more apt to draw the distinction between work and leisure-time activities with especial stringency and to sacrifice the leisure-time activity to the needs of the hour. Song writers and other artists turn their talents to the cause; all arts, in fact, may be subordinated to propaganda requirements. In revolutionary upheavals, as one of the more visible symbols of class standing, the arts enjoyed by elite groups are often a primary target of the revolutionaries.

The American Revolution transformed the situation of the arts. England's guidance in the colonial arts did not altogether cease simply because the colonies fought a victorious revolution, however, the attitude of a people that defines itself as a colony is far different from that of a people that defines itself as an independent nation. There was a radical displacement toward cultural autonomy from England.

Along with the separation from England went an inner transformation of social structure. In considerable measure the Revolution brought about a crystalization of sentiment within the colonies as well as between the colonies and the old world. The English loyalists were, by and large, an upper stratum of officials and businessmen. Many of the loyalists migrated from the United States; their estates were confiscated and broken up; the policies identified with them went into eclipse; and the style of life they sustained was brought under suspicion. The effect of this was to strengthen the middle and lower class groups in America which had serious consequences for the arts.

The Revolution left the American economy exclusively in native hands. At the end of the eighteenth and in the first decades of the nineteenth century, Americans generally settled down to opening up the country and making money with no nonsense. One foreign visitor after another was impressed by the comparative lack of any diversion. At American meals Dickens found "no conversation, no laughter, no cheerfulness; no sociality, except spitting, and that is done in silent fellowship round the stove when the meal is over."¹¹

In these same years the foundations for a new series of American fortunes were being laid, resting on the flowering plantation economy of the South and the industrial economy in the Northeast. Dixon Wecter observed that when one type of privilege is destroyed another tends to rise from the ruins. Jefferson fought against the aristocracy resting on entail and primogeniture (Carrolls, Livingstons, Schuylers, and Van Renselaers), but almost simultaneously a new plutocracy was arising. It was epitomized

¹¹ Charles Dickens, *American Notes* (Fireside ed.), p. 77. Foster Rhea Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 88. Typical observations by other observers in Frances Trollope, *Domestic Manners of Americans* (London: 1831); Basil Hall, *Men and Manners* (Philadelphia: 1833); Frances J. Grund, *The Americans* (Boston: 1837).

by Nicholas Biddle in Philadelphia, Robert Lenox in New York, and Thomas H. Perkins in Boston.¹² By the time of the Civil War, the North was dominated by a plutocracy of bankers, mill owners, shipping magnates, and speculators in city real estate. For example, the Astors, Goelets, Schermerhorns, and Rhinelanders owed much of their fortunes to speculation in New York real estate.¹³ At the top of the plantation society were a thousand families who in 1850 received around \$50,000,000 a year. The remaining 66,000 families of the South received approximately the same amount.

While the emergence of commercial and industrial plutocrats in the Northeast and plantation aristocrats in the South was of importance for the arts during the period from the Revolution to the Civil War, another major event was represented by the pioneering movement which first opened the Old Northwest and gradually the whole of the continent. Just as the colonial seaboard had primarily been populated by north European middle class groups, so the Old Northwest was in considerable measure populated by middle class groups, this time from the east. This impressed Tocqueville.

Many of these men, who rush so boldly onward in pursuit of wealth, were already in enjoyment of a competency in their own part of the country. They take their wives along with them, and make them share the countless perils and privations which always attend the commencement of these expeditions. I have often met, even on the verge of the wilderness, with young women who, after having been brought up amid all the comforts of the large towns of New England, had passed, almost without any intermediate state, from the wealthy abode of their parents to a comfortless hovel in a forest.¹⁴

Drepperd observed that when the pioneers moved from Pennsylvania, New York, and New England to the Ohio valley, they mixed even further the already mixed patterns and styles. This tended to destroy the possibility of a true folk art.

¹² Dixon Wecter, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 103. For accounts of the techniques by which some of the fortunes were established, see Gustavus Myers, *History of the Great American Fortunes* (New York: Modern Library, 1936).

¹⁴ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 274.

We must really go to the Ozarks and the Appalachian Plateau for American folk art. The Ozark folk art derives from England, France, and Spain by various and devious routes. The Appalachian art is in the tradition of Elizabethan or Tudor England.¹⁵

Pioneer art was not folk art but a rough and ready adaptation of established forms, forming the basis for what Kouwenhoven describes as vernacular.¹⁶ The communal arts of groups like the Shaker and Amana communities arose in the adaptations of existing styles to the limitations of special religious beliefs.

Though it is perhaps a mistake to assign the working of all these influences on the arts to the democratic principle, there is no doubt as to the acuteness of Tocqueville's observations on the state of the arts in America between the Revolution and the Civil War. He argued that mediocrity of fortunes, general desire for comfort, and the attempt to procure it caused preference for the useful to predominate over the love of the beautiful.¹⁷ In ages of privilege, he urged, practice of the arts also tends to become a privilege in which those involved have not only their fortunes but their reputations to make and preserve. Hence, Tocqueville believed the object of the arts in an aristocracy was to manufacture the best, not the fastest and cheapest. However, when every profession is open, many persons are continually taking them up or dropping them; the members are strangers to one another. This inclines the practitioners of a trade to make as much money as possible rather than to produce the best possible goods. Tocqueville contended that the abolition of privilege meant that some people were sinking in social rank. A number of persons had desires they found difficult to satisfy, and surreptitious means of providing for these wants were embraced. At the same time there may be large numbers of persons whose fortunes are expanding but not quickly enough to keep pace with their desires. Again there is an inclination to seek satisfaction with substitutions. Thus the artisans of a democracy endeavor to sell high workmanship less than to get rich by selling at a low price to all. The workman

¹⁵ Carl W. Drepperd, *American Pioneer Arts and Artists* (Springfield, Mass.: Pond-Ekberg, 1942), p. 147.

¹⁶ John A. Kouwenhoven, *Made in America* (New York: Doubleday, 1948), pp. 15 ff.

¹⁷ Tocqueville, *op. cit.*, pp. 272 ff.

tries to invent methods that enable him to work quicker and cheaper, or failing that, to diminish intrinsic quality.

To mimic virtue is of every age; but the hypocrisy of luxury belongs more particularly to the ages of democracy.

To satisfy these new cravings of human vanity the arts have recourse to every species of imposture: and these devices sometimes go so far as to defeat their own purpose. Imitation diamonds are now made which easily may be mistaken for real ones; or as soon as the art of fabricating false diamonds shall have reached so high a degree of perfection that they cannot be distinguished from the real ones, it is probable that both one and the other will be abandoned, and become mere pebbles again.¹⁸

Tocqueville did not believe that the number of persons cultivating the fine arts necessarily decreased in a democracy. However, he did think that many who had developed a taste for the arts were impoverished and many who were not yet rich adopted that taste. The number of customers increased while opulent and fastidious customers grew scarce. To satisfy the new demand, artistic production grew, while quality declined. Aristocracies produce a few great pictures; democracies a great number of insignificant ones. In the former statues are in bronze; in the latter they are modeled in plaster.

When I arrived for the first time in New York, by that part of the Atlantic ocean which is called the Sound, I was surprised to perceive along the shore, at some distance from the city, a considerable number of little palaces of white marble, several of which were built after the models of ancient architecture. When I went the next day to inspect more closely the building which had particularly attracted my notice, I found that its walls were of white-washed brick, and its columns of painted wood. All the edifices which I had admired the night before were of the same kind.¹⁹

The one place, Tocqueville believed, where this democratic devaluation of art did not hold was in the public monuments.

From the Revolution to the Civil War American music was primarily derivative, the Germans in America taking the lead in the promotion of serious music. There were, however, some beginnings of native music; *Tammany* by James Hewitt (1770-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 276.

1827), said to be the first American opera, was produced in New York under the auspices of the Tammany Society (1794). After 1800 a number of musical periodicals were established, most of which were short lived. From 1810 on various orchestras were founded, beginning with the Boston Philharmonic Society founded by Gottlieb Graupner (1767-1836), who also founded the Handel and Haydn Societies (1815). Orchestras were formed in New York and Chicago; choral societies at Philadelphia, Milwaukee, Chicago, and Cincinnati. The first important music school in the United States was the United States Music School of Boston in 1832. The most important popular song writers of the period were Daniel D. Emmett (1815-1884) and Stephen C. Foster (1826-1864).²⁰

In the period between the Revolution and the Civil War, the theatre evolved into a democratic institution and underwent change.²¹ The tragedy, *Douglas*, was the first recorded English language drama to be performed west of the Alleghenies (1897). The first indication of the emergence of Negro minstrelsy was the introduction of a Negro character who sang "The Gay Negro Boy," accompanying himself on the banjo at the close of the second act of *Oroonoko*, produced in Boston by Gottlieb Graupner. The minstrel character and song, *Jim Crow*, was introduced in Louisville, Kentucky, by Thomas Dartmouth (1808-1860). Phineas T. Barnum used minstrels in his American Museum. The Daniel Decatur Emmett (1814-1904) quartet, the Virginia Minstrels, presented the first full-length minstrel show in 1843.

As in colonial days, the South was more receptive to the theatre than the North, but in both foreign and domestic acting troops were received and theatres were formed. After 1812 traveling companies of players began to tour the frontier, while in New York and elsewhere huge theatres were constructed to meet the extensive popular demand. At an early period other forms of entertainment (special dancers, popular music, trained animals, and acrobats) were interspersed between the acts. The first ballet dancers to arrive in the 1820's were immediately popular.

²⁰ See John Howard and George Bellows, *A Short History of Music in America* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1957), pp. 72-130.

²¹ See Dulles, *op. cit.*, pp. 100 ff.

In the fine arts portraiture flourished in the period from the Revolution to the rise of photography. Gilbert Stuart (1755-1828) was perhaps the most able in the early state period. Historical painting developed between 1790 and 1860 along with religious and panoramic genres. Landscape painting came to prominence after 1830. Thomas Doughty (1793-1886) was the first American painter to make a successful career in the genre. Anecdotal painting enjoyed some popularity. Of the early artisan sculptors, William Rush (1756-1833) enjoyed the most successful career. After 1830 American sculptors began to seek training abroad; the first was Horatio Greenough (1805-1852), most famous for his statue of Washington.

Following the American Revolution, the demand for a new architecture led to a Roman Revival (1789-1820) followed by a Greek Revival (1820-1860). The professional architect made his appearance in the United States with the Roman Revival. Thomas Jefferson's design for the Virginia capitol in Richmond (1785-1789) was the earliest American structure in Roman style. The Greek Revival after 1820 was partly attributable to the influence of foreign architects and American sympathy for the Greeks in their independence struggle. The introduction of Greek Revival was primarily the work of Benjamin Henry Latrobe (1764-1820), who designed the Bank of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, in Greek style. After 1840 the foundations for a Gothic Revival in architecture were laid by A. J. Davis. A book dealing with landscape and rural architecture by Andrew Downing (1815-1862) aided the spread of the Gothic Revival. The trend was attacked by Horatio Greenough in *American Architecture* (1843), *Aesthetics at Washington* (1851), and *Structure and Organization* (1852).²²

AMERICAN ART FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR

In the period from the Revolution to the Civil War the fullest development in American arts was achieved in literature.²³ The

²² See Thomas E. Tallmadge, *The Story of Architecture in America* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1927), pp. 75-117.

²³ Vernon Louis Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, Vol. II, 1800-1860, *The Romantic Revolution in America* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1927); Van Wyck Brooks, *The Flowering of New England* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1957).

increasing absorption of American literary figures in specifically American and national issues appears in the best sellers from 1790 to 1900. In 1892 Hugh Breckenridge's *Modern Chivalry* was a satire which realistically examined frontier conditions. The extent to which public interest in literature was becoming local is seen by the popularity of Ben Franklin's *Autobiography*. Patriotic motives were manifest in the popularity of Thomas Paine's *Age of Reason* (1794) and Mason Weems' *Life of Washington* (1800).

The dominant literary figures in America after 1815 were Washington Irving (1783-1858), whose *History of New York* was the best seller in 1809 and whose *Sketch Book* was the best seller in 1819; James Fenimore Cooper (1789-1851), whose *Spy* in 1821, *Pilot* in 1823, *The Pioneers* in 1823, *The Last of the Mohicans* in 1826, and *The Prairie* in 1827 were all extremely popular; and William Cullen Bryant (1794-1878). These formed the core of the Knickerbocker School.

After 1815 the renaissance of literature in New England rapidly took shape. New England achieved its spiritual release under transcendental philosophy, the capitol of which was the city of Boston. Under the leadership of William Ellery Channing (1780-1842) the Unitarian revolt against orthodox Congregationalism was carried through. Unitarianism in turn was brought under attack by Transcendentalism which received its most complete formation in Ralph Waldo Emerson's (1803-1882) *Nature* (1836). This form of philosophic idealism and romanticism reached its most intense expression in the writings of Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862).

Transcendentalism also influenced Nathaniel Hawthorne (1804-1864), who conducted some of the most penetrating studies ever made of the Puritan mind and its preoccupation with sin. Herman Melville (1819-1891), who formulated the problem of evil against the background of the sea, was also influenced by transcendentalism. In Melville's *Moby Dick* (1851) and Walt Whitman's *Leaves of Grass* (1855) American writers struck out the lines of a new idiom. The foremost literary figure of the South during the period was Edgar Allan Poe (1809-1849), who promoted the development of American literary criticism and poetry and who laid the basis for the detective story. Other major southern writers were John Pendleton Kennedy (1795-1870), who de-

scribed plantation life, and Augustus Baldwin Longstreet (1790-1870), who sketched life in the backwoods. The major American poets prior to the Civil War were Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1807-1882), John Greenleaf Whittier (1807-1892), and James Russell Lowell (1819-1891). Major historians included William Hickling Prescott (1798-1869), George Tichnor (1791-1871), George Bancroft (1800-1891), and John Lothrop Motley (1814-1877). These writers introduced the standards of German historicism to the writing of American history. In the 1840's the reform novel became important, illustrated by Harriet Beecher Stowe's (1811-1896) *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1852) and the literature of the temperance movement.

During this period there was a rapid extension of free public education, subscription libraries, and a spread of the lyceum movement. Book publishing rapidly expanded, and the public library evolved into an American institution. The Library of Congress was established in 1800 with Thomas Jefferson's library as a nucleus. The first tax-supported local library was a children's library established in Salisbury, Connecticut, in 1803.

In his interesting history of American taste, Russell Lynes maintains that the formation of taste is a major industry in America essential to the operation of American capitalism. Demand is created by changing people's tastes. The serious development of taste-making into a business began prior to the Civil War.

When Andrew Jackson was elected to the presidency in 1828 on a wave of cocksure Americanism, there came with him not only a new 'age of the common man' but the beginnings of what I would like to call the Age of Public Taste. Taste became everybody's business and not just the business of the cultured few.²⁴

Mass production was the new element. In 1837 William Compton patented a loom for fancy weaving. In seven years the first wallpaper printing machine was imported from England. A loom to make Brussels carpets and tapestries was developed. From 1840 to 1860 the value of factory-made furnishings rose from \$7,000,000 a year to \$28,000,000. At first magazines such as Peterson's *The Lady's World of Fashion* and Godey's *Lady's Book*,

²⁴ Russell Lynes, *The Tastemakers* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), p. 5.

though filled with the latest information on Paris and London styles, quite failed to recognize the revolution being wrought by the machine.

In this period Americans were unwilling to support the arts. Attempts to establish art galleries made little headway. The first successful move in this direction was taken by James Herring, a young portrait painter, who opened a gallery in New York in 1830. His scheme to create interest was to run the museum on a lottery basis. Each supporter who paid five dollars for an annual subscription to the Apollo Association, received a ticket with a number entitling him to a chance on a genuine hand-painted picture by an American artist in an annual lottery. In 1844 the Apollo Association changed its name to the American Art Union, and was supported by William Cullen Bryant and others. By 1844 membership had risen to over 2,000. In that year it distributed 92 paintings at its lottery; four years later it distributed more than 400. The Union continued to flourish until 1851, when the New York Supreme Court decided that its operations violated the law and its lottery had to be abandoned. In a few years several new organizations using the Union's ideas appeared. The most popular museum of the day was that of P. T. Barnum. The third major success was scored by Doctor Collyer at Palmo's Opera House, where the public was lured in droves to see nude paintings. As Lynes describes it:

Aesthetics served straight is a liquor that only a practiced and dedicated few can down without choking. The public needs a chaser. The Art Union gave it to them in the form of gambling; Barnum gave the freaks and oddities along with 'masterpieces' of art; Dr. Collyer sweetened the drink with sex. It was on such a basis that culture and commerce met at the beginning of the Age of Public Taste.²⁵

Major changes in popular taste in landscaping and domestic architecture were initiated in this period by Andrew Jackson Downing, a landscape architect from Newburgh, New York. Lynes maintains that there is scarcely a city park or a building dating from the 1840's and 1850's that does not reflect some of his ideas. The architectural style he introduced is known as Gothic Revival. In 1841 and 1842 he produced *A Treatise on the*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

Theory and Practice of Landscape Gardening and another on *Cottage Residences* which were immediately popular throughout the country. Among Downing's friends was Alexander Davis, who claims to have introduced the bay window of which Downing made much. Davis was largely responsible for convincing the public that architects have domestic uses. Downing persuaded Frederick Law Olmstead to design Central Park in New York in 1856, the first major attempt to prevent urban land from being completely sacrificed for real estate promotion. For his part, Downing was commissioned in 1851 at a salary of \$2,000 a year to design public gardens near the Capitol in Washington and to landscape the White House and Smithsonian Institution. The architecture promoted by Downing has come to be known as "Carpenter Gothic." However, Lynes observes that it was also a genuine beginning of the attempt to bring order out of architectural chaos.²⁶

AMERICAN ART FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Like every major crisis, the immediate effect of the Civil War was to halt the development of the arts and transform their objectives to propagandistic and other war needs and then to permanently transform the situation of the arts. Prior to the Civil War, American society had achieved some sort of synthesis. Three types of society, each with its potential for aesthetic development, were taking shape. Plantation society was coming into flower in the South. While considerable sections of the plantation elite dissipated their leisure and their great wealth an ideal of gracious living was also growing. Prior to the Civil War the theatre had found its most dependable reception and patronage in the South. There is no more reason to suppose that the plantation elite had any less capacity for the development of aesthetically refined tastes than had other courtly societies of the past. This, however, takes time.

A second type of society was stabilizing in the midwest. By the time of the Civil War, the pioneering phase of midwestern development had come to an end. Over and again the same gen-

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

eral development occurred—enterprising easterners (with unusual frequency Yankees from New England) opened up an area, established the lines of its primary business and financial structures, and laid the foundation for the reception of others, including family migrations from overseas. There was a mixture of middle class groups from the coast who, though generally less prosperous than those on the coast, had the same cultural demands. These communities had begun to take an increasing interest in the cultural amenities. They offered an eager market for the newly printed wallpapers, broad loom rugs, and the cheap Currier & Ives hand-colored lithographs.

The pictures avoided scenes of violence or even of hard work. Pastoral scenes were preferred, but all scenes were idealized. The Indian was a noble savage; the west was a lovely prairie. The firm had agents in many cities. Sporadic peddlers and traveling agents bought the prints wholesale, and peddled them far and wide. A parallel operation was carried out by John Rogers with clay statuary. The mass production of art for the home by Currier & Ives and John Rogers was addressed in considerable measure to the midwestern market. Other items destined for the same market were the fancy wallpapers, Brussels carpets, factory made chairs, and flowered chintz.²⁷

The third of the regions, the east, was the most fully developed prior to the Civil War. It produced a thriving civic life with rich traditions in politics, trade, fishing, and whaling. A plutocracy had taken shape, of which the second generation, and particularly the women, were under less pressure to immerse themselves exclusively in commerce. The flowering of New England's literature reveals the presence of a stability, and a maturity, sufficient for brilliant aesthetic creativity.

The Civil War radically altered all this. It destroyed the plantation society of the South, reducing it to a cultural backwater, and saddled it with the problem of reconstruction. It brought the world of Emerson, Whitman, Thoreau, Melville, and Hawthorne to a close. After the Civil War there was no picking up where these aesthetic beginnings had left off. This led Mumford to label the post-Civil War period as "the brown decades."

²⁷ Lynes, *op. cit.*, pp. 65 ff.

The Civil War shook down the blossoms and blasted the promise of spring. The colors of American civilization abruptly changed. By the time the war was over, browns had spread everywhere: mediocre drabs, dingy chocolate browns, sooty browns that merged into black. Autumn had come.²⁸

POST CIVIL-WAR ARTS

During the Civil War hundreds of songs were written expressing the ideals of the respective sides of the conflict. After the war American music began to mature. Many music festivals were held, and a tradition of choral singing was established. The opera was expanded, and many orchestras were formed. The college music departments and independent music schools, made their appearance. America's art music flowered among composers active in New England, in a musical world dominated by German romanticists. None of these so-called Boston classicists departed far from accepted paths, but they did form the first school of musical composition to appear in America.²⁹

The post-Civil War theatre was increasingly sensitive to national themes. Partly influenced by the French drama, the comedy of manners with American content flourished from 1870 to the end of the century. The drama reflected the national interest in the West. Frank Hitchcock Murdock's *Davy Crockett* (1872), Bret Harte's *The Two Men of Sandy Bat* (1876), Joaquin Miller's *The Danites in the Sierras* (1877) heralded the dramatic stage debut of the West. After 1880 the realistic drama took shape, as illustrated by such plays as *Secret Service* (1895) by William Gillette, *Hearts of Oak* (1880) by James A. Herne, and *Shore Acres* (1892) by David Belasco.

Portrait painting was still active after the Civil War, but its days were numbered by the rise of photography. Some of the outstanding portrait painters of the time did their work abroad. The pre-Civil War tradition of historical and landscape painting continued in the Hudson River School traditions. New levels of efficiency were achieved by Winslow Homer, in whose work American illustration achieved a temporary climax before giving

²⁸ Lewis Mumford, *The Brown Decades* (New York: Dover Publications, 1931), p. 5.

²⁹ Howard and Bellows, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-157.

way to photography. Meanwhile, John LaFarge together with H. H. Richardson made available to America much of the culture of Europe and the Orient, and re-awakened an interest in the decorative arts. Thomas Eakins established a new realism, and Albert Pinkham Ryder achieved a poetic semi-mystical intensity.³⁰

The foundations for basic changes in architecture after the Civil War were laid by the general use of commercial buildings of cast iron, large sheets of glass, and practical elevators. Around 1866 college education in architecture began. A rapid evolution of architectural styles occurred.

The Philadelphia Centennial Exposition in 1876 is now generally thought of as at once summing up and ending an era of bad taste.³¹ Some 249 buildings occupying 465 acres at Fairmount Park illustrated the architectural styles of the period: Queen Anne, Victorian Gothic, French mansard, and Swiss chalet. There were even a few examples of the new architectural forms made possible by the developments in engineering and industry.

The leading force in the Romanesque revival after 1876 was Henry Hobson Richardson (1838-1886) who had been trained at the *École des Beaux Arts*. His work displayed a new efficiency in the use of mass, space, and ornament—first represented in Trinity Church at Boston (1877). Romanesque revival was employed by Daniel H. Burnham (1846-1912) and John Wellborn Root (1850-1891) who designed the old Chicago Art Institution, the Montauk, Phoenix, Rookery, and Rialto buildings in Chicago. Use of cheap, abundant structural steel and the elevator made possible the skyscraper, an American contribution.

The World's Fair (1893) provided the major impetus for the adoption of Greek, Roman, and Renaissance architectural forms and the abandonment of Romanesque. During the period of the so-called Classical Revival, the development of an indigenous functional style was pressed by Louis H. Sullivan and Frank Lloyd Wright. Toward the turn of the century Wright began to develop his prairie house style.³²

The radical reorientation that was occurring in the mentality of Americans after the Civil War appears in the literary rediscov-

³⁰ Mumford, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-248.

³¹ Tallmadge, *The Story of Architecture*, pp. 162 ff.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 228 ff.

ery of the West. Twain's fascination with the West was documented in *Roughing It* (1872); his delight in the frontier tall tale is illustrated in the story, "The Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calaveras County" (1865). In contrast to Twain's impiety toward European culture, *The Innocents Abroad* (1869), was his enthusiasm for American scenes, events, and characters as seen in *Life on the Mississippi* (1883) and *The Gilded Age* (1873). Twain excelled in the improvisation of episodes and the portrayal of regional characters, as appears in *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer* (1878) and *Huckleberry Finn* (1884). But he was not alone in the interest in local scenes, regional dialects, and character types. Other writers concerned with the West included Bret Harte (1836-1902), whose *Luck of Roaring Camp* (1870) is the ancestor of western local color stories; John Hay (1838-1905), whose *Castilian Days* (1871) was anti-Catholic, and whose *Bread Winners* (1883) was anti-labor; and Joaquin Miller (1837-1913) one of the early balladists of the West. James Whitcomb Riley (1849-1916) and Eugene Field (1850-1895) also celebrated the West in verse. Edward Eggleston (1837-1902) wrote pioneer historical works on American cultural history and founded the Hoosier School with his novels of the middle border.

In the South, Joel Chandler Harris (1848-1908) stands out for his Uncle Remus stories which pictured Negro folk life. He also supplied authentic pictures of the Georgia Negro under slavery and of the "poor white" and "cracker" farmers. George Washington Cable (1844-1925) also painted local color pictures of the south in his short stories and novels of Creole life. Thomas Nelson Page (1853-1922) idealized Tidewater Virginia of antebellum days.

One of the major events in American literature in the post-Civil War period was the rise of realism.³³ A frank examination of some of the seamy side of life was contained in John William de Forest's studies of the Civil War and of a South Carolina feud (*Miss Ravenel's Conversion from Secession to Loyalty* 1867, and *Kate Beaumont*, 1872). Most popular of the realists was William Dean Howells whose masterpiece, *The Rise of Silas Lapham* (1885), studied the *nouveau riche*. Howells became interested

³³ Alfred Kazin, *On Native Grounds* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956), pp. 1-58.

in socialism, and took up the cause of social reform in his book, *A Hazard of New Fortunes* (1890). His *Criticism and Fiction* (1891) officially championed realism. Howells was a major influence on Hamlin Garland, Stephen Crane, Frank Norris, and Robert Herrick. Meanwhile a psychological realism was adding incisiveness to the novelists of manners, the most sensitive of whom was Henry James (1846-1916).

In Lynes' opinion, there were three major developments in popular taste in the post-Civil War period affecting interior decoration, architecture, and the appreciation of art, respectively. A disciple of William Morris, Eastlake brought about major changes in the conception of interior construction and decoration of living rooms, hallways, dining rooms, and bed rooms. The Queen Anne and Elizabethan cottage style of building came into conflict with and eventually surpassed Gothic. The Centennial Exposition at Philadelphia not only exposed millions of persons to art exhibition, but touched the relation between industry and the household arts.³⁴

The main features of Charles L. Eastlake's *Hints on Household Taste* (1872), which was the basis of a revolution in household furnishing, was the insistence that necessary structure should never be concealed by secondary forms of ornament. The essential function of furniture should be strong and comfortable. A chair or table, moreover, should be sincere; that is, put together with pegs and dowels rather than with nails and screws.³⁵

The new architecture—the so-called Queen Anne style—is described by Lynes as “a tossed salad of Elizabethan, Jacobean, and the style of Francis I, with the structural underpinnings of none of them.”³⁶ Its key features were sharply peaked roofs, second and third floor balconies, spindled verandas, stained glass windows, corner towers considered to be both “sincere” and “quaint.” To this were added the repercussions of the Centennial. Today, Lynes observes, critics look back on the Centennial Exhibition as an architectural and artistic calamity, which accumulated the bad taste of the Gilded Age.³⁷

³⁴ Lynes, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

Among the bizarre events of the gilded age was the construction of palatial private homes by its millionaires. When William H. Vanderbilt died in 1885, he left a fortune twice the size of the \$90,000,000 he had inherited from the Commodore. Of this George Washington Vanderbilt II received only \$10,000,000. His brother Cornelius II received \$67,000,000, and his brother William K. received \$65,000,000. However, George quickly put his fortune to what he felt was most responsible use, constructing the most palatial mansion erected in America and surpassing those of the families of the Astors, Goelets, and Belmonts.³⁸

For the construction of his massive limestone chateau (called the Biltmore), Vanderbilt secured the services of Frederick Law Olmstead, the designer of Central Park. To manage his forests he employed Gifford Pinchot, establishing the first experimental forest in America and employing more men than the Department of Agriculture at the time. Hundreds of employees worked the farms and forests, and lived in a village complete with a church and a hospital, providing a choir for Vanderbilt's private chapel. Biltmore is a massive structure of limestone based on the Chateau de Blois. Hundreds of artists were imported from France to lay the walls and apply the ornament. The cost was from \$3,000,000 to \$5,000,000.

Richard Morris Hunt became the architect of the post-Civil War millionaire palace builders. At that time millionaires were emerging across the land. The Potter Palmers made a fortune in real estate and hotel keeping in Chicago; in San Francisco the Crockers and Huntingtons had arisen on the swell of railroad fortunes. From railroads and real estate the Floods and Leland Stanfords had amassed fortunes. Social competition among these *nouveau riches* was intense with social standing determined by the magnificence of their houses, the richness of their paintings, tapestries, decorations, and the splendor of their entertainments. The most spectacular cluster of palaces, according to Lynes, was that at Newport, looked at by Bostonians as their very own until the New Yorkers (the Astors, Belmonts, and Vanderbilts) surpassed it in their summer homes. The mansions had massive *façades*, entrance halls several stories high, layers of balconies and

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

balustrades, carvings and wrought iron, chandeliers, sculptured nymphs, allegorical ceiling paintings, friezes, extensive use of white, pink, and green marble. Hunt gave his clients Moorish rooms, Byzantine rooms, palm courts, or Jacobean courts. He helped his clients select exotic birds which sang in oriental cages. "Hunt was the trusted darling of the New York rich. He was their taste and their sense of fitness."³⁹

THE ARTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

In 1890 the director of the census formally announced that the frontier was at an end. While there was no longer a frontier line, frontier conditions persisted in nuclei for fifteen to twenty years longer. There is no evidence that a frontier has ever produced any art other than literature. The fluidity of social relations, on the one hand, the rough and ready character of technology, are opposed to the standardization and perfection of forms required by an art. On the other hand, a frontier is often rich in colorful action and incident, forming a type of literary material though not a rounded literature. The greatest literary works of America in the nineteenth century, *Moby Dick* and *Huckleberry Finn*, had the frontiers of America (the midwest and the sea) for their material sources and scenes; they were most deficient in their capacity adequately to present woman. Women tend to be under-represented on the frontier, and those women who were available were of selective types. A radical distortion of social relations results. Thus, not even the literary arts ever reaches full development during a pioneering period.

By the end of the nineteenth century the country as a whole had crystalized into cities and rural villages, however, the national community was growing rapidly at the expense of both. Real estate speculators, railroad agents, and recruiters for the new mass industries cooperated in transplanting peasant masses from southern and eastern Europe, from the Orient and from Mexico. These were crowded into the cities, where they were often experienced by the prior residents as an alien invasion. Traditional laboring groups saw the standard of living of the imported foreign peasant masses as a threat to their own. This was a major component in

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

the formation of the American labor movement after the Civil War. In order to meet the growing national industry on its proper ground, labor was forced to organize on a national basis as well.

The small cities and rural villages of the midwest were embattled by the railroads, industrialists, and eastern financiers. This was a component in the formation of the new farm organizations and the agrarian agitation. In considerable measure the city and rural village were still intact at the end of the nineteenth century, but there was no doubt that the new national combinations of industry and commerce were tending to assume greater importance than local community forms. From the colonial period through the first three decades of the nineteenth century, America was a land of village communities and small towns; from the 1830's to the end of the nineteenth century, America was a land of growing towns and cities. The twentieth century is the age of the national community.

One of the most significant of all facts of about late nineteenth century American society was the ruthless consolidation of business and finance on a national scale by the "robber barons." So far as they were reflective and self-conscious, the robber barons quickly made the philosophy of Social Darwinism into an ideological self justification.⁴⁰

The naturalistic and propaganda novel arising after 1890 adapted itself in the form of celebration or protest to these themes of objectivity, naturalism, biological and economic determinism, and fatalism. Notable early writers of the school were Stephen Crane, Frank Norris, Robert Herrick and Jack London. Zola influenced Crane's *Maggie: A Girl of the Streets* (1893) and his *Red Badge of Courage* (1895) on the Civil War. Norris was fascinated by the disintegration of character under economic pressures. *The Octopus* (1901) studied the struggle between the Southern Pacific Railroad and the wheat growers. *The Pit* (1903) studied the Chicago grain market. Herrick's *Memories of an American Citizen* (1905) and *Waste* (1924) studied the problem of corruption. Social Darwinism and escape appear in relatively pure form in London's novels. David Graham Phillips' *The Great God Success* (1901) and *Susan Lenox* (1917)

⁴⁰ See Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1955).

exemplified the problems of slum life and political corruption. Upton Sinclair studied corruption and labor exploitation in a variety of institutions. Theodore Dreiser's naturalism and Darwinism appear in many of his works, but perhaps the most famous victim of his victims of social and biological forces was the hero of *An American Tragedy* (1925).

THE ARTS AFTER WORLD WARS I AND II

In contrast to the two other major wars of the United States, World War I did not rest in any considerable measure upon internal class and institutional tensions. To be sure, considerable hostility was directed at many German Americans, but this was hardly the equivalent of the clash between the loyalist and revolutionary strata of American society in the Revolution or the forces of the South and North in the Civil War. The real conflict in World War I and World War II was between America as a nation in league with its allies against other national groups. World Wars I and II thus have tended to tighten up national identifications and loyalties without the internal divisions that colored previous major conflicts. In both world wars the economy has been re-tooled at public expense, vast markets have been created for agricultural and industrial products. Both wars have been correlated with high levels of economic prosperity; both wars have bound national political and economic society into close-knit unities. Thus the wars welded the nation together and provided the occasion for the speedy rise of the United States to the position of the most highly industrialized economic power the world has ever seen.

After 1880 with the rise of national industry and the counter defensive activity by the agrarians and forces of labor, the problems of immigration have increasingly become a national problem. The nationalistic fervor accompanying World War I brought the problem into focus and led to the quota laws of 1921 and 1924. Americans were developing a conception of population balance and closure which, despite some modifications to accommodate to the needs of displaced persons, they were not willing to abandon. This was evident in the recurrence of a similar pattern of demands after World War II, expressed in the McCarran-Walter Act (1952) passed over President Truman's veto. It re-

tained the provisions of the 1924 Act on maximum immigration and the quota system, though removing the ban against Asian and Pacific peoples. Screening measures to keep out "subversives" were added. For good or ill, a national population closure was occurring; henceforth the various industrial needs for cheap labor that had formerly called the peasant masses from abroad would increasingly be met by internal migrations of Puerto Ricans, Southern Negroes, Mexican-Americans from the southwest, and perhaps eventually, by the movement of American Indians from the reservations.

The development of the national community has inevitably occurred in considerable measure at the expense of the rural and urban community. As various local forms of the community have been destroyed, there has been no guarantee that forces released in this destruction would automatically be taken up in the new community of the nation. This appears to have been one component in the cynicism of the disillusioned intellectuals and aesthetes of the Post-World War I years whom Gertrude Stein called "the lost generation." F. Scott Fitzgerald typified the cynicism and disillusion of the jazz age in *This Side of Paradise* (1920) and *The Great Gatsby* (1925). Sinclair Lewis directly reported small town pettiness, the dullness of the business men, and exposed corruption in the traditional professions.

Escape literature also appeared in the post-World War I generation. The most powerful writer of the generation was Ernest Hemingway who described an ex-patriot group in *The Sun Also Rises* (1926) and wrote the most powerful novel of the period, *A Farewell to Arms* (1929). To this period also belong Sherwood Anderson's naturalistic interpretation of American small town life, *Winesburg, Ohio* (1919), and Ring Lardner's sardonic humor.

The literature of the first three decades of the twentieth century records directly and indirectly the rise of national society and the destruction of the local society. The very fact that so many of the most able writers of the so-called "lost generation" were ex-patriots could perhaps be taken, not unfairly, as a direct product of the fact that while local forms of American community were being destroyed, the national community was too undeveloped to re-incorporate the pieces. The artists were like refugees from destroyed communities. During the same period new devel-

opments in the media of communication were beginning to carry out major transformations in the other arts. As Walter Benjamin pointed out, photography, the movies, sound recording, radio, and television were carrying out a revolution in the very meaning of the traditional arts.

That the same forces at work on the writers were manifest in the other artists appears in the 1900 to 1910 school of American painters. These painters were affected by such Europeans as Hals, Goya, Hogarth, and Daumier. They concentrated on homely incidents and characters. The rise of lithography and photography spelled the end of the use of painting for representational purposes from portraiture to historical painting. Moreover, all those groups that had supported painting in some measure because of its capacity to portray realistically and to record were to support of the photographer and movie maker. If painting was to survive as an art in the traditional sense, it had to be for other reasons. The reconstruction in modern art is traced by Rudi Blesh to the post-impressionists: Georges Seurat, Paul Gauguin, Vincent van Gogh, and Paul Cézanne.⁴¹

The camera spelled the death of the copyist art. Significantly, it was one of the pioneer camera men, Alfred Stieglitz, who brought over a group of Rodin's wash drawings of nudes and in 1907 began introduction of modern art to America.

The great event in the conversion of American taste toward receptivity to modern art was the now famous Armory Show opened at the 69th Regiment Armory in New York on February 17, 1913 by the Association of Painters and Sculptors under the guidance of Arthur B. Davies. The show exhibited the works of Ingres, Delacroix, Courbet, and the French Impressionists, but also included such post-Impressionists as Cézanne, Van Gogh, Seurat, and others; and cubist and abstractionist painters such as Picasso, Matisse, Duchamp, and Kandinsky. The show had a deep effect on art criticism and opened the way for the acceptance of a new kind of American painter.

The common property of the brisk turn-over of art styles was the search for a field for art outside the areas lost to art by the rise of photography. The great sensation of the Armory exposi-

⁴¹ Rudi Blesh, *Modern Art USA* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1956), p. 4.

tion was Marcel Duchamp's "Nude Descending a Staircase." The kind of abstract painting it represented completely set aside representational values and transformed the world of art to the chaste rendering of the formal values of a composition of lines and planes. Dadaism, on the other hand, which sprang up around 1915 and quickly attracted artists, writers, poets, and philosophers, accepted representation and meaningful values, but undertook the destruction of traditional art values. The leaders of American dadaism in New York were Duchamp and Picabia. In Rudi Blesh's words:

Even the ebullient futurists had not been so noisy; the Dadaists issued insulting manifestoes, staged demonstrations, disrupted public meetings and affairs, slaughtered 'good taste' with vulgarity. They were violent, witty, and destructive.

What the world saw in Dada was the mustache that Duchamp painted on a postcard of the Mona Lisa or five people dressed in stovepipes performing a dance; what the world heard was a scandalous sonata played on typewriters and pot covers, or three poets on a platform 'seriously' declaiming simultaneously their several original poems. Poems like that by Tristan Tzara, which repeated the word 'roar' one hundred and forty-seven times, then added the last line: 'who still considers himself very charming,' and Hugo Ball's 'sound poem';

gadji beri bimba
glandridi lauli lonni cadori
gadjama bim beri glassala
glandridi glassala tuffm i zimbrabim
blassa galassasa tuffm i zimbrabim. . . .

The poetic literature of Dada surely culminated in Kurt Schwitters's majestic ode. Schwitters recited the letter W once only, and then barked like a dog.⁴²

Eventually modern art found organized sponsorship in the Museum of Modern Art in New York, founded in 1929. In the first five years over 800,000 attended; in the next five years more than one million and a half visited the museum, and between 1944 and 1954 attendance was over five million.⁴³

The situation has also been radically transformed for American

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

music. By the twentieth century American music was coming under the domination of foreign born performers and leaders, and the stage was being set for the final emergence of the great orchestras, new and elaborate auditoriums, and performances equal to any in the world.⁴⁴ At the same time, the rise of the music recording industry, radio, the movies, and television was to present powerful industries toward which music would necessarily be oriented.⁴⁵

In 1900 the United States had only half a dozen orchestras of major importance. By 1950 the number had grown to thirty, supplemented by six hundred to a thousand secondary groups. An amazing growth of music in the public schools was brought about, with thousands of schools offering some form of musical instruction. Investigations of the American folk song began. There is little doubt that the rise of jazz, on the one hand, and the researches into the American folk song on the other, were in part related to the strong American sense of a lack of roots as the national community carried out the destruction of local community forms. Among the pioneers of ragtime were Scot Jolpin (1869-1917) who to his dying day believed that his syncopated compositions could be favorably compared to European classical music.⁴⁶ The Dixie Jazz Band of New Orleans opened at Reisenweber's Cabaret in Chicago in 1917. Jazz was reported in New York by *Variety* in February of the same year. Major events in its rise to popularity were Paul Whiteman's concert at Aeolian Hall, New York, in 1924, featuring George Gershwin's (1898-1938) "Rhapsody in Blue."

The collection of folk songs began with Negro spirituals as early as the 1850's and 1860's,⁴⁷ but the major interest in the twentieth century came with the issue by John Lomax of his first volume of cowboy songs in 1910. Cecil Sharp made a collection of Appalachian ballads before 1920. Increasing numbers of collections of folk songs were made—to such an extent that Charles Haywood's *Bibliography of American Folklore and Folksong* ran to 1292 pages. Among the major types are Negro music, Anglo-

⁴⁴ Howard and Bellows, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

⁴⁵ See Paul S. Carpenter, *Music: An Art and a Business* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1950).

⁴⁶ Howard and Bellows, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 312 ff.

American folk music, Appalachian mountain ballads, cowboy songs, lumberjack songs, and Creole songs. There are also bodies of French-Canadian and Hungarian folk songs in America, as well as Spanish folk songs in California and the Southwest.

Among the major musical conservatories established in the twentieth century there are the Institute of Musical Art (1905) under Frank Damrosch and financed by a \$500,000 bequest, the George Eastman School of Music (1918), and the Juilliard Graduate School of Music, established in 1924 with an endowment of \$19,000,000. Increasing numbers of operas have been written by American composers, and there have been increasing numbers of performances of works by American composers.

Counteracting these promising trends is the phenomenal growth and commercial success of the music business. Before World War I, art and business lived on opposite sides of the tracks. Since then, however, the power complexes of the radio industry, motion picture industry, and recording industry are impoverishing the musical life of the regions. A great many of our potential performers and composers are transformed into passive listeners. "With a single metropolis as the directing center of all manufacturing, merchandizing, industry, agriculture, education, artistic activity, and entertainment, regional initiative could be effectively starved out and the citizens of the regions could be reduced to a peonage."⁴⁸ In Carpenter's view, radio has grown into a centralized bureaucracy which "envelops and controls American musicians. . . . They are being absorbed into the apparatus of radio's machine shops, where individual characteristics are dissolved into mass programs and artistic efforts are valued only for what they sell. Music is the call boy of a gigantic peddler who controls the inconsidered trifles in his musical pack."⁴⁹ TV is rapidly replacing radio.

Creative ability, is essential to success, but it is only one essential. The basis of daily musical writing is informed eclecticism. The score must be written in two or three weeks between the sneak preview and the deadline for the finished music. The writer for the movies "has a practical knowledge of the entire standard music literature and a working knowledge of orchestra-

⁴⁸ Carpenter, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

tion sufficient to his special requirements of reproducing, quickly and authoritatively, with any given material, the orchestral style of any well known composer, from Beethoven to Stavinsky, and for the earliest ragtime to Gershwin and Robert Russell Bennet." ⁵⁰

The music recording industry is dominated by commercial considerations. From the beginning, record manufacturers built up large popular markets for recordings by celebrity artists. Serious American music fills a minute place in the catalogues of record companies. "In popular music and jazz the Big Business of Music in America, astute business management has made the popular song the most profitable musical property in the world. Some 4,000,000 records of the Missouri Waltz have been sold, 500,000 since Mr. Truman became president." ⁵¹

Carpenter reports that Bing Crosby is a corporation, and Dinah Shore has a business staff which has run the yearly sales of her records into millions. A number of composers have their own publishing and promotion enterprises. Most successful composers of popular music are members of the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers and the Music Publishers Protective Association. Some of the leading dance bands have become the highest paid musical organizations in the world with earnings running concurrently from personal appearances, radio, motion pictures, records, and television. While hundreds of new songs and dance tunes are placed on sale every week, serious music languishes for lack of opportunity to be heard by the public. In Carpenter's opinion, "our popular music is a cheap brand of trade goods which merits no more attention than do the radio hucksters, instinctively employing vulgar music as a prelude to vulgar salesmanship." ⁵² Moreover, he believes a vast gap has come to separate art music from popular music. The serious composer has been driven away from writing music for the people by "his identification of popular music with cheapness, tawdriness, and vulgarity."

The developments of the new commercial art forms have also had a fundamental influence on the theatre. After 1880, paralleling the appearance of realism in literature and painting, there was

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 206.

a notable realism in the theatre manifest in William Gillette's study of the Civil War, *Secret Service* (1895), William Vaughan Moody's *Great Divide* (1906), and Langdon Mitchell's critical examination of marriage in *The New York Idea* (1906). After 1900 the little theatre movement got under way with the establishment of the Hull House Players in Chicago, G. P. Baker's 47 Workshop at Harvard, and others.

A major development in the twentieth century theatre was the rise of the musical. The first long-run musical extravaganza was *The Black Crook* (1866) by Florenz Ziegfeld. The musical comedy with its combination of opera, comedy, and ballet began to develop in the early 1900's. Important events in its emergence were the work of Jerome Kern in *Show Boat* (1928). George and Ira Gershwin, Cole Porter, Richard Rogers and Moss Hart also helped shape its form. George S. Kaufman's *Of Thee I Sing* (1931) was a major success. Another striking success (1943) was *Oklahoma* by Richard Rogers (1902-) and Oscar Hammerstein II (1895-) followed by their *South Pacific* (1947). An important innovation was the introduction by Agnes de Mille of ballet sequences in such productions as *Oklahoma*, *Carousel* (1945), and *Brigadoon* (1947).

The most notable playwright of the twentieth century was Eugene O'Neill. The first production of the Theatre Guild was Jacinto Benavente's *The Bonds of Interest*. The Guild realized the level of the American theatre and scored successes in the 1920's with *Porgy*, Shaw's *St. Joan*, and O'Neill's *Strange Interlude*. During the depression and World War II the American theatre turned to themes of propaganda and social criticism. Outstanding works were written by Clifford Odets, Lillian Hellman, and Robert E. Sherwood. At the mid-century, notable playwrights include Tennessee Williams and Arthur Miller.

In the face of the competition with the motion pictures, radio, and television, however, the legitimate theatre has tended to decline. There were 68 legitimate theatres in New York City in 1928; they dropped to 36 in 1940, and to 32 a decade later.

The first commercially exhibited motion picture was at Koster and Bial's music hall in New York in 1896. *Cinderella* was the first film to use artificially arranged scenes in progressive continuity (1900). By 1905 an early movie house had been estab-

lished in Pittsburgh; by 1908 from 8,000 to 10,000 were in operation. Between 1909 and 1935 consolidation and the formation of trusts characterized the industry. By 1913 the trust had made Hollywood the center of the industry. The Famous Players Films Co. (later Paramount) was organized in 1912, and introduced "block booking." Loew's (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1912) was organized in 1920, Warner Brothers in 1923, Columbia in 1924, Radio-Keith Orpheum in 1928. Twentieth Century Fox was the last of the combines (1935).⁵³

By 1930 it had already been demonstrated that the situation of the arts had been permanently transformed. The movies and radio were bringing about a vast liquidation of traditional culture, corresponding to the destruction of local community forms by the national community. At this time there was a radical demonstration of the fact that the communal destinies of contemporary man were national, rather than civic and local. The great depression of the 1930's proved that in contrast to previous panics and depression in America, the organization of the national community had gone so far that it was not possible any longer to permit the rural and urban communities to pick up the pieces once a crisis developed.

Nothing could have more completely demonstrated the importance of the new national community, for the arts as well as other areas of life than the fact that the federal government undertook the task of extending assistance to American writers and artists. In 1935 the WPA-Federal Art Project was organized. The first federal aid for art came in 1934 with the PWAP (Public Works of Art Project) which lasted six months. In 1935 the WPA Art Project came into being, and was operated until 1943. Some community art centers established by it are still functioning. Holger Cahill, who had been temporary director of the Museum of Modern Art, actively promoted collection of folk art. In the opinion of Rudi Blesh, "One branch of the many branches of Works Progress Administration—the art subsidiary—will stand as

⁵³ For interesting treatments of the movies and other of the commercial arts including radio, TV, and the comics, see Leo C. Rosten, *Hollywood, the Movie Colony, the Movie Makers* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1941); Gilbert Seldes, *The Great Audience* (New York: The Viking Press, 1951) and *The Public Arts* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956); Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White, *Mass Culture* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957).

the most salutary thing that ever happened to the American artist and American art.”⁵⁴ Howard and Bellows assign a similar importance to the operations of the WPA for music.⁵⁵ Over 10,000 musicians had been employed by the end of the 1930's. Programs and performances were planned for schools, hospitals, and tax-supported institutions. Men were placed in bands, orchestras, dance bands, choral and operatic units in forty-three states and the District of Columbia. Lending libraries were established, and folk songs were collected. Music, like art, was employed therapeutically in hospitals, and instruction was given in rural areas as well as in congested cities. Similar types of assistance were given to actors and to writers.

SUMMARY

In the United States the situation for the development of the arts was presented by a plurality of community forms, the frontier, the extensive and varied immigrations of the nineteenth century, and the industrial revolution of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. All these great transformations have come with too much speed to permit more than the beginnings of a distinctive artistic development in the United States. With the emergence of the national community in the twentieth century, the destruction of local community forms, the aggregation of artistic talent from all parts of the world, the phenomenal growth of the mass arts, and the commercial art industries (record-making, radio, movies, comic strips, and television), the United States may be on the threshold of a new and distinctive development of the arts. There is little doubt that there has been a vast liquidation of traditional art values. Many students see in architecture the greatest hope for the arts in our time.

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⁵⁴ Blesch, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

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QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. How do you account for the high development of literature in New England prior to the Civil War?
2. Aesthetic judgments in America frequently tend to take the form of moral judgments. How do you account for this? Illustrate your answer.
3. Peter Viereck has stated: "Since 1913, new aesthetic movements have been outmoding each other so fast that nobody can be sure whether he is radical or reactionary." Do you agree? Why?
4. Sculley Bradley has stated:
 There was . . . something healthy and self-respecting in the effort, from 1910 onward, to establish the artist as a willing participant in the new world of the machine; and in the fresh will to make use of new materials, new processes, new images, new rhythms; Duchamps' brilliant anticipation of stroboscopic photography in his painting of a Nude Descending a Staircase, Brancusi's transposition of a bird in flight into a smoothly sinuous metal abstraction, Leger's conversion of the human body and other organic forms into cylinders and pistons, Gabo's translation of the exquisite materials and processes of modern

technology into symbolic sculptures of metal, glass, and plastic, even the chaste if absurdly empty abstractions of Mondrain. . . .

What does this tell you about the arts in the twentieth century? Explain.

5. Some thinkers have maintained that modern architecture is the most progressive of the arts. Do you agree? Justify your answer.
6. In what ways is the situation of the arts in the United States parallel that of play?
7. What influence did Puritanism have on taste in America?
8. What did Kouwenhoven mean by the vernacular tradition in the American arts?
9. What was Tocqueville's theory of the influence of democracy on the arts?
10. Discuss the proposition that taste-making is a major industry in America essential to the operation of American capitalism.

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